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This thesis is a study of the distribution of competences between the main actors 
in European integration:  namely the European Community and the Member States.  It 
aims to evaluate the place of the competence provisions in the current Treaty structure as 
well as within the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europ^JThis task first involves 
a  legal-technical  exercise  based  on  a  textual  interpretation  of different  categories  of 
competences within the above-mentioned sources. Second, it involves a review of the 
relevant Court of Justice case law with regard to those competences. The study of both 
has led the author to consider how the evolution of Community competence has given 
rise to the phenomenon of ‘competence’ creep’. It is argued that Member States contend 
that  the  Community  assumes  more  powers  than  those  it  possesses.  Thus,  the  thesis 
provides  an  insight  into  concerns  about  ‘creeping  competence’.  Certain  types  of 
situations  are  identified  under  the  title  of  ‘creeping  competence’.  These  include,  the 
adoption of unjustified or undesired EC legislation under qualified majority voting; the 
expansion  of  the  Community’s  competence  under  Article  308  EC  and  finally  the 
adoption  of EC  legislation  that  goes  beyond the  scope of Article  5  EC  (principle  of 
attribution  of  powers).  The  thesis  will  provide  certain  examples  to  underline  the 
problem. It will take account of the use of the flexibility provisions of Article 95 EC and 
308 EC with regard to the regulation of health and the Community’s accession to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which are treated as case studies in the 
thesis.
In the context of a problematic system of competences, the author will consider 
the assumptions made in the Nice and Laeken IGCs as well as the European Convention
1   The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe or EU Constitutional Treaty has been ratified by 
thirteen Member States (See http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm)for  a  clearer  distribution  of  competence  and  assess  the  role  of  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity as a tool against the expansion of Community competence into new policy 
areas. It is argued that the reform of subsidiarity will enhance EU legitimacy and enlarge 
the  role  of  national  legislatures  in  the  Union.  The  reconstruction  of  subsidiarity 
procedures may remedy the tensions in the current system of competence and provide 
limits to the degree of EU intervention. Besides tidying up competences between the EU 
and Member States, European Constitutionalisation hides a question of political finality 
and  further  integration.  How  can  the  EU  establish  an  effective  and  democratically 
legitimate governance beyond the Nation State? Via a European Constitution or through 
alternative  methods?  This  question  is  particularly  important  in  the  current  context 
following the French and Dutch rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty. The chances 
of the EU Constitution being revived in the near future are slim, since it is unlikely that 
either France or Holland will soon hold another referendum.  Thus,  either a period of 
reflection shall be allowed to Member States or alternative routes to integration shall be 
considered.  The  thesis  concludes  with  the  hypothesis  that  as  the  EU  Constitutional 
Treaty does not provide the answers to most of the questions posed by the Nice and the 
Laeken European Councils, enhanced cooperation may be utilised as a future method of 
governance  and  Fischer’s  ‘Core  Europe’  as  a  tool  capable  of  a  redistribution  of 
competences inside the Union. But then again the European Union needs to avoid a new 
iron curtain descending between those Member States that represent the ‘core’ and those 
that constitute the ‘periphery’.THESIS INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to cast light on the path towards a more efficient distribution 
of competences  between  the  main  actors  in  European  integration:  namely  the European 
Community and the Member States. The aim is to evaluate the place of the competence 
provisions  in  the  current  Treaty  structure  as  well  as  within  the  Treaty  Establishing  a 
Constitution  for  Europe1 .  This  thesis  argues  that  the  vertical  relationship  between  the 
Community and the Member States should be preserved through the exercise of different 
levels of competences.
Before entering into a detailed discussion of the different categories of competences, 
Chapter  1   introduces  the  question  of  institutional  balance  and  horizontal  relationship 
between the Community Institutions as a point of reference in measuring the way a Member 
State influences  Community decisions.  It  will  provide  an  intra-institutional  insight  on  a 
search for a possible Community equivalence of the three levels of democratic governance 
characterising nation states (the legislative, executive and judiciary). Discovering whether 
these elements exist within the EC may lead one to determine whether the Community acts 
as  a  federal  state.  Thus,  the  notion  of  ‘power’  within  the  Member  States  is  not  only 
synonymous  with  their  external  capacity  of  developing  constitutional  defences  as  a 
mechanism of maintaining their national sovereign values. It owes also to the less visible 
internal influence of supranational decisions by being able, for instance, to make or break a 
winning coalition  in  the  Council  of Ministers.  The  Chapter contends  that the  horizontal 
division  of  competences  within  the  Community,  along  with  the  principle  of  EC  law
1   [CIG  87/2/04]  Signed  by  the Representatives  of the  Governments  of the Member  States  [October  29, 
2004). Referred as EU Constitutional Treaty hereafter.supremacy  as  established by  the  Court  of Justice,  constitute  the  site  where  the  vertical 
division of competences operates.
The  main  analysis  in  the  thesis  however  focuses  on  the  gradual  evolution  and 
exercise of Community competences through the successive Treaty amendments over the 
last  fifty  years.  This  evolution,  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  reflects  the  changing  role  of a 
Community  that  has  evolved  economically,  socially  and  politically.  Particularly, 
additional powers to act to ensure the functioning of the internal market were granted to the 
Community  by  means  of  introducing  qualified  majority  voting  to  Article  95  EC. 
Additionally, the attainment of a Community objective in the course of the operation of the 
common market has during the years of treaty amendments necessitated the use of Article 
308  EC  as  a  ‘catch  all*  provision  (when there is insufficient textual  basis for the EC to 
legislate) that although residual this power has proved wide ranging. Finally this chapter will 
put EC competences into the current context of European constitutionalisation by presenting 
the approach of the Laeken European Council and the European Convention in relation to 
internal EU competences and briefly examining how these appear as a whole in the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Despite the crisis inspired by the double rejection of 
the EU Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referendums, the text itself represents 
a product of a long political  compromise between the heads of state  and government of 
Europe. As such, it makes a significant contribution to the broader debate about a balanced 
delimitation of competences in the Community.  However, it does not constitute the only 
source  of  ideas  for  this  thesis.  Thus,  although  the  outcome  of  the  French  and  Dutch 
referendums is important, this thesis does not rely upon the events prior to the ratification of 
the EU Constitutional Treaty but is rather informed by them.
2The  evolution  of Community competences  has given rise to  the phenomenon  of 
‘competence creep’, where the Member States contend that the Community assumes more 
powers  than  those  it  possesses.  The  author  uses  a  particular  conception  of  the  term 
‘competences’. Competences will therefore be divided into Subject-Related, considered in 
Chapter 3 and Objective-Related, examined in Chapter 4. These categories draw their titles 
from  their  subject  matter  (exclusive,  shared  and  complementary  competences)  or  their 
internal market objective (the flexibility provisions of Article 95 and 308 EC with regard to 
the  regulation  of  health  and  EC  accession  to  the  ECHR).  As  regards  Subject-Related 
competences, while it is clear that any action taken by the Community must have a legal
basis either in the Treat^orSecondary legislationand^that certain Treaty provisions address 
the extent of that power, there is no clear substantive division of powers in the EC or EU 
Treaty. The problem of a clear delimitation of internal Community competences lies in the 
fact that those competences  attributed to the supranational cannot be regarded separately 
from those attached to the intergovernmental arena. Instead, competence in Community law 
is  based  on  an  interplay  between  the  two  levels.  With  reference  to  Objective-Related 
competence, the Court has restricted the conditions under which the EC Institutions might 
rely upon Article 95 EC, especially as a way of overcoming restrictions on EC competence 
in  fields  other  than  the  internal  market.  Similarly,  the  Court  has  recognised  that  new 
Community competences can only be launched through valid legal instruments. Article 308 
EC constitutes such an instrument with the exception of instances when its use would entail 
a substantial change in the present Community system, such as the entry of the Community 
into a distinct international institutional system.
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3The  trend  to  change  the  current  system  of  competence  division  between  the 
Community  and  the  Member  States  in  order  to  introduce  a  clearer  classification  is  a 
persistent issue throughout  the thesis.  Chapter 4  in particular,  analyses  the  work  of the 
Convention on  the Future of Europe and the relevant competence provisions of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty towards this end. The arguments as to the allocation of competence 
and competence creep are strengthened by a clear treatment of the concept of subsidiarity. 
Chapter 6  provides  an  insight into  subsidiarity,  as  a principle  that  aims  to regulate  the 
exercise and not the existence of Community competences. The Member States’ demand for 
an accurate monitoring of subsidiarity is manifested within the EU Constitutional Treaty, 
which provides for National Parliaments to adopt a monitoring role in EU legislation. The 
so-called ‘early-warning system’ has a dual purpose. First it aims to promote the principle of 
subsidiarity  compliance  and  second,  to  enhance  the  Union’s  democratic  legitimacy  by 
giving national parliaments a direct role in EU politics for the first time. The Chapter poses 
the question as to whether this early warning system is enough to guarantee EC compliance 
with  subsidiarity  or  more  efficient  monitoring  devices  are  necessary.  Ultimately,  it 
emphasises the importance of effective judicial subsidiarity checks not only ex post but also 
ex ante, when EC legislation is prepared as a proposal by the Commission.
Conclusively, Chapter 7 will consider the role of enhanced cooperation as a flexible 
mechanism to accommodate diversity when certain Member States are unwilling or unable 
to  participate  in  the  Union’s  policy  developments.  This  is  particularly  important in  the 
current context following the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. The 
chances of the EU Constitution being revived in the near future are slim, since it is unlikely 
that either France or Holland will  soon hold another referendum. Thus, either a period of
4reflection shall be allowed to Member States  or alternative routes to integration  shall be 
considered.  Yet, the extent to which European  integration can proceed by rules that are 
made by and apply to a small number of Member States brings competence issues to the 
fore, especially as enhanced cooperation  would cover a larger part of the Union’s policy 
areas  in  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty.  The  author  concludes  by  making  a  comparison 
between enhanced cooperation as a method of governance and Fischer’s ‘Core Europe’  as 
tools capable of a redistribution of competence inside the Union.  The exclusivity  of the 
proposal for a ‘Core Europe’, albeit temporary, is sufficient to lift up the weaker and less 
demanding  idea  of  Communitarian  enhanced  cooperation.  Yet  as  the  Communitarian 
approach has historically failed to lead to a settlement, since Member States tend to identify 
more with the concept of national competence / sovereignty than European integration, the 
Franco-German relationship can emerge as a close association based on the shared belief 
that there is something over and above the interests of the nation state.
The  research  question  raised  at  the  beginning  of this  introductory  chapter  with 
regard to the level of efficiency of competence delimitation in the current EC Treaty and the 
draft EU Constitution has led the author to make the following assumptions.  Being a sui 
generis entity, the EC / EU cannot in practical terms utilise the same formulas that have 
shaped power relationships within the nation states to divide competences. The study of the 
evolution  of  Community  competence  confirms  that  neither  can  the  delimitation  of 
competences between the EC / EU and the Member States be solved once and for all. The 
evaluation of the flexibility provisions of Article 95 and 308 EC as well as the principle of 
subsidiarity prove that flexibility and change in the tasks of the two actors must be taken 
into account. The study of the relevant provisions of the EU Constitutional Treaty suggests
5that it is possible to establish a much clearer definition and codification of competences, but 
this will not stop conflicts between subsidiarity on the one hand and the need for integration 
on the other. Finally, the author suggests that the need of certain Member States for further 
integration may exploit the example of ‘enhanced cooperation’ as a model to engage into a 
more selective partnership agreement, a hard core Europe operating beyond the control of 
the majority of Member States.
6CHAPTER 1
THE BACKGROUND TO THE VERTICAL DELIMITATION OF 
COMMUNITY COMPETENCES
Introductory note
Since the founding of the European Economic Community the approach taken in 
relation the vertical  division  of competences between the two main  actors, namely the 
Community  and  the  Member  States,  has  considerably  changed.  The  Community  has 
evolved in a legal / political creature and this has an impact upon three issues: First, the 
distinctive  features  of  democratic  governance  that  mark  the  separation  of  powers  at 
national level (executive; legislative and judiciary) have been steadily developed at EC 
level.  This  obviously  affects  the  way  powers  are  distributed  horizontally.  Since  these 
different functions  were not initially designed for a supranational organism such as the 
EC, they are based upon an intra-Institutional interplay rather than a separation of powers 
per se. Second, the development of a horizontal tripartite level of governance among the 
Institutions has contributed towards a relevant vertical evolution to define the relationship 
between the EC and the Member States.
Third,  the  EC,  not  possessing  a  higher  norm  such  as  a  written  Constitution, 
allowed the Court to constitutionalise (through its decisions) the Treaties establishing the 
concept of supremacy of EC law. Subsequent Treaty revisions extended the ambit of EC 
competences  through  relevant  provisions,  manipulated  by  the  proactive  Court  to 
Communitarise national practices. In such a climate, Member States - alarmed as to the 
Court’s  expansive  interpretation  of  EC  law  -  have  been  eager  to  balance  EC  law 
supremacy  with  national  sovereignty  and  to  retain  control  over  the  way  powers  aredistributed horizontally between the EC Institutions. This is to ensure a chain reaction in 
the manner powers are divided vertically between the former and the latter. Nevertheless, 
the  recognition  of  precedence  of  EC  law  over  national  law  has  not  brought  the 
supranational and intergovernmental elements of the Union to different ends. Certainly, 
the capacity for unilateral decision-making in areas of Community law has been removed 
from individual states but still ultimate sovereignty rests in them and has not been totally 
transferred to the EC1 . Besides, sovereign intergovernmental bodies are still competent to 
make decisions that are implemented by national governments and enforced by national 
courts reserving also key policy areas such as defence. On the other hand, through their 
accession to the Community the Member States have recognised that the Treaty forms an 
inherent part of their national legal  heritage2.  They  assist the Court in its  enforcement 
through ensuring its uniform implementation3.
The  method  under  which  powers  are  allocated  horizontally  between  the 
Community Institutions, although at first glance may be regarded as irrelevant to the way 
powers  are  divided  vertically between the  Community  vis-a-vis  the  Member States,  is 
vital in the debate concerning a clear vertical distribution of internal competences within 
the EU. The national recognition of the supremacy of EC law has placed restrictions on 
Member States’  ability to act independently and on their own initiative contrary to their
1   See  Lord  Denning’s  speech  in  Case  129/79  Macarthys  Ltd v  Smith  [1980]  ECR  1275  “if Parliament 
deliberately passes an Act' contrary to the EC Treaties, it would be the duty of the UK courts to follow the 
Act”
2 The European Communities Act  1972, adopted by the UK showing a dualist approach in its reception of 
EC  law,  is  a  Constitutional  Statute  and  as  such  cannot  be  ‘impliedly  repealed’  by  a  new  statute.  See 
Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QBD 151
3 “A national court.. .is under a duty to give full effect to [Community law], if necessary refusing.. .to apply 
any conflicting provision of nation legislation....” Case 35/76 Simmenthal v Commission [1980]  1  CMLR 
25; See also Lord Bridge’s speech in R v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p Factortame (No.2)  [1991] 
AC 603obligations arising from the Treaty4. Therefore, the more they retain power over the EC 
Institutions the more they are likely to control the delimitation of competences at vertical 
level. Thus, the notion of ‘power’ within the Member States is not only synonymous with 
their  external  capacity  of  developing  constitutional  defences  as  a  mechanism  of 
maintaining  their  national  sovereign  values.  It  owes  also  to  the  less  visible  internal 
influence  of supranational  decisions  by  being  able,  for  instance,  to  make  or  break  a 
winning coalition in the Council of Ministers.
The  first  part  of  the  chapter  will  attempt  to  identify  the  ways  in  which  EC 
Institutions resemble national-level institutions. This requires an intra-institutional insight 
on  a  search  for  a  possible  Community  equivalence  of the  three  levels  of democratic 
governance  characterising  nation  states  (the  legislative,  executive  and  judiciary). 
Discovering  whether  these  elements  exist  within  the  EC  may  lead  one  to  determine 
whether the Community  acts as a federal  state.  One can  also observe whether national 
influence over the EC legislation would have the same effect as within the Member States 
where legislative power is vested in a single body, the Parliament.  Following a degree of 
continuity, the second part of the chapter will provide an insight to the supreme nature of 
EC law through the Court’s expansive interpretation, identifying therefore the extent of 
national competence / sovereignty that has been surrendered. The issues involved in this 
chapter  serve  therefore  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  national  membership  in  the 
Community is more than a process of cooperation resulting in a partial or total shift of
4 Case 26/62  Van  Gend En Loos  [1963] ECR  1; Case 6/64  Costa v ENEL [1964]  ECR 585;  Case 35/76 
Simmenthal  v  Commission  [1980]  1  CMLR  25;  See  also  Case  11/70 Internationale  Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH v Einfuhr - und  Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange I)  [1970]  ECR  1125  “the law 
stemming  from  the  Treaty...cannot...be  overridden  by  rules  of  national  law....[T]he  validity  of  a 
Community  measure  or  its  effect  within  a  Member  State  cannot  be  affected  by  allegations  that  it  runs 
counter  to  either  fundamental  rights  [in]...the  constitution  of  the  State  or  the  principles  of  a  national 
constitutional structure.”
9constitutional  authority from  the  Member  States  to  a sui generis  autonomous  level  of 
organisation possessing powers of coercion independent from the state.
A.  THE HORIZONTAL DIVISION OF COMPETENCES IN THE
COMMUNITY
Setting the scene
...the  necessity  of  maintaining  the  so-called  “separation  of  powers”
(,separation  des  pouvoirs),  or,  in  other  words,  of  preventing  the 
government,  the legislature,  and the  Courts from encroaching upon  one 
another's province.5
The manner competences are allocated horizontally in the Community, as a multi­
layered  system  of  governance  is  difficult  to  compare  against  the  relevant  structures 
existing within a nation state pointing to a clear separation of powers. An open translation 
of Article 16 of the French  "Declaration des droits de I’homme et du citoyen” of 17896, 
to which the current Fifth Constitution of 1958 commits itself7, affirms that “a society in 
which  the  guarantee  of  rights  is  not  assured,  nor  the  separation  of  the  capacities 
determined,  does  not  have  a  Constitution.”8   On  the  other  hand,  The  German 
“Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutchland”  (Basic  Law)  of  1949  establishes  in 
Article 20  (2) that “all  state authority emanates from the people.  It is exercised by the 
people by means  of elections  and voting and by  specific  organs  of the legislature,  the
5  See Dicey, A.V., “Introduction to the Study of the Constitution” (1885) in Marshall, G., & Moodie, G., 
“Some Problems of the Constitution”, Hutchinson, 5th  Edition, London, (1971)
6  ‘D6claration des Droits de l'homme et du citoyen du 26 aout  1789’  (Declaration of the Rights of Man) 
available at www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/textes/dl789.htm
7  ‘Constitution De  1958, publiee au JO du 5 octobre  1958’, p. 9151,  esp.  Preambule,  available online at 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/textes/constit.htm#Preambule
Q
“Toute  Societe  dans  laquelle  la  garantie  des  Droits  n'est pas  assuree,  ni  la  separation  des  Pouvoirs 
determinee, n'a point de Constitution. ”
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10executive  power  and  the judiciary.”9  Even  in  the  British  ‘unwritten  Constitution’  the 
principle  of  separation  of  powers  exists.  This  corresponds  to  an  artificial  separation 
between the executive, largely assigned to the Ministers of the Government, and perhaps 
to  the  civil  service  and  the  police.  The  ‘Sovereign’  Parliament  as  a  whole  forms  the 
legislature, while the role of the judiciary is taken by the courts, and to a certain extent by 
tribunals.
An  express  statement  of the  principle  of separation  of powers  does  not  exist
within the EC Treaty or in the Court’s teleological interpretations1 0 . Yet, the lack of an
equivalent to an  allocation  of nation  state power in the Community may not prompt a 
conscious or unconscious association / comparison of the Community’s horizontal power 
division with the traditional separation of powers in the Member States. This in its turn 
could create a case for popular misconceptions regarding the current and future fashion 
under which competences  are vertically divided.  Before illustrating the reasons behind 
such  a  potential  fallacy  based  upon  a  wrong  impression  -   that  the  Union  is  more 
competent  than  the  Member States1 1   - it  would be  wise  to provide  a  synopsis  of the
9  ‘Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutchland’, Vom 23.  Mai  1949  (BGB1.S.1), Available online at 
http://www.bundestag.de/gesetze/gg/:  Artikel  11-20  (2)  “Alle  Staatsgewalt geht  vom  Volke aus.  Sie  wird 
vom  Volke  in  Wahlen  und  Abstimmungen  und  durch  besondere  Organe  der  Gesetzgebung,  der 
vollziehenden Gewalt und der Rechtsprechung ausgeubt. ” According to Article 79 (3) of the ‘Grundgesetz’ 
the principle of separation  of powers  cannot be amended:  “Eine Anderung  dieses  Grundgesetzes,  durch 
welche...der Gesetzgebung oder die in den Artikeln  1  und 20 niedergelegten Grundsatze beruhrt werden, 
ist  unzuldssig. ’’(trans:  An  amendment  of this  Basic  Law  affecting....the  basic  principles  laid  down  in 
Articles 1 and 20, is inadmissible)
See Currie, D., “Separation of Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany” (1993) 41  American Journal 
of Comparative Law 201
10 See Joined Cases 188-190/80, France, Italy & UK v. Commission, [1982] ECR 2545, 2573
1 1   See  Maduro,  M.P.,  “We  The  Court:  The  European  Court  of  Justice  and  the  European  Economic 
Constitution”,  Hart,  (1998).  The author here presents one side to the shaping of the European Economic 
Constitution,  namely  the Court’s case law on Article 28  EC.  The  vagueness of the concept of measures 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions has left the Court sufficient space for manoeuvre,  making therefore 
the degree of integration it sought to achieve ambiguous. Although the prohibition of Article 28 EC was a 
Treaty obligation its application by the Court raised up questions about whether it aimed to merely remove 
national protectionist measures or establish a Community based on a neo-liberal economic model.
11horizontal division of competences as they presently appear in the Community. This will 
assist  one  to  appreciate  first  that  the  Community’s  institutional  arrangements  differ 
substantially  from  those  of  the  Member  States  and  second  that,  as  with  vertical 
competences,  there is  no clear-cut separation of horizontal powers per se but rather an 
interaction between the Union’s organs.
The  basis  for  the  division  of  competences  within  the  Union  as  set  down  in 
Articles  5  TEU  and 7  EC  is  not static  in  character.  On the contrary,  there is  a rather 
pluralistic and flexible interplay of authority between EU institutions. This has much to 
do with the way competences are allocated as  a result of the pillarised structure of the 
Union after the Maastricht renovations1 2 . According to the latter, depending on the pillar 
that these powers are exercised they vary in nature being at times more supranational in 
character  and  less  intergovernmental  (especially  when  they  concern  Pillar  I  issues: 
European  Community)  and  vice  versa  (in  relation  to  Pillars  II:  Common  Foreign  and 
Security Policy and III: Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters). Although 
different in nature to the nation state, one should be cautious about reaching the other end 
claiming that there is no connection whatsoever between the assignment of functions as 
they appear in the Union and the classic governmental functions as shared by the Member 
States’  institutions.  The three elements that bind together modem democracies  are also 
apparent  within  the  Union  as  a  democratic  system  of  governance.  These  are:  i)  the 
legislative,  ii)  the  executive  and  iii)  the judicial  power.  What  differs  in  the  Union  as 
compared to the nation state is the way these are distributed between the EU organs since
12  See  the  ‘single  institutional  framework’  as  established  by  Article  3  TEU;  also  Hartley,  T.C., 
“Constitutional  and  Institutional  Aspects  of  the  Maastricht  Agreeement”  (1993)  42  International  & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 213
12no power is exclusively vested in  any one of its political institutions but still there are 
many parallels to be made between the two.
1.  The Legislative: A Shared Power
In view of the fact that the EC is not a state in the sense European citizens are 
familiar with,  the people’s  will  has been preserved  and  upheld by the  Council,  which 
constitutes in a way the Community’s equivalent of national parliaments being composed
of national representatives. This collective representation of national parliamentarians in 
the Council is a good indication that EC legislation and governance is not about a pure 
surrender  of  national  sovereignty  from  the  intergovernmental  structures  to  the 
supranational.  It is rather about a joint or collective exercise of power, which aims at a 
closer  integration  without  distorting  national  interests,  but  through  reaching  a 
compromise in such a way that powers are harmoniously distributed and exercised within 
the EU.
The  delimitation  of  competences  within  Community  decision-making  was 
initially developed towards the preservation of national interests by the Member States. 
However, the deepening of European integration, especially during the period of market 
building  succeeding the  Single European Act  (1986) gradually publicised the  aim  of a 
more balanced even supranational approach to legislation. Nevertheless, the Community 
never  adopted  a  state  equivalent  structure  and  for  that  reason  the  traditional  in  the 
Member States separation of powers never occurred within the EC legislative system. On 
the contrary the EC followed a unique method whereby all of its political Institutions are
13active participants in the legislative process, which is performed on four stages governed 
by different procedures1 3 .
The EC legislative power is therefore split between the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament, whilst the Commission submits its policy proposals to both and 
under  the  EC  pillar  it  has  an  exclusive  agenda-setting  role.  There  are  also  instances 
(competition law) where the Commission may legislate without the direct involvement of 
the Council or Parliament. The Council1 4  on the other hand, may sometimes act as a sole 
legislator  (under  Article  133  EC)  by  choosing  not to  co-decide,  as  required,  with  the 
Parliament (Article 251  EC) or consult it (Article 308 EC). Nevertheless, the legislative 
interplay between the  Council  and the Parliament reminds  one  of federal  democracies 
where  the  two-chambered  model  operates.  In  the  same  manner  that  a  state’s  second 
chamber represents the constituencies’  local interests,  the Council  takes up this role to 
make  sure that the  Community method does  not overtake the preservation  of national 
interests.  To this  end,  the  Council  of Minister,  is  assisted by other  actors  such  as  the 
European Council, national governments and interest groups that play an important role 
in taking initiatives and advancing policy proposals.
Under  the  European  Convention’s  Constitutional  Treaty1 5   (Article  1-24)  the 
General  Affairs  and  Legislative  Council  shall  ensure  consistency  in  the  work  of the
13 For instruments of general validity (regulations and directives), there is the consultation procedure, the 
cooperation procedure, the co-decision procedure and the approval procedure;  ii) implementing measures 
are adopted by specific procedures; iii) there is a simplified procedure for binding individual decisions and 
non-mandatory instruments; iv) ECSC instruments are subject to their own specific procedures.
14  The  Treaty  lays  down  formal  requirements  for  the  adoption  of legislation  allowing  for  unanimity,  a 
simple  majority  or  a  qualified  majority  within  the  Council  of  Ministers  in  different  circumstances. 
Consisting  of representatives  from each  member  state,  the  Council  makes  general  policy  decisions  and 
adopts formal legal acts, such as EC primary and secondary legislation.
15 European Convention draft EU Constitution [CONV 850/03] and Conference of the Representatives of 
the Governments of the Member States  [CIG 87/2/04]. The EU Constitutional Treaty and its provisions in 
relation to competences will be discussed in Chapter 5.
14Council of Ministers1 6. The Council, acting in its legislative capacity, shall consider and, 
jointly  with  the  European  Parliament,  enact  European  laws  (ex  Regulations)  and 
European framework laws (ex Directives), in accordance with the provisions of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty (Articles 1-33  (1) and 1-34). The definitions of what constitute the 
Union’s legislative acts, given by Article 1-33 (1) of the EU Constitutional Treaty, aim to 
correspond  to  those  referred  to  previously  in  Article  249  EC.  Regrettably,  reading 
through  the  lines  defining  ‘European  framework  laws’  reveals  that  they  have  been 
marked  by  a  somewhat  awkward  terminology.  The  ‘entire  freedom’  bestowed  upon 
Member States by Article 1-33 (1) to implement European framework laws falls short of 
producing some sort of legal effect undermining therefore the wording of Article 249 EC 
relying on the  ‘discretion of each individual Member State’. What is more, the wording 
of Article 1-33  (1) contradicts the Court’s established principles in Marleasing1 7  of the 
duty on a Member State to achieve the objectives of a directive and Francovich™ of the 
requirement  to  compensate  individuals  for  damages  incurred  as  result  of  the  State’s 
breach of its public law obligations1 9  under a directive.
Further to that, Article 1-25 introduces new rules for the calculation of a qualified 
majority  within  the  decision-making process  of the  Council  of Ministers.  A  qualified 
majority  is  defined  by  the  abovementioned  Article  as  “a  majority  of Member  States, 
representing at least three fifths of the population of the Union”. In this so-called ‘double
16  When the  Council  acts  in  its  General  Affairs  function,  it  shall,  in  cooperation  with  the Commission, 
prepare and ensure follow-up to, meetings of the European Council.
17  Case C-106/89 Marleasing  [19901  ECR 1-4135  “It follows  that  in  applying  national  law  whether the 
provisions concerned pre-date or post-date the directive, the national court asked to interpret national law is 
bound to do  so  in every  way possible in light of the text and  aim of the directive to  achieve the results 
envisaged by it, and thus to apply Article 189 of the Treaty”
18 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR 1-5357
19 Dougan,  M.,“The Francovich  Right  to  Reparation:  Reshaping  the  Contours  of Community  Remedial 
Competence” (2000) 6 European Public Law 103-128.
15majority voting’, intended to take effect as from  1  November 200920,  all countries  will 
have one vote, but in order to get a qualified majority, those representing at least 60% of 
the total EU population must vote in favour of a proposal. This innovation to the rather 
new  system  of votes  introduced by the Treaty  of Nice2 1   to accommodate  the ten new 
members of the EU became one of the main points of contention among the states for 
finalising negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty22.
In particular, Poland and Spain felt they had more power in the weighting of votes 
under the Nice  system than under the EU Constitutional  Treaty23. Under the Treaty of 
Nice,  Poland  was  to get 27  votes in the  Council, just two fewer than  the  four largest 
countries: France, Britain, Italy, and Germany, even though Poland’s population is much 
smaller. Likewise, Spain was also given a relatively generous 27 votes in the Council of 
Ministers by the Nice Treaty. Under the EU Constitutional Treaty it, too,  stand to lose 
disproportionately. The Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the European Union 
on the IGC that met in Brussels on December 12-13, 2003, failed to bridge the differences of the 
Member  States  over  this  controversial  issue.  However,  in  the  agreement  on  the  EU
20 This of course depends upon the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty by all twenty-five Member 
States, which was scheduled to take place on November 1, 2006 (although the French and Dutch rejection 
has led to a period of reflection before the state of discussions will be re-examined in the first half of 2006.)
21  Under current rules, qualified majority voting involves each Member State casting a certain number of 
votes with more populous states having more votes. Totally, there are 87 votes in the current Community of 
15  and  62  are  required  to  make  a majority  and  therefore  pass  a proposal.  The Treaty  of Nice  changed 
qualified majority voting in the Council by increasing the number of vote shares of big states along with the 
majority threshold adding a 50% of states and 62% of population. Under the EU Constitutional Treaty each 
state’s vote is assigned to two different weights: i) its population share (i.e. the number of states - 60%) and 
ii) its membership share (i.e. how many people you have - 50%).
22 The Italian Presidency of the European Council failed during its course to emerge with a comprehensive 
agreement  on  the  text  of the  future  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  due  to  the  Polish  and  Spanish  veto  for 
preservation of the previous voting regime. Talks on an EU Constitutional Treaty were therefore concluded 
with no agreement at the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the European Union on the IGC 
that met in Brussels on 12-13 December 2003. See Italian Presidency Website http://www.ueitalia2003 .it
23 European Commission, Enlargement Directorate General Information Unit, “No New Treaty for a new 
Europe” (16.12.2003) Enlargement Weekly
Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest  weeklv.htm#A
16Constitutional  Treaty  at  the  Brussels  summit  on  June  18,  2004,  Poland  and  Spain 
managed to insert a safeguard clause under which a blocking minority must consist of at 
least four countries.  This  will give them more weight against bigger Member States24. 
The new double majority voting system, as introduced by the EU Constitutional Treaty, 
appears more transparent both against the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty (qualified 
majority system) and the Nice Treaty (triple majority system). Yet, the raised thresholds 
and safeguard clauses, added at the request of Spain and Poland, will possibly outweigh 
some  of the  benefits  of  the  proposed  system  by  making  legislation  in  the  Union  of 
twenty-five Member States a complicated process.
Thus, a country’s weighting of votes in the Council indicates something about its 
size and power and openly affects the nature of EU policies directed to it as a Member 
State. Therefore its capacity to control / block legislation from the inside has an obvious 
consequence upon its vertical relationship with the EU and its obligations arising from its 
membership  -   accession  to  it.  But  still,  the  new  dimension  given  by  the  EU 
Constitutional Treaty to the co-decision procedure2 5  as the general decision-making rule 
for  EU  legislation,  illustrates  that  Member  States  would  need  to  do  a  lot  more  than 
exercising  their power in  the  Council  to  influence the  legislative  outcome  of the  EU.
24  In  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  and  Monetary  Policy,  it  is  the  Council,  a 
Member State or the European Central Bank that takes the legislative initiative and not the Commission. 
There,  the voting threshold is raised to 72 per cent of the member-states representing 65  per cent of the 
population.
25  Under  the EC  Treaty,  Article  251  EC,  the  ‘co-decision’  or  ‘conciliation’  procedure  occurs  when  the 
Parliament  and  the  Council  decide  jointly.  Under  the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  the  simplified  co-decision 
procedure shares  decision-making power equally between the Parliament and the Council.  A legal  act is 
adopted if Council and Parliament agree at first reading. If they disagree, a ‘conciliation committee’ - made 
up  of  equal  numbers  of  members  of Parliament  and  of  the  Council,  with  the  Commission  present  - 
convenes, seeking a compromise on a text that the Council and Parliament can both subsequently endorse. 
If this conciliation does not result in an agreement, the Parliament can reject the proposal outright - but only 
by an  absolute  majority.  The co-decision procedure,  which strengthens  the role of the  Parliament as  co­
legislator, applies to a wide range of issues (39 legal bases in the EC Treaty), such as the free movement of 
workers, consumer protection, education, culture, health and trans-European networks.
17Under the EU Constitutional Treaty, the number of policy areas subject to the co-decision 
procedure,  which  involves  both  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament,  would 
substantially  increase.  Currently,  more  than  thirty  policy  areas  are  subject  to  the  co­
decision procedure where legislative proposals have to be approved by both the Council 
acting by a qualified majority and the European Parliament.
It is  therefore important under the EU  Constitutional  Treaty,  not only  that the 
European Parliament matters in some legislative capacity, but also that it has transformed 
to a great degree from a mere symbolic consultative Assembly to a legislative force that 
will  potentially bring  about real  changes  in the  nature  of the European  Union.  Under 
Article  1-23  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty,  the  co-decision  procedure  becomes  a 
general principle, except where the text specifically provides otherwise. This enshrines a 
dual democratic accountability, already existing in the Community, by turning a system 
of double checks to a general norm of the EU legislative process. Given that under the 
co-decision procedure the Parliament stands on  an equal footing to the Council,  it can 
veto a law or propose amendments by absolute majority of its members. This practically 
means that Member States alone (through their representation in the Council) would not 
be able to pass  legislation  without the  Parliament’s  approval.  Thus,  if Member States 
desire to control the legislative outcome of a constitutionalised EU, further to their need 
to ensure  a good representation  of their national interests  in the Council,  they need to 
establish their proximity to the political groups that the co-legislator Parliament consists 
of. Since the European Parliament is not organised by nationalities but by political groups 
in  association to national political  groups,  a double democratic legitimacy of the EU is 
based  on  a  close  relationship  between  the  former  and  the  Member  States,  whose 
governments are controlled by democratically elected Parliaments.The figures for the last Parliament election held in June  10-13, 20042 6  contradict 
the existence of such a relationship. An overall turnout of 45.7 per cent in the currently 
twenty-five  Member  States  demonstrates  that  neither  national  governments  nor  the 
European  Parliament  have  sufficiently  introduced  the  Community  Institutions  to  the 
demos (people). Hence, the European citizen, may find it more convenient to believe that 
national  Parliaments  can  more  effectively  scrutinise  their  national  governments  when 
these act at a European level in the Council. This undermines the idea that apart from 
national parliaments the elected representatives of the European citizens are located in the 
European Parliament. As a result, an improvement in the figure in Parliament elections is 
important to bring legitimacy to the democratic body, which is armed with increasingly 
important oversight powers in the Union. This is particularly important at a time where 
the European Parliament struggles to come across a political  solution on what to do as 
regards the future of the EU Constitutional Treaty.
2.  The Executive: Commission or European Council?
The  executive authority  in  the EC  appears  very  much  to be  a matter  largely 
reserved to the Commission, which has often been characterised as the EC law enforcer 
or  the  ‘Guardian  of the  Treaty’.  Similar  to  the  executives  in  the  Member  States,  the 
Commission initiates  and formulates policies  in  the form  of legislative,  budgetary  and 
programme  proposals  prepared  for  the  Community’s  legislative  organs.  It  is  also 
expected to  implement the policies  that have been  decided by the legislature.  In other 
words  it  is  occupied  with  the  monitoring  and  supervision  of  the  relative  national 
implementation  procedures  as  these  appear in  the  Member States.  At  another level,  it
26 See the EP elections results at http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites/en/index.html
19negotiates trade and cooperation agreements with third countries on behalf of the Union 
providing also financial and technical assistance. To summarise, the Commission’s task 
within the EC is to formulate policy proposals to present to the Council for adoption, to 
draft legislation for Council approval and finally to ‘police’ the Treaty.
Additionally,  the Council  has certain  powers  as  regards  Article  23  TEU  issues 
(implementation of the European Council’s EU Common Strategies). But, even where the 
Council passes legislation (e.g. a Directive) there is a dichotomy between legislation and 
implementation. While the power of Community law implementation is normally shared 
with national authorities,  sometimes the Council delegates implementing powers to the 
Commission assisted by a committee of experts in accordance with a procedure known as 
‘comitology’27.  According  to  Georg Haibach  writing in  1999,  “Comitology  in  the  last 
forty years has been probably the most fervently contested interinstitutional battleground 
between  the  Commission,  Council  and  the  European  Parliament”28.  The  lack  of  a 
specification within the Treaty of how much discretion can the Council delegate to the 
Commission in its transfer of implementing powers has not been dealt with by the Court 
that has left the interplay between the Community’s  ‘legislative’  and ‘executive’ operate 
in  tension,  despite its  attempt to provide guidelines  as to the nature of legislative  and
27 Where EC legislation prescribes implementation by the Community and not by the Member States, the 
Council confers this task upon the Commission. In practice, each legislative instrument specifies the scope 
of  the  implementing  powers  granted  to  the  Commission  and  how  the  Commission  is  to  use  them. 
Frequently, the instrument will  also make provision for the Commission to be assisted by a committee in 
accordance with a procedure known as ‘comitology’.  Article 1-37 of the EU Constitutional Treaty contains 
a reference to mechanisms for control over implementing acts of the EU by the Member States (comitology 
framework).
28  Haibach,  G.,  “Council  Decision  1999/468  -  A  New  Comitology  Decision  for  the  21st  Century?” 
European Institute of Public Administration, (1999) 99/3 Eipascope Working Paper
20implementing acts.2 9  Thus the Council has been eager in the past to confer wide powers 
on  the  Commission  since  it  exercises  considerable  control  through  comitology 
committees30. This practice has caused certain discontent within the Parliament, which is 
merely  ‘informed’  and  has  no  influence  on  the  committee  procedures.  This  reality  is 
particularly  important  in  raising  conflicts  between  the  Council  and  the  Parliament, 
predominantly in cases decided by the co-decision procedure where the two Institutions 
need to arrive at a compromise as to what is decided in the legislative and what in the 
implementing  /  executive  act31.  This  constitutes  a  further  reflection  of  the  author’s
assumption  that  the  principle  of separation  of powers  has  neither been  institutionally
manifested by the Treaty nor the case law of the Court32.
From the above, one may conclude that the effect of comitology on the horizontal 
distribution of competences within the EU is a complex one and demands special study of 
its own3 3  that goes far beyond the scope of this thesis. On the other hand the social reality
29  Case  25/70  Einfuhrstelle  v.  Koster  [1970]  ECR  1161.  Here  the  Court  interpreting  Article  211  EC 
established  a distinction between  measures  directly  based  on  the Treaty  itself (considered  as  legislative 
acts) and derived law intended to ensure their implementation (executive acts).
30  Article  1-37  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  contains  a  reference  to  mechanisms  for  control  over 
implementing acts of the EU by the Member States  (comitology framework).  Article 202 EC, restated in 
Article 1-37 (2) and (3) of the EU Constitutional Treaty states, contrary to the  ‘Comitology Decision’  that 
European law will lay down the general principles regulating the control of the executive by the Member 
States.
31  See Council Decision  1999/468,  ‘the Comitology decision’  of 29 June  1999.  Inter alia the  ‘Decision’ 
gave the comitology system as sound legal basis under Article 202 EC.
32 Article 7 (1) EC provides that “each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it by 
this Treaty”. In Joined Cases 188-190/80 France, Italy and UK v. Commission, [1982] ECR 2545 the Court 
referred to Articles 7 EC;  202 EC;  211  EC and 249 EC ruling that “the limits  of the powers conferred” 
upon a EC Institution  “are to be inferred  not from a general principle,  but from an  interpretation of the 
particular provision in question”. But still the EC as a body of law retains a hierarchical system consisting 
of  three  kinds  of  rules:  i)  Primary  Law,  ii)  Secondary  Law  (basic  acts)  and  iii)  other  procedures 
(implementing  acts).  See  Haibach,  G.,  “Comitology:  A  Comparative  Analysis  of  the  Separation  and 
Delegation of Legislative Powers”, (1997) 4 (4) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 373; 
Lenaerts,  K.,  “Regulating  the  regulatory  process:  delegation  of  powers  in  the  European  Community”
(1993) 18 European Law Review 23
33 Joerges, C., and Vos, E. (eds.) “EU Committees. Social Regulation, Law and Politics”, Oxford, Portland: 
Hart, (1999)
21of comitology is  relevant  as  far as  it  has  an  impact  upon  the  EC  vertical  division  of 
competences. While the comitology committees are intended to monitor the Commission 
and therefore represent the Member States, the implementing committee participants are 
not  government  representatives  but  independent  experts  having  their  own  views  and 
normative  visions34.  This  raises  questions  as  to  the  extent  the  Commission’s 
implementation of EC legislation corresponds with the individual needs of the Member 
States35. Being an operation outside the constitutional framework of the Treaty and a back 
door to  achieving intergovemmentalism  due  to its  link with  the  state,  comitology lies 
somewhere between a supranational and an intergovernmental approach creating what is 
often called ‘infranationalism’36.
Despite  its  idiosyncrasy,  the  nature  of the  comitology procedure  is  capable  of 
attracting comparisons in terms of the operation of the Commission vis-a-vis the national 
executive37. A similar process to that of comitology operates within a Member State when 
the  legislative  leaves  certain  space  to  the  government  to  regulate  particular  areas. 
Member States have also experienced similar problems to the Community when it comes
to distinguishing between legislative acts and implementing acts. This can be compared
to the Treaty’s lack of a clear definition in terms of classifying measures directly based 
on  the Treaty itself (considered as legislative acts) and derived law  intended to ensure
34 Although the Commission officials will eventually receive information about their governments’ position 
on the relevant issues, they  are exercising power away from political  accountability and judicial review. 
See Schaefer, G.F., Egeberg, M., Korez, S., and Trondal, J. “The Experience of Member States Officials in 
EU Committees: A Report on Initial Findings of an Empirical Study” (2000) 3 Eipascope 29, Maastricht: 
European Institute of Public Administration.
35  Stevens,  A.,  &  Stevens  H.,  “Brussels  Bureaucrats?  The  Administration  of  the  European  Union”, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave (2001)
36 See Joerges C., and Neyer, J., “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: 
The Constitutionalisation of Comitology” (1997) 2 European Law Review 273
37  See Hooghe,  L.,  “The European Commission  and the Integration of Europe.  Images  of Governance”, 
Cambridge University Press, (2001)
22their  implementation  (executive  or  implementing  acts).  National  constitutional  orders 
have attempted to remedy this problem in various ways. The French constitution provides 
a somewhat clear-cut separation of legislative (Article 34) and executive (Articles 21; 37) 
powers,  although the executive may also adopt acts of legislative nature (Article 38).3 8  
The German Constitution on the other hand restricts the allocation of such powers and 
leaves it up to the discretion of the Bundesverfassungsgericht3 9  to police the distribution 
of  legislative  and  executive  powers40.  Finally,  the  UK  possessing  neither  a  written 
Constitution nor a set of criteria for the  allocation  of law-making powers relies to the 
principle  of Parliamentary  Sovereignty  that  allows  no  legal  restrictions  to  an  Act  of 
Parliament.  As  regards  implementation,  a  joint  politico-judicial  monitoring  of 
Parliamentary acts exists without challenging the definition of their scope. The same role 
of the courts is also employed to monitor the administrative conduct of the executive.4 1
Having  seen  both  the  way  laws  are  implemented  in  the  Community  and  the 
Member  States,  parallels  can  be  raised between  the  two  legal  systems,  especially  the
38 ‘Constitution De 1958, publide au JO du 5 octobre 1958’, p. 9151
39 Des Bundesverfassungsgericht or BverfG in short. (German Federal Constitutional Court)
40 Although under the theory of ‘Essentialness’  (Wesentlichkeitstheorie) the Federal Constitutional  Court 
requires in constant jurisdiction that the most important questions are decided by the legislator (Bundestag). 
See The Constitutional Court’s decision over the right of a female Muslim teacher to wear a headscarf in 
school.  [2  BvR  1436/02  vom  24.9.2003  http://www.bverfg.del  The  BVErfG  underlined  that  though 
Germany’s constitutional law did not explicitly forbid the wearing of headscarves in the classroom in state- 
run  schools  in  the first place,  the  possibility  remained  for  states  to  legally  enact  such  a  ban.  Thus  the 
BverfG  left  it  up  to  the  state  Parliament  to  decide  if  Baden-Worttemberg  should  have  such  a  legal 
regulation in place.
41  See Dicey, A.V.,“Introduction to the Study of the Constitution”, (1885) in Marshall, G., & Moodie, G., 
“Some Problems of the Constitution”, Hutchinson, 5th  Edition, London, (1971). “The plain truth is that the 
power  possessed  by  the judges  of controlling  the  administrative  conduct  of the  executive  has  been,  of 
necessity,  so  exercised  as  to  prevent  the  development  with  us  of  any  system  corresponding  to  the 
‘administrative  law’  of  continental  states.  It  strikes  at  the  root  of  those  theories  as  to  the  nature  of 
administrative  acts,  and  as  to  the  ‘separation  of powers’.. .the  droit  administratif of France.”  See  R  v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,  Ex p Daly  [2001]  UKHL 26 concerning a challenge to the 
decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department to apply a policy of cell searches in all closed 
prisons  in  England  and  Wales.  The House  of Lords  quashed  the  administrative  action  on  human  rights 
grounds, adding a ‘proportionality test’ to the grounds for judicial review.
23Commission’s  operation  vis-a-vis  the national  executive.  The  question  is  whether this 
comparison  can  be  extended  to  Community  cases  of  handling  individual  cases  on 
competition  policy  (e.g.  merger  applications).  Can  the  Commission’s  functions  in 
competition  policy  be  put  next  to  a  national  executive  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
legislative actions of the Council along with the Parliament were compared to the work of 
a two-chambered national legislative. At first glance, the Commission’s composition (top 
rank  politicians)  and  its  functions  point  towards  a  predominantly  executive  role 
comparable  to  national  governments.  The  only  ambiguity  as  to  its  role  is  raised  in 
accordance with the nature of its motivations when it acts in an executive / administrative 
capacity for the Community as  a whole.  There the question  is  whether its  actions  are 
influenced and therefore directed according to the Member States’ intentions aiming at an 
elevation of the national voice in the EC or rather the Commission has a will of its own 
pointing towards a supranational reality?
Looking  at the EU  as  a whole with  the EC  as  a part of it,  the Commission  is 
neither  the  absolute  nor  exclusive  holder  of  executive  authority.  As  regards  policy 
initiatives, when it comes to the other two pillars (Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and Justice  an  Home  Affairs)  the  Commission,  challenged by  the  Council  secretariat, 
plays a limited role in setting the EU political agenda. It can only submit proposals in the 
same  fashion  as  national  governments  and  be  present  at  the  discussions.  Despite  the 
somewhat  marginal  contribution  of  the  Commission  in  the  intergovernmental  pillars 
(developing policy programmes), one could argue that after the Amsterdam transference 
of certain third pillar issues to the first EC pillar (visas,  asylum  and immigration),  the 
influence of the Commission has grown bigger and it will most possibly carry on likewise 
in the future. Especially after the Convention’s Constitutional Treaty is put into operation
24(an  action  that  will  eventually  bring  down  the  Maastricht  pillarised  system)  the 
Commission’s  contribution  to  the  once  intergovernmental  pillars  will  no  longer  be 
uneven  compared  to  the  supranational  EC  pillar.  This  unveils  a  critical  debate  about 
whether the Commission or the newly institutionalised European Council42 should take 
up the leading role in collective European governance.
Article  1-22  (1)  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  proposes  the  new  post  of 
permanent President of the European Council. This includes a term of office renewable 
every two  and a half years  instead of the present six-month rotation  between Member 
States.  Such  proposal  leaves  behind  the  existing  partnership  model  of  the  rotating 
presidency in the European Council, which assured that every Member State has its turn 
at the Chair regardless of its size and influence. Going back to the question of whether 
and  in  what  ways  EC  Institutions  resemble  national-level  institutions,  one  would 
conclude that the institutional architecture put forward by the EU Constitutional Treaty 
introduces an additional fundamental characteristic of the nation state: the ‘Head of State’ 
as  the  face  of  the  EU  President.  However  symbolic,  Article  1-22  (2)  states  that  the 
President will represent the EU “on issues concerning its common foreign and security 
policy”. This may create possible reactions considering that the whole European Council 
agenda may be dictated by the Member State occupying the fixed Presidency chair.
A more competent politicised Commission could perhaps provide an alternative to 
this challenge. Such a Commission - protector of the small Member States - would be in 
full control of all EU executive tasks gradually developing to an equivalent of national
42 Article 1-22 of the EU Constitutional Treaty states that the European Council shall elect its President, by 
qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. The Council President would “chair 
and  drive  forward”  the  work  of  the  European  Council  and  replace  the  current  system  of  six-monthly 
rotating  chairs.  The  person  nominated  to  be  the  President  of the  European  Council  would  have  to  be 
approved by the European Parliament.
25governments  for the Union43.  Article 1-26  (6), however,  entails the loss of the right of 
each State to appoint a voting Commissioner. This may cause certain uneasiness amongst 
small Member States although the number of Commissioners is not directly linked to the 
degree  that  national  interests  are  represented  in  the  EU.  The  politicisation  of  the 
Commission may on the other hand upset the institutional balance by counteracting the 
new EU constitutional order through its transformation from a ‘policeman of the Treaty’ 
to a  ‘butterfly of EU  government’.  Possibly this  was  anticipated by the  Constitution’s 
drafters who decided to attribute executive powers to the state representative European 
Council.  As  for  the  Commission,  following  this  reasoning,  its  future  role  would 
presumably be reduced to a mere European Council secretariat or a gap-filling player in 
the conduct of the EU’s foreign policy as a way to ensure that the centre of power in the 
EU would not shift to the hands of the large Member States44.
A fresh debate on the EU Constitutional Treaty need to determine whether the EU 
should turn further to the supranational method, where Member States surrender several 
competences to central authorities or whether intergovemmentalism should win through, 
leaving  therefore  Member  States  to  make  decisions  with  less  recourse  to  common 
institutions. On the other hand the Commission might be alarmed as to the predominance 
of  intergovernmental  trends  in  the  future  shape  of  the  Union.  It  may  fear  that  the 
intergovernmental system lacks functionality and accountability. Therefore if it is to be 
applied in  areas  where  the  Commission presently represents  the  Union  in  a collective
43 Egeberg, M.,  “The European Commission: The Evolving EU Executive” (2002) 02/30 Arena Working 
Papers, Oslo
44 The fact that under the EU Constitutional Treaty (Article 1-26)  only  15  of the 25  Commissioners will 
have  voting rights  is  capable  of raising  some concern  in  the  small  Member  States.  However one  could 
argue  that  the  question  as  regards  the  composition  of the  Commission  is  not  one  of nationality  but  of 
efficiency. Therefore the determination of its number should be fixed according to the number of areas of 
EU  activity  and  not to  a  fixed  number representing  an  operational  compromise  in  view  of the Union’s 
enlargement.
26manner based  on  a Council  mandate  any  vision  for common  federal  action  would be 
frustrated. But even if a federal action were to be taken, would the Union’s system ever 
reflect what is happening in the Member States?
3.  The Judicial: The European Court of Justice
Last but not least, the judicial power is at large exercised by the European Court 
of Justice  (the  Court hereafter),  despite the  attempts  of the  European  Council  at Nice 
(2000) to handle over key functions such as preliminary references (Article 234 EC) over 
to  the  Court  of  First  Instance  -  to  be  renamed  High  Court  according  to  the  EU 
Constitutional  Treaty  The  legal  basis  of the  Court’s  competence  over  Community 
matters lies in Article 220 EC and when it comes to certain Union activities in Article 46 
TEU. Under these provisions the Court is competent to ensure that both EC Institutions 
and  Member  States  comply  with  the  law  of the  Treaty  both  in  its  interpretation  and 
application.  Unlike  the other three  Institutions,  the  Court’s  functions  have  never been 
dramatically modified by a Treaty review or even by the EU Constitutional Treaty. This 
relates  to  the  overwhelming  majority  of  government  representatives  in  European 
Summits wishing to preserve the Court's leading role in the operation of the Community.
Despite that, the Court does not enjoy an absolute monopoly over the assurance of 
the uniform  application  of EC law throughout the  Community compared to  a national 
constitutional  court.  To  pick  an  example,  in  cases  concerning  competition  issues,  the 
Commission may act as a judge of first instance. Before Council Regulation No 1/20034 5
45 Council Regulation No  1/2003  of 16 December 2002 on the interpretation of the rules  on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. OJ Ll/1
27national courts were only competent to apply Article 81(1) EC4 6  while the Commission 
had exclusive competence to  do  so in relation  to  Article  81(3) EC.  Such  a system  of 
public enforcement by the Commission undermined the very essence of the Van Gend En 
Loos4 7 judgment  that  emphasised  the  significance  of private  enforcement  in  EC  law. 
Regulation No 1/2003 underlines in paragraph 4 that “the present system should therefore 
be replaced by a directly applicable exception  system in which competition  authorities 
and courts  of the  Member States  have  the power to  apply not only  Article  81(1)  and 
Article 82 of the Treaty.. ..but also Article 81(3) of the Treaty”.
Furthermore, talking about the distribution of judicial power, the Council - acting 
under the procedure requiring the assent of Parliament - may take the appropriate steps to 
ensure the uniform  application  of Article  6  (1)  TEU  in  the  Member States  by taking 
action  against  relative  breaches  of  the  Union  values.  The  values  of  the  Union  are 
summarised in Article 6(1): “the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law,” the rights guaranteed by the ECHR 
and “respect for the national identities of the Member States.”4 8  As provided by Nice and 
the EU Constitutional Treaty, besides the Court of First Instance there will be specialised 
judicial panels with jurisdiction in individual areas. Hence, the exercise of judicial power
46 As regards Article 82 EC, it is directly applicable and national courts are responsible for its application.
47 Monti, M., “The Application of Community Competition Law by National Courts”,  Conference at the 
Europaische  Rechtsakademie,  ‘Towards  the  Application  of  Article  81  (3)  by  National  Courts’,  Trier, 
(27.11.2000)  Speech/00/466, European Commission Press Room;  Van  Gend En Loos Case 26/62  [1963] 
ECR 1
“....On questions  of legal  interpretation national  courts  will  and  should continue  to turn  to the Court of 
Justice or to the Court of First Instance if this Court is  made competent for Article 234 questions in the 
field of competition. The preliminary reference procedure will play a crucial role in maintaining coherent 
application  throughout  the  Community  as  it  has  done  since  the  very  beginning  in  all  other  areas  of 
Community  law.”;  See also:  Conference on “The Reform of European Competition Law”,  Freiburg,  (9- 
10.11.2000) available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches
48 Under the EU Constitutional Treaty there would be a triple guarantee of human rights in the EU:  i) the 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  (Part  II  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty);  ii)  the  ECHR  and  iii)  the 
principles common to the Member States.
28within the Union is similar to the exercise of legislative and executive power. Although at 
times it seems that certain organs have greater competence to act in certain  areas,  this 
competence is not exclusive but part of a network of parallel competences.
Nonetheless, the Court - maybe more than any other EC Institution - exercises the 
Community’s  judicial  functions,  being  the  prime  interpreter  and  developer  of  the 
‘unwritten’  European  Constitution.  J.W.R.  Reid  writes  that  “where  there  is  no  1  
constitution, and by implication where the constitution establishing the ‘delicate balance 
between  majority rule  and certain  fundamental  values’  is  open-textured,  then  it is  the 
Court which must guarantee that balance.”4 9 One should not overlook its contribution in 
adjudicating  vertical  conflicts  arising  between  the  Community  Institutions  and  the 
Member  States  (Articles  226  and  230  EC50),  as  well  as  its  teleological  approach  in 
solving  horizontal  disputes  between  citizens  and  their  national  governments  (State 
liability doctrine51). The Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on an act of 
one of the Institutions of the Community within the meaning of Art 234 (1) (b) EC and its 
decisions  form  an  integral  part  of  the  Community’s  legal  system.  Besides  the  very 
foundations of Community law, instituted on a unique complex between direct effect and 
supremacy of EC primary and secondary law, were developed by the Court itself on a 
non-textual  /  Treaty  basis.  Accordingly,  the  Court  has  also  jurisdiction  to  give 
preliminary rulings under Article 234 EC concerning the interpretation of provisions of a 
mixed  agreement  in  any  case  not  concerning  the  exclusive  powers  of  the  Member
49 Reid, J.W.R.,  “Political Review of the European Court of Justice and its  Jurisprudence”  (1995)  13/95 
Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, NYU
50 Especially as regards the use of Article 230 EC, the Court of First instance has played a significant role 
in opening up standing rules for private applicants in Case T-177/01 Jego  Quere et Cie SA v Commission 
[2002] ECR 11-2365
51 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR 1-5357; Joined Cases C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie 
du Pecheur and Factortame III [1996] ECR 1-1029
29States52.  Thus  the  Court  is  an  alternative  means  of  accomplishing  a  certain  desired 
outcome outside the scope of internal /domestic law.
Once  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  is  ratified,  the  Court  would  according  to 
Article 1-29 (3) be the prime interpreter of the provisions laid within it deciding therefore 
conflicts  over  competences  and  disputes  over  subsidiarity.  According  to  the  relevant 
Protocol  attached  to  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty 53,  Member  States  acting  under  the 
request of their national legislatures on the basis of violation of the subsidiarity principle 
may challenge EU legislation in Luxembourg.5 4  Such monitoring of the constitutionality 
of acts of the Union would have a direct impact to the vertical division of competences. 
Not only that but in addition, the individual will be at an advantage, albeit a small one, in 
bringing his case to the Court. Article III-365 (4) of the Constitution grants the individual 
a right to institute proceedings against a regulatory act provided that it concerns him/her 
directly and does not entail implementing measures. This deviation from the unrealistic 
Plaumann criteria5 5 owes much to the Jego Quere decision of the Court of First Instance 
to dismiss the  objection  of inadmissibility raised by the Commission  against a private 
applicant, whose vessels were ultimately found to be covered by the scope of a regulation 
on fisheries56. There the Court of First Instance highlighted in contrast to what had been 
ruled before:
“A natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a
Community measure of general application  that concerns him directly if
52 See Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmtind, [1987] ECR 3719
53 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, para 7
54 See more in Chapter 6
55 Case C-25/62 Plaumann v.  Commission [1963] ECR 95
56 Regulation (EC) No 1162/2001
30the measure in question  affects his legal position, in  a manner which is 
both  definite  and  immediate,  by  restricting  his  rights  or  by  imposing 
obligations  on him.  The number and position  of other persons  who  are 
likewise affected by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in 
that regard.”5 7
The Court fairly  soon  after Jego  Quere rejected  the proactive judgment of the 
Court of First Instance in the UP  A case58 in a somewhat egoistical approach to preserve 
its own restrictive Plaumann locus standi test. Such a decision frustrates J.H.H. Weiler’s 
recognition  that  individuals  are  the  principal  guardians  of  the  legal  integrity  of 
Community law59since in the pre-Jego Quere case law they had little opportunity to prove 
it.
Moreover, with the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty, the provisions of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights6 0 will become an integral part of EU law (Part II of the 
EU  Constitutional  Treaty)  and  consequently  take  constitutional  value  by  becoming 
justiciable by the Court61. Fundamental rights presently consist of general principles of 
EC  law  based  on  the  constitutional  traditions  of the  Member  States  and  international 
treaties to which the latter belong62. In view of that, despite the positive air surrounding 
the legalisation of the Charter63, there may be concerns as to the equivalence of level of
57 Case T-177/01, Jego Quere et Cie v Commission [2002] ECR 11-2365, para 51
58 Case C-50/00P Union de Pequefios Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR 1-6677, para 45
59 Weiler, J.H.H, “The Transformation of Europe.” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403-2483
60 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 OJ (C 364)  1, entered into force Dec. 7, 
2000
See  Case  C-173/99  Broadcasting,  Entertainment,  Cinematographic  and  Theatre  Union  (BECTU)  v 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Opinion of 8 February 2001. The Advocate-General, Tizzano’s 
Opinion attracted attention not only because it implied the amendment of UK working time legislation but 
also because he cited as a “substantive point of reference” the provisions of the Charter.
62  Weiler,  J.H.H.,  “The  Jurisprudence  of  Human  Rights  in  the  European  Union:  Integration  and 
Disintegration, Values and Processes” (1996) 2/96 Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, NYU
63 Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-263/02 Jego Quere et Cie SA v Commission [2002] ECR 11-2365
31fundamental  rights  protection  granted  by  the  Constitutional  Treaty’s  Part  II  (which 
contains the unamended Charter in format) as compared to the way they are safeguarded 
in each Member State. For instance, the Charter does not expressly state that European 
legislation in violation of the Charter shall be void. This contrasts with the Constitutional 
practices of several Member States. Article 15.4 of the Irish Bunreacht na hEireann, for 
instance, provides that “the Oireachtas (Parliament) shall not enact any law which is, in 
any  respect,  repugnant  to  the  Constitution....’’and  in  case  it  does  is  to  be  declared 
invalid64. Moreover the EU Constitutional  Treaty does not include the possibility of an 
individual complaint alleging breach of fundamental rights  whilst in the United States 
individuals have been the prime actors in ensuring the vindication of the Bill of Rights.
Scepticism as to the Court’s aptitude to adjudicate on future EU constitutionalised 
values such as human rights, which already enjoy constitutional protection in the Charter 
or  Constitution  of  each  Member  State  may  bring  to  the  fore  a  good  basis  for  those 
proposing the establishment of a new institution to hold the Court accountable. However, 
one could add that it is rather awkward to carry on building up counter-institutions in a 
constitutional process that initially begun in the name of simplification. Alternatively, EU 
constitutional  issues  could  start  and  finish  at  national  courts,  rendering  therefore  the 
Court of Justice  a last resort national  Constitutional  Court.  As regards  objectivity  and 
harmony of application,  each high  constitutional  court of a given Member State could 
comprise an independent representative that irrespective of his nationality could seat at 
the national court providing an alternative opinion, acting very much in the capacity of an 
Advocate General.
64 Constitution of Ireland, Enacted by the People (01.07.1937)
32To summarise, even though only a few reforms in the EU Constitutional Treaty 
affect  the  Union’s  judiciary,  the  Court’s  role  will  still  be  valuable  within  a 
constitutionalised  EU.  Besides  it  was  the  first  Institution  to  transform  and  therefore 
constitutionalise the Treaties65; legitimise new legal avenues and de-legitimate other EC 
measures; call for legislative intervention and compensate for lack of it. Even though its 
activism / jurisprudence has been criticised for being dominated by a profound element of 
proactiveness66, the self-restraint of the Court has been greater in recent years than those 
of the highest national courts. Despite the fact that the Court has very much acted as the 
Community’s  motor  of integration,  any  egoistical  attempts  to  increase  its  power  and 
pursue its agenda have been held up within the constraints imposed by the national courts 
and the scope of the Treaty. Hence any hostility towards the Court is located in what G.F. 
Mancini describes as the “self-preserving interests of the political and bureaucratic elites 
in the fifteen Member States”67, now twenty-five.
Not  surprisingly,  the  Union’s  alleged  constitutionalisation  involves  a  detailed 
discussion about the role of justice and the relation between judicial and political organs 
within Europe. It concerns very much the relation between justice and politics, dealing, to 
put it otherwise,  with the judicialisation of political decisions and accordingly with the 
politicalisation of the role of judges in the Member States. The Court has attained great 
political  influence facilitating the evolution of European integration.  The reasons vary: 
from its very nature, being a dependent variable to the technicality of issues involving EC 
law.  Whatever the  case  may be,  the judicialisation  of European politics  has  gradually
65 Case 294/83 Parti ecologiste  ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339
66  Rasmussen,  H.,  “On  Law  and  Policy  in  the  European  Court  of Justice  -  A  Comparative  Study  in 
‘Judicial Policy-Making” (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1986)
67 Mancini, G.F., “Europe: The Case for Statehood” (1998) 4 European Law Journal 29
33occurred  through  the  tendency  of  EC  Institutions,  national  governments  and  private 
applicants alike to resort to the Court in order to vindicate and consequently enhance their 
competences under the Treaty. To quote from R. Dehousse: “the more decisions are taken 
by the judiciary the more potential plaintiffs will be tempted to go to court to protect their 
interests.”68As  litigants  have  voluntarily  agreed  to  implement  and  enforce  the  Court’s 
decisions,  the  latter’s  role  as  prime judiciary  and  compensator  for  lack  of legislative 
initiative at EC level has been elevated and along with it the legitimacy of EU law.
In contributing towards  the judicialisation of politics the  Court has itself been 
transformed by  the  collective political  environment in  which  it evolved  and operated. 
From the  1990s to the present day it has given signs of retreat from its previous theses 
that  caused  considerable  national  reaction.  This  tendency  of  self-limitation6 9   or 
‘reasonable  activism’  has been  defined by J.H.H.  Weiler  as  “a return  to  orthodoxy”7 0 _____   — a
manifested in decisions such as Keck7 1  and UPA12. At another level it owes much to the
anticipation that the EC has completed its circle as a quasi-legal  state,  which  allows  a 
more relaxed stance taken by its Institutions compared to the early developmental stages 
of building up a new legal entity.
68  Dehousse,  R.,  “The  European  Court  of  Justice:  the  Politics  of  Judicial  Integration”,  Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, (1998) at 115
69See  also  Sweet,  A.S.  and  Brunell,  T.L.,  “The  European  Court  and  the  National  Courts:  A  Statistical 
Analysis of Preliminary References, 1961-95” (1997) 14/97 Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, NYU
70 Weiler, J.H.H. “The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of the 
Free  Movement  of Goods”  in  Craig,  P.,  and  De  Burca,  G.,  (eds.)  “Evolution  of the  EU  law”,  Oxford 
University Press, (2000), p.349-376
71 C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR1-6097
72 Case C-50/00P Union de Pequehos Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR 1-6677, para 45
34B.  THE DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF EC LAW
Introduction
Before  examining  the  way  vertical  competences  have  developed  throughout 
succeeding Treaty revisions, it is important to define the power relationship between the 
Community vis-a-vis the Member States. The tranquillity of this relation, dependent upon 
the extent of transferral of national competences to the Community, has been turbulent in 
times  due  to  national  reaction  in  terms  of  the  bi-dimensional  concept  of  EC  law 
supremacy. The two dimensions of the doctrine of ‘supremacy’ can be summarised first, 
in the Court’s monist conception of the supremacy of EC law and second, in the Member 
States’  problematic  response  to  the  fact  that  an  EC  law  provision  is  a  higher  norm 
compared to a conflicting national rule. But since the reception and therefore validity of 
EC law depends in certain Member States on their dualist approach to international law 
demanding a self-revision of the national constitution, how could they be irritated by the 
reality that EC law is supreme? During the course of this chapter one will identify that 
more than anything else it is the Court’s  ‘teleological’  interpretation of constitutionally 
recognised EC law provisions that has caused national uneasiness and not the doctrine of 
‘supremacy’ per se.
Certain Member States,  at least during the so-called  ‘political’ judgments of the 
Court in  the  1970s,  were  almost taken by  surprise  as  the Community’s judiciary  was 
giving interpretations to EC law provisions sometimes reaching far beyond the scope of 
the Treaty. Consequently these judgments went further than the expectations of the nation 
states as to the degree of integration or surrender of national  sovereignty they intended 
when they signed the Treaty. On the other hand such an expansive interpretation of EC
35law  by  the  Court  may  be  characterised  as  necessary  given  the  circumstances  of 
integration throughout the years and the peculiarity of the nature of the Community as a 
body consisting of states with diverse legal heritage. Does this assumption take us to the 
conclusion  that  the  Court’s  interpretation  of EC  law  in  a  rather  expansive  fashion  - 
different to national legal traditions - was or is justifiably subject to legal criticism?
The transference of national competences to the Community and their expansion 
by the Court may be regarded as necessary, not so much as symbolic but practical in the 
name  of  furthering  European  integration.  When  the  Member  States  transferred  their 
competences  to  the  Community  they  explicitly  recognised  that  they  entered  a  new 
organisation with authority and principles different to domestic ones along with its own 
executive,  legislative  and judiciary to create or interpret the constitutional rules  of the 
independent  legal  order.  The  imperative  of  furthering  European  integration  was 
something that Member States accepted when they transferred their competences to a sui- 
generis legal system but perhaps the level of change was not in their contemplation at the 
time of their accession to the EC.
A reference to the arguments of the three Member States before the Court in Van 
Gend En Loos 7 3   suggests that the Member States were not aware that Article  12 EEC 
(now 25 EC) in relation to custom duties was intended to have a direct effect. The Court 
however established that directly effective rights arise from the provisions of the Treaty 
and individuals may rely upon them in bringing a case before their national courts. One 
can argue that the concept of direct effect did not constitute a part of the obligations that
73 Case 26/62 Van Gend En Loos [1963] ECR 1
36the Member States agreed to when they joined the Community74.  It was the Court that 
interpreted  Article  12  EEC  in  the  light  of  the  general  aims  of  the  Community  as 
manifested  in  the  Treaty.  In  its  future  case  law,  the  Court  went  one  step  further  by 
holding  that  directly  effective  rights  may  also  spring  out  of  secondary  Community 
legislation75.  In  the  present  context  this  is  very  important  in  relation  to  the  accepted 
limitation / transference of national competences to the Community. The topical question 
is how far a system that has re-defined its level of integration, from peace and stability to 
economic and then political, is allowed to change the original national competences along 
with what has been left of national sovereignty. Asking this question, national authorities 
conclude that not all changes of competences thrown into this new organisation can be 
tolerable.
1. Justifying Supremacy: A sui generis Constitutional order
(a)  Introduction
Being more than international or mere socio-economic agreements,  the Union’s 
founding Treaties very much like a national constitution do organize the administration 
and governance of the Union in a political fashion. They describe the composition and 
functions  of the main actors on the Community stage,  namely the European Council76, 
Parliament,  Commission  and  the  Court  conferring  upon  them  a  power  to  act  when 
necessary for the attainment of the Treaties’  objectives7 7  prohibiting the carrying out of
74 Pescatore, P, “The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law” (1983) 8 European 
Law Review 155
75 See for instance: Case 41/74  Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337; Case 9/70 Grad v Finanzamt 
Traunstein [1970] ECR 825; Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti [1979] ECR 1629
76 Of course not referred to in the original Treaties
77 Articles: 308 EC; 203 Euratom; 95 (1) ECSC
37tasks outside these goals. Already from the starting point, since the Treaty of Rome to the 
succeeding agreements, the Community was never meant to be limited solely to a free 
trade zone on the basis of international law. It was rather drafted as a “legal community” 
built upon the fundamental principle  of supremacy that EC law  prevails  over national 
legislation regardless  its nature  and the time that comes  into  force  (enactment)78.  The 
Court emphasized this in Simmenthal.1 9
The doctrine  of supremacy is  one  of the most fundamental  bases  of European 
Law.  It  defines  the  importance  and  overruling  effect  of  primary  and  secondary 
Community  legislation  within  the  European  Union.  Although  never  laid  down  in  the 
Treaties,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  relatively  early  ruled  that,  according  to  the 
Treaties’  intentions, EC Law had to be considered above any national provision.8 0  Also 
national constitutional provisions may not be  applied by national  courts  if obstructing 
Community law.8 1  In a series of decisions the Court has pushed this evolution by means 
of its case  law  making  considerable  efforts  to  constitutionalise  the  Treaty  so  that the 
individual  is  protected by  it and  enjoys rights  derived from  it vis-a-vis  his / her own 
national government. To name but a few controversial  ‘politically driven’  decisions, in 
Van  Gend En  Loos82 the Court declared  that  “the  Community constitutes  a new  legal 
order of international law”, hinting that EC law is a sub-system of international law. It 
stated clearly that the Treaty not only addresses the Member States as such, but also the
78
Craig, P., “UK Sovereignty after Factortame”,  11  Yearbook of European Law 221, (1991), at 246, See 
Simmenthal  106/77, (1978) ECR 629 at 651-2; Matra Communications v Home  Office [1999]  1  Common 
Market Law Review 1154
79 Case 106/77 [1978] ECR 629
80 Steiner J., & Woods, L., “Textbook on EC Law”, 7th  ed., Mayfield Blackstone, (2000), 85.
81 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, 643-644.
82 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1
38individual  citizen  granting  rights  and  founding  obligations.  Spiermann  explains8 3   that 
because  the EEC Treaty,  in  addition to  the Member States,  counted individuals  as  its 
subjects, the legal order set up by the Treaty was ‘a new legal order of international law’. 
Yet, he argues that the concept of direct effect was established three years before the Van 
Gend En  Loos ruling  in  the  application  of the  ECSC Treaty84.  Additionally,  speaking 
from an international lawyer’s perspective, he challenges the Court’s idea of international 
law for being “essentially ahistorical”85.
From an EC lawyer’s perspective, the principle of direct effect was introduced so 
that EC law can be invoked in a Member State without prior implementation. Besides the 
concept  of EC  law  supremacy  would  be  fruitless  without  being  backed  by  directly 
effective  provisions.  Thus  the  Court  established  the  existence  of  a  new  legal  order 
through its conclusion that international law enjoys no direct effect over the nation state 
and therefore making what Mancini calls a “unique judicial contribution to the making of 
Europe.”8 6  Further, in Costa v ENEL8 7  the Court moved one step further by establishing 
that “by contrast to ordinary international  treaties,  the EEC Treaty has created its own 
legal system...which became an integral part of the legal  system of the Member States 
and which their courts are bound to apply.” Thus, the Court not only recognized that the
83  Spiermann,  O.,  “The  Other  Side  of the  Story:  An  Unpopular Essay  on  the  Making  of the  European 
Community Legal Order”, (1999) 10 (4) European Journal of International Law 763-789
84  See Case 20/59  Italy v High Authority  [1960]  ECR  325,  at 335  and Case 25/59 Netherlands v High 
Authority, [1960] ECR 355, at 371.
85 “There is, however, no doubt that under international law a national court, being an organ of the state, is 
obliged to reach decisions that are in accordance with the international obligations of the state. This is  so 
even when the holder of the corresponding right does not take part in the proceeding before the national 
court, though this will often be the case since, in modem international law, interests in the subject-matter 
governed by a rule normally breed rights (to lay claims and to bring actions) on the basis of the rule, also 
for individuals.”
86 Mancini F., and Keeling, D.,  “Democracy and the European Court of Justice” (1994) 57 Modern Law 
Review 175, at 183
87 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585/595.
39Community’s legal system is separate to the Member States but also disconnected from 
the intergovernmental nature of international law8 8  to further enhance the supranational 
principle of supremacy89. It accepted the power of the Member States to create law that 
could  be  incompatible  with  Community  law.  In  the  Court’s  own  words  this  was 
expressed as following:
“It follows  from all  these  observations  that the  law  stemming from  the 
Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and 
original  nature,  be  overridden  by  domestic  legal  provisions,  however 
framed,  without being deprived  of its character  as  Community law  and 
without  the  legal  basis  of  the  Community  itself  being  called  into 
question.”
Looking at the history of European integration one could argue that it has highly 
contributed to diminish national barriers and as a result national competences. One might 
even be tempted to state that the interpretation of the European Treaties in this special 
way  was  crucial  on  the  way  to  reach  the  declared  aim  of  economic  and  political 
integration.  Besides,  all  sympathy  one  might  feel  for  the  idea  of  European  nations 
moving  together  under  the  shield  of  a  higher  authority  /  constitutional  order,  the 
sovereignty of the EU Member States must always be borne in mind.
88 See Case C-20/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR 4973. The Court held that an EC regulation couldn’t 
be invalid just because it comes into conflict with an international treaty, GATT in particular.
89 The Community has legal personality and can enter into contractual relations with other either persons or 
organizations. Yet, the EC has been reluctant to apply international law in some cases arguing that “it is not 
capable of conferring on citizens of the Community rights, which they can invoke before the courts”,  (e.g. 
when a Community  norm is  in conflict with GATT.  (See Case 21-24/72 International Fruit  Company  v 
Produktscap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219).
40(b)  The European constitutional order: a new legal order of international law?
The  European  Treaties  might  have  led  to  a  legally  unique  and  not  clearly 
definable  structure  in  terms  of  international  law,9 0   but  nonetheless  the  agreeing 
governments were and are today still obliged to respect their own national constitutions. 
But being  “an  integral  part of the  legal  systems  of the  Member  States”,  EC  law  was 
declared to be  in  Costa  v ENEL not just  applicable to  define / facilitate the relations 
between them but has given confidence to their nationals to act as direct enforcers of EC 
law. What also played a part in the surrendering of national competences is the fact that 
the Community legal order was not seen as a part of international law. There, it is the 
principles of direct effect and supremacy that made the EC legal order find its own feet 
compared to the international.
Both principles of direct effect and supremacy are interconnected and interrelated. 
If a citizen of a Member state was unable to invoke a Community law provision how 
could EC law enjoy primacy over national legal norms? So not only does the individual 
enjoy rights under EC law, but these rights are justiciable before his / her national court. 
Furthermore, these rights not only exist where they are expressly granted in the Treaty 
but by reason of obligations that the Treaty imposes on individuals, their Member States 
and  the EC  Institutions.  Hence,  direct effect  is  not just  about  direct individual  rights 
conferred from the Treaty to the individual as a Member State citizen. It is also about the 
broader horizontal relationship between the individual as a ‘subject’ of the national legal 
system  and  the  national  sovereign  body  as  the  ‘master’.  According  to  the  Court, 
international law merely regulates the relationship between the states and does not count
90 Rodriguez-Iglesias, G. C., “Mackenzie-Stuart Lecture,  10. Feb.  1997”, (1998)  1 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Law 1, 2;  10.their citizens as ‘subjects’. This is a matter traditionally reserved by the sovereign states. 
For the first time in Van Gend En Loos the Court indicated that by setting up a new legal 
order the EEC Treaty also counts the individuals of the Member States as subjects. Not 
only  that,  but  by  defining  “the  legal  relationship  between  Member  States  and  their 
subjects”, the Court hinted at a change of roles. It almost feels that the Community has 
taken  the  place  of  the  national  sovereign  (e.g.  the  British  Parliament)  in  exercising 
sovereign rights. This includes of course its ability to produce legislation that has direct 
effect on individuals. This however does not imply that a state is precluded from enacting 
rules that are in conflict with Community law.
Although in Van Gend en Loos the Court affirmed that the Community is a “new 
legal order of international law”,  a year after, it surpassed the term  “international”,  by 
moving towards its  autonomy in  Costa v ENEL91. In  Costa the Community legal order 
was no longer, as in Van Gend “a new legal order of international law”. It was more of 
“an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States”,  a new legal order within 
national law so to say. The doctrines of direct effect and supremacy gave grounds to the 
prevalence of the Community’s legal order over national legislation. Both decisions were 
not just  about  rearticulating  common  principles  of international  law.  The  “new  legal 
order”  wording  is  more  than  rhetoric.  Both  decisions  formed  the basis  of the  Court's 
innovative  approach  to  the  Community  legal  order  explicitly  departing  from  the 
international legal order theory.
One  though  could  argue  that  the  Court’s  conception  of  international  law  was 
somewhat blurry or even  ‘ahistorical’  at the time of the Van Gend and Costa judgment.
91 See De Witte, B.,  “Rules of Change in International Law: How Special is the European Community?”
(1994) 25 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 299;  Schilling,  “The Autonomy of the Community 
Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations” (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 389.
42Certainly, the traditional view of international law illustrates that despite the fact that a 
country  enters  an  international  treaty  for  the  benefit  of  its  individuals  (for  instance 
international  human  rights  treaties),  these  treaties  do  not  confer  direct  rights  to 
individuals per se under international law. Therefore the traditional view of international 
law  wants individual rights to be interpreted as derivative rights by reason of a state’s 
obligations  that  arise  from it being party  to  a treaty.  Accordingly,  national  courts  are 
compelled  to  comply  with  the  international  obligations  of  the  state  even  though 
individuals,  who may benefit from the  state’s  compliance with  an  international  treaty, 
cannot participate in the relevant proceedings before their national courts.
Nowadays it is acknowledged that individuals can be the subject of specific rights 
and responsibilities under international law, albeit to a limited extent. A small number of 
international  treaties  have institutionalised complaint procedures  where  individuals  are 
allowed to bring  complaints  before international  bodies  regarding breaches  by  a  state 
contrary  to  their  rights  under  the  respective  treaties.  The  Optional  Protocol  to  the 
International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights9 2   is  an  indicative  example.  The 
Protocol gives legal force to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by allowing the 
Human  Rights  Commission  to  investigate  and  judge  complaints  of  human  rights 
violations from individuals from signatory countries93. It also allows individuals to bring
92 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.  16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force March 
23, 1976.
93  Part II,  Art.  2  “Each  State  Party  to  the  present  Covenant  undertakes  to  respect  and  to  ensure  to  all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any  kind,  such  as race,  colour,  sex,  language,  religion,  political  or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”;
43their claims to the United Nations Human Rights Committee for a violation of their civic 
and political rights and fundamental freedoms under the Covenant94.
This takes us to the conclusion that the Community legal order is not the only one 
that confers rights upon individuals. However, there is no doubt that the Community and 
its laws form an inimitable complex. Although the EU cannot yet be said to possess a 
constitution, the very nature of the rights and obligations that it creates extend beyond the 
contracting states.  This justifies that it is more than  a mere international  organization. 
Yet, an orthodox approach to the world order will demonstrate that it is composed on the 
one  hand  of  several  sovereign  states  and  on  the  other  by  a  group  of  international 
organisations. The EU does not fall into any of those two categories and quite naturally 
so.  The  Constitutional  Court  of Germany  was  accurate  to  question  the  nature  of the 
Community and reject the notion of a Bundesstaat (federal state) by upholding the idea of 
a Staatenbund (a confederation of states).
(c) The Court’s Jurisprudence
The concept of judicial activism, which involves a teleological approach on the 
part of the Court,  often has negative connotations.  Its  activism,  however,  has at times 
proved to be  a necessity to point towards a legal / political Community.  As  the Court 
went beyond  a mere interpretation  of the  Community prohibition  on a Dutch customs 
duty under Article  12 EEC in  Van Gend En Loos and a question on the legality of the
94 Article  1:  A State Party to  the Covenant that becomes  a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the 
competence  of the  Committee  to  receive  and  consider  communications  from  individuals  subject  to  its 
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant.  No  communication  shall  be  received  by  the  Committee  if  it  concerns  a  State  Party  to  the 
Covenant, which is not a Party to the present Protocol.
Article 2: Subject to the provisions of Article  1, individuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated 
in the Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted all available domestic remedies may submit a 
written communication to the Committee for consideration.
44nationalisation of an Italian electricity company in Costa v ENEL, it established two of 
the most fundamental  and interrelated constitutional principles of European law:  direct 
effect and supremacy. On the basis of its jurisprudence the law of the Treaty was later 
proclaimed  as  the  Community’s  “Constitutional  Charter”  in  Le  Verts95.  As  the  Court 
became the initiator of the so-called “nouvel ordre juridique ” (new legal order) it moved 
towards replacing internationalism with European constitutionalism. Its jurisprudence has 
been such as to claim autonomy of EC law and subsequently prevalence of its legal order 
over national via the express establishment of fundamental principles of EC law.
The Court's shaping of the Community legal order has been evident in the case 
law succeeding Van Gend en Loos and Costa. In the abovementioned case of Les Verts 
for instance,  the  facilitation  of Article  173  EEC  (now  230  EC)  was  given  a positive 
characterisation  and the Court’s approach was described as teleological for interpreting 
the Treaty according to its objectives. By holding that the European Parliament is a body 
subject  to  review,  something  that  did  not  occur  earlier,  the  Court  was  attempting  to 
uphold the intention of Article 173 EEC - that Community Institutions should be subject 
to review. The power to subject the Parliament to review was not inherent within Article 
173 EEC and in that sense the Court’s interpretation was teleological. But that again is 
the  very  problem  of  the  Le  Verts  decision  since  the  Court  was  doing  more  than 
interpreting what was in the provision, by interpreting into it an element, which was not 
there.  This  takes  us  closer  to  Judge  Donner’s  definition  of  the  Court  “not  as  an
95 Case 294/83 Parti ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, at para. 23.
45international court, but as the administrative  and sometimes constitutional court of the 
Communities”96.
When it comes to the Member States, Article 234 EC sets out the rules governing 
the  co-operation  between  the  Court  of  Justice  and  the  national  courts  concerning 
preliminary references. The Court co-operates with national courts in assessing whether a 
case is  a  ‘dispute  of a purely  domestic  nature’  that falls  overall  outside  the range  of 
Community law.  The question of whether the exercise of a competence falls under the 
headline  of  shared  or  exclusive  competence  is  up  to  the  Court  of Justice  to  decide 
respecting  that  the  EC  is  competent  to  act  only  in  so  far  as  a  Member  State  cannot 
achieve the  objectives  of the  Treaty  (subsidiarity).  It  should  also  be  cautious  that  its 
actions  are  proportionate  as  to  the  aim  achieved  (proportionality).  These  are 
constitutional  limitations  or  alternatively  devices  for  ‘pause  and  rethink’  the 
Community’s competences.
Up till  now,  the Treaty never had  and till  today  does  not maintain  an  explicit 
provision to define the relationship between national and Community law. The European 
Court established the latter’s supremacy that only enabled integration to the extent,  we 
are used to nowadays.  Irrespective  of the nature  of the  Community rule,  it prevails.9 7  
From a historical point of view the European Court truly was at this stage the driving 
force or ‘motor of integration’, as Gerber9 8  would have put it, to ensure the realization of 
the politico-economic aim of European integration as laid down in the Treaty. It took a
96 Donner, A.M., “National Law and the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, 
1 CMLR (1963-64) 8, at 9.
97 Hartley, T.C.,  “The Foundations of European Community Law”,  4th  edition,  Oxford University Press,
(1998), 232.
98  Gerber,  D.,  “The  Transformation  of European  Competition  Law”,  35  (1)  Harvard  international  Law 
Journal 97
46rather practical and functional  approach in its reasoning when finding, that no national 
rule whatsoever can override Community law, as this would jeopardize the rationale of 
this very body of law called European Community."
Although the early Court rulings have been coloured as politically driven1 0 0 , the 
doctrine of supremacy according to the spirit of the Treaty is now well established in the 
Court’s judicial practice1 0 1  and from the Community’s point of view it is a settled matter. 
However, one can find a contrary situation within the Member States. As easy as it was 
for the Court to constantly proclaim precedence of EU law over national law mirrors the 
difficulty for some national courts to deal with this concept as soon as constitutional law 
was  involved  (i.e.  declared  not  to  be  applicable).  Whatever  the  conception  of 
international  law  that  a  Member  State  adopted  in  incorporating  EC  law  into  its 
constitution when it joined the Community (‘monist’1 0 2  or ‘dualist’1 0 3 ) the national courts’ 
argument is whether the incorporation of EC law within a national constitution is a mere 
delegation of power or a pure transference of sovereignty.
This is evident in the Court’s case law where even in cases of hard constitutional 
conflicts between the two norms, national judges have gone as far as threatening not to 
apply EC law, with cooperation finally prevailing. This goes back to the notion that it is
99 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970] ECR 1125, 1134; Case 48/71  Commission v Italy [1972] ECR 527, 532.
100 Weatherill, S., & Beaumont P.„”EU Law”, 3rd  ed., London , Penguin, (2000), p. 433.
101 Wyatt, D., & Dashwood, A., “European Union Law”, 4th  ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, (2000), 67.
102 A monist country is one, which already has a constitutional mechanism for the direct application of EC 
law  in its domestic legal  system. In Minister for Economic Affairs v Fromagerie Franco-Suisse  ‘Le Ski’ 
(1972) CMLR 330. The domestic judge declared that since the Belgian Constitution was silent about the 
position of Belgium in the EC, Belgium was a monist country and thus the national court could disregard 
national  legislation in favour of an EC Treaty provision. Hence, the provision of Art.  12 EEC had direct 
effect and consequently the national court was under an obligation to uphold it even if it was contrary to 
Belgian law.
103  A dualist country  is  one that needs to  legislate  in order to  transfer its powers  and  give effect to EC 
supremacy over national sovereignty.
47the national constitutions that permit primacy of EC Law. In consequence, we witness a 
peculiar situation where although national judges appear that they would not accept the 
constitutional character of EC law, they persist in enforcing the constitutional features of 
the Treaties at any rate.  In this way, to quote from Weiler,  we have “constitutionalism 
without Constitution”. The problem with this  ‘quasi-constitutional’  or for some  ‘quasi- 
federal’1 0 4   structure  lies  in  the  question  of whether the relevant  model  of governance 
employed by the EU points towards the emergence of a European form of statehood that 
will  degrade  national  institutions  to  simple  executors  of supranational  decisions.  This 
leads us to the question of how the supremacy of EC law, as recognised by the laws of 
the  Member  States,  affects  the  relationship  of  competence  between  the  European 
“constitutional” legal order and the national.
Long  before  the  adoption  of  the  Convention’s  Constitutional  Treaty,  the 
signatories  to  the  Treaty  of  Rome  fashioned  a  supra-national  legal  system  amongst 
themselves,  with  individual  enforcement  instruments  (the  Commission  and  Court)  to 
ensure compliance with the new legal norms. Since all Member States are equal under the 
Treaty, they too enjoy identical rights and duties. This uniformity can only be achieved 
by  ensuring  that,  in  the  areas  where  the  Member  States  have  agreed  to  act  as  a 
Community,  they  limit  their  own  national  competence  to  act.  However,  the  relevant 
provision  in  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  on  the  primacy  of  Community  law  over 
national10 5 ,  may  suggest  to  certain  Member  States  that  what  started  as  an  express
104  See Hartley, T., “Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems:  The Emerging Constitution of the European 
Community”, 34 American Journal of Comparative Law (1986) 229; Lenaerts, K., “Constitutionalism and 
the Many Faces of Federalism”, 38 American Journal of Comparative Law (1990) 205.
105 See Article 1-6 of the EU Constitutional Treaty [CIG 87/2/04]], which states that: “The Constitution and 
law adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it, shall have primacy 
over the law of the Member States. ”
48assignment of sovereignty has reached a climax by being included as a written provision 
in the future Constitution. It is highly unlikely that the EU Constitutional Treaty aims for 
that.  Instead  the  motive  behind  a  basic  binding  text  suggests  that  the  objectives  and 
competences of the Union along with the rights and duties of European citizens need to 
be spelled out.
An Imperfect Constitutional Order?
As illustrated in the first part of the chapter, the institutional arrangements found 
in the Union  do not allow for a single institutional framework,  despite the wording of 
Article 3 TEU. Instead one witnesses a complexity in the allocation of competences as 
split between EU institutions. Not only that but various others institutions - the so-called 
advisory bodies1 0 6  and other distinctive actors1 0 7  - have in recent years become an integral 
part of the EC / EU to add to this complexity or polyphony, depending upon one’s views.
Going back to the assumption of popular misconceptions  with reference to the 
nature of the division of competences within the EU, there is nothing -  apart from the 
existence of the  main  three  elements  mentioned  previously:  executive,  legislative  and 
judicial powers - in the Union’s institutional interplay of competences, characterised by 
great diversity  of interaction  between  its  organs,  that corresponds  to  the  allocation  of 
competences at national level. This is evidence to start making hypotheses that even after 
its constitutionalisation, the EU will not resemble the liberal democracies that compose it. 
Perhaps  this  was not intended by  the European  Convention.  A call  for a well-defined 
delimitation of competences amongst the EU Institutions as well as the former and future
106 The Committee of the Regions and the Economic Social Committee
107 The European Council and the European Central Bank
49Member States appears therefore as a method of counter-balancing the Union’s tendency 
to concentrate competence within its supranational cell.
A  first  glance  at the European  legal  order may  suggest  that  the  EU  does  not 
satisfy  the  characteristics  inherent  in  constitutionalism  since  it  does  not  maintain  a 
Constitution as a basis to define its legal order. Despite the fact that in a legal sense it 
maintains a ‘constitution’, the Treaties are not formulated as such. Even the establishment 
and  ratification  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty,  involves  a  unique  process  of 
constitutionalisation  incomparable  with  the  traditional  notion  of constitutionalism.  In 
view of that, one may claim that the assumption that there is a European constitutional 
order is imperfect from its outset, if not a fallacy, despite Bruno de Witte’s remark that 
“the  supremacy  of  EC  law  over  national  legislation...gives  to  EC  law  a  quasi­
constitutional status within the domestic legal orders”108.
Thus,  the  first  rather  traditionalist  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that  a  real 
constitution  cannot  exist  without  a  nation  state  to  uphold  it.  A  constitution,  in  the 
traditional sense of the term, as is manifested in the legal systems of the Member States is 
the supreme law of the state. By saying this, it is right to claim that no possible source of 
law is superior in the sense that it can question  the validity of the constitution and by 
reason  of  that  its  authority.  What  is  more,  the  sovereign  constituent  power  (the 
Parliament  in  the  UK)  has  the  authority  to  bind  all  sub-national  bodies.  But  most 
important, the acknowledgment of a constitution requires the acceptance of the demos so 
that democracy is exercised both in law and in fact.
108  De  Witte,  B.,  “Agreement or Constitution?”  in  J.  A.  Winter et  al.  (eds),  “Reforming  the  Treaty  on 
European Union” (1996) 3, at 12
50Raz1 0 9  distinguishes between two senses of the term constitution. He describes a 
‘constitution’ in the ‘thin sense’ as the law that establishes and regulates the main organs 
of the  government  and in  the  ‘thick  sense’  as  being  ‘constitutive’,  ‘stable’,  ‘written’, 
‘superior’,  ‘justiciable’,  ‘entrenched’,  expressing  therefore  a  ‘common  ideology’11 0 . 
Having  observed  the  principles  behind  the  concept  of supremacy  of EC  law  and  the 
subjection of the Member States to its fundamentals, a second conclusion can be made. 
One  can  refer  to  the  Treaties  as  forming  the  Union’s  Constitutional  Charter  that 
establishes a distinct and unique legal order built upon concrete constitutional guarantees 
that subordinate national law to EC law and excludes their unilateral action. Despite the 
Union’s  portrayal  of  the  Treaties  as  a  Constitutional  Charter  they  should  not  be 
misconceived  and  therefore  labelled  as  forming  a constitution  in  the  manner  we  are 
familiar with  from  national  constitutions.  Thus,  the case  of the Union’s  constitutional 
order, the actual power of which has a large effect on the nation state, involves a partial 
or total re-definition of what the term ‘constitution’ entails.
The preparation of a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe manifests more 
than anything that a constitution can survive independently of national authority. There 
may be political and social events appearing in constitutional documents without having 
safeguarded  the  content  of authority,  which  internally  is  secured  by  the  primary  and 
secondary legislative and externally with the constitution as a symbol of the existence of 
an independent and dominant nation. It is the breaking free of the constitutional discourse 
from  the  boundaries  of  state  structures  that  has  recently  released  it  from  several
109 Raz, J.,  “On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions:  Some Preliminaries” in  Alexander, L., 
(ed) “Constitutionalism; Philosophical Foundations”, Cambridge University Press, (1999).
110 For details on the meaning of those senses see also Craig, P., “Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the 
EU”, (2001) 7 (2) European Law Journal 125-150
51theoretical and practical constraints allowing its wider application to a non- state body 
such as the EU1 1 1 . Needless to say that the role of national constitutions would still be 
crucial.  Besides,  the  acceptance of a European  Constitutional  text is conditional  upon 
agreement on the text and finally prior ratification by the Member States’  legal systems 
while its absorption requires the appropriate national constitutional background.
But as the EU is neither a sovereign state, nor an international organisation it is 
rather an oxymoron to assert that its legal order is an autonomous one for the following 
reasons.  First,  it  is  not  a  state;  it  does  not  possess  the  organic  notion  of European 
peoplehood  (the  demos  hypothesis  exemplified time  and  again  by J.H.H  Weiler1 1 2 );  it 
does not have a government (although its governance and law making capacity derives 
from an interplay of its political institutions) and finally it has no territoriality. Thus, the 
supporters  of  European  constitutionalism  are  confronted  with  the  question  of  the 
democratic legitimacy or lack of ‘democratic deficit,’  which primarily rests on the fact 
that  the  Community  draws  its  legitimacy  from  a  transfer  of  normative  power  / 
competence from the national sovereigns of the Member States as representatives of their 
citizens and not from a constitutional enactment of an identified European demos.
The  Union  is  not  a  sovereign  in  itself but  is  rather  composed  by  sovereigns 
(states). It owes its very existence to the convergence of the Member States’  sovereign 
will, through their unanimous incorporation and amendments of the founding Treaties to 
their  legal  systems  and  their  entrenched  approval  of  the  Court’s  interpretations  to
111 Shaw, J., “Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union”, 6 Journal of European Public Policy
(1999)  579-597;  Zuem,  M.,  “Democratic  Governance  beyond  the  Nation-State:  The  EU  and  Other 
International Institutions” (2000) 6(2) European Journal of International Relations 183-221; Zuem, M., and 
Wolf, D., “European law and international regimes: the features of law beyond the nation state.” (1999) 5 
(3) European Law Journal 272-292.
112
Weiler,  J.H.H.,“The  State  ‘iiber alles’:  Demos;  Telos  and the German Maastricht decision”  (1995)  1 
European Law Journal 219
52them. The European  Constitutional  area as  it is  formed by  the common constitutional 
traditions  of  the  nation  states,  the  Union’s  primary  law  and  its  acceptance  by  the 
constitutions  of  the  Member  States  suggests  a  scattered  European  Constitution,  un­
codified  and  un-systematic.  To  recapitulate,  the  ‘unwritten’  European  Constitution,
although existing, lacks all those features of a traditional or contemporary constitutional
document  as  met  in  the  nation  state.  The  scattered  and  partly  unwritten  European 
Constitution  is  therefore  fashioned,  as  already  discussed,  by  the  rules  comprising  the 
Union’s primary legislation that regulate the organisation and function of the institutional 
organs of the Community; the procedures for producing secondary legislation; the way of 
amending primary Treaty provisions; measures concerning citizenship and fundamental 
rights  in  conjunction  with  the  aims  and  policies  of  the  Union,  making  also  direct 
reference to the common constitutional traditions of the Member States  as  well  as the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
One could compare the EU to a unique version of a federal state. However, as the 
substitution of national or any other identity with a monolithic European identity cannot 
be possible, similarly the establishment of a Constitutional democracy in Europe cannot 
renlace  but  onlv  enhance  the  democracy  of  the  nation  states.  This  suggests  the
unlikelihood  of  a  total  transferral  of national  competences  to  the  EU.  The  emerging 
federal union in Europe that Joschka Fischer proposed in 2000 in his “Thoughts on the 
Finality  of European  Integration”1 1 3   at the  Humboldt University  in  Berlin  is  a unique 
process and cannot be compared to the federations founded in the course of establishment
Integration“(trans. “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration”), 
Berlin, Humboldt Universitaet,  (May 2000).  English version with commentary  in Joerges, C., Meny,  Y., 
and Weiler, J.H.H. (eds) “What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity?”, EUI, Florence (2000)
113  Fischer,  J.,  “Vom  Staatenverbund  zur  Federation  -  Gedanken  tiber  die  Finalitat  der  europaischen
53of the nation states, like USA and Australia114. This is why Fischer has been criticized for 
depriving the argumentation of its force1 1 5 .  The Convention’s constitutional debate was 
not therefore about state building, since the Union is missing the attributes that make up a 
state.  Europe  is  not just  one  nation  but  more  a  confederacy  that  consists  of  several 
members eager to maintain the key characteristics of the state. These can be epitomised 
in the desire to preserve ultimate sovereignty and delicate areas of competence as well as 
the diversity of heritage, culture and language.
This leads to the conclusion that the autonomy of the EU legal order as expressed
in Costa v ENEL is at best a legal fiction. Domestic courts appear to enforce EC law out 
of  the  same  reason  that  obliges  them  to  uphold  the  legal  provisions  of  their  own 
constitutions.  Accordingly they neither  act as  the  voice of the Court at Member State 
level. They endorse EC law simply because by joining the Community, its norms have 
actually  become  part  of  their  legal  heritage.  As  was  held  in  Van  Gend  en  Loos, 
Community law is an independent body of law, unlimited in duration and an integral part 
of the legal systems of the Member States. It is the national legal systems themselves that 
create  the  obligation  of  EC  law  enforcement  under  the  relevant  provisions  in  their 
national constitutions and legislative Acts. Respectively national judges claim that it is 
their national constitutions that allow EC law to be supreme. This means that Community 
norms are not imposed on Member States against their will. It is rather the Member States
114 “In federations, whether American or Australian, German or Canadian, the institutions of a federal state 
are situated in a constitutional framework which presupposes the existence of a  ‘constitutional demos’, a 
single pouvoir constituant made of the citizens of the federation  in  whose sovereignty,  as  a constituent 
power, and by whose supreme authority the specific constitutional arrangement is rooted.”
Weiler,  J.H.H.,  “Federalism and Constitutionalism:  Europe’s  Sonderweg",  (2000)  Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Papers, NYU
115  See  Joerges,  C.,  Meny,  Y.,  and  Weiler,  J.H.H.  (eds)  “What Kind  of Constitution  for  What  Kind  of 
Polity?”,  EUI,  Florence  (2000);  Olsen,  J.P,  “An  Institutional  response  to  Herr  Fischer’s  vision  of  a 
European Federation”, (2000) Arena Working Papers, Oslo
54that partially surrendered certain areas  of competence  and part of their sovereignty by 
acceding to the Union.
55CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY COMPETENCES
Introduction
The  existing  system  of  delimitation  of  competence  was  established 
according  to  objectives  to  be  achieved  and  means  for  achieving  those 
objectives1
As regards the way competences have historically been distributed between the 
Community and the Member States they were not initially anticipated by the drafter of 
the Treaty in a way that would make them definable within express provisions appearing 
in the text of the first Community Treaties. In a way Community competences evolved 
very much in a rather accidental way while their origins can be traced to the common 
market. The absence of an adequate legal base in the Treaty implies that Member States 
‘retain competence’. Moreover, the Community is not capable of adopting acts in areas 
where  it  is  not  competent.  Such  actions,  according  to  Advocate  General  Jacobs  in 
Parliament v. Council of the EU1, could lead to a possible annulment of the legislation in 
question  through  Article  230  EC  seen  as  an  unfounded  intrusion  into  national 
competence.
In subsequent years the Member State governments have proved their position as 
custodians  of decision-making power  in  Europe.  The  Community /  Union  could  only 
exercise power where the Member States chose to grant it. However the Community has
1   European  Convention  Secretariat,  “Delimitation  of Competence between  the  European  Union  and  the 
Member States -  Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be explored”,  [CONV 47/02], Brussels, (15 
May 2002)
2 Case C-316/91 Parliament v Council of the EU [1994] ECR 1-00625
56acquired increasing competences in areas around the internal market, specifically due to 
the trend of Treaty revisions to elevate the role of qualified majority voting. For instance, 
extra powers to act to ensure the functioning of the internal market were granted to the 
Community  by  means  of  introducing  qualified  majority  voting  to  Article  95  EC. 
Furthermore, the attainment of a Community objective in the course of the operation of 
the common market has during the years of treaty amendments necessitated the use of 
Article 308 EC as a ‘catch all* provision (when there is insufficient textual basis for the 
Community  to  legislate)  that  although  residual  this  power  has  proved  wide  ranging. 
Frequent recourse to those provisions by the Community has formed the root of vertical 
disputes  between  the  former  and  the  Member  States  over  whether  EC  legislation  is 
founded on the appropriate Treaty basis or constitutes a  ‘competence creep’  into areas 
traditionally reserved to the nation state.
This  chapter  will  provide  a historic  overview  of the  way  internal  Community 
competences developed vertically on a Treaty-by-Treaty basis.  The  so-called Treaty of 
Paris (1951) established the European Coal and Steel Community; the following Treaty 
of Rome (1957) established the European Economic  Community;  the Single European 
Act (1986) provided for the completion of the internal market; the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1992)  established  a  fairly  fundamental  restructuring  of  the  treaties;  the  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001) introduced other changes in line with 
the growing importance of policy co-ordination in areas such as economic and monetary 
policy. Finally this chapter will put EC competences into the current context of European 
constitutionalisation by presenting the approach of the Laeken European Council and the 
European Convention in relation to internal EU competences and briefly examining how 
these appear as a whole in its Constitutional Treaty.
571.  The ECSC and Euratom
The Treaty that established the European Coal  and Steel  Community3  and later 
the European Atomic Energy Community,  the  so-called Euratom4,  only went as  far as 
allowing competences to be exercised in  a common  fashion by  the  Member States  or 
High Contracting Parties that “having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due 
form, have agreed as follows”5.
Although the ECSC expired on July 23, 20026, almost fifty years after its entry into 
force, today it is rather symbolic in terms of competences that Member States from an early stage 
of integration  undertook  the  task  of pooling  their  coal  and  steel  resources  together  lifting 
restrictions on imports and exports creating therefore a single coal and steel market. The rationale 
of the ECSC’s founding fathers was to promote political integration (not that they anticipated the 
level of integration EU has reached at present) by starting with economic integration, on a gradual 
basis. Neofunctionalist thinkers would have expected that future integration would be fashioned 
similarly to the evolution from coal and steel to atomic energy through spill over of national 
policy sectors to the Community7. According to Lindberg8  ‘‘...’spill-over’ refers to a situation in 
which a given  action, related to a specific goal can be assured only by taking further action,
3 The Treaty of the European Coal  and  Steel Community (ECSC),  or Treaty of Paris,  was  signed on  18 
April 1951  and came into force on 25 July  1952. It makes visible its supranational method of integration 
through explicit reference to the future establishment of a European Federation.
4 The Euratom Treaty also signed in Rome along with the EEC was concluded for 50 years (Art. 97). It was 
therefore a sector-specific Treaty of limited application.”
5 This wording appears both in the ECSC and Euratom Preambles of the Treaties
6 Following the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, the field of competence of the European Economic and Social 
Committee will extend to the coal and steel sectors.
7  “In a nutshell, it [Neofunctionalism] identifies several paths toward greater integration, recognizing that 
any shift of political authority from the national to the supranational level will engender opposition, as well 
as  support.  Neofunctionalism emphasizes  sub-national  actors  and  transnational  coalitions  pursuing  their 
own  material or ideological  interests.”  Btithe, T.,  “The politics  of Competition  in  European  Union:  The 
First 50  Years”,  Proto-Paper prepared  for the Conference of the  State of the European Union  (Vol.  8), 
Princeton University, September 16, 2005
8 Lindberg,  L.,  “The Political Dynamics  of European Economic Integration”,  Stanford University Press, 
USA, (1963), at 10
58which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.” Yet the history 
of European integration itself demonstrates that Member States on occasion restrict the grant of 
competences to the Community to these powers they have agreed to confer, and no more. Thus, 
before trade liberalisation would lead to economic harmonisation and ultimately to spill over into 
political areas leading towards a political Community, the European integration process would 
need to take into account national diversity. Hoffmann wrote in 19669  that “every international 
system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the diversity of domestic determinants,  geo- 
historical situations, and outside aims among its units”.
As to the Euratom Treaty, although it has been overshadowed by the EEC Treaty signed 
at the same time; it is still in force and surprisingly with the same aim of developing the nuclear 
industry despite the fact that the context has in recent years radically changed1 0. Seeing it from a 
competences  angle,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  the  European 
Commission acquired the status  of a  supranational regulatory  authority  in  three  areas; 
radiation protection; supply of nuclear fissile materials and nuclear safeguards. But since 
the Treaty makes no reference to  fixed criteria as  regards  the  standardisation  of design, 
operation  and  maintenance  of  nuclear  installations,  regulatory  activities  in  this  sphere 
evolved by means of the national authorities and to a lesser degree by International Organisations 
/  Agencies1 1 .  However  in  Commission  of the  European  Communities  v  Council  of the
9 Hoffmann,  S.,  “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe”, 
(1966) 95 Deadalus 862-915, at 864
10 See Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EURATOM) No 2587/1999 defining the 
investment projects to be communicated  to the Commission in accordance with Article 41  of the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy  Community  (presented by the Commission)  COM/2003/0370; 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: COM (2002) 605 final 
“Nuclear Safety in the European Union”
1 1   The  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety  for  instance  was  adopted  in  1994  by  a  diplomatic  conference 
convened by the International  Atomic Energy Agency.  It was also ratified by all the Member States and 
entered into force in 1996.
59European Union1 2  the Court stressed that Euratom possesses competences under the EC 
Treaty  to  establish  a  legislative  and  regulatory  framework  governing  the  design, 
operation and safety of nuclear installations affecting public health1 3. Those competences, 
the Court held,  should have been mentioned in the declaration attached to the Council 
decision approving the Euratom’s accession to the International Convention on Nuclear 
Safety. Further to that, the authority of the Euratom to oblige its Member States to set up 
funds for financing the decommissioning of nuclear facilities is questionable given that 
no  explicit  competence  to  do  so  springs  out  of  the  Treaty14.  The  nuclear  package 
presented by the European Commission in November 20021 5  was an attempt to alleviate 
problems related to  the  vertical  limits  of competence between  the  Community  and its 
Member States within the framework of the Euratom Treaty. Yet, one may criticise it as a 
means  for  the  EU  to  disguise  developing  nuclear  power.  Universal  nuclear  safety 
standards are maintained without such a  ‘package’,  given that both EU Member States 
and accession countries  are already party to the International  Atomic Energy Agency’s 
Nuclear Safety Convention.
It is peculiar that at the fringes of the Union’s constitutionalisation, the Euratom Treaty 
remains  an independent  settlement and has not yet been  reformed by any  Intergovernmental 
Conference  revising  previous  Community  Treaties.  This  perhaps  reflects  the  Community’s
12 Case C-29/99 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR 
1-11221
1 3  The Court concluded that it is not appropriate to draw an artificial distinction between the protection of 
the health of the general public and the safety of sources of ionising radiation.
14  To  some  Member  States  potential  financing  of  the  nuclear  industry  from  public  funds  seems 
unacceptable.  See  Art.  30  ff.  of the Euratom Treaty;  “A review  of the situation  of decommissioning  of 
nuclear installations in Europe”, European Commission report (DG XI/C3) EUR 17622 (1997).
15 “Towards a Community Approach to Nuclear Safety” (2002), The package was aimed to make the point 
that only a common approach by EU Member States can guarantee that high nuclear safety standards will 
be maintained in an enlarged EU. The Commission’s proposals included the establishment of a directive 
defining the basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations during operation 
and decommissioning.
60troubled legal jurisdiction in the area of nuclear safety accompanied by continuous calls 
for Member States to retain their own national responsibility over nuclear regulations. 
While working on the EU Constitutional Treaty, the Convention addressed the Euratom 
question, although not very satisfactorily one could argue. The updating of the Union’s 
Constitution  could  as  well  imply  an  express  statement  within  the  EU  Constitutional 
Treaty of Euratom’s  expiration  time by  20071 6.  The  Convention’s  Praesidium instead, 
feeling  that  that  issues  interconnected  to  Euratom’s  application  had  not  been  raised 
previously in the Laeken Declaration, decided to adapt it to the new provisions of the EU 
Constitutional  Treaty  by  adding  a  relevant  protocol,  which  will  ultimately  leave  its 
independent legal status intact1 7.
On  the  other  hand,  a  debate  led  by  Civil  Society  Groups1 8   and  Green  Party 
members of the European Parliament, may raise a case before the ratification of the EU 
Constitutional  Treaty  against having  Euratom  altogether  as  a  freestanding  part.  Since 
health protection,  waste disposal and treatment and decommissioning of nuclear power 
stations  (to  name  but  a  few)  may  fit  under  the  environmental  title  of  the  EU 
Constitutional  Treaty,  there  seems  to  be  no  substantial reason  why  the environmental 
policy  competences  of  the  Union  should  not  also  allow  the  adoption  of  minimum 
standards  to be  taken  on  all  energy issues  with  environmental  consequences.  The EU 
Constitutional  Treaty  has  introduced  an  energy  section  (Article  III-256),  which
16 Following the 50-year time period of expiration given to the ECSC (1952-2002).
17  Treaty  Establishing  a  Constitution  for  Europe,  Signed  in  Rome  by  the  Representatives  of  the 
Governments of the Member States,  October 29, 2004,  [CIG 87/2/04], Protocol 36 Amending the Treaty 
Establishing  The  European  Atomic  Energy  Community:  “The  High  Contracting  Parties  recalling  the 
necessity that the provisions of the  Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy  Community  should 
continue to have full legal effect’’.
18 On Monday, 3 March 2003 a number of Civil Society Groups urged (via a declaration) the Convention to 
abolish Euratom. See http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2003/MJ  03  March  declaration.htm
61establishes shared competence for energy policy and specifies the objectives of European 
energy  based  on  the  establishment  of  the  internal  market.  Furthermore,  the  Euratom 
Treaty  has  been  annexed  to  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  as  a  separate,  stand-alone 
Treaty from the legal entity of the European Union. This compromise reached within the 
Convention has been welcomed by environmental groups1 9  as it gives Member States the 
right to abandon Euratom without consequences for their membership of the Union.
2.  The EEC Treaty
The  Euratom  model  (“resolved  to  create  the  conditions  necessary  for  the 
development of a powerful nuclear industry.. .’,20) was almost adopted by the EEC Treaty, 
also  known  as  the  Treaty  of  Rome.2 1   In  the  EEC  Treaty,  however,  the  extent  of 
Community powers appeared implicitly by reason of its objectives as these were stated 
respectively in Articles 2 and 3 of the EEC Treaty centering round its task of establishing 
a  common  market  along  with  its  four  freedoms  (free  movement  of  persons,  goods, 
services and capital)  and an economic and monetary union.  The abstractness  of these 
aims and objectives made it necessary for the Community to maintain a ‘safety clause’. 
This, also known as a ‘safety valve’, would actually stand as a technical formulation of 
the assignment of powers to the Community should the powers conferred by the Treaty 
be too limited.  Such a clause was included within the Treaty in the face of Article 235 
EEC (now 308), which states as follows:
19 Gorlach, B.,  and Meyer-Ohlendorf,  “Energy Policy in the Constitutional Treaty”, Ecological Briefs, A 
Sustainable Constitution for Europe, (December 2003), available at http://www.ecologic.de
20 See the Preamble of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [CIG 87/2/04]
21 The  Treaties  of  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community (EAEC,  otherwise known  as  Euratom'), or the Treaties of Rome,  were signed on  25  March 
1957 and came into force on 1 January 1958
62“If  action  by  the  Community  should  prove  necessary  to  attain,  in  the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community and this Treaty has  not provided the necessary powers,  the 
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.”
Although Article 235 EEC was to be considered only if a Community measure 
could not be based on any other provision of the Treaty, fields not included in the EEC 
Treaty,  were  gradually brought under the umbrella of Community law  by  way  of the 
broad  application  of the  provision22.  Thus,  Community  objectives  under  the  common 
market were gradually extended by Community Institutions to regulate inter alia trading 
companies23,  energy  policy2 4   and  financial  services25.  Not  to  mention  how  increasing 
resort to the Article also affected vocational training26, social policy27, drugs monitoring28, 
and the environment29. The Treaty of Rome still provides the basis for the most part of 
the European Union's decisions and responsibilities and it has been added to by a number 
of other Treaties and protocols over the years.
22 In Opinion 2/94 (1996) the ECJ held with reference to Article 235:  “That provision, being an integral 
part of the  institutional  system based  on  the principle of conferred powers,  cannot  serve  as  a basis  for 
widening the scope of Community powers beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the 
Treaty as a whole and, in particular, by those that define the tasks and the activities of the Community.”
23  See Council  Regulation No 40/94  of 20.12.1993  on  the  Community  trade  mark  (OJL11,  14.1.1994); 
Council Regulation No 2309/93 of 22.7.1993 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and 
supervision of medical products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medical Products. (OJL 214, 24.8.1993)
24  Includes  framework  programmes,  international  cooperation  measures  and  conclusion  of international 
agreements. See for instance Council Decision of 14 December 1998 adopting a multiannual programme to 
promote international cooperation in the energy sector (1998-2002).
25  See  Council  Regulation  No  907/73  of  30.4.1973  setting  up  a  European  Monetary  Fund  (OJL  89, 
5.4.1973)
26 Council Regulation No 337/75 (OJL 39, 13/2/1975)
27 Council Regulation No 90/73 (OJL 89, 5.4.1973); Council Regulation No 1062/94 (OJL 216, 20.8.1994)
28 Council Regulation No 302/93, (OJL 36, 12.2.1993)
29 Council Regulation No 1210/90 (OJL 120, 11.5.1990)
63Before  the  Single  European  Act,  the  objectives  of the  Community  were  once 
more elaborated by the Commission’s Internal Market White Paper30, approved in June 
1985  by  the  European  Council  in  Milan31.  The  White  Paper  spelt  out  the  legislative 
programme  for  the  completion  of  the  ‘internal  market’  listing  about  three  hundred 
legislative  measures  of  harmonisation  to  be  taken,  grouping  them  under  three  main 
objectives:  i) The elimination  of physical barriers, by abolishing checks  on  goods and 
persons at internal frontiers, ii) The elimination of technical barriers by breaking down 
the frontiers of national regulations on products and services, by harmonisation or mutual 
recognition,  iii)  The  removal  of  fiscal  barriers  /  elimination  of  tax  frontiers:  by 
overcoming the obstacles created by differences in indirect taxes, by harmonisation or 
approximation of VAT rates and excise duty.
3.  The Single European Act
The Single European Act (SEA)3 2  did not refer explicitly to the abovementioned 
White Paper,  although the Intergovernmental Conference that concluded the Treaty did 
so in one of the declarations contained in the Final Act.3 3  The SEA led to the adoption of 
a  programme  of numerous  measures  to  complete  the  Community's  ‘internal  market’, 
which  under  Article  8A  EEC  replaced  the  well-established  notion  of  the  ‘common 
market’.  It also gave the Community competence in the area of the environment under
30  European  Commission,  “Completing  the  Internal  Market:  White  Paper  from  the  Commission  to  the 
European Council”, Milan, 28-29 June 1985; COM (85) 310
31 Conclusions of the European Council in Milan, 28-29 June 1985
32  The  then  twelve  Member  States  signed  the  Single  European  Act  in  February  1986.  It  was  a  major 
revision to the original EEC Treaty or Treaty of Rome and became applicable the following year. It was 
intended,  as from  1  January  1993, to open up a huge internal  market where goods,  capital,  services  and 
people could circulate freely within the Community.
33 Declaration on Article 8A of the EEC Treaty, OJ (1987) L 169/24
64the legal basis of the now Article  174 and the procedural basis of Article  175 EC34. The 
single  market  imperative  was  back  then  more  clearly  foreseen  and  the  systematic 
harmonisation of national rules was taken even further.
The  SEA’s  contribution  to  European  integration  was  large,  first  by  giving  a 
specific concept of the internal market in the Treaty also providing for its completion by 
31 December 19923 5  and second by introducing qualified majority voting in a number of 
areas previously decided by unanimity. Especially as regards the second parameter, the 
SEA  started  a  tradition  followed  by  subsequent  Treaty  revisions  at  Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice. Among the areas3 6  to be decided under qualified majority was the 
approximation of national legislation under the general clause of Article  100a (now 95 
EC) so that it provided as follows:
34 Folmer, H., and Jeppesen, T., “Environmental Policy in the European Union: Community Competence vs 
Member State Competence”,  94  (4) Tijdschrift voor Economische en  Sociale Geografie 510,  (September 
2003)
35 Article 18 (8a)
36 Amendment of the common customs tariff [Article 26(28)], free provision of services  [Article 49 (59), 
second paragraph] and free movement of capital (Article 70, repealed subsequently)
65Article 100a
By  way  of  derogation  from  Article  100  and  save  where  otherwise 
provided  in  this  Treaty,  the  following  provisions  shall  apply  for  the 
achievement of the  objectives  set out  in  Article  7a.  The  Council  shall, 
acting in  accordance with the procedure referred to in Article  189b  and 
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures 
for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation  or 
administrative  action  in  Member  States  which  have  as  their  object  the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.
The  increasing  use  of  qualified  majority  voting  into  the  Council’s  legislative 
practices had a double impact on the vertical allocation of competences. First it stripped 
Member States of their power to veto EC legislation through unanimous voting. This has 
created a trend towards  enhancement of the  Community’s  functional  competences,  an 
example that,  as  mentioned,  was  followed by  subsequent Treaty  amendments.  This  of 
course gave more political weight to EC decisions since the acts of the Council no longer 
require that every Member State is in agreement. Second, such a horizontal change has 
raised the apprehension of the Member States as to the level of importance of ensuring 
the legitimacy of decisions taken within the area of EC competences. This is evidently 
the  vehicle  to  maintain  national  control  over EC  decisions.  The  necessity  to  promote 
legitimacy  at  European  level  has  thus  become  strongly  linked  to  the  political 
responsibility  of the  EC  and  the  determination  of the  limits  of its  competence.  It  is 
arguable  whether  at  the  time  Member  States  were  in  a  position  to  ascertain  the 
consequence of the otherwise technical redefinition of the ‘common market’ to  ‘internal 
market’ by Article 8A EEC.
66As  already  illustrated,  although  the  SEA  did not cause  an  immediate  political 
blast it was more of a silent revolution adding to the broadening of Community functional 
competences over the Member States. This was achieved via the use, or abuse to the most 
cynical, of the technique of “approximation of legislation” under Articles  100 and  100a 
(now 94 and 95)37, already existent in the EEC Treaty38. The innovation of the SEA was 
to repackage these provisions  as  an integrated plan for the internal market so that the 
dominant purpose for employing them should be economic where other purposes should 
be included only in so far as they are incidental to some economic purpose. This simply 
means that Articles  94 and 95  EC  are  still  today  only relevant insofar  as  the  internal 
market is concerned, whereas Article 308 EC is still an umbrella provision allowing for 
open Community competence. In that respect, Article 308 EC it gives the Community the 
opportunity to decide its competences contrary to what the German Constitutional Court 
has said about the EU’s lack of ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’.
With the Delors Report of 19893 9   and its subsequent approval by the European 
Council  summit  in  Madrid  in  June  198940,  the  Community’s  plan  for  achieving  a 
progressive  transfer  of  decision-making  power  on  monetary  policy  matters  to  the 
supranational institutions via establishing a European system of central banks gave even
37 “By the deadline, most of the 1992 target had been met. Over 90 % of the legislative projects listed in the 
1985 White Paper had been adopted, largely by using the majority rule.” European Parliament Fact Sheets, 
“3.1.0. Principles and general completion of the internal market”
38 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, 22nd Report, VI Sessional papers 1977- 
78, (H.L.131), HMSO, (1978) This report is an attempt to make certain the extent of the Council's powers 
under Article 100, and to examine the purposes for which the powers have been used hinting some loss of 
national sovereignty.
39 “Delors Report: together with the proceedings of the Committee, minutes of evidence and an appendix”, 
House  of  Commons  Treasury  and  Civil  Service  Committee,  (341)  Sessional  Papers  1988-89,  HMSO, 
(1989)
40 Presidency Conclusions,  15 & 16 December 1995, at http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/madl  en.htm. 
It gave name to the single currency in  1995, EURO and established the date of the beginning of the third 
stage of the EMU, January 1, 1999.
67greater boost  to  the  internal  market  objective.  By  reason  of that,  broader  power  was 
attributed to the Treaty for elimination of all market frontiers and tariff barriers, which 
consequently  can  be  translated  as  widening  the  application  of  Article  308  EC.  This 
gradual growth of the Treaty’s application and therefore competence reaffirms Monnet’s 
‘functionalist  theory’  of  economic  cooperation  within  a  free  market  economy  and 
guarantees  the  supremacy  of  the  supranational  legal  order  that  slowly  but  steadily 
proclaims its rule of law to be a basic principle for the assessment of both governmental 
and  Community  authorities’  acts.  This  became  more  visible  in  due  course  especially 
since the succeeding Treaty of Maastricht emphasised the transnational character of the 
EC  necessitating  a  widening  of  its  activities  beyond  the  mere  economic.  This  is 
something  received  with  particular  suspicion  by  the  Member  States’  Institutions 
(particularly  the  Bundesrat  always  eager  to  protect  the  prerogatives  of the  Lander*1 ) 
taking into account that control at national level has become inadequate.
4.  The Treaty of Maastricht
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) or Treaty of Maastricht, followed along the 
lines of the SEA and took the Delors Report one step further by providing inter alia for 
the setting up of an economic and monetary union (EMU); the development of common 
foreign and security policies (CFSP); cooperation on justice and home affairs (JHA)4 2  and 
the confirmation or extension of Community powers in education (Art  149 EC), trans- 
European  networks,  industry,  health,  culture,  consumer  protection  and  development 
policy. Pillarisation, a new term for the European Economic Community became a norm
41 Bundesrat, Decision  1081/01, “Resolution on the division of competences in the context of discussions 
on the future of the EU”, Session 771, (December 2001)
42 Both areas of CFSP and PJCC were excluded from the supranational Community legal order and handled 
through purely intergovernmental techniques.
68for what was to be named the European Union, a structure set up on three distinct pillars, 
a supranational (EC) and two intergovernmental (CFSP and JHA).
The SEA ‘market building’ imperative became a ‘market completion’ objective in 
Maastricht, which resulted to further harmonisation / subordination of national policies to 
Community  internal  market  legislation.  Thus,  the  TEU  will  on  the  one  hand  be 
remembered as the most dramatic extension of Community’s competences inserting a big 
range of legal bases to the Treaty.  On the other hand it will be recalled for introducing a 
number  of  restrictive  devices  /  structures  such  as  the  three  pillar  system;  the 
complementary  character  of  Community  interventions4 3   and  last  but  not  least  the 
principle  of  subsidiarity,  which  constitutes  a  subject  of  extensive  academic  debate 
sometimes reduced to a mere  ‘background noise’  than an effective constitutional check 
on the exercise of Community powers.
Even if the extent of Articles 94, 95 and 308 EC grew over the years from simply 
being  collateral  features  of  the  common  market  to  fully  equipped  harmonisation 
measures,  this  was  a  growth  with  restrictions.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  formulated  the 
principles  of subsidiarity  and  proportionality  in  Article  3b  (now  Article  5  EC)  in  an 
attempt to provide an answer to those eager to hold the Community accountable for its 
lack of a system of competences44. By establishing that the Community competences are 
attributed,  the  Treaty  made  explicit  that  there  are  ‘limits’4 5   in  the  EC  sphere  of
43 This concept, introduced in the TEU, invites the Commission and Member States to work more closely 
together deciding who is best placed to do what in a continuous cooperation. Yet, the search for improved 
complementarity has been a rather difficult process and rather a political slogan than a practical reality of 
mutual contribution in policy making. The Commission has feared that some Member States may use the 
complementarity debate to reduce EC competencies and budgets.
44 Art.7EC  also requires  each  institution to  act within the limits  of the powers  conferred  upon it by the 
Treaty.
45 Art.5 EC “The Community must act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty and 
the objectives assigned to it.”
69competences and implicit that the Member States have residual powers. In October 1992, 
the Birmingham European Council4 6  confirmed that decisions should be taken as closely as 
possible  to  the  citizen  under  Article 5  EC.  The  same reasoning  was  followed  by  the 
Edinburgh European Council of December 1992.
Article  5  EC  expressly  established  that  the  Community  lacks  ‘Kompetenz 
Kompetenz  for  it  is  not  capable  of enlarging  its  own  competence  over  matters  not 
covered by the Treaty. Ironically, Article 5 EC operates in full armour save those areas 
where the EC has exclusive competence; the application of Article 308 can be triggered; 
or the utilisation of Articles 94 and 95 EC go far beyond achieving the objective of the 
internal market. As regards the application of Article 308 EC, the Maastricht Treaty did 
not introduce any new changes while the provision still granted the Union the power of 
creating  new  competences  for  the  establishment  of the  prolonged  ‘free  trade  area’47. 
Unfortunately,  the  tripartite  ‘pillarisation’  at Maastricht,  which  kept competences  in  a 
somewhat firm  division between the  supranational  (EC)  and intergovernmental  (CFSP 
and JHA), did not succeed in achieving a balance as regards the vertical distribution of 
internal  Communitarised  competences  between  the  Community  on  the  one  hand  and 
Member States on the other. This can be justified due to the fact that the flaws of the 
European Economic Community were transferred to the renamed European Community.
Yet, as previously stressed, the EC widened in Maastricht its activities beyond its 
economic imperative boosting its political and moral ethos. It is not certain whether this 
owes more to its market completion or to the social / human element that the Community
46  See Birmingham European Council  in  October  1992, The Conclusions  of Presidency  are  available  at 
www.europarl.eu.int/summits/birmingham/default  en.htm
47  See Edinburgh  European  Council,  December  11  -   12,  1992.  The  Conclusions  of the  Presidency  are 
available at www.europarl.eu.int/summits/edinburgh/default  en.htm
70cultivated in the Treaty. The constitutionalisation of EC citizenship under Article  17 (1) 
EC can be seen as part of this evolution in building up an inclusive notion of political 
belonging despite the wording of the provision that citizenship “shall complement and 
not  replace  national  citizenship.”  What  also  added  to  the  human  element  of  the 
constitutional  equipment of the new-founded Union  was the introduction  of Article  6 
TEU. In its second paragraph Article 6 embodies the express commitment of the Union to 
observe  fundamental  rights.  There,  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  /  power  to  review  the 
conformity of acts of the Institutions in relation to Article 6 (2) is set out by Article 46 (d) 
TEU48.  The  development  of  concrete  and  shared  supranational  values  far  from 
domestically coloured policies  goes back to the notion of a political  belonging to  the 
European Polity.
The notion of political belonging is vital to the subject of competences due to its
relation to the broader horizontal relationship between the individual as a ‘subject’ of the
”       -   -   ...        . .     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
national legal system and the national sovereign body as the  ‘master’. According to the
Court, international law merely regulates the relationship between the states and does not
count their citizens as ‘subjects’. This is a matter traditionally reserved by the sovereign
states. For the first time in  Van Gend En Loos the Court indicated that by setting up a
new  legal  order,  the  EEC  Treaty  also  counts  individuals  of  the  Member  States  as
‘subjects’. Not only that, but by defining “the legal relationship between Member States
and  their  subjects”,  the  Court  hinted  at  a  change  of roles.  It  almost  seems  that  the
Community’s transnational level of policy-making has to a certain degree taken the place
48 The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal  and  Steel  Community  and  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
concerning  the  powers  of the  Court of Justice  of the  European  Communities  and  the  exercise of those 
powers shall apply only to the following provisions of this Treaty: (d) Article 6 (2) with regard to action of 
the  institutions,  in  so  far  as  the  Court  has  jurisdiction  under  the  Treaties  establishing  the  European 
Communities and under this Treaty.
71of the national sovereign (e.g. the British Parliament) in exercising sovereign rights. This 
includes of course its capacity to produce legislation that has direct effect on individuals. 
This does not imply that a state is precluded from enacting rules that are in conflict with 
Community law, but the insertion of Citizenship and Human  Rights  within the Treaty 
proper  have  created  a  momentum  towards  a  widely  shared  appreciation  of  the  vast 
political and legal weight of the Community. The increasing political / legal consequence 
of the Community has not escaped national scepticism as regards the cost of the gradual 
increase in power at European level. The preservation of national autonomy, including 
regulatory freedom, still worries most Member States. Such concerns are not unjustifiable 
given  that  both  vertical  and  horizontal  constitutional  limitations  to  Community’s 
ambitions  cannot provide  such  safety.  The  former  (vertical)  subsidiarity  falls  short of 
defining the exclusive competences of the EC and the latter (horizontal) unanimity has 
given its place to qualified majority in most policy areas, meaning that the national veto 
can no longer strike out unwanted legislative proposals in the Council.
Such a climate has encouraged a cautious stance on the part of the Member States 
as regards their tolerance to accepting changes in the architecture  of the  supranational 
organisation.  For instance,  by ratifying the  Maastricht Treaty,  Germany  made  express 
that  it  did  not  submit  itself to  an  uncontrolled  automatism  towards  Monetary  Union 
pointing  to  a  lack  of democratic  legitimisation  of  the  EC  Institutions.  According  to 
Article 38 GG:
72“Any German citizen with the right to vote is guaranteed the subjective 
right to participate in the election of the German Federal Parliament, and 
thereby to co-operate in the legitimation of State power by the people at a 
federal level, and to influence the implementation thereof.”
This  provision  of German  Basic  Law  constitutes  the  minimum requirement of 
democratic legitimation to which national citizens are subject. The fundamental right of 
individuals to participate in national  elections can be violated once the exercise of the 
responsibilities  of  the  German  Parliament  is  transferred  extensively  to  one  of  the 
Institutions of the Community. If, for instance, the Council enacts legislation that goes 
beyond the authority delegated by the German parliament, then the German government 
(that represents  Germany  in  the  Council)  would  violate  the  separation  of powers  by 
engaging in executive law-making. In October 1993, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court  (BverfG)  issued  its  Brunner  /  Maastricht  decision49,  which  upheld  the 
constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht.  The morale behind the judgement of the
BverfG  can  be  summarized  in  that  when  EC  Institutions  act  beyond  their  attributed
powers bestowed to them by Article 24 GG (reception of EC legal  order)  the German
state  organs,  by  reason  of constitutional  law,  would  automatically be  prevented  from
applying these legal acts in Germany.
The case before the BverfG thus raised -  according to Steve J.  Boom 5 0 -  two 
rather  interconnected  although  discrete  questions  namely:  i)  the  expansion  of  EU 
competences through treaty amendment and ii) the interpretation, and potential existence 
of  “absolute”  limits  to  European  integration.  The  fact  that  most  new  competences
49 Brunner v European Union Treaty [1993] BVerfGE 89, 155 / CMLR [1994] 57
50 Boom, S.J., “The European Union after the Maastricht Decision: Is Germany the “Virginia of Europe?” 
(1995) 43 American Journal of Comparative Law 177
73attributed to the Community through the periodic Treaty revision are supplementary in  / 
nature (Article 176; 137 and 153 EC)5 1  in conjunction to the Court’s Tobacco Advertising 
dicta may demonstrate that on the whole national preference for producing stringent rules 
and  regulatory  experimentation  have  been  preserved  in  the  course  of  European 
integration despite the re-emergence of the Community with a novel political and legal 
ethos.
5.  The Treaty of Amsterdam
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in  1999, further strengthened 
the arrangements for CFSP; transferred visas, asylum and immigration policies from the 
third  intergovernmental  pillar  (JHA)  into  the  Community  pillar  and  framework  and 
provided for the merger of the EC Treaty (Title IX) and the Social  Agreement (1992) 
annexed to the  Social  Protocol52.  Article  136 EC  (ex  117) reaffirms  that social  policy 
constitutes a shared competence between the Community and the Member States.  Yet, 
the incorporation of the Social Agreement extends the former powers in the improvement 
of  the  working  environment,  working  conditions,  information  and  consultation  of 
workers,  integration  of  persons  excluded  from  the  labour  market  and  sex  equality. 
Moreover, taking into account the future enlargement from the perspective of an essential 
renovation of the EU institutional  system, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced several 
reforms  to  the  functions  and  competences  of the  main  Institutions  by  way  of closer 
cooperation, which will be considered individually in a Chapter 7.
51  These provisions  govern EC competence to legislate in relation to Environmental Protection (Art.  176 
EC); Social Policy (Art. 137 EC); Consumer Protection (Art.  153 EC)
52 Additionally, the EC and the Member States have defined the social rights they hold to be fundamental 
on the basis of the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961  and the 1989 Community 
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.
74The  principle  of closer  or  enhanced  cooperation  invented  at  Amsterdam  and 
redefined at Nice, was significant in preserving flexibility and preventing certain Member 
States from setting a slow pace to the integration process. It is aimed at addressing issues 
such  as  social  affairs  (Social  Charter)  or  elimination  of  border  controls  (Schengen 
Accords) by enabling a limited group of Member States to broaden European integration 
within  the  single  institutional  framework  of the  Union.  The  very  notion  of enhanced 
cooperation is restrictive, first as regards the number of the participant states involved in 
the process (comparisons arise with Fischer’s avant garde or core Europe51) and second, 
as to its character as a last resort solution. Despite the fact that its potential is to reduce 
the tension between  the  Community vis-a-vis  the  Member  States  by  diverting  from  a 
mode  of  integration  based  around  the  principle  of  subsidiarity.  It  achieves  that  by 
introducing  progress  at  a  different  pace  and  with  different  objectives  without 
contradicting  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  Treaties  and  the  Community’s  acquis 
communautaire.
The Treaty of Amsterdam was intended, although unsuccessfully, to address the 
issues of the adaptation of Community Institutions to an enlarged and democratic Union. 
These  became  known  later  as  the  ‘Amsterdam  leftovers’.  Moreover,  Community 
competences in the spheres of common foreign and security policy  (CFSP) and police
Fischer,  J.,  “Vom  Staatenverbund  zur  Foderation  -  Gedanken  tiber  die  Finalitat  der  europaischen 
Integration“(trans. “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration”), 
Berlin, Humboldt Universitaet,  (May 2000). English version with commentary in Joerges, C., Meny,  Y., 
and Weiler, J.H.H. (eds) “What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity?”, EUI, Florence (2000)
“One possible interim step on the road to completing political integration could then later be the formation 
of a  centre  of gravity.  Such  a  group  of states  would  conclude  a  new  European  framework  treaty,  the 
nucleus of a constitution of the Federation.  On the basis of this treaty, the Federation would develop its 
own institutions, establish a government which within the EU should speak with one voice on behalf of the 
members of the group on as many issues as possible, a strong parliament and a directly elected president. 
Such a centre of gravity would have to be the avant-garde, the driving force for the completion of political 
integration and should, from the start, comprise all the elements of the future federation.”
75and judicial  cooperation  (JHA)  were not enhanced.  Instead,  as  already  illustrated,  the 
Treaty provided for a bilateral cooperation between governments and nation states. The 
text of the Treaty itself consisted of three parts, one annex and thirteen protocols. One of 
those  protocols  introduced  was  the  Protocol  on  the  Application  of  Subsidiarity  and 
Proportionality. It was aimed to codify and give legal substance to the guidelines adopted 
by the Edinburgh European Council of 199254.  Following the inclusion of Article 5 EC 
(formerly 3b) by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the initial refusal by the 
Danish  to  ratify  it,  the  Community  through  the  Subsidiarity  Protocol  attempted  to 
proceduralise the  subsidiarity principle through posing three legally-binding  guidelines 
according to which the EC may act in the areas of shared competence55:
i) When an issue has transnational aspects, which cannot satisfactorily be 
regulated by Member State action.
ii) When Member State action or lack of Community action would conflict 
with Treaty requirements.
iii)  When action at Community level would produce clear benefits of scale 
or effect.
The problem with these guidelines is that they did not address directly or even 
sufficiently the open-endedness of the principle of subsidiarity, although they have been 
credited for adding to limits of the power of the Community. But then again the nature of 
the principle of subsidiarity itself as a dynamic concept is open to interpretation not to
54
The Protocol aimed to “establish the conditions for the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality enshrined in Article 3b of the Treaty establishing the European Community with a view to 
defining more precisely the criteria for applying them and to ensure their strict adherence and consistent 
implementation by  all  institutions”  and  “to  ensure  that decisions  are  taken  as  closely  as  possible to  the 
citizens of the Union”.
55
De Burca,  G.,  “Reappraising  Subsidiarity’s  Significance after Amsterdam”,  (1999)  7/99 Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper, NYU.
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76say  a value judgement,  therefore  allowing EC  action  within  its  attributed limits to be 
expanded  once  circumstances  demand  and  vice  versa  when  there  is  insufficient 
justification to achieve Community objectives56.
The Treaty also provided the ground for a Charter of Fundamental Rights5 7  at EU 
level. At first glance, it was aimed at strengthening fundamental rights as these form an 
inherent part of the Union’s objectives rooted according to the Treaty on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of 
law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights was not only destined to raise an awareness of 
fundamental rights  among European citizens but also to supply the Community with a 
powerful human rights policy with powerful enforcement mechanisms, indispensable to 
any polity. The Union had prior to the Charter a bi-dimensional source of human rights 
borrowing  from  the  European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and 
Fundamental  Freedoms  (ECHR)  signed  in  Rome  on  4  November  1950  and  the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. This owes, according to Mancini, 
to the inadequate protection of fundamental rights within the founding Treaties that failed 
to “safeguard the fundamental rights of the individuals affected by its application”58.
The  impact  of the  German  BVerfG  ‘Solange-Rechtsprechung’  (‘so  long  as...’ 
judgements)5 9  of  the  early  Seventies  have  surely  been  critical  in  motivating  the 
establishment of a human  rights  Charter  at EU  level  as  supplementary to  the  Court’s
56 See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of the principle of subsidiarity
57  In  1998,  the European Council  held  in Cologne,  decided  to begin drafting a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The Charter  was  to be  based on  the Community Treaties,  international  conventions  such  as  the 
1950  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  the  1989  European  Social  Charter,  constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and various European Parliament declarations.
co
Mancini,  G.F.,  “The Making of a Constitution for Europe”,  (1989)  26 Common Market Law Review 
596
59 Solange I [1974] BVerfGE 37, 271 / 2 CMLR 540; Solange II [1987] BVerfGE 73, 339 / 3 CMLR 225 
(1987)
77established  human  rights jurisprudence.  However,  commentators  such  as  Coppel  and 
O’Neil6 0  adopt a critical perspective on the Court’s reactive role creating a human rights 
jurisprudence  in  response  to  challenges  to  the  supremacy  of  Community  law  from 
national courts. Indeed, the Court has accepted that the fundamental rights drawn from 
the national constitutional traditions and the guidelines supplied by international treaties 
form an integral part of the general principles of Community law. However, early in its 
case law, the Court has also emphasised upon the independence of those rights from the 
nation state claiming that “the question of a possible infringement of fundamental rights 
by  a  measure  of  the  Community  institutions  can  only  be  judged  in  the  light  of 
Community law itself.”6 1  Additionally, the Court has extended the exercise of its human 
rights jurisdiction to national measures. Weiler identifies two types of situation:  “(a) the 
agency  situation  -  when  the  Member  State  is  acting  for  and  /  or  on  behalf  of  the 
Community  and  implementing  a  Community  policy  (Klensch  and  Wachauf);  and  (b) 
when  the  State  relies  on  a  derogation  to  fundamental  market  freedoms  (£i?7\..and 
... Bauer). “6 2
Thus  the  Community  has  gradually  developed  a  general  human  rights  policy. 
Textually, the Treaty of Amsterdam attempted to secure that the Community guarantees 
fundamental rights in an adequate way. Any Member State violating human rights in a 
“serious  and persistent”  way may  lose its rights  under the  Treaty.  The  Council,  after
60 Coppel, J., and O'Neil, A., “European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?” (1992) 29 Common 
Market Law Review 669-92
61 Case 44/79 Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, Para 14 and 15.
62 Weiler, J.H.H.  and Fries,  S.C.,  “A Human rights Policy for the European Community and Union: The 
Question  of Competences”,  (1999)  4/99  Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper,  NYU.  Case  References: 
Joined Cases 201  and 202/85 Klensch v Secretaire d'Etat E0 I 'Agriculture et E0 la Viticulture [1986] ECR 
3477; Case 5/88  Wachauf v Germany [1989] ECR 2609; Case C-260/89 ERT v DEP [1991] ECR 1-2925; 
Case  368/95  Vereinigte  Familiapress  Zeitungsverlags  und  Vertriebs  GmbH  v  Heinrich  Bauer  Verlag 
[1997] ECR 3689.
78complying with different conditions, can determine the existence of a serious breach of 
the fundamental principles included in Article 6 EC by a Member State. Then acting by 
qualified majority the Council can suspend certain rights derived from the Treaty to the 
respective Member State. This may go as far as including a suspension of voting rights of 
the  representative  of the  national  government  in  the  Council.  In  February  2000,  for 
instance, the EU adopted sanctions against Austria because of the access of Jorg Haider’s 
far right party  to  the Vienna governmental coalition63.  The Union’s  attitude  again  not 
only demonstrates a clear defence of fundamental rights through a prevention of political 
views that endanger the nature of those rights but also a self-recognition of the enormous 
political and legal authority of the Community.
Last but not least, under the Treaty of Amsterdam a new Article 13 EC has been 
written into the Treaty to underline the guarantee of non-discrimination laid down in the 
Treaties and extend it to cases similar to ones cited previously. Having secured a good 
level of human rights protection and therefore some security as regards national threats 
against such a protection, the Union has moved forwards in bringing more issues under 
the competence of the Community Institutions. As a result all affairs related to the free 
movement  of persons:  including  controls  over  external  borders;  asylum;  immigration; 
protection  of rights  of third-country  nationals  as  well  as judicial  cooperation  in  civil 
matters  were  brought  under  the  umbrella  of the  Community  pillar  by  the  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam.  As a result,  the Schengen acquis6 4  became part of the supranational legal
63 Haider’s so-called Freedom Party (FPO) had obtained more than 27 percent of the votes in the Austrian 
parliamentary elections of October  1999.  See Programme of the Austrian Freedom Party  adopted on  30 
October  1997,  available at http://www.fpoe.at/:  Johnson, L.,  “On  the Inside Looking Out:  Austria's New 
OVP-FPO Government, Jorg Haider and Europe” (2000) 2(10) Central Europe Review
64 The Schengen Agreement and Convention were included in the Treaty. The UK, Ireland and Denmark 
voluntarily stayed out and reserved the right to independently exercise controls on people in their frontiers.
79framework of the Community as opposed to intergovernmental arrangements of the third 
EU pillar (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters).
However,  the  Member  States’  willingness  to  keep  intergovernmental  matters 
away from a Communitarised constitutional package shows a national fondness for the 
maintenance of the second and third pillar. This is a rational response having in mind that 
second and third pillar cooperation deals with delicate issues of national competence such 
as defence (including compulsory military service) deeply rooted to the idea of national 
sovereignty.  Their  subjection  to  Community centralisation  has  been  met  with  caution 
even by the Court itself. In the decision of the Court of Justice in Alexander Dory6 5  in a 
preliminary reference from the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Germany), it held that the 
Community provisions  of equality between men  and  women  do  not limit the right of 
Member States to compel  only men to enlist to the military  service,  although  such an 
obligation involves a delay in the career of male European citizens.
65 Case C-186/01 Alexander Dory and Federal Republic of Germany ECR 1-2479.
80... .The delay in the careers of persons called up for military service is an 
inevitable consequence of the choice made by the Member State regarding 
military organisation and does not mean that that choice comes within the 
scope  of  Community  law.  The  existence  of  adverse  consequences  for 
access to employment cannot, without encroaching on the competences of 
the Member States,  have the effect of compelling the  Member State  in 
question either to extend the obligation of military service to women, thus 
imposing  on  them  the  same  disadvantages  with  regard  to  access  to 
employment, or to abolish compulsory military service66.
Enhanced cooperation instead of Community harmonisation appears therefore as 
a preferable way of achieving integration in relation to delicate intergovernmental issues. 
Community integration of the result of enhanced cooperation (instead of harmonisation) 
could be brought in once Member States have arrived at a consensus on a given matter. 
The example of Schengen-isation6 7  as opposed to Communitarisation6 8  demonstrates the 
success of intergovernmental cooperation, Communitarised once it has reached a state of 
maturity between  its architect Member States.  The subsequent Treaty of Nice in  fact 
introduced the possibility of closer cooperation in the field of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, except for matters having military or defence implications. Procedurally,
66 Para 41  of the Alexander Dory judgement.  See also Para 39:  “The decision of the Federal Republic of 
Germany to ensure its defence in part by compulsory military service is the expression of such a choice of 
military organisation to which Community law is consequently not applicable.”; Para 42: “In the light of all 
the foregoing, the answer to the national court's question must be that Community law does not preclude 
compulsory military service being reserved to men.”
67 The term has  been  used by  scholars to  emphasise the exclusive  intergovernmental  approach  taken  in 
relation to asylum. It derives from the Schengen Convention [30 International Legal Materials 69 (1991) ]. 
Schengen was originally signed in  1985 by Germany, France and the Benelux countries on their gradual 
abolition  of their  common  borders  and  was  followed  by  an  Implementing  Convention  in  1990,  which 
entered into force on September 1993, when more countries joined except the UK, Ireland and Denmark.
68 Peers, S., “Undercutting Integration: Developments in Union Policy on Third-country Nationals”, (1997) 
22 European Law Review 76;  Marie-Claire S.F.G.  “Europe and its  Aliens After Maastricht: The Painful 
Move to Substantive Harmonization of Member States’ Policies towards Third Country Nationals”, (1994) 
42 American Society of Comparative Law 783
81the Council decides after an Opinion from the Commission, acting by qualified majority 
on the basis of a common strategy.
6.  The Treaty of Nice
The aim of the Treaty of Nice Treaty was to create the grounds for an adequate 
institutional  infrastructure for an enlarged Union.  Ironically,  similar provisions for EU 
enlargement to twenty Member States had already been included at Amsterdam. In that 
respect,  the  Treaty  of  Nice  failed  to  address  the  so-called  ‘Amsterdam  left-overs’ 
involving issues such as the size and composition of the Commission; the reweighing of 
votes in the Council of Ministers and the possible extension of qualified majority voting. 
Instead it became a renegotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam considering that important 
issues such as the status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Declaration no. 23) 
and the role of a Security and Defence European rapid reaction force, under the foreign 
and security policy (Declaration no.  1), proved to be too contentious to be agreed on at 
the Nice Summit. Consequently, these were excluded from the text of the main Treaty, 
although referred in the aforementioned relevant Declarations attached to it. However, 
the Treaty of Nice can be credited for putting  onto agenda the commencement of the 
debate  about  ‘the  Future  of  Europe’69,  which  incidentally  hinted  at  a  clear  vertical 
division of competences70.
The morphology of the enlarged Union -  political, institutional, economic -  was 
planned to be defined and framed across the debate concerning the future of Europe that
69 Additionally the Treaty did well in increasing the importance of the Court of First Instance (Articles 224 
and 225 TEC); pushing the development of enhanced co-operation [Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(Articles 27a to 27e TEU) and Police and Judicial Co-operation (Articles 40 to 40b TEU) are incorporated 
in the Treaty establishing the EC (Article 11 TEC); extending qualified majority voting in thirty-nine areas
70 Para 5 of the 23rd  Declaration on the Future of Europe (see below)
82had  already  opened in  the entire European  area  according  to  the relevant Declaration 
annexed  to  the  Treaty71.  This  annex,  drafted  as  the  23rd  Declaration,  is  of  wide 
significance taking into account that it describes the future aims of the Community both 
in  the  immediate  future  and  the  long-term.  The  issues  that  it  put  forward  for 
consideration, including a clear delimitation of competences, paved the way towards an 
Intergovernmental  Conference (IGC),  which started in Rome on October 4, 2003.  The 
IGC  worked  through  the  relevant  arrangements  regarding  the  political  future  of  the 
enlarged  European  Union  with  the  aim  of  agreeing  a  new  European  Constitution  to 
replace  the current Treaties.  The Nice  agenda that was later replicated by  the Laeken 
European Council includes:
i)  The  inclusion  of  the  Charter  of  Basic  Human  Rights  into  the  EU 
Treaties;
ii)  The  simplification  of  the  EU  Treaties  in  order  to  increase  their 
legitimacy;
Hi)  The  ordering  of  competences  between  the  vertical  and  horizontal 
layers of governance in the European Union;
iv) The future role of national parliaments in the European architecture.
Additionally,  the  Treaty  of Nice  adopted  provisions  that  should  smoothen  the 
progress of the mechanism of enhanced cooperation that, as already mentioned, allows a 
group of Member States to establish closer ties in certain areas (inside the framework of 
the EU institutions) independently from non-participant Member States. Eight Member 
States  are  therefore  required  to  form  closer  cooperation  subject  to  a  number  of
71  The  23rd  Declaration  adopted  by  the  Conference  of Nice  annexed  to  the  Treaty,  also  known  as  the 
“Declaration on the future of the Union”, SN 1247/01 REV, p 167. Treaty of Nice, Brussels, (14/02/2001)
83technicalities72.  Comparisons  to  Fischer’s  model  are  unavoidable  but,  as  argued  in 
Chapter 7, there is a fundamental difference between his example of a ‘Core Europe’ and 
enhanced cooperation. Fischer’s  ‘centre of gravity’  is made out of the most determined 
Member States to push forward the integration momentum.  If this  ‘centre’ proves to be 
fruitless  within  the  EC  framework  then  it  can  always  transform  to  an  avant-garde, 
capable  of  surviving  outside  the  Community  with  its  own  institutions73.  In  contrast, 
enhanced cooperation ought to remain within the limits of the attributed powers of the 
Community  and  should not cover its  areas  of exclusive competence.  From the  vertical 
distribution  of competences  point  of  view,  enhanced  cooperation  may  not  affect  the 
competences, rights and obligations of non-participating Member States74.
Furthermore,  it  would have been  expected that the  need  for  a Constitution  at 
European level  should be weighed up once the amendments made by the Nice Treaty 
have  been  implemented  in  an  enlarged  Union.  Reality  has  been  different  since  the 
Convention’s Constitutional Treaty was presented sooner than the Treaty of Nice came 
into  force.  This  may  raise  criticism  that  the  process  of  European  centralisation  of 
competence  has  built up  a momentum  of its own  aloof from  external  events  such  as 
enlargement,  which  in  this  case  has  almost  been  manipulated  to justify  the  Union’s 
constitutional agenda.  But one could argue that as a matter of law, the Treaty was not 
legally  necessary  to  authorise  the  accession  of the  twelve  applicant  states,  especially
72 Member States can no longer prevent closer cooperation:  the matter may be referred to the European 
Council but it is the Council of Ministers that decides by the majority provided for in the Treaties; under 
the EC Treaty, Parliamentary assent is required if closer cooperation covers a field subject to co-decision; 
an additional condition for the implementation of closer cooperation has been added: it must not jeopardise 
the internal market or economic and social cohesion.
73 Olsen, J.P., “How, Then, Does One Get There? An Institutionalist Response to Herr Fischer's Vision of a 
European Federation”, (2002) 00/22 Arena Working Paper, Oslo
74 See Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion on enhanced cooperation
84since the particulars of admission of the new candidates to the Union are negotiated in 
their individual Accession Treaties and are not inherent in any EC Treaty75.
Since the Nice Declaration on Enlargement was not at the time a legal part of the 
Treaty proper, its rejection by Ireland did not in practical terms hinder the accession of 
new  Member  States  to  the  Union.  Quite  the  opposite,  it looks  as  if the  allocation  of 
Council votes and seats in the Parliament as set out in the Declaration  was of no direct 
concern to the approaching enlargement and therefore there appears no particular reason 
why the enlargement countries could not instantly join the Union.  Hence,  the changes 
made by Nice were not necessary in order to allow an enlarged Union to function and 
ultimately decide on its vertical share of competences. Those familiar with the  ‘Fischer 
rhetoric’ would recall a similar manipulation without substance of European enlargement 
as the dominant factor that necessitates EU political reform76.
What is more, unanimity was also selected at Nice in relation to Article  133 on 
Common Commercial Policy (‘the French clause’) specifically on negotiations with third 
countries; cultural and audiovisual services;  educational services  and social and human 
health  services  and  Article  161  on  structural  funds  and  cohesion  fund  (‘the  Spanish 
clause). In a Union of twenty-five, it is more than obvious that a competence constrained 
by the unanimity requirement would not consist of a real but rather a virtual competence. 
In that respect, the Nice compromise came to a sticky end. But then again Nice could not
75 The first enlargement of the EU in 1973 when the EFT  A states (Ireland, Britain and Denmark) joined did 
not necessitate the sketching of a particular treaty signed between the founding six Member States. Neither 
did the subsequent accession of the Mediterranean states during the  1980s enlargements, or later on when 
the Scandinavian countries and Austria joined the EU in 1995.
76 The Minister spoke in contradictory terms when at the beginning of his speech in Berlin he supported the 
argument that European enlargement makes EU political reform imminent and then during the course of his 
lecture  he  declared  that  such  a change  should  take  place  in  ‘ten  years’  time.  See  Cruz,  J.B.,  “Whither 
Europe  and  When:  Citizen  Fischer  and  the European  Federation”,  7/00  Harvard  Jean  Monnet  Working 
Paper, NYU
85act towards a clear separation of the competences of the Union and the Member States. 
Even when the Treaty was compromised such delimitation was not feasible, as it would 
have been incompatible with the specificities of European integration.
Therefore all that the European Council was left with at Nice was setting the rules 
of  interplay  between  areas  decided  by  qualified  majority  and  those  determined  by 
unanimity.  The  flexibility  of the  basic  rules  and  the  institutional  mechanisms  of  the 
system, laid down by the previous Treaties, was otherwise maintained despite the calls in 
the Nice Declaration for a more precise definition of the competences and the subsequent 
reference  in  the  Laeken  Declaration  to  a  greater  and  more  transparent  division  of 
competences.
7.  The Laeken European Council / Declaration
The political dialogue as shaped at Nice, reconfirmed the fact that the views of
European leaders about the future shape of the EU substantially fluctuate in their totality.
The proposals that stood out embraced all possibilities: from a European federation to a
simple  intergovernmental  cooperation  limited  to  certain  areas.  In  the  context  of  the
debate about the future of Europe ignited by Joshka Fischer and given a public dimension
by  the Nice  “Declaration  on  the  future  of Europe”,  the European  Council  meeting  in
Laeken, in December 20017 7  introduced the European Convention, an intergovernmental
and  inter-ministerial  body  composed  not  only  of  governments’  delegates  but  also
representatives  drawn  from  the  European  and  national  Parliaments  as  well  as  the
Commission. The Convention was challenged at Laeken with a prime task: the creation
77  On December  15,  2001  the European  Council  approved the Laeken Declaration on  the Future of the 
European Union,  which  includes  a decision to  set up a broad-based Convention to pave  the  way for an 
open,  transparent  reform  of  the  EU.  The  text  is  entitled  the  Laeken  Declaration,  “The  Future  of  the 
European Union”
86of a constitutional  text as a means to unlock the debate about the future of the Union 
taking  into  account  the  need  to  familiarise  the  EU  citizen  with  the  Union’s  political 
agenda78.
The diverse political offers considered by European leaders both pre-Laeken and 
post-Laeken  demonstrate  that  the  obstacles  to  a  Constitutional  text  were  plenty  and 
visible.  The  Declaration  adopted  in  Laeken,  annexed  to  the  European  Council 
conclusions  aimed  to  commit  to  paper  an  alternative  to  the  traditional  method  of 
negotiating EU Treaties. It was therefore split into three principal elements / chapters to 
address such obstacles: i) Europe at a crossroads; ii) challenges and reforms in a renewed 
Union and iii) convening a Convention on the future of Europe. The second chapter of 
the Declaration named “challenges in a renewed Union” framed the constitutional debate 
into four central  issues,  which  aimed to summarise the Union’s  expectations  from the 
Convention.  The  aim  was  to broaden  altogether  the points  marked  down  at  the  Nice 
Summit into a well-built institutional and constitutional agenda and open a conventional 
constitutional debate. The need for a clear delimitation of competences was included. The 
four points sketched out by the European Council were the following, namely:
78 See the European Commission,  IP/01/602,  25  April  2001,  “Proposals  on  procedures  for debating the 
future of the Union”. The debate on the future of the Union comprised two features: i) It should develop in 
the  member  and  applicant  states  according  to  their traditions  and  national  and  regional  priorities;  ii)  It 
should be strengthened in taking account of the different national debates.
87i)  The  reorganization  and  simplification  of  the  Union’s  overlapping 
Treaties with a view to making them clearer and better understood without 
changing their meaning or substance.
ii) The  accurate division of the Union’s  competences  or delimitation  of 
powers between the Union and its Member States and regions reflecting 
the principle of subsidiarity.
iii) The legal status of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
iv) The role of the national Parliaments in the European structure.
The Nice “ordering of competences between the vertical and horizontal layers of 
governance in the European Union” was transformed in Laeken to an “accurate division 
of the Union’s competences or delimitation of powers between the Union and its Member 
States and regions reflecting the principle of subsidiarity.” It therefore appears, as regards 
the distribution of competences,  that the institutionalisation of the constitutional debate 
by the European  Council  at Laeken  was  merely  concerned  with point (ii) the  vertical 
dimension  /  delimitation  of powers  between  the  two  principal  actors  (EU  -  Member 
States - regions).  Alternatively,  the horizontal  division of competence,  based upon  the 
interplay of power between EC  Institutions,  was  incidentally  addressed or inferred by 
point (iv) of the Laeken list. Despite being a minor observation it appears that the issue of 
the vertical  distribution  of powers between the EU  and the  Member States  should be 
considered individually and therefore given more weight.
The  emphasis  on  the  vertical  delimitation  of  competences  demonstrates  the 
realisation that the current system of assigning competences is manifested on scattered 
Treaty  Articles  and  thus  requires  change  at  all  levels  of EC  competence  (exclusive  - 
shared - complementary). Not only that, but the Laeken European Council operated underthe impression or recognition that EU Citizens often hold expectations of the Union that 
are not always fulfilled and vice versa. It supported that EU Citizens have the impression 
that the Union takes on too much in areas where its involvement is not always essential. 
The explicit reference to the principle of subsidiarity and its reinforcement in the Laeken 
agenda proves the previous conclusion correct. Yet, the inclusion of the ‘old’ principle of 
subsidiarity within a ‘new’ constitutional debate does not suggest drastic changes in the 
exercise  of competences,  something  that  was  made  evident  in  the  EU  Constitutional 
Treaty’s  provisions  of Title  III entitled  ‘Union  Competences’.  It,  however,  portrays  a 
refusal  to  take  into  account  political  proposals  as  illustrated  in  the  unconventional 
constitutional  debate  corresponding  to  competences.  Fischer’s  strict  catalogue  of 
competences constitutes a facet of the unconventional debate that sidetracked the Nice 
and Laeken conventional agenda.
The establishment of a Kompetenzkatalog (catalogue of competences) or quasi­
constitution based upon a delineation of powers awarded to supra-national authorities and 
to national and regional bodies was the basis of Fischer’s proposal in Berlin in 2000. This 
delimitation of competences at all costs is something expected from a German politician 
at the time. One needs to take into account Germany’s early interest in a supranational 
initiative to divide competences on an equal footing between the EU, the Member States 
and the Lander or regions. Even  so,  Minister Fischer avoided the hazard of indicating 
examples  as  to  how  the  proposed  division  of  competences  should  occur  within  the 
federation.  Nor  was  the  effect  of the  Constitution  upon  subsidiarity  illustrated  in  his 
speech but was merely hinted in his version of the legislative structure of the federation 
consisting of national representatives and possibly an additional subsidiarity body, next to 
the already existing Community institutional organs.
89The  abandonment  by  the  Laeken  European  Council  of  a  positive  list  of 
competences  as  an  alternative to a European Constitution  is not due to a fundamental 
disagreement of objectives between the two. Besides, the aims of a list of competence are 
proximate to Laeken’s vision of a Constitution for Europe, which aims to “ensure that a 
redefined  division  of  competence  does  not  lead  to  a  creeping  expansion  of  the 
competence of the Union...” The motive behind both proposals is to target the Union’s 
competence creep. By competence creep we mean the situation where the Community 
has been increasingly competent to legislate in order to achieve the aims of the internal 
market and beyond. The question is: How far will the Community push its boundaries in 
the  name  of  those  objectives?  Since  most  competences  are  shared  and  need  to  be 
exercised flexibly the establishment of competence catalogues does not seem to be the 
best  solution  to  the  problem.  Although  preciseness  is  the  sole  objective  of  a  strict 
competence list, the intention behind establishing a Constitution for Europe goes one step 
beyond  ensuring  that  “the  European  dynamic  does  not  come  to  a  halt”.  Thus  the 
European Council at Laeken, instead of producing an agenda that would potentially cause 
integration to freeze through a positive list of competences insisted on the maintenance of 
flexibility that subsidiarity allows.
Thus  in  a series  of issues posed by the  Laeken  Declaration  simplification  and 
clarification stand out to produce the adjustments necessary to face the new challenges in 
Europe.  The  re-organisation  of  the  current  system  goes  a  long  way  to  meet  the 
expectations  of  the  EU  Citizens  (transparency)  and  the  acquis  communautaire.  The 
question remains in relation to the acquis jurisprudential, especially as to the everyday 
administration  and  implementation  of  the  Union’s  policy.  Should  it  be  left  more 
emphatically  to  the Member States  and,  where national  constitutions  so  afford,  to  the
90regions / peripheries? Should both players (Member States and regions) be provided with 
guarantees that their spheres of competence will stay unaffected? If yes, what guarantees 
are there, apart from the principle of subsidiarity that competences will still be exercised 
in  an efficient way? On  the other hand if subsidiarity is  given by the  Court the same 
dynamic  as in Article 5(2) EC (a wide interpretation to the powers of EC Institutions) 
then Member States will still talk about ‘competence creeps’ in the post-EU Constitution 
era, despite the fact that the EU Constitutional Treaty does clarify the areas falling under 
the headline of exclusive Community competence. This was admittedly anticipated by the 
European Council at Laeken that very accurately pointed to the importance of the role of 
National Parliaments7 9  as an additional actor (even represented in  a new  institution) to 
monitor the legislative process at EU level and therefore ensure that all initiatives comply 
with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  thus  contributing  “...towards  the  legitimacy  of the 
European project”.
The Laeken  agenda made explicit that not only  should  a rearrangement of the 
division  of  competences  occur  to  make  the  Union’s  functions  transparent  without 
freezing  the momentum  of integration,  but  also made explicit  that this  change  should 
occur on a canvas coloured by the dual notion of ‘simplification-clarification’. In fact the 
formal dimension to the Constitutional debate at Nice, Laeken and later as matured at the 
European Convention demonstrate that both ‘simplification’ and ‘clarification’ have been 
treated  by  politicians  at  the  European  Council  and  the  Convention  as  synonymous 
notions, when legally they imply different things especially when they are employed in 
an  institutionalised  process  of EU  reform.  Legal  academics  have  shown  considerable 
caution  in  using  the term  ‘simplification  -  clarification’  as  individual  while they  have
79 See Chapter 6 for the role of National Parliaments in detail.
91demonstrated  a  preference  to  ‘clarification’  and  an  antipathy  to  ‘simplification’. 
Particularly Weatherill80 remarks that some matters are at an advantage when simplified, 
such as the elimination of the EU pillar structure but in other areas “simplification may 
be perilous”. Weatherill argues that the “complexity of the EU is one of its strengths” and 
stresses that it can be clarified but not simplified. In other words “clarification of why the 
process  is  complex  is  virtuous.  Simplification  may  rob  us  of  dynamism  and 
adaptability”81.
8.  The European Convention
Introduction
Since its commencement, the European Convention always had in contemplation 
that any reference to competences within a newly-fangled European Constitution would 
need to reflect the individuality of the EU  system.  A classic  process  of constitutional 
design based upon an imitation of national constitutions would therefore cause possible 
distortions as to the next stages in the establishment of competences within the original 
text of the constitution and the decent function of the document as  a whole.  The first 
expression  of  Europe’s  intentions  as  to  the  ideological  stream  it  would  follow 
(intergovernmental or supranational) came with the presentation of its first constitutional 
draft in October 2002,  a draft constitutional model, including two Titles  about the fair 
delimitation  of  competences82.  On  July  18,  2003  the  Convention  submitted  to  the
80 Weatherill, S., “Competence and Complexity, Simplification and Clarification...and Legitimacy too”, in 
Nicolaidis,  K.,  and  Weatherill,  S.,  (eds)  ‘Whose  Europe?  National  Models  and  the  Constitution  of the 
European  Union’,  Papers  of a  Multi-Disciplinary  Conference,  Oxford,  (April  2003).  Also  available  at 
http://www.europeanstudies.ox.ac.ukAyhoseEurope.pdf.
81 Ibid
82
See  The  Convention,  Praesidium,  “Preliminary  Draft  Constitutional  Treaty”,  [CONV  369/02],  28 
October 2002, Title III: Union Competences and Actions, Title V: Exercise of Union Competence.
92President of the European Council in Rome a full draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for  Europe.  On  June  18,  2004,  the  Heads  of State  or  Government  of the  twenty-five 
Member States took the historic decision to unanimously adopt the Treaty. Thus the draft 
EU  Constitutional  Treaty  was  signed  in  Rome  on  the  29th  of October  2004  by  the 
twenty-five Member States of the Union.  The Treaty can enter into force and become 
effective  only  after  it  has  been  ratified  by  all  Member  States  either  through  the 
parliamentary method or referendum method. After the French and Dutch rejection of the 
EU Constitutional Treaty on May 29 and June  1, 2005, the ratification process will be 
examined by  the  European  Council  under the  Austrian  Presidency in the  first half of 
2006.
Arguably,  a ratified EU  Constitutional  Treaty  will  elevate  the Union’s  competences 
especially in the field of asylum and immigration and will to a certain extent bestow more 
legislative powers  on the supranational creature. However one could contradict the view that 
these reforms are so crucial as to have a grave impact for the Member States since any changes 
introduced  by  the  new  fangled  constitution  adding  to  the  Union’s  competences  are  trivial 
compared  with  those  conferred  in  either  the  Single  European  Act  or  the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht. The problem with the distribution of competences as this currently appears 
within  the  Union’s  system  is  the  fact  that  starting  from  the  present  structures  of 
delimitation  of powers  to  the  principles  that underpin  such  delimitation  and  types  of 
competences available to the Union, nothing so far enjoys a clear definition within the 
Treaty. This does not go without having an impact upon the citizen’s impression of the 
Union’s  interventionist  role  at  large.  This  is  something  that  was  given  particular 
consideration both at Nice and Laeken. The issue of a clear delimitation of competences
93has been one of the top priorities of the Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe8 3  
along with the simplification of the Community Treaties, the enhancement of the status of 
the  Union’s  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  the  increase  in  the  contribution  of 
national Parliaments in the Community’s legislative process.
Equally  the  Convention  throughout  its  sixteen-month  endeavour  attempted  to 
resolve the problem of competences within the Community. The first time it did so was in 
during  its  third  plenary  session  of  15-16  April  200284.  Even  before  that,  the  first 
Convention contribution to the issue of competences came in late March 200285. There 
the Praesidium started almost from basics providing an account of the current vertical 
separation of competencies along with a description of the existing checks / guarantees of 
the Union’s compliance with the delimitation of competences and subsidiarity.
(a)  Plenary Sessions
The  Convention  spotted  two  ways  in  which  the  Union  does  not  remain 
unchallenged when its exercise of competences goes beyond its attributed powers by the 
Treaty. First it relied on the public control of EU competences based upon the interplay 
between the Community Institutions (in terms of the limits on their power in the decision 
making process) and national Institutions (which can control their Council representatives 
/ Ministers). Second it recalled the importance of judicial control in the present exercise 
of  competences  pointing  towards  the  role  of  the  European  Court  of Justice  and  the
83 15 December 2001, atEuropa: http://europa.eu.int/futunim/documents/offtext/doc 151201  en.htm
84 Agenda,  [CONV 21/02];  Summary Note of the Plenary Session,  [CONV 40/02];  European Parliament 
Report on the division of competences between the EU and the Member States, Lamassoure Report,  24 
April  [2001/1034 (INI)];  Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Draft Report of the European 
Parliament on the division of powers between the European Union and the Member States,  13 March 2002 
[CONV 26/02 Annex]
85 “Description of the current system of competences for the delimitation of competence between the EU 
and the Member States”, 28 March 2002, [CONV 17/02]
94national courts acting as Community courts and the limited jurisdiction of the former in 
Titles V and VI of TEU. This contribution formed the gist of the Secretariat’s discussion 
paper on the delimitation of competence that appeared during the fourth plenary session 
examined below.
Overall the Convention’s third plenary session8 6  was based on an attempt to ignite 
talks on the issue of competences  starting off with a  ‘general debate’  on the so-called 
‘missions of the European Union’. It then went on to visit the question of ‘which criteria 
should  be  used  for  deciding  which  missions  should  be  carried  out  at  Union  level’ 
concluding with a question upon whether the Treaties should spell out the Member States 
residual nature of competences on matters not covered by the missions of the Union87. 
Therefore the whole session very much involved questions upon the systematisation of 
the current vertical division of competences so that according to the European Parliament 
“the transfer of the powers between the Union and Member States must work both ways” 
and  “the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality must be taken into account.”8 8
In  answering  those  questions  about  the  nature  of  the  criteria  employed  for 
deciding which missions should be carried out at Union and accordingly at Member State 
level,  the  Convention  concluded  with  the  following  remarks:  As  regards  the  issue  of 
whether and on  the basis  of what criteria the Treaties  should carry on leaving matters 
outside the Union’s objectives to the Member States, a positive list of competences was 
considered as the least appropriate solution. Such a categorisation would rather freeze the
86 Meeting of the Praesidium, Brussels, 25 April 2002, [CONV 40/02]
87
As it has been argued by establishing that Community competences must be attributed, the Treaty makes 
explicit that there are  ‘limits’  in the EC sphere of competences and implicit that the Member States have 
residual powers.
88 See Transcript of Proceedings, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/l  001110.htm. 
and http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/2  001082.htm for 15 and 16 April 2002 respectively.
95current system of flexible interaction existing between the Union and the Member States. 
The imperative to preserve Articles 95 and 308 EC was also pointed out and against that 
the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  as  effective  checks  of  their  abuse. 
Complementary  to  these  legal  checks  on  EU  competence,  the  Convention  also  made 
reference  to  the  potential  setting  of  a political  (national  parliamentarians)  or judicial 
device to further ensure the Union’s compliance with the division of competences.
Following  the  third  plenary  session,  the  Convention’s  re-visited  the  issue  of 
vertical separation of competences in its next fourth plenary session held in May 200289. 
Inter alia, the main issues were the achievement of the Union’s tasks and the creation of 
working groups and their mandate. Again as with its preceding session the debate shifted 
on  to  the  vertical  division  of  competences,  particularly  on  to  how  the  Union’s 
competences could be exercised in a better manner from the point of view of legitimacy 
and efficiency.  In its discussion paper9 0  the Praesidium pointed to the system’s lack of 
clarity in the allocation of competences in respect to the Member States’ residual powers; 
the lack of precision of the so-called safety clauses of Articles 94, 95 and 308 EC; the 
incidental non-compliance with subsidiarity and proportionality; the false expectations of 
European  citizens  in  terms  of the Union’s  powers  and the  insufficient  checks  for the 
exercise of EU competence
89 Agenda,  [CONV 51/02]; Guideline,  [CONV 47/02]; “Delimitation of competence between the EU and 
the Member States -  Existing system, problems and avenues to be explored”  [CONV 47/02]; “The legal 
instruments: present system”, [CONV 50/02];
Transcript of Proceedings available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim  020523.htm 
and  http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim  020524.htm  for  23  and  24  May  2002 
respectively.
90 “Delimitation of competence between the EU and the Member States -  Existing system, problems and 
avenues to be explored” [CONV 47/02]
96The reality that the Union has in times exceed its competences and has therefore 
penetrated  into  areas  traditionally  reserved  by  the  Member  States  strengthens  the 
argument  for  examining  the  likelihood  of having  a  ‘Kompetenzkatalog*   (catalogue  of 
competences) at EU level as a guarantee that the Community exercises its competences in 
a subsidiarity capacity. But during its third plenary session the Convention made it clear 
that the problem does not only lie with the strictness of the separation of competences or 
with what would be included in the list but more with the aftermath of such an action. 
Therefore  one  could  claim  that  the  Praesidium  very  accurately  stressed  in  its  fourth 
plenary session that there are two requirements, namely “the need for precise delimitation 
and...the  need  for a degree of flexibility.”9 1   The truth  is  that once  a choice has been 
made, the future Union would either continue to suffer from impreciseness or play safe 
within  a  static  system,  always  depending  on  the  choice.  That  is  merely  why  the 
Convention agreed on placing emphasis upon the principle of ‘attribution of powers’ and 
an open method of coordination with some restrictions followed by good monitoring and 
restraints in resorting to Articles 94, 95 and 308 EC.
(a)  Working Groups
Consequently, two working groups (out of six92) were set up on June, 6-7 2002 
(5th plenary session93) on the subject of competencies, one on Subsidiarity9 4 and the other
91 Ibid p. 10
92 Subsidiarity  [CONV 71/02]; Charter of Fundamental rights  [CONV 72/02]; Legal Personality  [CONV 
73/02];  National  Parliaments  [CONV  74/02];  Complementary  Competences  [CONV  75/02];  Economic 
governance [CONV 76/02].
93 The definitive composition of the working groups is agreed [CONV 77/1/02 rev.l] while the Presidium 
produced guideline mandates for the first six working groups:
94 Subsidiarity [CONV 71/02]
97on Complementary Competencies95. Their reports were then discussed in the 8th and 11th 
plenary sessions, respectively in September 12-13 9 6  and November9 7  7-8, 2002. This had 
as a result the presentation by the Praesidium on February 6, 2003 of a title of the first 
part of the EU Constitutional Treaty (Articles 1  to 16) that was dedicated to the topic of 
competences.  The  numerous  proposals  for  amendments  that  were  put  forward  by  the 
Convention  participants  were  then  considered  on  February  27-28,  2003  when  the 
Praesidium also approved a draft for a protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.
Due  to  the  vast  number  of Articles  amendments  submitted  to  the  Praesidium, 
including the draft for a subsidiarity / proportionality protocol, the  17th plenary session 
held  on  March  5,  2003  talked  over  the  vertical  separation  of  exclusive  and  shared 
competences  as  these  were  illustrated  by  Articles  1-9  to  1-17  of  the  draft  EU 
Constitutional Treaty9 8  (now I-11 to 1-18 of the EU Constitutional Treaty99). Taking into 
account the proposals for reform of the current system as elaborated by the members of 
the  Convention,  it  almost  feels  that  the  whole  atmosphere  surrounding  the  potential 
reforms suggested a tidying up exercise rather than drastic modification of the rules. To 
summarise,  the  proposition  for  a potential  categorisation  of competences  through  the
95 Complementary Competences [CONV 75/02]
96 During this session the Convention’s debate was focused on EU legislative procedures. Some issues also 
raised by the Presidium  [CONV 225/02]  were also  discussed.  First of all the  Convention dealt with the 
question of how can the number of instruments available to the Union for the exercise of its competences 
be reduced, and how can their legal effects be clarified.
97 During this  session, the Convention talked over the reports of Working Groups V on  Complementary 
Competences  and  VI  on Economic  Governance.  There  were also  oral  presentations  by the Chairmen of 
Working Group X on security and justice as well as the Chairman of Working Group IX on simplification 
of  procedures  and  instruments.  Finally,  the  debate  on  the  preliminary  draft  Treaty  that  occupied  the 
Convention during its previous session was continued here.
98 Adopted by consensus by the European Convention on June 13 and July  10, 2003 and submitted to the 
President of the European Council in Rome on July 18, 2003 [CONV 850/03]
99 Signed in Rome by Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on June  18, 2004  [CIG 
87/2/04]
98establishment  of a clear-cut  list  was  unanimously  rejected  due  to  fears  that  it  would 
render the allocation of competences inflexible. Therefore,  at this stage, correction and 
flexibility  constituted  the  two  basic  elements  stemming  from  the  Convention’s 
endeavour.  Another  suggestion  that  sidetracked  the  idea  of  flexibility  was  the 
achievement  of  some  differentiation  in  the  scope  of  EU  action  in  various  fields  of 
decision-making accompanied by sufficient procedural checks and balances.
The  need  for  procedural  safeguards  was  also  reflected  in  the  report  of  the 
Working  Group  on  Subsidiarity  that  inter  alia  emphasised  the  necessity  for  efficient 
checks  on  the  application  of the  principle  of  subsidiarity  that  could  entail  the  active 
contribution of national legislatures. Having said that, the Union would need to combine 
its already existing system with new principles that are in a way the inevitable results of 
its  constitutionalisation.  This  would  in  a way preserve  a harmonious  evolution,  much 
preferable to both Union officials and citizens at large to an unprecedented evolution via 
positive integration that would ultimately imply a change of architecture. The problem of 
the  uncertainty  of  effectiveness  of  procedural  checks  was  silently  put  aside  by  the 
Working Group on Complementary Competences that went on to observe all questions 
related to competences, except of subsidiarity of course, that had been touched on by the 
preceding Working Group especially set up for this purpose. Here proposals put the clock 
back to the establishment of a fundamental delimitation of competences within each and 
every sector of the Union’s operation. As already mentioned there was a call for review 
of the constitutional reference for “an ever closer union“  as appears in Article  1  TEU. 
Such an action would be above all symbolic, implying that the transfer of competences to 
the supranational level should not be endless. The final suggestions involved definitional 
issues on respect of national identity under Article 6.3 TEU and most important calls for
99restricting the scope and extent of EU harmonisation under the safety valves of Articles 
94, 95 and 308 EC.
Due  to  its  somewhat  strict  tone  the  report  was  not  well  received  within  the 
Convention during its  11th plenary session held on November 7-8, 20021 0 0 . In fact it was 
criticised for bringing to the fore the already rejected idea of a competences catalogue. 
Further criticisms involved the somewhat faulty perception of the Working Group of the 
meaning of “an ever closer union” that is intended solely to amplify the concept of the 
people of Europe and has no practical consequence on the competences subject matter. 
Amongst other criticisms there was a feeling within the Convention that the report was 
harsh  on  the  proposed  procedure  for  exercise  of  complementary,  harmonising  and 
residual competences, particularly as regards resort to Article 308 EC.
Although the ideas expressed by this report, pointing at the abuse of the so-called 
safety  clauses  would  be  embraced  amongst  sceptics,  the  Convention’s  integrationist 
approach  stayed  firm  on the idea of positive harmonisation  on  the part of the Union, 
albeit with some checks and safeguards. After all, the Member States themselves agreed 
that the Union’s competences should be defined by reason of its objectives. Since these 
objectives, as included in Article 1  of the TEU, are aimed at an “ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe”, a teleological interpretation of these objectives should not take 
the  Member  States  by  surprise.  In  the  past,  the  Court  by  reason  of  its  teleological 
interpretation has gained the competence to expand an otherwise limited Treaty provision 
and go rather far with it.
100 During  this  session,  the Convention discussed  the reports  of Working  Groups  V  on  Complementary 
Competences  and VI  on Economic  Governance.  There  were  also  oral presentations  by the  Chairmen  of 
Working Group X on security and justice as well as the Chairman of Working Group IX on simplification 
of  procedures  and  instruments.  Finally,  the  debate  on  the  preliminary  draft  Treaty  that  occupied  the 
Convention during its previous session was continued here.
100Conclusion
To conclude, the tribute paid by the Praesidium to the issue of competences was 
neither accidental nor marginal. Far from it, the Convention’s continuous discussion over 
the  area  of competences  reaffirms,  in  conjunction  with  the  proposals  drawn  from  its 
sessions  and  the  working  groups  reports,  that  any  democratic  form  of  multi-level 
governance  should  be  characterised  by  a  constitutional  separation  of powers.  This  is 
particularly important when one considers that the Convention was the first stage of the 
Union’s  constitutionalisation.  Yet,  being  a  sui  generis  entity,  the  Union  cannot  in 
practical terms utilise the same formulas that have shaped power relationships within the 
nation  states.  That  is  why  a  clear-cut  delimitation  of  competences  demands  both  a 
delicate and complex process at Union level.
101CHAPTER 3
THE MAIN CATEGORIES OF SUBJECT RELATED EC / EU INTERNAL
COMPETENCES
Introduction
The vertical delimitation of internal Community competence is based on a relentless 
tension between the  vertical  levels  of government:  namely the  Community  vis-a-vis the 
Member States. The current allocation of competences between the two does not imitate the 
positive provisions or competence catalogues as found in the constitutional  traditions of 
Germany  (Article  72  GG -  Basic  Law);  Austria  (Article  10,  Federal  Constitution);  the 
United States (Article I (8), US Constitution) and Canada (Article 91, Constitution Act). The 
Community possesses no formal catalogue of competences to designate the sectors where 
compromises on the values between the two decision-makers (EC / EU and Member States) 
should be drawn. Neither does it maintain a systematic description of legal effects of its 
power with reference to national competence.
Instead, Article 3 and 4 EC provide an overview or checklist of the Community’s 
spheres of activity. This list, however, is intended to provide guidance as to the scope of 
issues over which the Community has powers to take action. It is neither exhaustive nor 
does it include any powers from the side of the Community to establish legal instruments. 
On the other hand, according to Article 5 EC, under the principle of enumerated powers 
competences must be expressly specified. Part El of the EC Treaty, entitled “Community 
Policies” consists of seventeen Titles / enabling provisions that set out the different policy 
objectives of the Community and the means of achieving those objectives. While it is clear 
that any action  taken by the Community must have a legal basis either in the Treaty or
102secondary legislation and that certain Treaty provisions address the extent of that power, 
there  is  no  clear  substantive  division  of powers  in  the  EC  or  EU  Treaty.  Hence  the 
Community as an international organisation draws its powers from individual legal bases of 
its constituting Treaty, including any legislation based upon it. All other powers remain in 
principle within the nation state.
In the absence of a formal catalogue of competences, it is possible to identify several 
generic types of Community competence or general principles governing die relationship 
with domestic regulatory power. Article 5 EC distinguishes between the Community’s exclusive 
and non-exclusive powers. Certain sectors can therefore only be regulated at Community level and 
the Member States may exercise legislative powers  only if empowered to  do  so by the 
Community itself. The distribution of competences at all levels of government is a common 
characteristic of every multi-level system of governance, whether federal or decentralised. 
Certainly,  the  separation  of powers  occurring  at  Community  level  reminds  one  of the  way 
competences (Verbandskompetenzen) are organised vertically between the Federation and State level 
in the German Basic Law (Verflechtungsmodell), which makes reference to exclusive and concurrent 
powers  next  to  the  framework  powers  of the  Federation.  As  this  chapter  will  attempt  to 
demonstrate, the allocation of competences in the Community represents a unique example 
of distribution of competence intended for a multilevel  system that although it does not 
resemble national constitutional democracies, is characterised by pluralism.
The difference between exclusive and non-exclusive competence exists insofar as 
the  Community  has  not  exercised its  power.  Von  Bogdandy  and  Bast  characteristically 
express the view that “if.. .the Union has enacted legislation, then the difference depends on 
a  criterion  that  appears  rather  technical,  namely,  whether  the  norm  that  leads  to  the 
prohibition to enact different national  legislation is  at the level  of primary or secondary
103law.”1  This chapter will attempt to provide an insight to the main categories of competences 
(exclusive;  shared;  concurrent).  Almost in  parallel  it  will  concentrate  on  the notions  of 
‘exclusivity’ and ‘pre-emption’ whose balancing constituted the ground for the competence 
debates over the EU Constitutional Treaty,  signed on October 29,  2004 by the Heads of 
State of the twenty-five Member States2. When competences are transferred to a new legal 
system of international law,  the argument is  as to the degree of limitation  over national 
regulatory power, original national competences and national sovereignty.
Exclusivity involves the more concrete  sectors  of EC  exclusive competence that 
consist  of  Common  Commercial  Policy  (CCP);  the  preservation  of  marine  biological 
resources and monetary policy (EMU).  On the other hand pre-emption is attached to the 
areas of shared and concurrent competence. Yet, the element of pre-emption operates next to 
the element of mixity. Internal powers are divided in a mode where as long as Community 
secondary legislation is absent in a given sector, the Member States may legislate provided 
that their measures are compatible with the Community’s primary legislation (the Treaty). If 
the Community on the other hand has chosen to harmonise national legislation by enacting 
secondary laws (e.g. a Directive), national competence to regulate is seen as pre-empted in 
accordance with the law in question.
1  Von Bogdandy,  A., and Bast, J.,  “ The European Union’s Vertical Order of Competences:  The Current 
Law and Proposals for Reform”, (2002), 39 Common Market Law Review 227-268, at 243
2 [CIG 87/2/04]
104A.  EXCLUSIVE COMMUNITY COMPETENCE
Introduction
Textually, the concept of exclusive EC competence appeared for the first time in the 
Treaty of Maastricht (TEU), Article 3b (now Article 5 EC) that contains the principle of 
attribution of powers, subsidiarity and proportionality. The Article excludes the application 
of the principle of subsidiarity in areas “which do not fall within the exclusive competence” 
of  the  Community.  This  limitation  upon  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  relieves  the  EC 
Institutions from the practical obligation to prove in accordance with the subsidiarity test 
that Community action is necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaty. The Protocol on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality introduced by the Treaty 
of  Amsterdam  contained  a  further  reference  to  the  notion  of  exclusive  competence. 
Specifically: “The principle of subsidiarity does not call into question the powers conferred 
on  the European  Community by the Treaty,  as  interpreted by the  Court of Justice.  The 
criteria referred to in the second paragraph of Article 3b of the Treaty shall relate to areas for 
which the Community does not have exclusive competence.”
The Community thus enjoys exclusive competence in a handful of sectors where it is 
solely  responsible  for legislating  and  adopting  legally  binding  acts.  That  is  to  say  that 
Member States are even in the absence of EC measures, barred from enacting legislation in 
the relevant area except insofar as they are purposely authorised to do so by the Community 
or for the implementation  of acts  adopted by the Community.  Internally,  the  Community 
enjoys exclusive competence with regard to the preservation of marine biological resources 
(Article  32  EC)  and monitoring  of monetary policy for those  Member  States  that  have 
adopted the Euro currency (Article  106 EC). Furthermore, the exclusivity of Community
105competence in areas of external policy such as Common Commercial Policy (Articles 131- 
134 EC) may have an impact internally where Member States are precluded from imposing 
unilateral  measures  equivalent  to  customs  duties.  This  partly  justifies  why  certain 
commentators3  speak of an artificial distinction between internal and external competence.
1.  The Area in Question Falls under the Exclusive Community Competence
The areas dominated by the a priori exclusive effect of Community law are limited 
in extent and have been developed by the jurisprudence of the Court. Action by the Member 
States  is  possible  only  where  the  Community  has  empowered  such  action.  Mixity  is 
preserved to a certain degree since a Member State is not precluded from legislating but this 
right is  subject to it acting as  a  ‘trustee of the Community interest’.  Therefore,  national 
legislation  in  areas  of EC exclusive competence has practically  an  identical  outcome to 
Community  legislation.  It  demands  prior  authorisation  by  the  EC  Institutions  that  also 
exercise control to ensure that the actions of the Member State in question promotes the 
‘common interest’. Practically, this attitude represents a way of remedying the legal vacuum 
arising when the Community fails to address national regulatory needs. Symbolically, it represents a 
departure from the traditional definition of exclusivity.
(a)  Common Fisheries Policy
An illustration of a Member State acting to promote the Community interest is in 
relation  to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).  Since  the regulation  of the  CFP is not 
wholly attached to the Community, a preliminary introduction to this area might be valuable
3  Lodge,  J.,  “The European  Community  and  the  Challenge  of the Future”,  Pinter,  London,  (1989)  p83 
Lodge  comments  that  “internal  policies  have  external  effects  and  the  idea  of an  impenetrable  barrier 
separating the two is misleading”.
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for the competence of the Community within the fishing sector.
The common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural 
products.  “Agricultural  products”  means  the  products  of  the  soil,  of 
stockfarming  and  of  fisheries  and  products  of  first-stage  processing 
directly related to these products.
The  CFP  is  an  area  of  regulatory  polyphony  characterised  by  a  complex  of 
Community and national institutions4. The Community is competent to pose limits to the 
Member States in relation to the rate of permissible catches and fishing fleets. Alternatively, 
the Member States are competent in terms of monitoring the management of fishing quotas 
and fleets. The principle of subsidiarity therefore applies in some areas of the CFP, although 
the Community has traditionally relied on the issuing of Regulations that suggests a direct 
intervention in the activities of the sector compared to Directives that allow certain national 
discretion as regards their implementation5. Council Regulation 3760/926 on “Establishing A 
Community System For Fisheries And Aquaculture” brings to mind in Article 4 that “the 
Council  shall  establish...  Community measures laying down  the conditions  of access  to 
waters  and resources  and of the pursuit of exploitation  activities”7.  This emphasises  the
4  For  more  information  on  the  development  of  the  CFP  see  Jensen  C.L.,  “A  Critical  Review  of the 
Common Fisheries Policy” (1999) IME Working Paper 6/99
5 Other legal acts referring to control of Member States or to delegation to the Commission include rules 
for  the  recording  and  transmission  of information  concerning  catches  taken  by  fishing  vessels  of the 
Member  States  (Reg.  753/80);  Control  measures  for fishing  activities  by  vessels  of the  Member  States 
(Reg.  2057/82);  Certifications  and  logbooks  (Reg.  3723/85  and  2057/82);  Recording  of  landings  and 
inspections by Member States (Reg. 4027/86); certain control measures - e.g. illegal nets (Reg. 2241/87); 
Prevention  of  over-fishing  (Reg.  3483/88);  monitoring  measures  (Reg.  2870/95);  surveillance  (Reg. 
686/97); simplification and reinforcement of controls on fishery products (Reg. 2846/98)
6 OJ.L 389, 31.12 1992; See also Reg.  170/83 in terms of legislation establishing a Community system for 
the conservation and management of fishery resources.
7 According to Article  10 of the Regulation a Member State has the competence to implement a national 
conservation policy only when the national measures are compatible with the intentions and objectives in 
the conservation policy of the Community.
107Member States’ transference of competence to the Council to make decisions in relation to 
the conservation regulation.
Communitarisation  of  fishing  resources  creates  a  sense  of  security  by  putting 
constraints on their users but “monitoring compliance with fisheries policies is relatively 
more difficult than,  say,  monitoring tariffs or monetary policy.4 * 8  This is  a fair argument 
considering that the Community principle of equal access does not prevent fishermen from 
over-fishing outside their national fishery zone. Quota hopping has created a dilemma as to 
the prevalence of conservation objectives on the one hand and the fundamental freedoms of 
Community  law  on  the  other,  particularly  the  freedom  of competition  and  freedom  of 
establishment9.
In the areas of CFP dominated by exclusive Community competence that are of 
direct  relevance  here  (i.e.  the  regulation  of  fishing  conditions  designed  to  ensure  the 
protection  of fishing  grounds  and  the  conservation  of biological  resources  of the  sea) 
Member  States  may  still  act  in  order  to  promote  the  ‘common  interest’,  meaning  in 
compliance with the Community’s policy. Under the Community’s CFP, Member States are 
given the right to fish for all descriptions of sea fish between  12 and 200 miles, subject to 
quotas  and  conservation  measures  in  accordance  with  Regulation  2371/20021 0   and  the 
Fishing Boats Designation  Order of  198311.  In  Commission  v  UK1 2  the Court held that, 
“since the expiration on 1  January 1979 of the transitional period laid down by Article 102 
of the [UK's]  Act of Accession, power to adopt, as part of the common fisheries policy,
8  Payne,  D.,  “Policy-Making  in  Nested  Institutions:  Explaining  the  Conservation  Failure  of the  EU’s 
Common Fisheries Policy” (2000) 38 (2) Journal of Common Market Studies 303-24, at 307
9 See Case C-213/89 Factortame I [1990] ECR1-2433; Case C-221/89 Factortame 11,  [1991] ECR 1-3905
10 OJ.L 358,31.12.2002, p59
1 1  SI 1983/253 (amended by SI 1986/382, 1992/3108 and 1996/248)
12 Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045
108measures relating to the conservation of the resources of the sea has belonged fully and 
definitively to the Community.” In other words the Court made clear that a Member State 
could not take measures on its own in an area committed to Community jurisdiction, even 
though EC legislation had not been effected. However, it confirmed that Council Regulation 
2371/2002  gives  Member States  the  right  to  introduce  non-discriminatory  conservation 
measures, up to 12 miles from the shore line. Such measures must conform to the CFP and 
be cleared with the Commission in advance.
(b)  Economic and Monetary Union
Having  said  about the  variety  of competence  in  the  CFP,  internally,  the  Treaty 
explicitly confers competence only in the Monetary Policy sector.  The  Community thus 
enjoys exclusive competence to monitor the Union’s Monetary Policy (EMU) in relation to 
the Member States that have adopted the Euro and therefore achieve its objective of price 
stability1 3 . A pre-condition of a Member State’s membership of the EMU is that its national 
central  bank has  to be independent1 4 .  Initially,  national  governments  gave up  control  of 
monetary policy to their national central banks and then the latter surrendered this control to 
the European System of Centra] Banks. Decisions in relation to Monetary Policy are thus 
taken by the heads of the national central banks and the European Central Bank (ECB), a 
body that forms an integral part of the Community framework. Article 106 EC states as follows:
1.  The  ECB  shall  have  the  exclusive  right  to  authorise  the  issue  of 
banknotes within the Community. The ECB and the national central banks 
may issue such notes. The banknotes issued by the ECB and the national
13 See Article 105 EC “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability..
14 See Article 107 EC
109central banks shall be the only such notes to have the status of legal tender 
within the Community.
Almost1 5   all  elements  of monetary sovereignty -  the power to  adopt and issue  a 
currency under public international law - have been surrendered ‘irrevocably’ by eleven out 
of the fifteen Member States / Members of the EMU1 6. Furthermore, the ten new Member 
States that acceded to the EU in May 2004 have to join the EMU once they fulfil the Maastricht 
criteria for EMU membership.  As  Begg1 7   explains,  the criteria  set out in  Maastricht are 
“nominal convergence criteria”. They “ensure that a country’s fiscal and monetary position 
is  compatible  with  the  obligations  of monetary  union,  irrespective  of its  growth  rate.” 
According to Zilioli and Selmayer1 8  the Euro-zone States are able at any given moment to 
break free from that obligation by simply revoking EMU through a Treaty amendment. This 
however, is not very likely given that currently most Euro-zone States participate in stage HI 
of EMU. Most important, its statute is contained in a Protocol to the Treaty and can only be 
amended by an Intergovernmental Conference that requires a unanimous agreement by all 
Member States. Moreover, the Copenhagen criteria of accession to the Union1 9  include inter 
alia “the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, Economic and Monetary Union.” Finally the absence of a case before the Court 
demonstrates that Community’s exclusive competence in the area has been widely accepted 
by the Member States. However the transference of national monetary sovereignty to the
15 In certain areas related to coinage and legislation against falsification, monetary sovereignty still remains 
attached to the Member States that have adopted the Euro.
16 See Art. 4 (2) and 3 of Council Regulation 974/98 on the introduction of the Euro, O.J.L 139/1, 1998
1 7 Begg, I., “Quick Entry for the New Members - A Good or Bad Thing?”, Paper for the Conference on EU 
Enlargement and the Baltic Sea Region, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (2003), Available at 
http://www.ui.se/begg.pdf
18  Zillioti,  C.,  and  Selmayr  M.,  “The  External  Relations  of the  Euro  Area:  Legal  Aspects”  (1999)  36 
Common Market Law Review 273
19 As  laid  down  by  the  Copenhagen  European  Council  in  June  21-22,  1993  available  at: 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/ec/cop  en.htm
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their horizontal competence to act to achieve the objectives of the EMU.
Contrary to other policies  attached to Community’s  exclusive competence  where 
national  sovereignty  is  transferred  to  the  Institutions  of  the  Community,  monetary 
sovereignty  has  been  transferred  from  the  Member  States  to  the  Community  and  the 
European Central Bank (ECB) that is given special reference in the wording of Article 106 
EC.  Herrmann  adds  that  since  “the  ECB’s  competences  are  laid  down  in  primary 
Community law, the conclusion is drawn that the sovereign powers of the Member States 
concerning monetary matters have been transferred directly to the ECB.”2 0  This has created 
a  positive  obligation  to  the  Community  Institutions  and  the  Member  States  to  respect  the 
independence of the ECB. Yet, the ECB  as an independent body free from direct political 
control has raised questions as to the degree of accountability and legitimacy of the EMU 
system as a whole21.  It has separate legal personality and its members  are immune from 
political  interference22.  Legal  personality  gives  it  standing before  the  Court,  either  as  a 
litigant or defendant. Additionally, Article 110 EC empowers it to issue legislative measures 
in the form of regulations, decisions, recommendations and opinions without referring to an 
Institution.
When  adopting  a legislative  measure,  the  ECB  needs  to  determine  whether the 
measure falls within its fields of competence outlined in Articles 105 and 106 EC. A challenge to
20 Herrmann,  C.W.,  “Monetary  Sovereignty  over  the  Euro  and  External  Relations  of the  Euro  Area: 
Competences, Procedures and Practice”, (2002) 7(1) European Foreign Affairs Review 1-24, at pp 5
21 Buiter, W.H., “Alice in Euroland”, (1999) 37(2) Journal of Common Market Studies  181-209; Verdun, 
A., and Christiansen T., “Policy-making, Institution-building and European Monetary Union: Dilemmas of 
Legitimacy”,  in Colin Crouch ed.,  “After the Euro:  Shaping Institutions for Governance in the Wake of 
European Monetary Union”, Manchester University Press, (2000) pp. 132-44.
22 Article 108 EC and Article 7(1) Statute.
Illan ECB legislative measure by a Community Institution occurred in Commission v ECB2 3  
There the Commission brought an action pursuant to Article 230 EC for annulment of Decision 
1999/726 EC of the European Central Bank of 7 October 1999 on fraud prevention. The Court held 
that in  failing to apply Regulation  1073/1999^  adopted under Article  235  EC  (now  308)  and 
adapting its  internal  procedures in  order to satisfy the requirements  laid down by it,  the ECB 
infringed the regulation and therefore exceeded the margin of autonomy of organisation it retains to 
combat fraud. Hence, the Commission’s claim was upheld and the contested decision was annulled. 
Advocate General Jacobs2 5  commented:
“The case raises a number of important issues concerning, in particular, the scope 
of Community competence to adopt measures under Article 280 EC2 6  aimed at 
combating fraud and other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the 
Community, the obligation of the Community Institutions and the Member States 
to respect the independence of the ECB imposed by Article 108 EC and the duty 
to  consult  the ECB  on  proposed Community  acts  falling  within  its  fields  of 
competence laid down in Article 105 EC.”
To conclude, despite certain problems in determining the scope of the Community and the 
ECB, previously identified, the transference of national monetary sovereignty to a dual supranational 
authority having exclusive competence contributes to placing EMU on the path of both monetary and 
price stability.
23 Case C-l 1/00 Commission v ECB [2003] ECR1-7147
24 On investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office.
25 Case C-l 1/00 Commission v ECB, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs [2003] ECR 1-7147
26 The founding Treaties did not provide a specific legal basis for measures in the field of fraud prevention 
in  the  Community.  Article  209a  of the  EC  Treaty  (now  Article  280  EC)  -  inserted  by  the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht  -  obliged  Member  States  to  take  the  same  measures  to  counter  fraud  affecting  the financial 
interests  of the  Community  as  they  take  to  counter fraud  affecting  their own  financial  interests  and  to 
coordinate their action aimed at protecting the financial interests of the Community against fraud. It did not 
grant the Community any new legislative powers. Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
the  Communities  adopted  various  measures  aimed  at  combating  fraud  committed  by  recipients  of 
Community funds in the Member States on the basis of Article 308 EC. The Treaty of Amsterdam amended 
Article 280 EC granting the Community explicit competence to take ‘the necessary measures in the fields 
of the prevention of and fight against fraud.’
112(c)  Common Commercial Policy: Charges Equivalent to Customs Duties
Article 23 EC covers all trade in goods and incorporates a Common Customs Tariff 
that is to bring homogeneity of the charges levied at the Community’s external frontiers on 
products imported from third countries to ensure that trade with non-Member States is not 
diverted and the free movement of products between Member States is not distorted. As the 
uniformity of the Customs Union and the CCP would be jeopardised by a Member State 
unilaterally imposing charges equivalent to customs duties on imports from third countries, 
the  CCP  enshrined  by  Article  133  EC  entails  that  national  differences  of  a  fiscal  and 
commercial nature affecting trade with third countries must be abolished. Article 133 (1) EC 
provides:
Customs duties on imports into the Member States of goods originating in 
the countries  and territories shall be completely abolished in  conformity 
with the progressive abolition of customs duties between Member States 
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
The Court has  affirmed that all measures containing instruments regulating trade 
with  third  countries  come  within  the  Community’s  exclusive  competence  by  virtue  of 
Article 133 EC.
In  two  cases  lodged  by  the  Commission  against  Italy27,  the  former  challenged 
national rules requiring from each undertaking, where services were rendered outside the 
customs area or outside normal office hours to several undertakings at the same time, in 
connection with the completion of customs formalities in intra-Community trade, payment 
of a fixed fee corresponding to one hour's work. Accordingly, Aprile (a customs  agent / 
administrator of an  insolvent company) paid  the  Italian  administration  fees  for  customs
27 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 1483; Commission v Italy [1991] ECR 1-1575
113transactions  according  to the  respective national  legislation.  Consequently,  he  instituted 
proceedings to obtain repayment of those fees28. Despite Italy’s claims that Aprile’s case 
was unfounded since the imports where the fee was imposed were goods from non-Member 
States (but EFTA in that case), the Court decided that the result of EC law applies to the 
claim as a whole and found an infringement by the Italian Republic of the prohibition on 
charges having an equivalent effect to customs duties (Articles 23  and 25 EC) declaring 
national legislation incompatible to the Treaty.
From  the  abovementioned  judgments,  it  appears  that  the  regulation  of  export 
controls falls under the headline of CCP and therefore Member States have no competence 
to  take  any  measures  aimed  at  safeguarding  their  external  security.  However,  In  Fritz 
Werner2 9   v  Germany  and  Peter  Leifer}0  concerning  a  question  on  whether  national 
restrictions  on  exports  of dual-use  goods  are  compatible  with  the  concept  of common 
commercial policy as envisaged in Article 133 EC, the Court’s approach suggested that this 
impression does not correspond to the  spirit of the Treaty.  While  any restriction on the 
export of goods in  the  form  of strategic  controls  falls  within the  exclusive  Community 
competence  by  reason  of  Article  133  EC,  the  Court  stressed  that  national  restrictive 
measures  can  be  justified  under  Community  law.  According  to  Emiliou31,  “on  closer 
examination, these judgments seem to imply that the Community enjoys concurrent powers 
in this area...” Thus national export restrictions are not precluded as long as they do not
28 Case C-l25/94 Aprile [1995] ECR 1-2919, paras. 32-37
7 0
Case C-l019A Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrustungen GmbH v Federal Republic of Germany [1995] ECR 
I- 3189
30 Case C-83/94 Criminal proceedings against Peter Leifer and Others [1995] ECR 1-3231
31  Emiliou,  N.,  “Restrictions  on  Strategic Exports, Dual-Use Restrictions  and  the Common  Commercial 
Policy”, (1997) 22 (1) European Law Review 68-75
114infringe the freedom to trade - being the foundation of the Community’s internal market and 
CCP - or insofar as the Community has not harmonised the respective area.
In Werner a licence to export goods to Libya with a potential military use for the 
country’s missile development programme (furnaces and coiling machines) was declined by 
Germany as being contrary to the Republic’s Law on Foreign Trade. This prohibition aimed 
at  national  security  by  preventing  any  disruption  to  the  external  relations  of Germany, 
preserving  therefore  the  peaceful  co-existence  of  nations.  The  Court  held  that  such  a 
national measure restricting the exportation of certain goods was not to be considered as 
falling outside the scope of Community law (CCP) since it had foreign policy and security 
implications.  Germany  could  not  therefore  adopt  a  measure  equivalent  to  quantitative 
restriction to that policy in the light of its own arrangements. Instead, national commercial 
policy measures are allowed only when they gain prior authorisation from the Community 
or when justified on the grounds of Article 30 EC32. The Court in Werner recognised that the 
principle of free exportation of EC law may be restricted when a strategic restriction on 
exports by a Member State poses such limitations where necessary for the protection of 
national  /  public  security  due  to  the  risk  of  disturbance  to  its  foreign  relations  and 
international peace. Such restrictions ought to be proportionate.
Leifer  concerned  Germany’s  criminal  proceedings  against  traders  for  an 
unauthorised exportation to Iraq of goods suitable for producing chemical weapons.  The 
Court  was  once  again  confronted  with  the  question  of whether  national  restrictions  on 
exports could be adopted by a Member State unilaterally or such measures should rather fall 
under the Community’s exclusive competence.  Given that the national prohibition against 
the  exporters  occurred  at  the  time  of  the  first  Gulf  War,  Germany  claimed  that  the
32 See Regulation 2603/69 establishing Common Rules on Exports, Article 11
115prohibition not only intended to secure its external security but the lives of people in Iran- 
Iraq. Once again the Court stressed that export restrictions on goods going to third countries 
is reserved exclusively by the Community by virtue of its CCP, Article 133 EC.  Equally 
with  Werner,  the Court stated that prior authorisation is required for a Member State to 
adopt a restrictive rule against exports to third countries. Under Article  11  of Regulation 
2603/69 a Member State may introduce restrictive measures against imports if necessary to 
prevent public security risks related to its foreign relations or to the peaceful coexistence of 
the nations. In this case the national restriction was proportionate given the political situation 
in the Iraq and therefore Germany could take criminal action for breaches of the licensing 
procedure.
Thus, public security reasons and proportionality, as a way of maintaining national 
abidance with the rules of CCP, can excuse derogation from the principle of Article 133 EC. 
It might be argued that the Community has adopted a pragmatic approach in terms of its 
competence: While it reserves the right to harmonise export control policies with the aim of 
establishing a uniform external trade regime,  it declines  to take  in  hand purely security 
matters.
B.  SHARED / CONCURRENT COMPETENCE
Introduction
In contrast to the areas of exclusive competence, in sectors falling under the leading 
of  shared  competence  both  the  Community  and  the  Member  States  are  competent  to 
exercise  their  regulatory  powers.  The  Community’s  legislative  action  in  those  areas  is 
subject to compliance with the principles of subsidiarity (the Union/Community should take 
action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
116achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Community level) 
and proportionality (any action by the Union/Community should not go beyond  what is 
necessary  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  Treaty).  Here,  the  exercise  of  Community 
regulatory  powers  takes  precedence  over  the  exercise  of  national  regulatory  powers. 
However, the intensity of the legislative action sometimes depends on the type of measure 
and the type of legal act provided for in the Treaties.
Article 3 EC contains a general ’list’  of areas in which the Community may act to 
achieve the purposes set out in Article 2 EC aiming towards a:
“...harmonious,  balanced  and  sustainable  development  of  economic 
activities,  a high level of employment and of social protection,  equality 
between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high 
degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic  performance,  a 
high  level  of  protection  and  improvement  of  the  quality  of  the 
environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and 
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.”
Under the primary Treaty provision of Article  14 EC,  “the  internal market shall 
comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods (Articles 
28 to 31  EC), persons (Articles 39 to 48 EC), services (Articles 49 to 55 EC) and capital 
(Articles 56 to 60 EC) is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”. The 
Community  archetype  of  a  fully  integrated  and  deregulated  market  demands  that 
Community initiatives override national trade and economic measures.  The attainment of 
uniformity  thus  unequally  divides  competences  between  national  and  Community 
involvement in the market. The Treaty also defines by areas Community competence for the 
conduct of concrete Community policies such as customs (Articles 26,  27 and  135  EC); 
social policy (Articles  136 to  148 EC), environment (Articles  174 to  176 EC), consumer
117policy (Articles 136 to 148 EC), transport (Articles 70 to 80 EC) and agriculture (Articles 32 
to 38 EC).
1.  The Pre-emptive effect of Community Law
The underlying principle behind the Court’s jurisprudence in internal competence 
situations is the preservation of unity of the internal market and the uniform application of 
Community  law.  There,  the  preclusion  of national  regulatory  powers  by  the  Court  re­
enforces the effect of normative supranationality by adding next to the principles of direct 
effect and supremacy the notion of implied pre-emption. Mixity is preserved to a certain 
degree as regards the identity of the actor / legislator but not the content of the legislation. In 
other words, where the Community fails to respond to national regulatory needs, a Member 
State may act under close supervision by the Commission to attain the objectives set out by 
the Community.
The principle of pre-emption originates in the U.S. Constitutional tradition and its 
effect is to remove national regulatory powers giving way to the federal33. Pre-emption can 
emerge in  different versions,  either as  ‘express’  or  ‘implied’  pre-emption.  In  the former 
situation (express pre-emption) the removal of state power derives expressly from the text of 
a federal regulatory act establishing the will of the federal agency. The federal agency may 
optionally include in the act a saving clause intending to allow for state regulatory power in 
the relevant area as long as it is intended to achieve the same objective set out in the act34. In
33 Bleiweiss,  S.J.,  “Environmental  Regulation  and the  Federal  Common  Law  of Nuisance:  a  Proposed 
Standard  of  Pre-emption”,  (1983)  7  Harvard  Environmental  Law  Review  41;  Newman,  J.,  “A 
Consideration of Federal Pre-emption in the Context of State and Local Environmental Regulation”, (1990) 
9 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 97
34 See the judgment of the U.S.  Supreme Court in Sprietsma v.  Mercury Marine,  [2002] 537 US 51. The 
Court said that the Federal Boat Safety Act (1971) contained an express pre-emption clause, pre-empting
118the latter situation (implied pre-emption) there are two different scenarios namely that of 
‘direct conflict’,  where  a state act comes into conflict with the relevant federal law  and 
‘obstacle conflict’, where the state act constitutes an obstacle to the law of the federation. 
Thus,  the  distinction  between  the  two  is  related to  the  possibility of conflict.  The  first 
situation addresses a real disagreement while the second a potential clash.
Pre-emption in EC Law has been characterised as implied pre-emption35. Both the 
Community and the Member States enjoy regulatory powers in the same field. However, 
conflict resolution between EC and national law does not arise expressly in the text of the 
Treaty. Quite the reverse, the concept of pre-emption in EC Law is identified as a conflict 
pre-emption always resolved by the Court in favour of the Community. The Court acts by 
emphasising that where the EC exercises its shared / concurrent powers, any Member State 
action is pre-empted. Where the EC exercises its shared / concurrent powers, Member States 
are not precluded from exercising their regulatory competence but pre-emption may appear 
either when  a restriction to this competence arises by virtue of a Treaty obligation (e.g. 
Article 28 EC) or the area has been regulated (sometimes over-regulated) by Community 
secondary law. In that case, the Court interprets the principle of Supremacy of Community 
law as an ingredient adding to the binding force of the Treaty.
2.  Before the Adoption of Secondary Legislation: Directly Effective Provisions
The obligations of the Member States under the Treaties are unconditional and their 
attainment  of  these  objectives  requires  uniform  application  of  EC  law.  In  that  sense,
any state or local  law or regulation.  The Act also contained a  ‘saving clause’  providing that compliance 
with it did not relieve a person from liability under common or state law.
35 Soares, A.G., “Pre-emption, Conflicts of Powers and Subsidiarity”, (1998) 23 (2) European Law Review 
132-145
119uniformity justifies supremacy for a contrary national rule would cause the legal basis of the 
EC itself to be called into question. Universal acceptance by the Member States of the rights 
and obligations arising from the Treaty carries with it a clear and permanent limitation of 
their sovereign rights, and any subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the aims of the 
Community cannot prevail.  Member States  are thus competent to legislate as  far  as the 
Community has not exercised its regulatory powers by adopting rules, which it may do as of 
right. Thus, directly effective Treaty provisions, which create obligations to Member States, 
restrict their regulatory competence to legislate in a given sector. This section will examine 
certain  examples  of  Treaty  provisions  that  pose  such  limitations  to  Member  States’ 
competence.
Under Walt Wilhelm national competition authorities are precluded from continuing 
proceedings  to  apply  EC  law  when  the  Commission  has  initiated  a  procedure.  This, 
however,  does not preclude them from  applying national competition law  subject to the 
obligation  of co-operation  under Article  10 EC,  implying  a  general rule that in  case of 
conflict between  EC  and national  law,  the  former prevails.  More  to  the  point,  in  Walt 
Wilhelm3 6   in  deciding  upon  the  question  of  whether  national  and  EC  antitrust  cases 
concerning the same conduct can run parallel, the Court declared that “...conflicts between 
the rules  of the Community and national  rules in  the matter of law  on cartels  must be 
resolved by applying the principle that Community law takes precedence.” It is clear from 
the judgment that in case of conflict or interference with each other, EC law prevails. This 
re-affirms the nature of implied or conflict pre-emption of EC law as first elaborated, albeit 
implicitly,  by  the  Court  in  Costa37.  It  also  poses  a question  as  to  the  determination  of
36 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1
37 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 565compatibility of national proceedings with EC law.  In particular,  can multiple sanctions 
exist  for  the  same  conduct,  one  imposed  by  the  Member  States  and  the  other by  the 
Community?
The area of competition law is one of those areas that Community policy making is 
not subject to any explicit exceptions apart from the possibility of Article 81 (3) EC where 
an anti-competitive agreement may be saved (determined by the Commission). In particular, 
Article 81(1) EC poses extreme limits  on private  autonomy and freedom  of contract of 
private  undertakings.  Deckert  comments:  “in  such  cases  we  have  a  true  conflict  of 
competences that cannot be solved simply by proclaiming direct primacy or unconditional 
supremacy of Community law. The theory of practical concordance does not sufficiently 
take into account this competency issue, which seems to be at the heart of the problem.”3 8  
The employment of the  German judicial  principle  of practical  concordance3 9   to balance 
specific Community and national interests falls short of addressing the wider problem of 
competence delimitation between the former and the Member States.
Furthermore, in certain areas of shared competence the Court has assumed that the 
task of coordinating national  legislation has been entrusted to the Community through a 
given Treaty provision without demonstrating that responsibility for attaining that objective 
was to be shared with the Member States.  In  Germany v.  Parliament and Council,  the 
Court facing a German challenge to the adoption of a directive harmonising national laws on 
deposit guarantee schemes held that “the legislature cannot be criticised for having provided for
38 Deckert, M.R., “Some Preliminary Remarks on the limitations of European Competition Law” (2000)  1 
European Review of Private Law 173-185
39  Mortelmans,  K.,  “The  Relationship  Between  the  Treaty  Rules  and  Community  Measures  for  the 
Establishment and Functioning of the Internal Market -  Towards a Concordance Rule” (2002) 39 Common 
Market Law Review 1303-1346
40 Case C-233/94 Germany v. Parliament and Council [1997] ECR 1-2405.
121an obligation to join a scheme, despite the proper functioning of a voluntary membership scheme in 
Germany.”4 1  The legal basis chosen by the Community legislature was Article 57(2), under which 
the Council may issue directives for the coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States concerning the taking-up and pursuit of activities as self- 
employed persons. Most interesting was the Opinion of the Advocate General Leger who elaborated 
on the exclusive competence of the Community to exercise its competence on the given matter:
82.  In  such  cases,  however,  competence  is  clearly  stated  to  be  shared.  In 
contrast,  at no  time  does Article 57  refer to the competence  of the Member 
States.  It  entrusts  the  Community  alone  with  the  responsibility  for  the 
coordination of national legislation in this field, which shows that, from the very 
outset, the authors of the Treaty considered that, as regards the taking- up and 
pursuit of activities as self-employed persons, coordination was better achieved 
by action at Community rather than national level.
Thus, certain Treaty provisions act as a virtually complete regulatory code, severely 
restricting / pre-empting national freedom of manoeuvre.  On the other hand other Treaty 
provisions offer only an incomplete regulatory code. This means that Member States enjoy 
the freedom to legislate only insofar as they respect their Treaty obligations. The Court’s 
jurisprudence  on  the  free  movement  of goods  (Articles  28-31  EC)  provides  a  peculiar 
manipulation of a Treaty obligation in relation to measures adopted by Member States that 
can  place  a  limit  on  the  amount  of imported  goods  and  measures,  which  although  not 
explicitly,  create  a  hindrance  to  the  free flow  of goods.  Article  28  EC  is  a key Treaty 
provision  concerning  the  integration  of  national  markets.  The  deregulation  of  national 
measures by the Community through Article 28 EC was in the early stages of the internal 
market considered  crucial  in  creating  a centralised  environment where  it was  easier  for
41 Ibid Para 82 of judgment
122importers  to  break  into  the  market.  As  we  will  examine  below,  the  Court  pushed  this 
deregulatory momentum too far by unleashing negative integration to build more than  a 
liberalised  trade  area.  However  its  case  law  has  not  always  been  consistent  creating 
therefore problems in setting limits to the outer boundaries of Article 28 EC.
Both in Dassonville4 2 and Cassis de Dijon*3   the Court established that even non- 
discriminatory equal burden rules which did not favour domestic products over imports, 
could be caught by Article 28 EC. The distinction between equal burden rules and dual 
burden  rules  is  a  test  based  on  the  existence  of  direct  or  indirect,  actual  or  potential 
discrimination by the importing Member State. Equal burden rules apply to all goods and 
are not designed to be protectionist. They do not have a greater impact on the sale of foreign 
goods, even though they can affect the overall trade volume. On the other hand, dual burden 
rules apply to imported goods that have fulfilled similar rules in their state of origin. There 
was a point in the case law of the Court where equal burden rules had no effect upon the 
importation of goods and escaped the prohibition of Article 28 EC44. Article 28 EC was thus 
only aimed to cover dual burden rules, which in most cases concerned the content - inherent 
characteristics of the imported goods. However, after its decision in Cinetheque45, the Court 
started to experience difficulties on the outer boundaries of Article 28 EC. It held that the 
rule in question, which applied equally to domestic and imported videos, was prima facie
42 Case 8/1974, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837
43 Case 120/1978 Rewe Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis De Dijon) [1979] 
ECR 649. Cassis established that national rules would still be in breach of Article 28 EC even though they 
do not discriminate against imported goods but hinder free trade because they are simply different than the 
national rules of the country of origin of the imported goods.
44  See  Case  155/80  Oebel  [1981]  ECR  1983.  The  case  concerned  an  equal  burden  rule  prohibiting  the 
delivery of bakery products to consumers and retailers at night.  The Court concluded that this rule was not 
caught by Article 28 EC.
45 Joined Cases 60 and 61/84, Cinetheque SA v.  Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais [1985] ECR 
2605
123within Article 28 EC. Equal burden rules could be caught by Article 28 EC unless there was 
an  objective justification  under EC  law  and  the  method  of attaining  that objective  was 
proportionate.
This was challenged in Keck4 6  where the Court took a step backwards and excluded 
the application of Article 28 EC from rules that do not prevent market access (equal burden 
rules) by labelling them selling arrangements. The Court distinguished between measures 
falling under the prohibition of Article 28 EC (relating to the inherent characteristics of the 
goods) and measures that escape the prohibition of Article 28 EC  (relating to the extrinsic 
characteristics of the goods). The latter, known as selling arrangements, although affect the 
sale of goods they do not aim to regulate trade. The Court’s decision in Keck did not rescue 
the application of Article 28 EC from ambiguity as to what constitutes a selling arrangement 
and what a rule relating to the nature of the product47.  However,  Keck demonstrates the 
Court’s change of attitude from its previous anti-protectionist manner towards a willingness 
to sustain a mature regime of market integration where trade liberalisation can be achieved 
without strict economic deregulation48. The case outcome of Keck reflects a respect for the 
traditional value of subsidiarity and gradual limitation of the Community’s competence to 
interference with national policy-making. After Keck the free movement of goods principles 
are not aimed at deregulating economic measures but at liberalising trade in a way which 
reflects the precise wording of Article 28 EC. But still the Court’s approach reflects a semi­
46 Cases C-267-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097
47 See Case C-391/92 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR 1-1621; Case C-368/95  Vereinigte Familiapress 
Zeitungverlags und Vertreibs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag (Familiapress) [1997] 3 CMLR 1329
48 For details over the case-law see Weatherill, S., “Recent Case Law Concerning The Free Movement Of 
Goods: Mapping The Frontiers Of Market Deregulations” (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 51
124decentralised  model  as  the  Community  still  maintains  competence  to  strike  down 
discriminatory state measures even though these are labelled as selling arrangements49.
One has to balance the division between the Community’s interests and the Member 
States’  responsibilities  to  their  nationals  in  order  to  assess  whether  there  should  be  a 
difference between trade liberalisation and economic deregulation in a single market. The 
whole issue shifts to the question of competence50. Should national regulatory autonomy be 
undermined by the  Member  States’  Treaty  obligations  that emphasise  the  Community’s 
harmonisation imperative or should states rather be left to regulate their markets freely? 
Seeing the purpose of the single market as “a fusion of the national markets ” harmonisation 
at Community level appears desirable. On the other hand, if we establish that its objective is 
to "facilitate individual freedoms”5 1  a more active state involvement seems to be appealing.
3.  After the adoption of Community Secondary Legislation
The Member States’  freedom to legislate is not only conditional upon their Treaty 
obligations but also upon obligations imposed by Community secondary legislation. Once 
the Community has legislated in a sector, Member States may no longer be competent to do 
so in the field covered by this legislation, except to the extent necessary to implement it. It is 
important that  this  prohibition  is  usually  unwritten  and  attributable  to  the  principle  of 
supremacy of EC law. Therefore, by attributing precedence to the legislative rules adopted
49 Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] 3 CMLR 1329
50 “Disputes over the application of Article 28 are disputes over different conflicting Constitutional models: 
Harmonised rules in a Centralised model are achieved through positive integration at Community level. In 
a Competitive or Neo-liberal regime harmonisation is achieved through a Darwinian competition, for only 
the fittest state measure survives in a laissezfaire market. Finally in a Decentralised model Member States 
keep hold of regulatory powers in a system based very much on competition and anti-protectionism.  All 
these conceptions presuppose different legitimacy  sources:  Therefore one comes  across  three sources of 
legitimacy: The Community, the self-regulated market and the National democratic authority.”
51 Chalmers, D., “Repackaging the Internal Market - The Ramifications of the Keck Judgment” (1994) 19 
European Law Review 385
125by the Community over those of the Member States, Community competence becomes pre­
emptive through its exercise. What is more, the areas of Community harmonisation cannot 
be characterised as examples of pre-emptive exclusivity per se, since power has not passed 
definitely to the Community. This however does not prompt certain Community secondary 
legislation from having full or partial pre-emptive effects (i.e. occupy the relevant regulatory 
field, preventing national exercise of competence)
(a)  Fully pre-emptive effect
When  Community  legislation  is  fully  pre-emptive,  Member  States  are  entirely 
barred from exercising their regulatory competence in the particular sphere. The case of 
Commission  of the  European  Communities  v  United  Kingdom  and Northern  Ireland?2  involved 
Directive  76/756/EEC  on  the  approximation  of the  laws  of the  Member States relating  to  the 
installation of lighting and light-signalling devices on motor vehicles,  as  amended by Directive 
83/276 EEC.  The UK had decided that Directive 76/756/EEC,  which  specifies the harmonised 
technical requirements applicable to the installation of lighting and light-signalling devices, does not 
contain  an  exhaustive  harmonisation  of the  requirements relating  to  the  installation  of lighting 
devices. This means, according to the UK, that Member States have the power to lay down additional 
requirements such as the installation of dim-dip lighting devices. The Court rejected this argument 
holding that the UK had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty by adopting the Directive.
This  approach  by  the  Court  necessitates  a  definition  of  the  precise  scope  of 
application  of the  Community’s  secondary  legislation.  In  fact  the  Court  established  in 
subsequent  decisions  that  national  competence  is  pre-empted  within  the  scope  of
52 Case 60/86 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland (Dim-Dip Headlights) [1988] ECR 3921
126Community law but nonetheless survives intact outside. In Mayenne Cooperative5 3  the Cour 
de Cassation asked the Court of Justice whether the French rules on insemination of animals 
(where each  authorised insemination centre  serves  an  exclusive territory and imports  of 
semen from other Member States are free but must be delivered to authorised production or 
insemination centres) were compatible with the rules of the Treaty on competition and on 
the free circulation of agricultural products. The Court held that the granting of exclusive 
rights did not infringe the Community’s principles of Competition law under Articles 90(1) 
and  86  EC  since  the  ‘abuse’  concerned  the  allegedly  exorbitant prices  charged  by  the 
insemination centres and not an encouragement by the French law to the centres to charge 
disproportionate  costs.  The  Court  added  that  if the  obligation  to  deliver  semen  to  the 
authorised centres was caught under Article 30 EC (now 28) it could be justified on the 
grounds of health under Article 36 EC (now 30)  - provided that it is proportionate to its aim 
so  that  the  pricing  policy  did  not  discriminate  actually  or  potentially  against  imported 
semen.
What is important in  terms of the vertical distribution  of competence is that the 
Community  had not harmonised by means  of legislation  the  trade  of semen  within  the 
internal market. Pre-emptive Community harmonisation indeed plays a significant role to 
the extent of Member  States’  competence54.  One  however should not  underestimate  the 
principle  of  ‘mutual  recognition’  as  an  additional  factor  of  limitation  to  national 
competence. The operation of the principle of mutual recognition between Member States
53 Case  C323/93  Societe  Civile  Agricole  du  Centre  de  I'Insemination  de  la  Crespelle  v  Cooperative 
d'Elevage et d'Insemination Artificielle du Departement de la Mayenne [1994] ECR 1-5077; See also Case 
Comment (1995) 20(6) European Law Review, Supp. (Competition).
54  See  the  new  approach  to  technical  harmonisation  where  both  harmonised  safety  specifications  for 
products and the principle of mutual recognition may contribute seriously in reducing national competence 
to legislate.
127on product requirements case law demonstrates that regulatory control lies in principle with 
the  state  of  origin  whilst  the  exercise  of  control  is  also  undertaken  by  the  state  of 
importation. This results in a double regulatory burden. Nevertheless, in this case not only 
was  the  subject matter not harmonised by the  Community but  also the relevant French 
legislation did not hinder the marketing of imported products, it neither favoured domestic 
products or imported ones. As a result, the requirement that all semen coming from outside 
the exclusive territory needed to be delivered to the competent centre,  applied equally to 
both domestic and imported products.
(b)  Partially Pre-emptive effect
Having  examined  about  the  fully  pre-emptive  effect  of  Community  secondary 
legislation,  there  are  cases  where  Member  States  retain  the  competence  to  engage  in 
regulatory activity even within the relevant field of Community secondary legislation. This 
can be interpreted as the exception to the general rule that expects Directives to harmonise 
national laws providing common rules for the achievement of a more integrated internal 
market. A Directive, when adopted constitutes more than a point of reference as to the field 
that it addresses. It is a governing norm for the respective field safeguarding the interests in 
question. Yet there are situations where the pre-emptive effect of EC soft law is only partial. 
This  occurs  intentionally  to  allow  national  regulatory  competence  operate  without non- 
exhaustive Community harmonisation, especially in terms of the marketing of products.
A Directive is ’minimum’ in character only insofar as this is indicated in the Treaty 
basis or in the Directive itself. There, national regulation is allowed as long as it respects the 
principle  of  market  access  being  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  internal  market  as 
established by the Treaty. In particular, Member States are competent to enact regulatory
128code for products intended to circulate only in their domestic market next to the already 
established Community regulatory codes that aim to achieve what is often called minimum 
harmonisation ,55for the marketing of products circulating in the internal market. Minimum 
harmonisation therefore occurs when the Community rule provides a ‘floor of rights’ without 
preventing Member  States  from  applying  stricter  standards  provided  they  are  otherwise 
compatible with the Treaty. This means that there is a Community wide standard with which 
every Member State needs to comply as a minimum. Minimum harmonisation differs from 
total harmonisation since Member States are allowed to do more by deciding on stricter 
standards.
Member States are competent to enact higher standards and the Treaty contains legal 
bases  for  minimum  harmonisation  measures  adopted  for  the  protection  of  consumers 
(Article  138  and Article  153  EC) and the environment -  particularly quality standards - 
(Article 176 EC), to name but a few. Yet, one could argue that if Member States are allowed 
to protect their domestic markets against imported products using only minimum standards 
then it is the Community that should ultimately decide. The realisation of the internal market 
contains  a continuous conflict between an uncontrolled market re-nationalisation and the 
goal  of keeping  a  high  level  of protection  under  the  Communitarian  harmonisation  of 
national  standards.  The  political  choices  of the  Community  are  important  in  adopting 
harmonisation at a high level of protection or mutual recognition and / or harmonisation at a 
low level  of protection. For example, the recent European enlargement has,  among else, 
raised  questions  as  to  the  degree  that  new  Member  States  can  take  on  a  complete
55  Directive  71/316/EEC  on  the  approximation  of the  laws  of the  Member  States  relating  to  common 
provisions for both measuring instruments and methods of metrological control, 26 July  1971, O.J. L 145, 
27/06/1972 p.  11
129environmental  acquit6.  Their accession to the  Community may therefore bring  a lower 
level of protection in the decision of environmental policies. Alternatively, a higher level of 
protection may take place among a core group of States,  which favour a high degree of 
harmonisation.  This  however may encourage  the development  of a multi-speed Europe, 
which is discussed in Chapter 7.
Articles 94 and 95 EC do not make reference to minimum harmonisation and in fact 
most Directives related to products do not permit this technique. In both cases a Member 
State  remains  free  to  act  subject  only  to  the  control  of primary  EC  law.  This  occurs 
according to Weatherill  “because  of the  impediment to market integration which  would 
follow abandonment of classic pre-emption, in contrast to environmental measures which 
have long had the minimum formula, accepting some incidental barrier to goods.4 * 5 7  In R. v 
Secretary of State for Health Ex p. Gallaher Ltd58, British producers challenged the legality 
of the UK’s scheme on health warning labels printed on cigarette packets for posing a higher 
burden upon domestic products (a warning covering 6% of the surface area of the packet) 
compared to imported products (a warning covering 4% of the surface area of the packet 
according to Directive 89/622). The case went to the Court for interpretation of Directive 
89/6225 9 [particularly Articles 3 (3); 4(4); 8(1); 8(2)] on the labelling of tobacco products, 
which was intended,  inter alia,  to harmonise national laws on the size of health warning 
labels printed on cigarette packets declaring [according to Article 3(3)] that **the indications
56  Carius,  A.,  Von  Homeyer,  I.,  and  Bar,  S.,  “The  Eastern  Enlargement  of the EU  and  Environmental 
Policy:  Challenges,  Expectations,  Speed  and  Flexibility”in  Holzinger,  K.,  and  Knoepfel,  P.,  (eds) 
“Environmental  Policy  in  a  European  Union  of  Variable  Geometry?  The  Challenge  of  the  Next 
Enlargement” Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Switzerland, (2000).
57 See Weatherill, S.,“Regulating the Internal Market: Result Orientation in the Court of Justice”, (1994) 19 
(1) European Law Review 55-67
58 Case C-l 1/92 [1993] ECR 1-3545
59  The  Directive  was  adopted  by  qualified  majority  under  Article  100a  as  part  of the  Council’s  1986 
Resolution on action against cancer.
130of tar and nicotine yields shall be printed on the side of cigarette packets.. .so at least 4 per 
cent of the corresponding surface is covered”. Moreover according to Article 8(1) of the 
Directive, Member States should not impede the market access of products that comply with 
it. However, under Article 8(2), Member States maintain the right to pose “in compliance 
with  the  Treaty,  requirements  concerning  the  import,  sale  and  consumption  of tobacco 
products  which  they  deem  necessary  in  order  to  protect  public  health,  provided  such 
requirements do not imply any changes to labelling as laid down in this Directive.4 4
This in conjunction to the “at least...” phrase in Article 8(1) can be interpreted in the 
following way: the EC Directive on labelling cigarette packets is intended to allow Member 
States the freedom to impose stricter conditions on domestic tobacco manufacturers. These 
conditions  however  do  not  catch  importers  since  that  would  impede  the  Treaty’s  free 
movement of goods principles60. Such an approach, adopted by the Court, is at odds with 
Advocate  General  Lenz’s  Opinion  that  Article  95  is  intended  to  eliminate  competitive 
distortion in the internal market61. Further, the Directive in question did not contain a market 
access rule similar to Article 3 of Directive 79/112 on the approximation of laws relating to 
labelling  of  foodstuffs62.  Despite  that,  the  Court  ruled  in  favour  of  the  UK.  A  broad 
interpretation of Article 8(1) of the Directive  allowed the UK to  adopt a more effective 
health policy by imposing higher objectives for internally produced tobacco products even if 
such a teleological interpretation could produce inequality in competitive conditions. As to 
any reservations  about such  an  approach,  the Court concluded:  “those consequences  are
60 See Case C-267-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097; Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I- 
4921
61 Advocate General Lenz's Opinion, delivered on March 2,  1993. The Advocate General was in favour of 
the tobacco manufacturers supporting that Article 8(1) refers to “sale” not “importation”. He stressed that if 
a Member State can place extra burdens on domestic producers the spirit of Article 95 aimed to eliminate 
competitive distortion in the internal market would be frustrated.
62 OJ L 033  (08.02.1979)
131attributable to the degree of harmonisation sought by the provisions in question, which lay 
down minimum requirements.4 *  The decision in Gallaher has been the subject of academic 
criticism for being “underdeveloped”. This is not unreasonable considering that “the Court 
itself has  chosen  to  blur  the  apparently  clear  picture  of the  limits  of the  technique  of 
minimum harmonisation.”63.
The outcome of Gallaher, may suggest a preference for minimum harmonisation 
against the traditional  notion  of pre-emption.  This  soft approach by the  Community  (to 
allow decentralisation of regulation through minimum harmonisation even where the Treaty 
does not require64)  might be  greeted with  contentment in  the  Member  States,  given the 
difficulty of application of a single pre-emptive regulatory code in a Union of twenty-five 
Member  States.  As  to  the  matter  of  balancing  vertically  the  scale  of  powers  in  the 
Community, it appears that the allocation of competence within the EC is evolving in favour 
of  the  Member  States.  This  hypothesis  contradicts  the  previous  situation  where 
Community’s  instruments  had  a  fully  pre-emptive  effect  but  it  does  not  imply  a  re­
nationalisation  of Community’s policy.  If then  the outcome  of Gallaher does not ignite 
doom scenarios about the fate of the vertical division of competence within the Community, 
it reminds to one of the Keck dicta: there the question of competence was hidden beneath the 
Court’s dilemma of where market integration stops and national regulatory capacity begins. 
The outcome in  Gallaher may thus  mirror the Court’s  consideration to  the principle of 
subsidiarity.  By  ruling  in  favour  of the  UK  while  turning  down  the claim  of domestic 
manufacturers  one  could  identify  behind  the  Court’s  decision  a  political  compromise
63 Weatherill, S./‘Regulating the Internal Market: Result Orientation in the Court of Justice”, (1994)  19 (1) 
European Law Review 55-67
64  See  Edinburgh  European  Council,  December  1992,  particularly  its  approach  in  setting  minimum 
standards. Presidency Conclusions available at www.europarl.eu.int/summits/edinburgh/default  en.htm
132between the Community and the Member States through a profound respect of the former to 
national sensitive regulatory choices.
C.  COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE 
1. Complementary Competence and Treaty Obligations under Article 18(1)
Complementary  competence  covers  areas  where  Community  action  is 
supplementary  to  or  supporting  the  action  of  the  Member  States65.  EC  and  national 
competences can therefore co-exist on the same plane and be exercised in parallel. This 
means that when the Community exercises a competence the Member States are not blocked 
from  regulating  in  the  given  field,  as  when  the  area  in  question  falls  under  shared 
competence. In contrast, national autonomous action is allowed and the Community may 
‘complement’  (Article  164 EC)  such  an  action  and  ‘contribute’  [Article  157  (3) EC]  to 
achieve the common objectives set out in the Treaty. This of course stands insofar as the 
measures  enacted  do  not  come  at  different  ends  but  rather  support  each  other.  When 
however problems  arise the principle of supremacy of EC law  applies  as a coordinating 
norm.
Having said that in areas of complementary competence the Community may adopt 
legally  binding  acts,  these  do  not  have  a  harmonising  /  pre-emptive  effect.  Therefore 
regulatory  power  remains  vested  in  the  Member  States  with  Community’s  intervention 
having a complementary effect. For instance, in relation to Education, Vocational Training 
and Youth (Title XI, Chapter 3 EC) Article 149 EC refers to the role of the Community in
65  Community  competence  involve  generally  Economic  and  Social  Cohesion;  Employment;  Customs 
Cooperation; Education, Vocational Training and Youth; Culture; Public Health; Trans-European networks 
(except  for  interoperability  and  standards);  Industry;  Research  and  Development;  Development 
Cooperation; Common Defence Policy (Title V of the TEU).
133“encouraging cooperation  between Member States  and,  if necessary,  by  supporting  and 
supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States 
for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and 
linguistic  diversity....”  The  Council  adopts  measures  by  co-decision  (Article  251  EC) 
“excluding  any  harmonisation  of the  laws  and  regulations  of the  Member  States”  and 
recommendations acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. The 
same also applies to cultural policy; most aspects of public health policy; employment and 
industrial policy. Von Bogdandy and Bast add a subcategory to parallel competences:  ‘non 
regulatory powers’.
Complementary  competence refers  only  to  Community  regulatory powers  under 
relevant  legal  bases.  Member  States  are  also  bound  within  these  policy  sectors  by 
obligations contained in the Treaty. In Grzelczyk6 6  the applicant, a French national studying 
at a Belgian university, was refused a minimum subsistence allowance on the ground that a 
person of non-Belgian nationality was only entitled to the benefit if, inter alia, he was a 
“worker” within the definition of Regulation 1612/68. In this case the applicant was not a 
worker.  The Court  stressed that  since the relevant Regulation  did not apply to  Belgian 
nationals  as  a condition to  determine the allocation  of the benefit,  the Belgian  law  was 
discriminatory on grounds of nationality. This was contrary to Article 6 EC of the Treaty 
that had to be read in conjunction to the Union Citizenship provisions of Articles 8 to 8e EC 
(emphasising  that  same  treatment  in  law  should  apply  to  all  Community  nationals 
irrespective of nationality). Additionally, the Court said that the Directive 93/96/EEC on the 
right  of residence  for  students  did  not  preclude  students  from  receiving  social  security 
benefits  from  the  host  state.  However  the  Court  recognised  in  agreement  with  the
66 Case 184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignies Louvain la Neuve  [2001] ECR1-6193Directive’s preamble, that Member States have a legitimate interest in preventing other EU 
nationals being a burden on their public finances. In that case, the Member State in concern 
may consider that the claimant no longer fulfils the conditions laid down by Article 18(1) 
EC and may revoke or refuse to renew his/her residence permit and/or even expel him/her 
from the country.
The approach of the Court in Grzelczyk overruled its previous decision in Brown v 
Secretary  of State for Scotland1   where  student  maintenance  grants  were  considered  as 
falling outside the scope of Community law68. This is due to the fact that at the time Brown 
was decided, EU citizenship had not yet been introduced in the Treaty and competence over 
education and vocational training was less clear. Thus, comes the difference in the Court’s 
judgment  in  Grzelczyk confirming that in  areas  of complementary competence Member 
States have to respect the obligations of Citizenship  contained in  the Treaty.  The Court 
confirmed  that  students,  under  certain  conditions,  could  claim  equality  of  treatment 
pertaining to social benefit. It imposed restrictions on Member States’  powers to end the 
lawful residence  status  of poor nationals  coming  from  other Member  States.  As  to  the 
“certain conditions”  where a Member State can deny equality of treatment pertaining to 
social benefit, the Court emphasised that recourse to social benefits is not a sufficient reason 
for a Member State to withdraw residence permits or refuse to grant new permits. It is only 
if a Member State demonstrates that nationals of other Member States have or will become 
an  unreasonable burden  on  its  social  assistance  scheme  that it can take  such  measures. 
Contrary to Directives 93/96, 90/365  and 90/364, the Court read into these Directives “a
67 Case C-197/86 Brown v Secretary of State for Scotland (1988) ECR 3205, at 3243
68 See Para 18 of the judgment: “at the present stage of development of Community law, assistance given to 
students for maintenance and training falls outside the scope of the EEC Treaty for the purposes of art 7 
thereof (now Article 6 EC).
135certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a host Member State and nationals 
of other Member States”.
Furthermore,  the  Court’s  decisions  in  Martinez  Sala6 9   and  more  recently  in 
Baumbast7 0  demonstrate the legal effects of Union citizenship. Not only has EU Citizenship 
been constitutionalised by the Treaty of Maastricht but also after Baumbast Article 18(1) EC 
it enjoys direct effect within the Member States. Theoretically, it can be invoked by private 
individuals - as long as they are nationals of a Member State - before their national courts. 
Regardless  of  whether  they  engage  in  some  form  of  economic  activity  and  receive 
remuneration  in  order  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  Article  39  EC  and  the  Court’s 
established case law71, EU Citizens can secure residence and social advantages in general7 2  
subject to limitations contained in the Treaty73. The judgments in Grzelczyk and Martinez 
Sala suggest that independent family members, who hold the nationality of a Member State 
and reside with the worker in the state of employment, are entitled to rely on Article 12(1) 
EC (discrimination on grounds of nationality). Thus, they are entitled to social benefit under 
the same conditions as the nationals of the host state. This is important since a Member State 
cannot terminate the lawful residence of an EU citizen on the basis of his / her economic 
inactivity and need of social benefit. Both in Grzelczyk and Martinez Sala the Court only 
referred to EU Citizens lawfully residing in the territory of another Member State but after 
Baumbast third country family members who have use of the right to reside guaranteed by
69 Case C-85/96 Maria Martinez Sala [1998] ECR1-2691
70 Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR 1-0000
71 Case 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR. 1035; [1982] 2 CMLR 454; Case 139/85 Kempf [1986] ECR 1741
72 Prior to Baumbast economically inactive persons derived their residency rights from Directives 90/364, 
90/365  and 93/96. The rights of residency were subject to the claimant’s sufficient resources and his/her 
proof of comprehensive medical insurance.
73 See Case C-357/98 ex parte Yiadom [2000] ECR 1-9265
136Article 10 (1) of EC Regulation 1612/68 also fall within the personal scope of Community 
law and thus Article 12 (1) EC.
This, however, challenges the integrity of welfare systems organised along national 
boundaries  and  dismisses  the  previously  successful  claims  of Member  States  that  such 
claimants constitute an  ‘unreasonable burden’  on public finances being, as often referred, 
‘welfare  tourists’.  Thus,  comes  the  pre-Baumbast  reluctance  of  the  Court  to  accept 
preliminary references solely on grounds of interpretation of Article 18(1) EC74. The Court’s 
jurisprudence  can  be  criticised  for  not  giving  sufficient  regard  to  the  Member  States’ 
interests. One could argue that Articles 12 and 18 EC should not have been interpreted as to 
impose on Member States the obligation to grant benefits irrespective of the individual’s 
participation in the workforce and economic contribution to the society in general. In that 
respect, the extent of application of Article  18(1) EC is in fact somewhat atypical. On the 
one hand Member States have to respect their obligations contained in the primary Treaty 
rules on EU Citizenship and on the other the practical significance of Article  18(1) EC is 
restrained due to the Community’s limited competence over the regulation of the welfare 
systems of its Member States.
Jacqueson7 5   speaks  of  a  rather  ‘symbolic’  notion  of  EU  Citizenship  since  “the 
Member  States  still  hold  exclusive  competence  in  conferring  their  nationality  while 
citizenship of the Union depends on whether one is a national of a Member State or not”.
74  Quoting from Dougan, M. and Spaventa, E., “Educating Rudy and the Non-English Patient: A Double 
Bill on Residency Rights Under Article 18EC”, (2003) 28(5) European Law Review, 699-712
“e.g.  Case  C-100/01,  Olazabal  [2002]  E.C.R.  1-10981,  on  Art.39  EC;  Case  C-  193/94,  Skanavi  [1996] 
E.C.R. 1-929; [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 372, on Art.43 EC. Cf. Case C-92/01, Stylianakis (judgment of February 
6, 2003), on Art.49 EC. However, the Court's attitude has not always been consistent, e.g. Case C- 274/96, 
Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR 1-7637; Case C- 135/99 Elsen [2000] ECR 1-10409”
75 Jacqueson C.,  “Union Citizenship and the Court of Justice:  Something New Under the  Sun? Towards 
Social Citizenship”, (2002) 27(3) European Law Review 260-281
137This however does not imply that Community law cannot set limits to the sovereign power 
of the  States  when  they put  in  danger the  fundamental  principles  as  laid down  by  the 
Treaty76.  By  its  decisions  in  Grzelczyk  and  Baumbast  the  Court  did  not  make  EU 
Citizenship, as established by Article 17 of the Treaty and Declaration No. 2 on Nationality 
attached  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  unconditional,  but  rather  limited  the  extent  of  the 
restrictions set by the previously mentioned Directives on Residence while respecting the 
regulatory power of the Member States. It is unrealistic to think that the funding of social 
assistance schemes will be gravely affected as a result of the Court’s decisions in Grzelczyk 
and Martinez Sala.  Besides those judgments do not grant an unconditional right to free 
movement of persons in the Community. Economically inactive EU citizens would still be 
required to satisfy the national eligibility criteria and present proof that they will not become 
a burden on the social assistance system of the Member State they wish to establish. It is 
rather the problem of a temporary financial need that Grzelczyk aims to address in relation to the 
right of residence and not to provide a panacea for intra-Community migration and social assistance 
benefits.
Conclusion
Having analysed the main categories of Community competence (exclusive, shared 
and  complementary)  this  chapter  attempted  to  provide  a  general  flavour  of  the  way 
competences  are  allocated  vertically  in  the  Community.  To  set  the  exact  limits  of the 
Community’s express powers would imply a detailed analysis of each and every provision 
of Part HI of the Treaty, something that Dash  wood considers as “the subject... of a lifetime
76 For instance a deprival of nationality would breach Article 17(2). Thus, such a national practice would be 
against a Treaty obligation and is not related to the division of competence vis-k-vis the Community. See 
D’Oliveira,  “Nationality  and  the  European  Union  After  Amsterdam  Legal  Issues  of  the  Amsterdam 
Treaty”, in O’Keeffe, D., and Twomey, P., (eds.),  "Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty”, Oxford , Hart, 
(1999), pp. 395-412.
138study”77. Instead, this Chapter focused on the manner of allocation of vertical Community 
competences through broad categorisation. The account of the main categories of internal 
subject-related competence of the Community (as opposed to objective-related competence 
that constitutes the subject-matter of the next chapter) therefore provided an overview of the 
wording of the relevant Treaty provisions and the Court’s case law.
Such an assessment aimed to demonstrate that the problem of a clear delimitation of 
internal Community competences lies in the fact that those competences attributed to the 
supranational cannot be regarded separately from those attached to the intergovernmental 
arena.  Instead, competence in Community law is based on an interplay between the two 
levels,  establishing  what  Pemice  identifies  as  “a  cooperative  system  of  separation  of 
powers”78. Any attempt to establish a clear separation of powers between the Community 
and the Member States in relation to the various levels of competence needs to take into 
account  the  existence  of the  cooperative  system  of power-separation  that  exists  in  the 
Community. This makes problematic the drawing of clear-cut lines of responsibility along 
with a strict allocation of competence.
77 Dashwood, A., “The Limits of European Community Powers” (1996) 21 (2) European Law Review 113
78 Pernice,  I.,  “Kompetenzabgrenzung  im  Europaischen  Verfassungsverbund”  (2000)  JZ  866,  871 
Antrittsvorlesung”CHAPTER 4
THE MAIN CATEGORIES OF OBJECTIVE RELATED EC / EU INTERNAL
COMPETENCES
Introduction
Contrary  to  subject  related  competences  linked  to  the  conduct  of Community 
policies,  objective  related  competences  are  associated  with  the  achievement  of  the 
Community’s internal market goals. As it has already been illustrated, for every proposed 
Community  act there  must be  an  authorisation  under  a legal  basis  within  the Treaty. 
However,  a focus  on the past use of the specific provisions of Article 95 EC1   and the 
broader revision clause of Article 308 EC by the Community’s legislature suggests that 
these general legal bases have often been interpreted broadly by the Parliament and the 
Council.  This  has  often  generated  fear  in  the  Member  States  with  regard  to  the 
effectiveness  of the principles  of attributed powers  and subsidiarity,  creating what has 
often been referred in academic literature as the problem of ‘creeping competence’ The 
term ‘competence creep’ has been used by academics2  to demonstrate that in the present 
system, which governs the attribution and exercise of competence, the Community and its 
Institutions have encroached upon the sovereign spheres of the Member States.
1  Article 95(1) EC reads: “The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of 
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.”
2  Weatherill,  S.,  “Competences”  in  De  Witte,  B.,  “Ten  Reflections  on  the  Constitutional  Treaty for 
Europe”,  European  University  Institute  Florence,  (2003)  at  45-66;  Hoffmann,  L.,  and  Shaw,  J., 
“Constitutionalism  and  Federalism  in  the  ‘Future  of Europe’  debate:  The  German  Dimension”,  (2004) 
Online Paper 03 / 04, European Federal Trust, London
140Against  the  post-Nice  effort,  culminating  in  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty,  to 
establish  a  clearer  and  more  precise  delimitation  of  competence,  one  comes  across 
instances where the adoption of measures by Community Institutions exceeds the limits 
of  the  Community’s  regulatory  competence.  This  Chapter  will  focus  upon  the 
Community’s competence to regulate public health under Article 95 EC (especially with 
regard to tobacco advertising) and to conclude international agreements under Article 308 
EC (especially the European Convention of Human Rights). Examples from the relatively 
recent case law  of the  Court will be used in order to present the current problems of 
clarity  as  regards  the  attribution,  exercise  and  control  of  competences  within  the 
Community. In each case the Court has encountered a conflict between the attempts of 
the EC Institutions to establish clear constitutional boundaries on a given area of national 
competence and the deliberate adoption of EC legislation on that same area, which goes 
beyond those limits.
The first part of the Chapter,  which focuses on the  so-called  ‘Tobacco Cases’, 
examines  the  problem  behind  the  lack  of  sufficient  legal  competence,  when  the 
Community attempts  to pass harmonisation measures  under Article 95  EC that aim to 
protect public health. The German Tobacco Advertising Judgment* has been chosen as an 
indicative example of this challenge. Contrary to the Directive adopted by the Parliament 
and the Council,  the  Court recognised that the prohibition  on  tobacco  advertising and 
sponsorship was not an internal market measure. Thus, the EC Institutions exceeded their 
legal competence in introducing a disguised ‘internal market measure’  that was intended 
to regulate public health. The Court, however, left open the possibility of a prohibition
3 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and the Council [2000] ECR I- 8419
141with  a  more  limited  scope,  confined  to  areas  where  foreseeable  obstacles  to  free 
movement  of goods  and  services  exist  and  where  distortion  of competition  would be 
appreciable. In a relevant case4, it held that the Directive in question genuinely had as its 
object the improvement of the conditions for the functioning of the internal market. Thus, 
it was possible for it to be adopted on the legal basis of harmonisation of the internal 
market.
The second part of this Chapter will examine the Community’s competence under 
the general provision of Article 308 EC. It will attempt to address the question of how far 
can Article 308 EC serve as the basis for widening the scope of Community competence. 
The  author  will  focus  on  the  Court’s  approach  to  the  Community’s  competence  to 
conclude an international agreement, particularly on the compatibility of accession to the 
European Convention  of Human  Rights  (ECHR).  In  an  act of self-restraint,  the Court 
ruled in  Opinion  2/945  that the Union lacked the power to  accede to  the ECHR.  This 
created an ideological split between those who argued that respect for human rights does 
not represent one of the objectives of the Community and those who argued the contrary. 
According  to  the  former,  the  Community  should  not  be  competent  to  legislate  over 
human  rights  issues  and  conclude  international  conventions  since  its  objectives  are 
limited  to  the  politico-economic  sphere  of  integration.  According  to  the  latter,  the 
protection  of  human  rights  consists  one  of the  objectives  of the  Community  and  its 
accession to the ECHR would prevent potential human rights violations by Community 
Institutions.  This  however suggests  that the partial  transfer of sovereignty by Member
4  Case  C-491/01  BAT Investments  LTD  &  Imperial  Tobacco  v  Secretary  of State for Health  [2003]  1 
CMLR 14
5 Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the ECHR [1996] ECR 1-1759
142States  in  a number  of areas  through  their  accession  to  the  Community  could  also be 
extended  in  the  future  to  the  area  of  human  rights.  Therefore,  had  the  Community 
Institutions  granted  a positive opinion by the Court,  the  use of Article  308 EC in  the 
accession agreement to the ECHR would have reduced the importance of the principle of 
subsidiarity. Taking these considerations into account one can empathise with the Court’s 
decision in Opinion 2/94 that Article 308 EC cannot serve as a basis for widening the 
scope of Community competence beyond the Treaty.
A.  ARTICLE 95 EC AND THE COMPETENCE TO REGULATE HEALTH
POLICY 
Public Health and Article 95 EC
Successive  Treaty  revisions  have  bestowed  to  the  Community  competence  to 
legislate in the fields of education and vocational  training  [Articles  149(4) and  150(4) 
EC] culture [Article 151(5) EC] and public health [Article 152(4) EC]]. The introduction 
of Article  129 EC (now Article  152 EC) by the Treaty of Maastricht conferred for the 
first time upon the Community Institutions competence in the area of health. Yet, as with 
Articles  149(4);  150(4)  and  151(5)  EC,  Article  152(4)  expressly  excludes  “any 
harmonisation of the laws  and regulations  of the Member States”.  Particularly,  Article 
152(4)(c)  EC  states  that  the  “the  Council...shall  contribute  to  the  achievement of the 
objectives referred to in this article through adopting...  incentive measures designed to 
protect  and  improve  human  health,  excluding  any  harmonisation  of  the  laws  and 
regulations of the Member States.” Thus, Community competence in public health under 
Article  152  EC  has  been  classified  as  complementary  to  those  of the  Member  States
143excluding Community harmonisation.  Article  152(4)(b) is  the most suitable legislative 
basis  for  promoting  cooperation  in  relation  to  health  policy  by  adopting  incentive 
measures  using  the  co-decision  procedure.  There  the  Court  determines  its  “proper 
construction.. .in the context of its jurisprudence and legal basis.”6
Health policy has become a general Community policy as emphasised in Article 2 
EC  (...raising  of the  standard  of living)  and  Article  3  (p)  EC  (a  contribution  to  the 
attainment of a high level of health protection).  As  a result,  the preservation  of health 
standards occupies almost every Community policy following the constitutionalisation of 
the internal market, from the movement of medicinal and hazardous goods to road safety 
and food quality7. Directly effective Treaty provisions may produce a deregulatory effect 
while  promoting  health  and  disease  prevention.  Member  States  need  to  respect  the 
primary Community law, as their competence monopoly over the regulation of health is 
limited. Not only the Community Institutions but also domestic manufacturers acting as 
enforcers  of EC  law  may  rely  upon  a  directly  effective  provision  to  contest  national 
protective measures that violate health rights under EC law. Nevertheless, there are ways 
of securing national  competence  in  relation  to  health policy.  For example,  the Treaty 
provides derogations from the free movement principles, as in the case of Article 30 EC, 
where Member  States  need to  show,  inter  alia,  a risk to  public  health  in  order to be 
exempted from the prohibition in Article 28 EC.
6 Hervey, T.K.,  “Community and National Competence after Tobacco Advertising”,  (2001) 38  Common 
Market Law Review 1421-1446. See also Case C-180/96 UK v Commission [1996] ECR 1-3903 pp 1423
7  See  the  European  Commission,  Communication  on  the  Development  of Public  Health  Policy  in  the 
European  Community,  COM  (98)  230  final.  The  Communication  outlines  a  possible  new  Community 
public health policy, based upon three elements: Better information exchange; Rapid reaction to emerging 
health risks and health determinants.
144Although  Community  Institutions  cannot  under  Article  152  EC  directly  adopt 
secondary legislation in the shape of harmonising measures  aimed at the protection of 
human  health,  a legislative measure under a different legal  basis  may  achieve  similar 
results. For instance, a provision standing as a legislative basis for Community secondary 
legislation  (e.g.  Article  175  EC  for  environmental  legislation)  may  be  employed  to 
achieve a health objective (e.g. improvement of air and water quality) as long as this is 
incidental to the core aim of the measure (e.g. to protect the environment) and the choice 
of the legal basis is the right for the realisation of that aim. The same occurs with regard 
to Community harmonisation measures adopted under Article 95 EC by the co-decision 
procedure for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. As long as they 
are considered necessary for the completion and proper operation of the internal market, 
their implications for national health policy may not raise a problem in relation to the 
balance  of  competences.  This  means  that  the  Community  does  not  enjoy  a  general 
competence to harmonise national health policies under Article 95 EC in the same way it 
did prior to the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht using the old Articles 
100 and 100a EC (now Articles 94 and 95 EC) to introduce legislation in areas not listed 
in the Treaties. These areas (e.g. health and environment) now form independent spheres 
of  Community  action.  Thus,  the  competence  problem  arises  when  the  Community 
attempts to regulate these policy sectors by introducing legislation based on the old bases 
of the renumbered Articles 94 and 95 EC. The question each time is whether the correct 
legal  basis  for  such  a  measure  has  been  used  and  whether  these  Treaty  provisions, 
particularly Article 95 EC, provide such a basis.
145Generally, the Community is only competent to harmonise national policies under 
Article 95 EC insofar as such action is necessary for the attainment of the internal market. 
Otherwise, a specific legal basis is more desirable than a general one. In a case against 
the  Council,  Germany  contested  Article  9  of Directive  92/59/EEC  (now  repealed  by 
Directive  2001/95/EEC8 )  on General Product Safety9 on  the basis that it could not be 
enacted under Article 95 EC. The directive created a broad-based legislative framework 
imposing  a  general  safety  obligation  to  producers  of the  Member  States  to  withdraw 
dangerous  products  from  the  internal  market.  In  particular,  Article  9  of the  Directive 
allowed  the  Commission  to  take  decisions  requiring  Member  States  to  withdraw  or 
restrict the distribution of such products on the basis that they consist a threat to public 
health. The Court expressed the view that the directive was aimed at preventing national 
barriers to trade and distortion of competition within the internal market caused by the 
absence of horizontal legislation in some Member States protecting the health and safety 
of consumers.  Additionally,  Article  9  was  considered  as  an  ultimo  ratio provision  in 
cases of serious health risk posed by a product or lack of uniformity in the protection 
offered by national laws in relation to the product in question. Article 95 EC was utilised 
here as a supplementary guarantee to Article 30 EC allowing for adoption of measures for 
the approximation of national legislation and removal of obstacles in relation to the free 
movement1 0  of a type of product with the aim of protecting public health.
8 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3  December 2001  on general 
product safety, O.J. L 011, 15/01/2002 P. 0004 -  0017. It is to be applied if there are no specific provisions 
among the Community regulations governing the safety of products concerned or if sectoral legislation is 
insufficient.
9 Case C-359/92 Germany v Council [1994] ECR 1-3681
10 See Case C-350/92 Spain v Council [1995] ECR 1-1995
146From  the  above  one  may  conclude  that  in  cases  where  a  Community’s 
harmonising  measure  serves  a  genuine  internal  market  approximation  aim  as  well  as 
pursuing health objectives, the Court considers the measure as being adopted within the 
legitimate limits of Article 95 EC. However, Article 95 EC cannot be used if other legal 
bases are more appropriate.  This was emphasised in the  Waste Directive Case1 1   and in 
Parliament v  Council (Waste Shipments)1 2  where the Court held that any effect of the 
measures in question to the internal market was ancillary. The Court decided that Article 
175 EC was in these cases a more sufficient legal basis to Article 95 EC for the adoption 
of Directive 91/156 on waste and Regulation 259/93 on shipments of waste. The same 
argument  was  also present in  the landmark Tobacco Advertising Judgement,  the most 
recent attempt of the Court to define the boundaries of Community competence.
Once a measure has been adopted, Member States retain competence to preserve 
their national rules and to introduce new measures or provisional ones. Article 95 (4) EC 
provides safeguards as to the maintenance of national provisions “on grounds of major 
needs referred to in Article 30,  or relating to the protection  of the environment or the 
working environment”. Furthermore, under Article 95 (5) EC introduced by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam Member States have the power to introduce new measures after the adoption 
of a harmonisation measure. Finally Article 95 (10) EC provides for a safeguard clause 
within the measure itself “authorising the Member States to take, for one or more of the
1 1  Case C-155/91 Commission v Council (Waste Directive) [1993] ECR 1-939
12 Case C-187/93 Parliament v Council (Waste Shipments) [1994] ECR 1-2857
147non-economic  reasons  referred  to  in  Article  30,  provisional  measures  subject  to  a 
Community control procedure.”1 3
1.  The Tobacco Advertising Judgement
The Court has over the years limited the scope of Article 95 EC affirming in its 
case law that the internal market goes as far as the scope of the fundamental Community 
freedoms. This  suggests  that fields of competence such as public health,  which extend 
beyond  the  internal  market  scope,  include  merely  the  establishment  of  minimum 
standards by the Community. This was illustrated in Germany v the European Parliament 
and Council1 4 , known also as the Tobacco Advertising Judgment1 5 .  Germany contested 
the validity of Directive 98/43 EC1 6 , which laid down a general prohibition on advertising 
and sponsorship of tobacco, on the grounds of a wrong legal basis for its adoption under 
Article  95  EC  (ex  Article  100a  EC).  The  directive  in  question  did  not  contribute  to 
market building to such an extent that the harmonisation provision of Article 95 EC could 
be  triggered.  Thus,  instead  of pursuing  the  attainment  of the  internal  market  through 
eliminating  obstacles  to  its  functioning,  it  constituted  a  measure  designed  to  protect 
health since the prohibition of tobacco advertising is predominantly related to that aim.
1 3  Case C-41/93  France  v  Commission  [1994] ECR 1-1829; Case C-3/00 Denmark v Commission  [2003] 
ECR 1-2643
14 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and the Council [2000] ECR I- 8419
15 In fact, two cases appeared before the Court: first, the already mentioned action for annulment brought 
by Germany and second, a request for a preliminary ruling by the UK from the High Court of Justice after 
proceedings  brought by  tobacco  manufacturers  in  R  v  Secretary  of State for Health,  ex parte  Imperial 
Tobacco [2000] ECR 1-8599
16 O.J. L213, 30/07/1998 p.0009 -  0012. The Council formally accepted the decision on 22 June 1998. It 
was decided that the directive would enter into force on 30 June 1998 and that it must be implemented by 
the Member States within three years.
148Germany  argued,  therefore,  that  the  legal  basis  for  a  directive  on  the 
approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products should be Art.  152 EC. 
The Advocate-General did not agree with that argument for the obvious reason that if the 
directive could not be presented as an internal market measure it would fail to be adopted. 
Article  152 EC could not be used as the legal basis for the directive simply because it 
cannot be utilised to achieve this end due to the exception in section 4. As the EC Treaty 
explicitly excludes in Article  152 (4) (c) EC the possibility of harmonisation legislation 
to protect public health, the Community was not competent to draft a directive relating to 
the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products. Accordingly, in deciding upon the 
validity of the directive, the Court held that the Community could not extend indirectly 
its harmonization policy to health protection using Article 95 EC as a legal basis.
Although the Tobacco Case was not decided on the ground of the incorrectness of 
the legal basis cited for the adoption of the Directive, but on the Community’s lack of 
competence  to  regulate  public  health,  the  choice  of  legal  basis  constitutes  a  great 
component of the case. When it comes to the choice of the right legislative basis, as De 
Burca  comments,  “the  crisis  of  the  competences’  scale  lies  more  on  the  Union’s 
institutional  shape  rather  than  its  definitional  clouds”1 7 .  While  the  general  question 
concerning the extent of the Community’s harmonisation competence in respect to the 
Member States’  health  policy  is  relevant to the  allocation  of vertical  competence,  the 
question  of  choice  of  the  right  legal  basis  in  relation  to  the  adoption  of  secondary 
legislation involves issues of horizontal competence related to the institutional balance of
17 De Burca, G., “Setting Constitutional Limits to EU Competence?” Faculdade de Direito da Universidade 
Nova  de  Lisboa,  (2001)  1001/02  Francisco  Lucas  Pires  Working  Paper,  Series  on  European 
Constitutionalism
149the Community. Thus the choice of a legislative basis to regulate an area does not only 
involve  considerations  of  Community  competence  creep  over  national  regulatory 
freedom.  It  also  concerns  different  institutional  requirements  as  regards  the  voting 
procedure in the Council and the legislative role of the Parliament or the Economic and 
Social Committee18.
In Commission v Council (Beef Labelling)1 9 , the dilemma in the choice between 
Article  37  EC  (ex  43  EC)  (Agriculture)  and  Articles  95  EC  as  a legal  basis  for  the 
adoption of Regulation  820/97  (labelling of beef in response to the BSE crisis) raised 
political  arguments  about  the  status  of  the  Parliament  as  co-legislator2 0   and  the 
competence of the Council to extend the scope of the Treaty. The Commission, favouring 
the co-decision procedure, emphasised that the aim and content of the Regulation related 
to the protection  of public health  and / or consumer protection  within  the meaning of 
Articles 152 (public health) and 153 EC (consumer protection) [ex Articles 129 and 129a 
EC  respectively]  of the  Treaty.  Its  argument  was  based  on  the  presumption  that  the 
Treaty  authors  intended  to  impose the  co-decision procedure  on  matters  falling  under 
Articles 152 and 95 EC. This would contribute to the growing influence of the Parliament 
over the Community’s decision-making. Finally, Article 43 EC was chosen as the right 
legal basis by the Council.  This provides only for consultation of the Parliament.  The 
Court was called upon to clarify the choice of legal basis21. It held that the purpose of the
18 C-300/89 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) [1991] ECR 1-2867
19 Case C-269/97 Commission v Council (Beef Labelling) [2000] ECR 1-2405
20 Article 95  EC  (ex  100a EC), favoured by the Commission’s proposal, provides for co-decision by the 
Council and Parliament.
21  See  also  Case  C-155/91  Commission  v  Council  [1993]  ECR 1-939  (Waste Directive);  Case C-187/93 
Parliament v Council [1994] ECR 1-2857 (Waste Shipments) Here any effect on the internal market was 
held to be ancillary. Article 175 EC was a better legal basis to Article 95 EC for Directive 91/156 on waste 
and Regulation 259/93 on shipments of waste.
150measure in question was not to protect public health but to stabilise the beef market in the 
Community  destabilised  by  the  BSE  crisis,  by  improving  the  conditions  for  the 
production and marketing of those products.
By annulling Regulation 820/97, in the same way it did in relation to Directive 
98/43 in the German Tobacco Judgement, the Court reinforced the constitutional limits of 
valid Community legislation / action  and clarified that a political majority of Member 
States in the Council cannot take up responsibility for determining the scope of the Treaty 
when the Treaty itself has expressly excluded the harmonisation of public health since 
Maastricht. But one must not confuse the reasoning of the Court these two cases. In the 
German  Tobacco Judgment the Court for the first time did not decide the case on the 
grounds that the Directive had been adopted on the wrong legal basis but on the basis of 
the Community’s lack of competence to regulate public health.
To  summarise,  the  proposed  Tobacco  Advertising  directive  could  not  be 
considered as a measure that aimed at promoting the operation of the internal market. It 
did not aim to remove obstacles for companies producing tobacco nor did it provide any 
advantages for manufacturers. Instead, its only effect was to bar access to advertising and 
sponsoring  to  tobacco  manufacturers  in  relation  to  their products.  This  constituted  an 
exclusion from a whole sector of services rather than a facilitation of mobility for tobacco 
products as could have been expected from an internal market measure. The Community 
Institutions had therefore gone beyond their respective competence, something that was 
recognized both by the Advocate General and the Court when it held the directive invalid 
and  granted  an  annulment.  An  anti-tobacco  advertisement policy  would  generally not
151serve  a  clear  internal  market  objective  but  instead  protect  the  public,  especially  the 
young, from the harms of smoking.
It is important that in preparing the directive, public health had often been put 
forward as an important argument in the materialisation of the decision2 2  but the directive 
was ultimately disguised as an internal market measure in order to be adopted. As Von 
Bogdandy  and  Bast2 3   point out  “the  qualification  of Article  95(1)  EC  as  an  exclusive 
competence overlooks the fact that internal market harmonisation is consistent with the 
maintenance of autonomous Member State regulatory competence”. By holding that the 
directive  prohibiting  tobacco  advertising  was  based  on  improper  grounds,  the  Court 
established that both Article 95 EC and Community activity in the health field have limits 
and they should operate  within those limits.  However the Tobacco Judgement did not 
provide a clear division of responsibilities in the protection of public health between the 
national and Community legislature. Despite the evolving Community activity in the area 
of health24,  the  lack  of a  clear  allocation  of responsibilities  has become the  source of 
practical problems when both have to deal with isolated incidents that nevertheless pose 
an  imminent  threat  to  human  health.  Incidents  such  as  the  BSE  crisis  reveal  the
22 Before its adoption, the Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee had insisted that article 95 EC was not a 
sound legal basis for such a directive because the provision constitutes the basis for legislation concerning 
the operation of the internal market, whereas the main aim behind the future directive was to protect public 
health. Thus, the proper basis for the tobacco directive should instead be Article  152 EC. Despite that, the 
Committee on the Environment,  Public Health  and Consumer Protection  stressed  that the directive was 
directly concerned with the operation of the internal market and that section 3 of Article 95 EC offered the 
possibility  of  a  high  level  of protection  of public  health.  On  13  May  1998,  Parliament  accepted  the 
Council’s common position on a second reading without any amendments. The amendments proposed to 
change the legal basis were not accepted, nor was a proposal to reject the common position.
23 Von Bogdandy, A.,  and Bast, J.,  “The European Union’s Vertical Order of Competences: The Current 
Law and Proposals for its Reform”, (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 227-268
24 See for example the European Commission Green Paper on Food Law COM (97)  183 final; White Paper 
on  Food  Safety,  adopted  on  January  12,  2000;  Commission  proposal  for  a  Regulation  establishing  a 
European Food Authority COM (2000) 716
152Community’s incapacity to respond quickly to emergencies due to the lack of discussion 
as to the proper construction of Article 95 EC.
2.  Towards a Statement of Principle Regarding the Scope of Article 95 EC
In the  Tobacco Advertising Judgement the Court confirmed that Article 95  EC 
provides  a specific  legal  basis  and thus cannot be cited for the  adoption  of a general 
internal market regulation. The use of Article 95 EC by Community Institutions as a legal 
basis for measures with an incidental health protection aim or effect was in fact allowed 
by the Court under one condition. The condition was that the harmonising measure in 
question must also serve a genuine internal market approximation aim. The Court stated 
as follows:
‘...  a  measure  adopted  on  the  basis  of Article  95  of the  Treaty  must 
genuinely  have  as  its  object  the improvement of the  conditions  for  the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market. If a mere finding of 
disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles to 
the  exercise  of  fundamental  freedoms  or  of  distortions  of competition 
liable to result there from were sufficient to justify the choice of Article 95 
as a legal basis, judicial review of compliance with the proper legal basis 
might be  rendered  nugatory.  The  Court  would  then  be  prevented  from 
discharging the function entrusted to it by Article 220 of the EC Treaty... 
of ensuring that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaty.’
In the text of the Tobacco Advertising Directive it was solely the preamble that 
made the attempt to disguise the measure as an internal market one whereas the content 
of  the  prohibition  was  clearly  aimed  at  regulating  public  health.  Hence  the  Court 
considered that the measure was adopted outside the legitimate limits of Article 95 EC,
153which enables the Community to harmonise national regulation in order to establish or to 
facilitate the free movement within the internal market.
In contrast to that decision, in the more recent case of British American Tobacco 
(Investments) Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health2 5  the claim of tobacco manufacturers 
against the validity of the Tobacco Control Directive 2001/37/EC was struck down by the 
Court. The applicants (British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco) sought judicial 
review before the English courts of the English Government’s intention to transpose the 
Directive,  arguing that it was invalid.  They requested  a ruling that the purpose of the 
Directive is to harmonise national rules concerning the protection of public  health,  an 
area which the Community does not have competence. The Directive was adopted on the 
basis of Articles 95 EC and 133 EC (CCP). The tobacco companies argued that this dual 
legal basis was inadequate. According to their argument, Article 95 EC could not be cited 
to harmonise national practices on packaging requirements and harmful substance levels. 
They claimed that the measure was not aimed at ensuring the free movement of goods in 
the Community but rather at protecting public health. Similarly, Article  133 EC, which 
will not be considered hereafter, could not be employed to ensure that exported tobacco 
products conform to the new manufacturing requirements, out of fear that they may be re­
imported  or  illegally  placed  directly  on  the  internal  market.  As  indicated  by  the 
applicants,  the  ban  on  tobacco  exports  not  meeting  Community requirements  did  not 
exclusively affect international trade but had an effect upon intra-Community trade. The 
export ban was thus not about external trade but rather the protection of public health.
25  Case  C-491/01  BAT Investments  LTD  &  Imperial  Tobacco  v  Secretary  of State for Health  [2003]  1 
CMLR 14
154The English High Court referred all validity arguments2 6  against the Directive to 
the European Court of Justice (Court hereafter), which upheld all aspects of the Directive 
apart from  its prohibition  on  the  export of tobacco products  that do not comply  with 
internal  Community  standards27.  Contrary  to  its  ruling  in  Germany  v  the  European 
Parliament and Council, the Court held that the Directive in question genuinely aimed at 
the improvement of the conditions of the functioning of the internal market,  an area in 
which the Community has competence to legislate and was therefore valid. The paradox 
is  that  in  determining  the  scope  of Article  95  EC,  the  Court referred  to  its  German 
Tobacco reasoning. First, it established that Article 95 EC could be used as a legal basis 
for  a  harmonising  measure  provided  that  it  is  genuinely  intended  to  improve  the 
conditions  for  setting  up  the  internal  market.  Then  it  moved  ahead  stating  that 
Community Institutions must also consider the effects of a potential measure based on 
Article  95  EC.  They  need  to  identify  whether  the  measure  contributes,  directly  or 
indirectly,  to  the  elimination  or  prevention  of  existing  or  future  obstacles  to  free 
movement. As long as these two conditions are satisfied, it is irrelevant that public health 
protection  plays  a  significant  role  in  adopting  the  measure.  Considering  that  the 
differences  in  national  legislation  as  regards  packaging  requirements  and  harmful 
substance levels form trade obstacles to the internal market, their harmonisation by the 
Community  is  intended  to  directly  eliminate  those  obstacles.  Therefore  recourse  to
26 The tobacco manufacturers raised seven pleas: Apart from the legal basis problem, arguments included 
an infringement of the principle of proportionality; a violation of the fundamental right to property under 
Article 295 EC; a violation of Article 253 EC and/or the duty to give reasons; finally, an infringement to 
the principle of subsidiarity and a misuse of powers.
27  Article 5  of the Directive  (ensuring that the consumer receives objective information  on  the  level  of 
harmful substances -  e.g. tar and nicotine) providing that the labels on cigarette packets must be printed in 
the official language of the Member State where the tobacco products were to be placed on the market was 
to apply only to non-export products. On the other hand, Article 7 of the Directive (prohibiting the use of 
descriptions  liable  to  mislead  consumers  in  that  respect  -   e.g.  ‘mild’)  was  to  apply  only  to  tobacco 
products marketed within the European Community.
155Article  95  EC  as  a  legal  basis  is  justified  in  its  entirety.  Equally,  the  export  ban 
introduced by the Directive can be indicative of an indirect contribution to the aim of 
preventing a potential infringement on rules aimed at removing trade obstacles.  Again 
Article 95 EC can be utilised as a legal basis for the export ban provision.
The difference between the British American Tobacco Judgement and the German
r-  '  '
Tobacco Judgment lies in the evidence of existence of trade obstacles.  In the German 
Tobacco  Judgment  the  existence  of trade  obstacles  was  a  pre-condition  even  for  the 
adoption of measures with a direct contribution to the removal of these obstacles. In the 
British American Tobacco Case the contribution of the export ban as an indirect measure 
was not supported by facts proving the existence of a trade obstacle but was rather based 
on a potential infringement on rules aimed at removing trade obstacles. Thus in its latter 
decision the Court widened the boundaries of Article 95 EC without however rendering it 
to a general legal basis provision in the sense of Article 308 EC.  Besides,  the internal 
market purpose of a potential measure was maintained as the basic factor of using Article 
95 EC as a legal basis. Community harmonisation of diverse national regulatory practices 
through  Article  95  EC  is  still  allowed  in  those  cases  where  a  Community  rule  is 
necessary to eliminate competitive distortions that have a restraining effect upon trade. 
As the Court  stated in  an  action brought on  19  October  1998  by the Kingdom  of the 
Netherlands  against  the  European  Parliament  and  Council28:  “the  purpose  of 
harmonisation is to reduce the obstacles,  whatever their origin,  to the operation of the
28 Case  C-377/98  Kingdom  of the  Netherlands,  Italian  Republic  and  Kingdom  of Norway  v  European 
Parliament and Council of the EU [2001] ECR 1-7079internal  market  which  differences  between  the  situations  in  the  Member  States
„ 7 0
represent.
B.  ARTICLE 308 EC
General Legal Basis
Considering Article 95 EC as a specific legal basis provision for the adoption of 
Community secondary legislation, Article 308 EC (former Article 235) provides a more 
general legal basis. Article 308 EC reflects the realisation of the drafters of the Treaty of 
Rome that the executive powers specifically allocated to the Community may not prove 
to be adequate for the purpose of attaining the objectives expressly set by the Treaties 
themselves. This has often been referred to as ‘competence ratione materiae \
Article 308  EC reads:  “If action by the Community  should prove necessary to 
attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community,  and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers,  the Council  shall, 
acting  unanimously  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission  and  after  consulting  the 
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.” Any measure may thus be adopted 
in case of the lack of specific competence if it is necessary to meet the Treaty’s objectives 
in relation to the internal market.
Contrary to the principle of attribution of powers (any Community legislative act 
ought to be based upon a Treaty Article), Article 308 EC is utilised when no legislative 
power as such exists to attain one of the objectives of the Treaty. One understands that 
the provision  of Article  308  EC  gives  the  Council  a wide  competence.  However this
29 Ibid Para 20
157competence is not unlimited but instead requires that the power should be used to attain 
one of the objectives of the Community and the attainment of this objective must take 
place in the course of the operation of the internal market. Yet, given the breadth of the 
Treaty objectives and the Court’s broad interpretation of Community aims, the conditions 
for  the  exercise  of  Article  308  EC  do  not  always  place  a  severe  constraint  on  the 
Council’s ability to legislate.
To  provide  an  example,  it can  be  argued  that by  virtue  of the  importance  of 
quality  of life  in  the  Treaty,  the protection  of public  health  constitutes  a  Community
objective. If so, since Article 308 EC is intended to “attain one of the objectives of the
Treaty”, it may be regarded as a legitimate legal basis to legislate on public health. This 
nevertheless  depends  on  the  existence  of a  specific  legal  basis  to  regulate  health,  as 
Article  308  EC  cannot  serve  as  the  basis  for  widening  the  scope  of  Community 
competence  beyond  the  Treaty  framework.  As  regards  public  health,  it  should  be 
underlined that Article 152 EC provides only for incentive measures where “Community 
action must be limited to measures of encouragement or to adopting recommendations.”3 0  
Article 308 EC may thus constitute a last resort legal basis for a measure aimed at the 
protection of health where the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers. In certain 
cases,  Article  308  EC  may  still  be  used  if  the  given  competence  is  regarded  as 
insufficient. In Ferguson3 1  Regulation 803/68 on the value of goods for customs purposes 
was adopted on the basis of Article 308 EC (Article 235 EEC then) despite the existence 
of  Article  27  EEC  (now  repealed)  as  a  legal  basis  indicating  Commission’s 
recommendations  to Member States  as regards  approximation  of national  practices  on
30 Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council  [1996] ECR 1-6177 at Para 57
31 Case 8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v Massey Ferguson GmbH [1973] ECR 897
158customs matters.  But how far can Article 308 EC  serve  as  the basis for widening the 
scope of Community competence. The Court has asked the same question as regards the 
Community’s  competence  to  conclude  an  international  agreement,  particularly  on  the 
compatibility of accession to that agreement.
1.  Community Competence to Conclude an International Agreement
(a)  Introduction
The debate in the European Convention about the incorporation of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental  Rights  (2000)  within  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  and  the  potential 
accession to the European  Convention of Human Rights  (ECHR)  has raised questions 
related to the boundaries of EU competence. This chapter will focus on the Community’s 
competence to accede to the ECHR by way of Article 308 EC.  It will also attempt to 
portray the general EU competence to legislate over the area of human rights.
As  the  current  situation  stands,  internal  Community  action  generally  requires 
compliance with the human rights principles. Article 6(2) of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
states that the EU shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR, and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.  Textually, 
the Maastricht Treaty inserted Article 6(2) (ex Article F) TEU into the Treaties’  body. 
Accordingly,  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  (1997) clarified that the jurisdiction  of the  Court 
under  the  EC  Treaty  extends  to  Article  6(2)  TEU  with  regard  to  action  of  the  EU 
Institutions (Article 46(d) TEU). Further, the Court has progressively extended its review 
to include not only acts of the EC Institutions, but also Member States’  derogations as 
long  as  those  fall  within  the  scope of Community law.  Yet,  the Treaty  is  not explicit
159about human rights forming one of its objectives. In that climate the Community’s formal 
accession to the ECHR appeared as a panacea to the protection of human rights.
Formal  accession  to  the  ECHR  was  first proposed  by  the  Commission  to  the 
Council in 197932and later in  199033. Furthermore, in  1993 the Commission published a 
working document under the title “Accession of the Community to the ECHR”. Finally, 
in 1996 the Court received a request for an Opinion from the Council pursuant to Article 
228 (6) EC as to whether accession to the ECHR by the Community is compatible with 
the  Treaty.  The  positive  actions  taken  in  the  area  of  human  rights  during  the  past 
suggested a future framework for ratification of the ECHR where all Member States were 
parties. Unfortunately, a concrete human rights policy based on accession to the ECHR or 
the granting of binding legal force of the EU Charter as the equivalent of a ‘bill of rights’ 
was not conceived until the Convention talks.
The  fact that past  policy  proposals  in  the  area of human  rights  failed  to  gain 
acceptance may reveal the Community’s lack of significant constitutional competence to 
deal widely with this subject matter. One could claim that to engage with every human 
rights issue at supranational level would imply Community action beyond its jurisdiction 
of  limited  governance  and  attributed  powers,  therefore  penetrating  delicate 
intergovernmental  areas.  Thus,  the issue of clear-cut competences is  at odds  with  any 
arguments for a solid EU human rights policy. In the context of the ECHR the current 
position of the Court is that it functions as an external check on Community actions. It is
32 Memorandum on the Accession of the EC to the ECHR, April 4,  1979 (Bulletin of the EC. Supplement 
2/79)
33 Commission’s Communication on Community Accession to the ECHR, November 19, 1990
160only when a question involves a Community competence that the matter is characterised 
as purely internal.
(b)  The scope of EC competence on human rights issues: The Court’s Self Restraint
The Court has accepted through its case law that human rights apply as part of the 
general principles of Community law, its implementation by national  governments and 
their Member States’ derogations from the fundamental Community freedoms and other 
rules of EC law. The Court has respected those boundaries by refusing to rule on human 
rights  issues  when  there  is  no  connection  with  the  Treaty  or  Community  secondary 
legislation34. Discrimination cases are indicative of the Court’s attitude towards human 
rights.  The  Court  established  in  Grant5 5   that  EC  law  could  not  have  the  effect  of 
extending  the  scope  of  the  Treaty  provisions  beyond  the  competences  of  the 
Community36.  It  differentiated  this  case  from  P  v  S3 7   concerning  discrimination  for 
belonging  to  a particular  sex,  as  opposed  to  “different  treatment based  on  a person's 
sexual orientation” in Grant. The Court suggested that the prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation is a task for the Community legislature and unless the 
Community  Institutions  adopted  specific  legislation  it could  not rule  on  the  case.  By 
rejecting  the  existence  of  an  independent  principle  of  equality  as  submitted  by  the 
applicant  the  Court  ruled  out  the  idea  that  such  a  right  could  be  inferred  from  the 
International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights.  This  would  have  the  effect  of
34 See Cases  12/86 Demirel  [1986] ECR 3719; C-159/90 Grogan  [1991] ECR 1-4685;  C-144/95 Maurin 
[1996] ECR 1-2909; C-299/95  Kremzow [1997] ECR 1-2629; C-291/96 Grado and Bashir [1997] ECR I- 
5531; C-309/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR 1-7493.
35 Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR 1-621, at Para 45
36 See also Case C-106/96 UK v Commission [1998] ECR I - 2729 (Social Exclusion Programme - unlawful 
expenditure by the Commission on certain projects.)
37 Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR 1-2143
161extending  the  scope  of Treaty provisions  beyond  the  competence  of the  Community. 
Contrary to Grant when it came to the accession of the Community to the ECHR, the 
Court  held  that  this  is  ultimately  a  question  outside  the  competence  of  Community 
Institutions via Article 235 EC (now 308 EC).
The Court ruled in Opinion 2/943 8  that the Union lacked the power to accede to the 
ECHR. The basic question was that of competence of the Community to conclude such 
an agreement,  given that the content of the agreement itself as well as the mechanisms 
under  which  the  Union  would  submit  to  the  ECHR  enforcement  mechanisms  were 
ambiguous. The query as to whether there was an envisaged agreement within the terms 
of Article 228 (6) EC (now 300) raised further questions concerning the compatibility of 
the provisions of the Treaty with the ECHR, especially as internal conflicts between the 
Community and its Member States would remain to be resolved under the provisions of 
Article 219 EC (now 291). When it came to the question of a specific legal basis in the 
Treaty to enact rules in the area of human rights, the Court held that there was no such 
power, either specific or implied, to allow for Union accession to the ECHR. The Court 
affirmed  that  “no  treaty  provision  confers  on  the  Community institutions  any  general 
power to enact rules  on  human rights  or to conclude international  conventions  in this 
field.” As a general rule, Community Institutions have the power neither to enact rules 
over human rights issues nor to conclude international agreements in that respect.
As regards the possibility of employing  a flexibility provision from the Treaty, 
Article 308 EC did not constitute an appropriate legal basis for the given purpose since 
this provision was associated with the Community’s ability to carry out its functions for
38 Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the ECHR  [1996] ECR 1-1759
162the attainment of a Treaty objective, whereby the Community has been given an express 
or implied power to act. Weiler explains that “following what it believes is the burden of 
Opinion 2/94 the Council comes to the conclusion that Article 308 EC also could not be 
used either to enact rules on human rights”3 9 Reich also comments: “in thus limiting the 
powers of EC Institutions under the general clause of Article 235 EC (now 308 EC), the 
Court  may  have  allowed  a  flexible  approach  to  deciding  the  Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
issue. But it should be insisted that this self-restraint came from the ECJ itself and not 
from  an  outside  institution”4 0  Incapable  of  extending  the  scope  of  Community 
competence, Article 308 EC could not constitute a substitute for amending the Treaty
Accession  to  the  ECHR  would  embody  a  transition  of  the  Community  legal 
system to a distinct organisation with its own legal principles, judicial structure and case 
law. It would “entail (as the Court said) a substantial change in the present Community 
system  for  the  protection  of  human  rights  in  that  it  would  entail  the  entry  of  the 
Community into a distinct international institutional system as well as integration of all 
the provisions of the Convention into the Community legal order” The Community would 
thus be subject to the external judicial control of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The accession to the ECHR that inter alia demanded a uniform interpretation of 
Community case law with that of the ECtHR is entirely different to the current human 
rights protection  guaranteed by the Treaty by way of general principles  of law  drawn 
predominantly from the ECHR and the national constitutional traditions.  It is therefore 
obvious that accession to the ECHR would entail an amendment of the Treaty structure
39 Weiler,  J.H.H.  “A Human Rights Policy For The European Community  and Union:  The  Question of 
Competences”, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 4/99, (1999), NYC
40 Reich, N., “On National Courts, European Law and Constitutions: Dialogue and Conflict”, (1999) 5 (2) 
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163being a constitutional change beyond the scope of Article 308 EC. If not, the Community 
would not have the competence to ratify such an international agreement.
The reaction in the Member States varied41. France; Spain; Portugal; the UK and 
Ireland claimed that even if the Community was competent to legislate over human rights 
issues  and  conclude  international  conventions,  respect  for  human  rights  does  not 
represent one of the objectives of the Community. Dismissing any social  aspect of the 
Treaty  they  claimed  that  Community  objectives  are  limited  to  the  politico-economic 
sphere  of  integration.  Against  that,  several  countries4 2  argued  that  the  protection  of 
human rights  does consist one of the objectives  of the  Community.  According to this 
wider  approach,  accession  to  the  ECHR  was  bound  to  happen,  as  it  would  prevent 
potential human rights violations by Community Institutions. The guarantee provided by 
the ECHR  as  a bill  of rights  could  suggest that the partial  transfer  of sovereignty by 
Member States in a number of areas through their accession to the Community could also 
be extended in the future to the area of human rights.
(c)  A substantial change in the Community system for the protection of human rights
Looking  back  at  the  question  of  the  Union’s  accession  to  the  ECHR,  the 
Commission  and  the  Parliament  assumed  that  what  happens  in  relation  to  the 
Community’s internal competence also occurs in terms of its external competence. Thus 
Article  308  EC  was  put  forward  as  an  appropriate  legal  basis  for  attaining  a  Treaty 
objective  drawn  from  the  preamble  of the  Single European  Act  and  enshrined in  the 
Treaty of Maastricht: that of ensuring respect for human rights. From the EC Institutions’
41  See Burrows, N.,  “Question of Community Accession to the European Convention Determined”, Case 
Comment, (1997) 21 European Law Review 58
42 Austria, Belgium; Finland; Germany; Greece; Italy and Sweden
164point of view, Article 308 EC could be utilised to achieve at Community level the same 
level of human rights protection offered by the national law of the Member States. In 
Opinion  2/94,  the  Council  acknowledged  that  the  EC  Treaty  does  not  provide  any 
specific powers for Community legislation in the area of human rights. In the absence of 
a specific legal basis and given that a call for human rights protection is supported in the 
Treaty, Article 308 EC could grant the Community competence to act in order to accede 
to the ECHR. The Court however held that without a Treaty amendment the Community 
had no competence to ratify the ECHR.
The Court used a competence reasoning bringing to attention the “constitutional 
significance”  of accession to the ECHR that would “entail  a substantial change of the 
Community  system  for  the protection  of human rights”.  One would find this  concern 
reasonable,  taking into account that had the Community Institutions  granted a positive 
opinion by the Court, the use of Article 308 EC in the accession agreement to the ECHR 
would  have  reduced  the  importance  of  the  principle  of  subsidiarity.  This  reasoning, 
however, creates  uncertainty as to the status of the ECHR as an external  international 
agreement on the one hand and as an internal Community source of fundamental rights 
on the other. In other words, whenever the Court applies an ECHR principle it is not clear 
whether it is bound by it as  a commonly agreed international agreement or whether it 
merely borrows a given principle and converts it into Community law.
Certainly, the Community possesses no competence to act beyond the boundaries 
of the Treaty. Yet one should not overlook the role of the Court in compensating for lack 
of legislative  initiative  by  the  Community  Institutions  through  establishing  respect  to 
fundamental rights even before these were given a textual reference in the Treaty. It was
165the Court through its case law4 3  that upheld that the protection of fundamental rights in 
the Community is  guaranteed by way of general principles of EC law referring to the 
common constitutional traditions of the Member States and to international instruments, 
predominantly  the  ECHR.  In  the  same  teleological  manner,  the  Court  could  have 
employed Article 220 EC (which requires the Court to ensure that the law is observed in 
the interpretation  and application  of the Treaty)  and Article  308 EC to  determine  the 
Community’s  accession  to the ECHR.  Taking this into  account the Court’s ruling  in 
Opinion 2/94^ that the Community lacked the power to accede to the ECHR may appear 
unsatisfactory  to  certain  commentators  that  see  a  motor  of  integration  within  the 
structures of the Court.
Others may talk of a purposive manoeuvre of the Court to find obstacles in the 
Community’s accession to the ECHR out of fear that this would undermine the autonomy 
of  the  EC  legal  order  in  the  same  way  as  the  ECtHRs  would  threaten  the  Court’s 
exclusive jurisdiction under Article 220 EC over the interpretation of all Community law. 
This  anxiety may be partly justified due to the present aloofness of the two European 
Courts. However, the Union’s lack of participation in decisions of the ECtHRs that have 
an  indirect  impact  upon  EU  law  is  neither  preferable.  The  European  Convention’s 
Working Group on Incorporation of the Charter / Accession to the ECHR underlined that 
all its members were unanimously in favour of a constitutional authorisation to enable the 
Union to accede to the ECHR,  “given that Member States have transferred substantial
43 Case 29/69  Stauder v  Ulm  [1969] ECR 419;  Case  11/70 Internationalle Handelsgessellschaft  [1970] 
ECR 1125
44 [1996] ECR 1-1759
166competences to the Union and that adherence to the ECHR has been made a condition for 
membership of new States in the Union.”
Alternatively, having identified a correspondence between the EU Charter rights 
and rights guaranteed by the ECHR followed by a harmonious co-existence between the 
Charter and the common constitutional traditions, the Group  suggested that the former 
should constitute a “legally binding text of constitutional status”. It also confirmed that 
the incorporation of the Charter would in no way modify the allocation of competences 
between the Union and the Member States (Art 51 para 2).4 5  Thus, the whole question of 
accession  to  the  ECHR  is  a  political  choice  of  the  Community  Institutions.  Weiler 
identifies an oxymoron in the actions of the Council. One the one hand, having in mind 
the Court’s Opinion 2/94, it denies promotion of human rights policy whilst on the other 
it has attempted to regulate public health through a directive on Tobacco Advertising46. 
He proposes a broader use of Article 95 EC for the protection of human rights against 
national measures that hinder one of the fundamental freedoms. “Subject perhaps to the 
principle of subsidiarity, there could be a Community harmonisation measure designed to 
protect human  rights  in  the  field of application  of Community law, just  as  there  is  a 
Community  harmonisation  measure  designed  to  protect  the  physical  life  or  safety  of 
individuals in this field of free movement.”4 7  This however pre-supposes the existence of
45 Report of Working Group II “Incorporation of the Charter / Accession to the ECHR”, Final Report of 
Working Group II, [CONV 354/02] “The fact that certain Charter rights concern areas in which the Union 
has little or no competence to act is not in contradiction to it, given that, although the Union’s competences 
are limited, it must respect all fundamental rights wherever it acts and therefore avoid indirect interference 
also with such fundamental rights on which it would not have competence to legislate.”
46 Weiler,  J.H.H.  “A Human Rights  Policy For The European Community  and  Union:  The Question  of 
Competences”, (1999) 4/99 Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, NYU
47 Ibid
167intra-Community  trade  barriers  between  Member  States  due  to  conflicting  national 
legislation.
2.  An evaluation of Article 308 EC: the door of creeping competence?
Having said that the purpose of Article 308 EC is to fill in the gaps in the current 
system of competence allocation,  we need to emphasise that the Court has maintained 
that  the  provision  cannot  serve  as  a  basis  for  widening  the  scope  of  Community 
competence beyond the Treaty. In Opinion 2/94 the Court did not propose to preclude the 
use of Article 308 EC from all cases of fundamental rights.  On the contrary, one may 
recall  that  under  certain  circumstances,  human  rights  constitute  an  objective  of  the 
Community.  Article  308  EC may thus be brought into function  allowing therefore the 
Council to exercise certain powers insofar as  “action by the Community  should prove 
necessary to  attain,  in  the  course of the operation  of the  common  market,  one of the 
objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers.”
Despite  that,  there  are  always  concerns  in  the  Member  States  as  regards  the 
potential abuse of the powers bestowed to the Community under Article 308 EC. The 
fears of the German Lander, going back to the 1996 IGC48, have found expression in the 
ideas  of  Wolfgang  Clement,  Minister  President  of  the  German  Land  of  North  Rhine- 
Westphalia49. Clement has supported the view that the flexibility provision of Article 308 
EC  shall  be  deleted  in  consideration  of the  Community’s  creeping  competence.  His
48 Schwarze, G.,  “Kompetenzverteilung in der EuropSischen Union und ftpderales Gleichgewicht” (1995) 
DVB1. 1265 - 1269
Clement,  W.,  “Europa Gestalten -  Nicht Verwalten, Die Kompetenzordnung der EuropSischen Union 
nach  Nizza”,  (Feb.  12.  2001) Walter Hallstein-Institute for European Constitutional Law, Humboldt University, 
Berlin.  Available  in  German  at:  http://www.whi-berlin.de/clement.htm;  available  in  English  at 
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/speech/sp12020l_en.htm
168opinion aims to reiterate a “traditional demand of the Lander”5 0  in view of the fact that the 
flexibility provision of Article 308 EC has often been used by the Council as a means for 
creeping  into  areas  of  national  competence.  Apart  from  Clement’s  views  another 
argument against Article 308 EC can be based on the fact that it reflects the demands of 
the  earlier stages  of European  integration  reflecting  the  ellipsis  of specific  powers  to 
attain the objectives of the Treaty.
Currently, the gap-filling role of Article 308 EC in the Community’s system of 
competence allocation appears more and more outdated. The Union now possesses a vast 
number of expressly granted powers. Not to mention that the introduction of Article 95 
EC, aimed for adoption of legislation at the establishment of the internal market, made it 
possible to adopt legislation on sectors such as social policy, environment and consumer 
that  were  previously  reserved by  Article  308  EC51.  This  renders  resort  to  the  power 
provided  by  the  provision  of Article  308  EC  occasional  if not  rare.  In  view  of this 
context,  national  objections  to  Article  308  EC  outweigh  the  benefit  of  flexibility  in 
emergency cases to attain one of the objectives of the Treaty. This thesis supports that the 
representatives  of Member  States  in  the  Council  should  scrutinise  the  Commission’s 
proposals and focus to the potential misuse of Article 308 EC where it appears that other 
Treaty Articles are more appropriate52.
50  See  also  Stoiber,  E.,  “Reformen  fur Europas  Zukunft",  (27.09.2000),  Bayern  in  Berlin,  available  at 
http://www.bayem.de/Berlin/Veranstaltungen/Redenarchiv/rede_000927_Reformen_fuer_Europa.html
51 See figures in Bergstrom, C.F. and Aimer, J. “The Residual Competence: Basic Statistics on Legislation 
with  a  Legal  Basis  in  Article  308  EC,  (2004)  Swedish  Institute  of  European  Studies,  Available  at 
http ://w w  w. sieps. se/_eng
52 See Draft Council Regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No. 337/75 establishing a European Centre 
for the Development of Vocational Training
169A proposal for radical constitutional change - deletion of Article 308 EC -  does 
not  take  into  account  the  emergence  of unforeseen  cases  in  the  course  of European 
integration. In such cases, all Member States represented in the Council are in favour of 
triggering Article 308 EC to address an issue of common concern for which the Treaty 
does not grant the necessary powers. The most indicative examples are the Union’s recent 
enlargement to the East and Central Europe and the introduction to the common currency 
during the last phase of EMU. There, although Community action was both legally and 
politically essential, there was no textual reference in the Treaty providing a means of 
action.  In  the  first  case,  in  the  framework  of the  pre-accesion  strategy,  the  Council 
adopted Regulation  1266/1999 under the legal basis of Article 308 EC. The Regulation 
aimed to provide aid to the applicant countries “as to include, in addition to the PHARE 
programme, aid to agriculture and for structural measures”. In the second case, due to the 
lack of a Council decision clarifying which Member States were to adopt the Euro, the 
Council passed Regulation  1103/97 based on Article 308 EC. The Regulation sets out 
general principles and rules applying to the changeover during the transitional period and 
at the end of it.  Both examples create a strong case for the maintenance of the provision 
of self-authorisation of the Community Institutions granted by the controversial Article 
308 EC as a guarantee of the dynamics of the Union’s evolution.
Even with the existence of the umbrella Article 181a EC introduced by the Treaty 
of Nice that covers economic, financial  and technical cooperation measures  with  third 
countries53, Article 308 EC appears valuable. It enhances the operation of the Community 
as an integrated social and political entity and not merely the harmonious operation of the
53 See the “25th  Report of the Select Committee on European Scrutiny”, 4 HMT (25705) Loan Guarantees, 
(May-June 2004)
170common market,  as it is textually referred in the Treaty. At present, the powers of the 
Community  are  not  constrained  to  establishing  and  regulating  the  operation  of  the 
common market. In fact, the gradual operation of Article 308 EC outside the constraints 
of  the  common  market  has  liberalised  the  criteria  for  its  use.  Considering  this 
development one can empathise with the fears of the German Lander that they gradually 
lose their regional policy-making capacity where the Community’s overarching authority 
obtains  superior  political  relevance54.  Against  that  they  suggest  a  catalogue  of 
competences or Kompetenzkatalog to restrain and list the regulatory powers of the Union. 
Yet their aim is seen as a bid to remain a point of reference in the constitutional debate of 
the Convention for the future of Europe and not a serious bid for reform at the heart of a 
more political Union.
Contrary to the view of the German Lander,  certain commentators express the 
belief that the problem with Article 308 EC does not lie in its immediate effect upon the 
vertical  relation between  the  Community  and the Member  States.  Von  Bogdandy  and 
Bast5 5 ,  for  instance,  point  out  that  there  is  “an  urgent  need  to  reform  the  legislative 
procedures of Article 308 EC. It is from a constitutional perspective, unacceptable that a 
competence  of  such  breadth  involves  the  European  Parliament  only  by  way  of 
consultation.”  Without underestimating the preservation  of institutional  balance in  the 
Community, the present author defends the view that the liberalisation of the conditions
54 Certain commentators believe that the reservations of the German Lander arise from the Community’s 
control  of  national  state  aids,  especially  the  Commission’s  economic  policy  agenda  in  distributing 
European funds. See Mayer, F.C., “Competences -  Reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU 
After the New European Constitution”, (2004) 5/04 Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, NYU
55 Von Bogdandy, A., and Bast, J., “The European Union’s Vertical Order of Competences: The Current 
Law and Proposals for its Reform”, (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 277-268
171of resort to Article 308 EC can sometimes be problematic to the vertical distribution of 
competences.
In  2001,  the  Commission  proposed  the  adoption  of a Regulation  on  the  fight 
against terrorism that would empower the Community to freeze the assets of persons and 
organisations considered to be participants in terrorist networks involved in the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 in the United States. The Regulation was adopted as Council Regulation 
2580/20015 6  and Article  308  EC  was used among other bases  as a legislative basis,  a 
choice that reflects a response to an emergency. On February 6, 2003, Jose Maria Sison 
brought  an  action  against  the  Council  and  the  Commission  before  the  Court  of First 
Instance57.  Mr  Sison,  a  Philippines  national  and  resident  in  the  Netherlands,  sought 
annulment of the Council decision to update the list of persons covered by the respective 
Regulation and applied for interim relief, which was dismissed on the ground of urgency. 
Among other grounds58, the applicant invoked the illegality of the Regulation 2580/2001 
arguing that the Council had no competence to adopt it under Articles 60; 301  and 308 
EC. He also invoked a violation of the principle of proportionality, the principle of legal 
certainty  and  a  misuse  of power by  the  Council.  The  decision  of the  Court  of First 
Instance will be of particular importance in setting the limits of Article 308 EC.
56 O.J.E.C. L344/70
57 Case T-47/03 Sison v Council [2003] ECR 11-2047
58 The applicant also invoked the violation of several general principles of Community Law,  such as the 
principles enshrined in Articles 6,7,10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 
of the First Protocol.
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“...those  legal  rights  that  remain  with  the  constituent  states  or  their 
citizens, belong to the states in the United States as well as the EU, the 
highest courts of these entities enjoy the right of defining the outer limits 
of  the  EU  and  U.S.  respective  competencies.  This  leads  to  ‘creeping 
federal’ jurisdiction.”5 9
This argument laid down by Thomas Fischer brings back in mind the question of 
who has the ultimate authority to determine the constitutionality of Community acts. In 
other  words,  the  question  remains:  Who  has  the  ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’?  The  main 
argument of this chapter is that despite the Community’s creeping attempts, manifested in 
the German Tobacco Judgment, there are limits to Community competence and the Court 
is ready to uphold those limits.  Despite its different approach in the British American 
Tobacco Case, the Court emphasised upon the principle of subsidiarity. It declared that 
the competences  of the Community,  as attributed by the Treaty,  exist “to improve the 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market, by eliminating 
barriers  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  and  the  freedom  to  provide  services  or  by 
removing  distortions  of competition”60.  Thus,  the  Court  has  restricted  the  conditions 
under which the EC Institutions might rely upon Article 95 EC, especially as a way of 
overcoming restrictions on EC competence in fields other than the internal market.
59  Fischer,  T.,  “Federalism”  in  the  European  Community  and  the  United  States”,  (1994)  Fordham 
International Law Journal 389, at 418
60 The Court argued that the principle of subsidiarity “applies where the Community legislature makes use 
of Article 95 EC, inasmuch as that provision does not give it exclusive competence to regulate economic 
activity on the internal market, but only a certain competence for the purpose of improving the conditions 
for  its  establishment  and  functioning,  by  eliminating  barriers  to  the  free  movement  of goods  and  the 
freedom to provide services or by removing distortions of competition”
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competences  can  only  be  launched  through  valid  legal  instruments.  Article  308  EC 
constitutes such an instrument. However, in Opinion 2/94 the Court decided that the use 
of Article 308 EC “would entail a substantial change in the present Community system 
for the protection of human rights in that it would entail the entry of the Community into 
a distinct international institutional system as well as integration of all the provisions of 
the Convention into the Community legal order”6 1  Thus, the Court imposed a limitation 
to the application of Article 308 EC that does not follow from a textual interpretation of 
the provision. Its decision demonstrates the desire to keep the outer constitutional limits 
of Article 308 EC within the framework of the Treaty by reading it in the light of Article 
5 EC (subsidiarity).
The  use  of  Article  95  and  308  EC  in  a  way  that  does  not  undermine  the 
fundamental principles of attributed powers and subsidiarity enshrined in Article 5 EC, 
constitutes, according to the author, the most effective barrier to the creeping expansion 
of Community competences. Undeniably a strict Kompetenzkatalog would have reduced 
to the minimum the danger of the Community penetrating into areas, which remain under 
national control, but would it allow the Community to react to fresh challenges? The next 
chapter will present how competences appear in the EU Constitutional Treaty. There one 
can see that the Convention has only used a positive list of competences only as regards 
exclusive competence. The remaining competences are open-ended and governed by the 
principle of subsidiarity.  As regards  the flexibility provisions,  the Convention has not 
proposed any substantive reform of Article 95 EC whilst there are sufficient safeguards
61Opinion 2/94, 1996 ECR. 1-1759,1-1789, Para 34
174as regards Article 308 EC (Article 1-18 in the EU Constitutional Treaty) to ensure that it 
should not pose any serious threat to the principle of conferred powers.
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CATEGORIES OF COMPETENCE IN THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 
Introduction
Taking into account the need to find a balance between the demand for flexibility 
and  the  demand  for  precision  in  delimitation  of  competences,  the  Convention’s 
Constitutional Treaty establishes a list of general categories of Union competences rather 
than a positive list of competences or ‘Kompetenzkatalog ’ to cover all policy fields of Union 
action. A hard competence list would set up an antagonistic power relation between the 
Union and the Member States, whilst the intention behind the Union is to create an arena 
where Member States can exercise their competence and not to question who has power. 
Hence,  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  introduces  a number  of  alterations  to  the  current 
system without changing the fundamentals of the present vertical allocation of competence 
between  the  Union  and  the  Member  States.  This  reflects  a  realisation  that  a  strict 
competence catalogue would be impractical given the interplay of sectors such as the free 
movement with national policies on health or education.
Flexibility  still  characterises  the  treatment  of  competence  within  the  EU 
Constitutional  Treaty.  To  confirm  this,  the  adoption  of harmonisation measures  for the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market under Articles 95 EC as well as the 
residual competence of Article 308 EC (named deliberately ‘flexibility clause’) have been 
maintained in the EU Constitutional Treaty through Articles HI-172 and 1-18 respectively. 
The most innovative adjustments introduced by the EU Constitutional Treaty merely lie in 
the  classification  /  codification  of  the  Union’s  exclusive,  shared  and  complementary 
competence and the sectors falling into each category. What is more, National Parliaments
176are  given  a  scrutiny  role  at  the  early  legislative  stages  of  EU  legislation  to  ensure 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. This chapter aims to provide a detailed picture 
of how  competences  appear  in  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  as  well  as  certain  textual 
problems and drafting uncertainties and finally avenues to overcome these problems.
A.  SUBJECT RELATED COMPETENCES 
Overview
This  part  will  focus  on  the  trend  under  which  subject  related  competences  are 
classified in Part I of the EU Constitutional Treaty agreed at the European Council in June 
2004 and officially signed by EU Heads of State or Government on October 2004 in Rome1. 
The  EU  Constitutional  Treaty first of all  defines essential  principles  as  to  the principle 
governing  the  allocation  of  the  Union’s  powers,  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality,  the  primacy  of the  Union  law  and  the  obligation  of Member  States  to 
implement Union law.
It is important to note from the beginning that certain aspects that previously fell 
outside the scope of this thesis, such as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), will 
need to be considered here due to the EU Constitutional Treaty’s effort to merge the three 
EU pillars and create a single Union. The Treaties do not expressly confer legal personality 
on the Union and consequently the latter has no power to contract obligations binding in 
international law or to belong to international organisations. The EU Constitutional Treaty 
resolves  this  by bringing down  the Maastricht pillared  structure  therefore  extending the 
concept of legal personality to the EU (Article 1-7). Since the dissolution of the Maastricht
1  [CIG 87/2/04]
177pillar structure is an inevitable step of constitutionalism, the relocation of competences from 
the Community to the Union would have occurred anyway and therefore it does not seem to 
constitute  an  achievement  of  the  relevant  ‘competence  provisions’  inserted  in  the  EU 
Constitutional Treaty.
Generally, the wording of the EU Constitutional Treaty in relation to competences 
does not suggest a radical change, although a few provisions or phrases do create certain 
confusion and uncertainty. The Convention aimed simply to respond to the Laeken question: 
“Can we thus make a clearer distinction between three types of competence: the exclusive 
competence of the Union, the competence of the Member States and the shared competence 
of the  Union  and  the  Member  States?”2   Thus,  Part  I  of the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty, 
determines the categories of competences, the principles governing their limits and exercise 
and finally the areas covered by each different category. Title HI ’’Union Competences” 
within Part I specifies the three categories of Union’s competences and asserts for each 
given  category  the  consequences  of  the  Union’s  exercise  of  its  competences  for  the 
competences  of  the  Member  States.  Article  1-12,  named  ‘Categories  of  Competence’, 
provides a broad categorisation of defined powers. A distinction is made between exclusive 
and  shared  competences  that  are  listed  in  Articles  1-13  and  1-14  respectively,  while 
complementary  competences  are  defined  individually  in  Article  1-17  of  the  EU 
Constitutional Treaty.
The provisions on the different policy fields as well as the specifications for each 
legal basis are addressed in Article 1-12 (6) of the EU Constitutional Treaty, which provides 
that supranational competences shall be exercised according to the provisions set out in Part
2  Laeken  Declaration  on  the  future  of  the  European  Union,  December  14-25,  2001,  available  at 
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/docl51201_en.htm
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those provisions. Moreover, the content of Article 1-38 entitled ‘Principles Common to the 
Union’s  Legal  Acts’  plays  a  significant part  in  the  allocation  of vertical  competences. 
According to the first paragraph of the respective Article, “Where the Constitution does not 
specify the type of act to be adopted, the institutions shall select it on a case-by-case basis, in 
compliance with the applicable procedures and with the principle of proportionality referred 
to in Article 1-11.” What is not made explicit by reading this provision is whether Part HI of 
the EU Constitutional  Treaty  (The  Policies  and Functioning  of the  Union)  will  include 
specifications in relation to the Union’s legal acts (e.g. a general exclusion of legislative acts 
in the field of CFSP), therefore deviating from the current free choice of instruments under 
the Treaty.
Although,  the  definitions  given  to  exclusive,  shared  and  complementary 
competences  have  almost the  same pre-Constitutional  connotations  given  before by the 
Court, the mere listing of competences in the EU Constitutional Treaty represents a rather 
innovative approach not previously found in the EC Treaties. Still, however, there are some 
separate categories of competence in the EU Constitutional Treaty that do not fit into the 
general  classification  and  are  therefore  assigned  to  no  particular  group.  These  are  the 
following: The coordination of economic and employment policies of the Member States 
(Article 1-15); the area of CFSP (Article 1-16). It is debatable whether both categories should 
remain outside the three broad categories of competence or should rather be assigned to one 
of them. Taking the coordination of the Member States activities in the area of economic 
and employment policy as an example, one may contend that it could be listed under the
3 See also [CONY 724/03]
179heading  of  complementary  competences  without  the  need  to  create  a  new  category. 
Accordingly, following the appropriate changes in Part III of the EU Constitutional Treaty, 
the area of CFSP could consist a part of the category  of shared  or more preferably  of 
complementary competence. Apart from the ‘simplicity’ that results from such an action, the 
coordination of economic and employment policies and the CFSP are closely attached to the 
Member States and therefore more proximate to the idea of complementary competence due 
to the inability of the Union to adopt harmonisation measures for matters falling within that 
category.
The Convention’s method of positive integration in enlarging the previously express 
list of the Union’s competences does not entirely echo the character of the constitutional 
process that begun in the name of clearness and transparency. Instead building up special 
categories of competence, especially in terms of the CFSP, may be translated as a political 
decision to maintain external relations or actions rooted within the federal / nation state 
rather than transferring them within a constitutionalised confederation of states. One could 
even  talk  of  an  attempt  to  put  the  clock back  through  an  indirect maintenance  of the 
intergovernmental pillar system of the Union that the EU Constitutional Treaty theoretically 
brings down. Nevertheless, the willingness to maintain an intergovernmental flavour within 
the Union’s external action is evident Part HI  Title V of the EU Constitutional Treaty’s Part 
HI  entitled  “The  Union’s  External  Action”.  A  look  at  Article  III-293  suggests  that the 
decisions adopted by the European Council in CFSP will diminish the actions of the other
180Institutions  of the  Union  and  as  Griller contends  “...might prejudice  all  other external 
activities of the Union”4.
1.  Exclusive Competence
(a)  Internal Competence
Article 1-13 lists exhaustively a number of exclusive competences for the European 
Union including competition rules; monetary policy; common commercial policy (CCP); 
the  customs  union;  preservation  of marine  biological  resources  via  a common  fisheries 
policy5  and conclusion of international agreements. Initially, the Convention’s draft proposal 
for a Constitutional Treaty included within the category of exclusive competence the four 
fundamental Community freedoms along with the rules on competition law. Kept outside 
the  heading  of  exclusive  competence,  the  four  Community  freedoms  were  ultimately 
enshrined  in  Title  I  of  Part  I  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  under  the  headline 
‘Fundamental  Freedoms  And Non Discrimination’  (Article 1-4)  ‘in  accordance  with  the 
Constitution”.  This  has  both  a  practical  and  symbolic  significance.  Practically,  their 
inclusion in the first Part of the EU Constitutional Treaty as ‘Objectives’ gives them a wider 
legal significance and political weight. Symbolically, their location next to the principle of 
non-discrimination  makes  them  more  visible  as  constitutionally  protected  fundamental 
freedoms. According to the author, it appears more desirable that any limitations on national 
action  in  respect  of the  free  movement  provisions  derives  from  the  obligation  on  the
4  Griller,  S.,  “External  Relations”  in  De  Witte,  B.,  “Ten  Reflections  on  the  Constitutional  Treaty  for 
Europe”, EUI, Florence, (2003), 133-157 at 136
5 Under the current situation Member States may at certain cases act as  ‘trustees of the common interest’ 
supervised by the Commission.  See Case 804/79 Commission v UK (Fisheries Conservation)  [1981] ECR 
1045
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freedoms  rather  than  the  inclusion  of  those  freedoms  within  the  Union’s  exclusive 
competences.
The  initial  inclusion  of the  adoption  of harmonising  measures  to  complete  the 
internal market under the leading of exclusive competence contradicted the recent decision 
of the Court in the British American Tobacco Case6, which confirmed that Article 95 EC 
does  not  provide  an  area  of exclusive  competence  but  rather  gives  the  Union  certain 
competence  to  improve  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market.  Free  movement  is 
characterised by an  interaction between directly effective Treaty provisions  and national 
regulatory  measures.  The  operation  of  directly  effective  Treaty  provisions  on  the  free 
movement of goods, persons, services  and capital does not depend upon the adoption of 
secondary legislation. Similarly, the objectives of the internal market are not monopolised 
by EU primary legislation as the completion of the internal market involves the elimination 
of obstacles to free movement through the passing of harmonisation measures under Article 
95 EC. The Praesidium considered the potential effect of a proposal to confer on the Union 
exclusive competence  to  adopt legally binding  acts  over the free  movement provisions. 
Thus,  the  final  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  (Article  1-13)  reserves  exclusively  for  the 
Community only the area of competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market7.
Even now, it appears that the Convention was troubled by the need to divide the 
competence to legislate from the obligation to regulate  according to the Treaty.  Thus it 
attached  the  same  meaning  to  them.  If  a  Treaty  obligation  is  thus  synonymous  with
6 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco Case [2002] ECR 1-11453
7 See [CONY 797/1/03]exclusive competence then other fields of Community law apart from competition may find 
a place in this broad definition. This includes the free movement provisions as well as other 
provisions  such as equal pay under Article  141  EC. For this reason, Article 1-13  (1)  (b) 
should  be  interpreted  narrowly  to  refer,  as  Davies  argues,  “to  no  more  than  measures 
governing  undertakings  and  direct  state interference  with  competition,  notably  via  state 
aids.”8   This  should  reflect  that  one  couldn’t  simply  treat  harmonisation  of competition 
distortions  as  an  exclusive  competence  while  maintaining  the  four freedoms  within  the 
realm  of shared  competence.  They  should have both been  deleted  from  Article 1-13  to 
achieve  legal  uniformity.  As  with  free  movement,  treating harmonisation  in  relation  to 
competition  distortions  as  an  exclusive  Union  competence  contradicts  the  Court’s 
established case law that categorises competition law as an area of shared competence. In 
Walt Wilhelm9 , the Court held that both Articles 81  and 82 EC constitute areas of shared 
competence. The Court affirmed that national competition authorities could apply national 
competition law subject to the obligation of co-operation under Article 10 EC. Community 
and national laws co-exist and can apply to the same agreement as long as Member States 
make certain that their measures would not jeopardise the value of the EC Treaty rules.
Moreover, Article 83(2)(e) EC enables the Community to adopt regulations in order 
to  determine  the  relationship  between  Community  and  national  competition  law.  The 
inclusion of the entire competition rules within the area of exclusive EU competence would 
be at odds with the so-called Modernisation Regulation1 0 , which came into force on May 1, 
2004.  The Regulation substantially changes the framework for enforcement of European
8 Davies, G., “The Post-Laeken Division of Competences”, (2003) 28 (5) European Law Review 689-698
9 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1
10 EC Regulation 1/2003 replaces Regulation 17/62
183competition law empowering - alongside the Commission - national competition authorities 
and courts of the Member States to apply and enforce Articles 81 and 82 EC. In relation to 
Article  81  EC,  national  competition measures  shall  not  deviate  from  the results  of EC 
competition law. Accordingly, in relation of Article 82 EC, Member States are free to apply 
more stringent measures that prohibit abuses of dominant position. A wide interpretation of 
Article 1-12 (1) of the EU Constitutional Treaty could overturn the current state of affairs by 
preventing  the  regulation  of  competition  by  the  Member  States.  Finally,  this  a priori 
exclusion of national competence could also imply that the Member States cannot act as 
trustees of the Union’s interest, since the list of exclusive competence is exhaustive in the 
EU Constitutional Treaty.
The merger model introduced by the EU Constitutional Treaty aimed to create a 
uniform  legal  -  political  Union,  apart  from  incorporating  competition  rules  within  the 
Union’s  exclusive  competence,  extends  the  old  sectors  of  Community’s  exclusive 
competence to the Union. As already illustrated this is a logical consequence following the 
transition  from  a  three-pillar  structure  towards  a  single-pillar  confederation  of  States. 
Moreover, its  significance is symbolic. For instance,  the inclusion of the conservation of 
marine  biological  resources  under  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy  (CFP),  as  an  area  of 
exclusive competence in the EU Constitutional Treaty (Article 1-13), represents an accurate 
reflection of the current situation with regards to the Community’s CFP. Yet, exclusivity to 
all fields of the common commercial policy (CCP) does not produce the same result.
(b)  External competence
Contrary  to  current  law  under  Article  133  EC  (abolition  of customs  duties  on 
imports  into  the  Member  States  of  goods  from  other  Member  States  or  from  other
184countries),  Article  1-13  (1)  dismisses  national  competence  to  conclude  international 
commercial  agreements  allowing  only  those  related  to  goods,  services  and  intellectual 
property. This of course does not exist without having a negative impact upon the economic 
freedom of the Member States attached to their statehood, i.e. to act externally as competent 
players  on  the  international  plane.  Most  important,  the  expansion  of  the  CCP  would 
diminish national internal competence as the Union could identify an international aspect in 
every national legislation.
The  same  could  be  said  about  the  application  of  Article  1-13  (2).  In  an  over­
simplified statement paragraph 2 of the Article gives the Union exclusive competence over 
the conclusion of an international agreement that affects an internal act1 1  This attempt to 
codify  the  Court’s  ERTA  decision1 2   is  inaccurate  and  clearly  contradicts  the  Court’s 
Opinion 2/911 3 . In the latter case the Commission argued that the Community had exclusive 
competence to conclude ILO Convention No 170 and requested an Opinion from the Court 
under Article 228(1) (2) EEC on the compatibility of the Convention with the Treaty. The 
Commission argued that under the ERTA principle, the Community had the competence to 
conclude  an  international  agreement  on  any  subject  matter  that  fell  under  the  internal 
legislative jurisprudence of the Community. Since Article  138 EC provided for a general 
legislative competence of the Community to regulate the safety of the working environment, 
the  Commission  contended  that  the  Community  had  competence  to  conclude  the 
Convention. Given that the subject matter of the ILO Convention was covered by internal
1 1   “...when its  conclusion  is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the 
Union to exercise its internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter 
their scope."
12 Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263
13 Opinion 2/91 on ILO Convention No 170 on Chemicals at Work [1993] ECR 1-1061
185Community  legislation,  the  Community’s  competence  was  exclusive.  The  Commission 
further argued that it  was irrelevant that  some of these rules laid  down  only minimum 
standards, since the co-existence of Community law and partial obligations entered in to by 
the Member States would jeopardise the autonomy of the Community legislature.
Contrary to that, the Court pointed out that the Community has internal competence 
to adopt only minimum standards and the conclusion of international agreements shall be a 
joint and not an exclusive Community competence. The Court highlighted that under Article 
5  EC  (now  Article  10  EC)  Member  States  are  obliged to  support  the  Commission  in 
carrying out its task regarding areas corresponding to objectives of the Treaty,  and thus 
withdraw  from  all  measures  that risked jeopardising  attainment of those  objectives1 4 .  It 
appears that the spirit of this decision is either not reflected in Article 1-13 (2) or that the 
provision  of the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty is  aimed to  be interpreted  in  a way  that the 
vertical delimitation of competence will not be altered.
2.  Shared Competence
Contrary to Article 1-13  introducing an exhaustive list of exclusive competences, 
Article 1-14 contains a residual category of split or shared competence between the EU vis- 
a-vis  the  Member  States.  There,  Member  States  have  the  power  to  exercising  their 
competence by enacting legislation only insofar as the Community has not exercised its own 
competence.  Article  1-14  (2)  describes  the  areas  of  shared  competence.  These  are  the 
internal  market;  social  policy;  economic,  social  and  territorial  cohesion;  environment; 
consumer protection; transport and an area of freedom security and justice to name but a 
few.  Certain  other  areas  such  as  research,  technological  development,  space  and
14 See Para 10 of Opinion 2/91  (ibid)
186humanitarian aid also fall under the headline of shared competences [Article 1-14 (3) and 
(4)]. The residual nature of shared competences within the EU Constitutional Treaty Article 
1-14 (1), implies that in case a new legal basis introduced within Part HI neither falls within 
exclusive nor complementary competences it automatically forms part of the category of 
shared competence.
Touching upon delicate issues of national sovereignty (such as education and public 
health) the Union’s exercise of competence as established in Article  14 (2), especially in 
relation to the internal market, seems better placed under the category of shared competence. 
There, the scrutiny test posed by the principle of subsidiarity, as illustrated in Article I-11
(3), is available. However if one approaches the principle of subsidiarity, as complemented 
by the relevant Protocol in the EU Constitutional Treaty, like a background noise rather than 
as a principle with actual effect, one may conclude that obstacles to free movement can be 
found  in  almost  every  area  of Member  States’  law.  This  may  imply  that  the  Union’s 
competence would stay uninterrupted regardless of whether the four freedoms fall within the 
category of exclusive or shared competence. Taking as an example the free movement of 
persons, it is highly unlikely that the EU Constitutional Treaty will allow discretion to the 
Member States to decide what constitutes employment in the public service in relation to 
Article 39 (4) EC derogation to the free movement of workers, as established by Article 39 
EC.
Generally,  decisions made  at EU level  will be capable of having an  effect upon 
Member States, although the majority of such legislation is meant to be made by the latter 
therefore  giving  precedence  to  the  exercise  of national  regulatory power.  However,  the 
vertical relationship that occurs from the definition given to shared competence by Article I-
18712 (2) suggests that it is exclusively based upon the Union’s competence to enact secondary 
legislation  while  the relation  between EU primary  and national  legislation  is  not  given 
particular reference.  Article  1-12  (2)  of the EU  Constitutional  Treaty  spells  that  “...the 
Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area.” 
Nowhere this provision suggests that even where the Union has not enacted legislation, the 
Member States shall respect their primary Treaty / Constitutional obligations.
Article 1-12 (2) follows: ‘The Member States shall exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its competence.” 
Likewise, this provision does not illustrate that Member States are still required to exercise 
their competence showing consideration for the primary provisions of the EU Constitutional 
Treaty.  The wording of Article 1-12 (2) misleads one to conclude that where the Union 
decides to take action in an area of shared competence, national competence is suspended. 
In fact this happens only in relation to the specific subject matter that the Union has taken 
action and not to the greater area of shared competence. The Cambridge Draft Constitutional 
Treaty1 5  spells accurately in Article 11 that “once the Union has acted in a certain matter, the 
legal  framework  of  Member  States’  action  changes.”  This  however  is  unclear  in  the 
Convention’s Constitutional Treaty.
What is more, the principle of pre-emption (i.e. that national competence seizes once 
the  Union  exercises  its  powers)  was  not  given  an  individual  reference  within  the 
Convention1 6 , although it is made vaguely implicit in the EU Constitutional Treaty’s Article 
1-12 (2). Yet the respective Article appears to suggest that once the Union has exercised its
1 5   Dashwood,  A.,  et  al,  “Draft  Constitutional  Treaty  of the  European  Union  and  Related  Documents” 
(2003) I European Law Review
16 Text of Preamble,  Part I,  II and Protocols  on  Subsidiarity  and Proportionality,  12 June  2003  [CONV 
797/1/03]
188legislative powers in  an area of shared competence,  the Member States are immediately 
precluded from exercising their competence. This picture of the power relation between the 
Union  and  the  Member  States  as  well  as  the  obligations  of the  latter  as  to  its  use  of 
competence  is  rather  misleading.  The  uni-dimensional  definition  of shared  competence 
based in terms  of pre-emptive EU legislation neglects the possibility of certain  areas of 
minimum harmonisation where the adoption of legally binding acts by the Union does not 
prevent national legislatives from enacting higher regulatory standards. This observation 
does not dismiss the express or implied pre-emptive effect of Union legislation, as the Union 
may  still  occupy  an  area by exercising its  competence preventing Member  States from 
exercising  their  own  competence.  However  this  provision  could  be  rephrased  to  make 
explicit that the exercise of Union competence does not dismiss the Member States’ capacity 
to exercise their regulatory powers. The Cambridge text again offers a clearer picture by 
explaining in Article  11:  “Where the Union legislation is found by the Court to be pre­
emptive... Member States are precluded from exercising any independent competence to 
derogate from or supplement the harmonised norms. Where the Union legislation provides 
for minimum harmonisation, Member States still remain subject to the relevant horizontal 
obligations”
The recognition of the possibility for Union legislation having a pre-emptive effect 
is not clear in relation to Article 1-14 (3) and (4) where the relevant policy areas of research, 
technological development, space (3) and development cooperation with humanitarian aid 
(4) cannot be pre-empted by the Union. Both paragraphs suggest that “.. .the exercise of that 
competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.” The 
definition  of  complementary  action  here  creates  confusion  as  to  the  meaning  of  the
189provision. The Convention appears to have preferred to call the relevant policy fields shared 
while in fact they are complementary and would fit better under Article 1-17  of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty as “areas of supporting, coordinating and complementary action”. To 
maintain a balance between the concept of pre-emption and national regulatory competence, 
the ambiguous sentence “...the exercise of that competence...’’could be erased from both 
paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 1-14. In doing this, the respective policy areas would fit 
without  difficulty  into  the  category  of  shared  competence.  But  such  a  decision  would 
potentially  extend  the  boundaries  of Union  competence  beyond  the  line  agreed  by  the 
Convention.
3. Complementary Competence
The category of “supporting measures” was renamed to appear in the final version of 
the EU Constitutional Treaty as ’’supporting, coordinating or complementary action”. The 
category of Article 1-17  reflects the current state of law in relation to competences that 
include protection and improvement to human health; industry; culture; tourism; education, 
youth, sport and vocational training; civil protection and administrative cooperation. The full 
application of subsidiarity does not apply in theses sectors as according to Article 1-12 (5) 
“legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions in Part III relating 
to these areas shall not entail harmonisation of Member States' laws or regulations”. Article 
1-17 was introduced by the Convention in the draft Constitutional text as an answer to the 
pressure  for  competence  containment in  the  final  EU  Constitutional  Treaty. Paul  Craig 
explains  that  “the  desire  for  containment reflected  the  concern,  voiced  by  the  German 
Lander as well as some Member States, that the EU had too much power, and that it should
190be substantively limited.”1 7  Thus the introduction of Article 1-17 functions as a means to 
ring-fence  competences  proximate  to  the  national  and  peripheral  interests.  Legislative 
competence lies with the Member States despite the fact that the Article’s wording related to 
the  exclusion  of harmonisation  suggests  that  the  Union  could  enact  legislation  in  the 
included sectors other than harmonisation measures.
Despite the effort to fortify national competences and contrary to the final reports of 
the Working Groups  of the Convention, the co-ordination of economic and employment 
policies has been disconnected from ’’supporting measures”.  Instead it has moved to the 
separate category of competences introduced by Art. 1-15 under the title “The Coordination 
of Economic And Employment Policies”. Harmonisation there is excluded and the Union’s 
intervention  is  limited  to  coordination.  This  works  as  an  exception  to  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity. Moreover, the second unique category of CFSP under Article 1-16 creates some 
confusion  as regards  the  nature and extent of the Union’s  intervention.  Article 1-16  (2) 
mentions that “Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union’s CFSP in 
spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s acts in this area. 
They  shall  refrain  from  action  contrary to  the  Union’s  interests  or likely  to  impair its 
effectiveness.” The wording of the provision suggests that it aims to prevent Member States’ 
abuses rather than defining the extent of Union action. According to the author both Articles 
1-15  and 1-16  as  well  as  the policy areas  of Article  1-14  (3)  and  (4)  should  have been 
incorporated within the title of complementary competences.
17 Craig, P., “What Constitution does Europe Need? The House that Giscard Built: Constitutional Rooms 
with a View”, European Federal Trust Online Paper 26/03, (2003). Available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk
191The  politics  of the  delimitation  of competence  appears  paradoxical.  The  Italian 
Presidency Proposal1 8  for instance suggested that the policies described in Article HI-107 of 
the  draft  Constitutional  Treaty1 9   (where  the  Commission  shall  encourage  cooperation 
between the Member States and facilitate the coordination of their action in all social policy 
fields  under  this  Section)  should  fall  essentially  within  the  competence  of the  Member 
States. According to this any Union action would be complementary in nature if it aimed 
therefore to encourage and promote coordination instead of harmonisation. Despite that, the 
IGC did not list the social policy dimension under the title of complementary competence. 
Instead social policy, for aspects defined in Part El, remains under Article 1-14 (2) under the 
Union  areas  of  shared  competence.  This  is  not  the  only  problematic  area  as  regards 
complementary competences. Article 1-12 (5) needs clarification to make obvious that even 
though the category of competence represented there does not allow Union harmonisation of 
the respective policy fields, it does not totally preclude the Union from legislating. Finally 
the transfer of the areas listed under Article 1-14 (3) [research, technological development 
and  space]  and  (4)  [development cooperation  and  humanitarian  aid]  as  falling into  the 
residual category of shared competence could perfectly fit under Article 1-17 as “areas for 
supporting, coordinating or complementary action”. The fact that both Article 1-14 (3) and
(4)  exclude the application of the principle of pre-emption, that mainly characterises the area 
of  shared  competence,  makes  a  strong  case  for  their  incorporation  to  the  title  of 
complementary competence.
18 Presidency proposal, 9 December 2003, [CIG 60/03] ADD 1, 41
19 Now Article III-213 of the EU Constitutional Treaty
192B.  OBJECTIVE RELATED COMPETENCES IN THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL
TREATY
Introduction
When it came to the issue of the division of competences the Laeken Declaration 
observed:
“Lastly, there is the question of how to ensure that a redefined division of 
competence does not lead to a creeping expansion of the competence of 
the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of 
the Member States and, where there is provision for this, regions. How are 
we to ensure at the same time that the European dynamic does not come to 
a halt? In the future as well the Union must continue to be able to react to 
fresh challenges and developments and must be able to explore new policy 
areas.  Should  Articles  95  and  308  of the  Treaty  be  reviewed  for  this 
purpose in the light of the ‘acquis jurisprudentiel’?”
As already mentioned, the adoption of harmonisation measures for the establishment 
and  functioning  of  the  internal  market  under  Articles  95  EC  as  well  as  the  residual 
competence  of 308  EC  have  been  maintained  in  the EU  Constitutional  Treaty  through 
Articles HI-172 and 1-18 respectively.
1.  Flexibility Clause
Article  1-18  (1)  empowers  the  Council  (on  a  Commission’s  proposal  and  the 
Parliament’s  consent)  to  take  appropriate  measures  in  case  action  by  the  Union  proves 
necessary within the framework of the policies of Part III to attain one of the objectives of 
the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty.  It  goes  further  than  the  existing  Article  308  EC,  which 
referred only to powers “necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common
193market, one of the objectives of the Community.” Given that the reference to the common 
market has been deleted and that there is a single pillar structure in the EU Constitutional 
Treaty (EU)20, Article 1-18 (1) extends the flexibility clause to the former second and third 
pillars. Union’s competence will thus increase to all the policies within Part III of the new 
Treaty, which includes the CFSP and police and criminal law.
One  could  easily claim  that  Article  1-18  (1)  confers  substantial  power upon  EU 
Institutions providing also  a backdoor to  amend the Constitution  and the delimitation of 
competences. Against this we should state that the Union’s action under Article 1-18 must be 
necessary not merely to attain one of the objectives set out in the EU Constitutional Treaty 
but also within the framework of the policies defined in Part III.  This reduces the capacity 
of the Union Institutions to add new objectives to the Constitutional Treaty via the use of 
Article 1-18. Nor can they go beyond the constraints of Union competence as established in 
Part III of the draft Constitution. Article 1-3 (1) states that “the Union’s aims is to promote 
peace, its values and the well-being of its people”. Article 1-2 lists the Union’s values being 
“.. .respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”. Legislation related to 
those  values  can  only  be  adopted  within  the  policies  listed  in  Part  III  of  the  draft 
Constitution and not by the Union.
20 See Lenaerts, K., “The merits and shortcomings of the Draft Constitution for Europe”, Speech delivered 
at  the  occasion  of  the  Leuven  Centre  for  a  Common  Law  of Europe  Colloquium  on  the  EU’s  Draft 
Constitution, December 15, 2003
“The Draft Constitution brings first of all together into a single document the existing Treaties, namely the 
EC Treaty and  the Treaty on European Union — I am stepping over the Euratom Treaty,  which remains 
separate, but is  linked to the Union through a special protocol. More importantly,  the Constitution places 
the EC and EU Treaties under a single legal regime.”
194There are additional defences to the principle of conferred powers. First, one may 
recall the Court’s cautious approach in using Article 308 EC as illustrated in Opinion 1/942 1  
and 2/942 2  as well as the constitutional safeguards appearing in the EU Constitutional Treaty 
itself: The Council can only act by unanimity (something that makes difficult the adoption 
of legislation  in  the  current  enlarged  Union)  after having  obtained  the  ‘consent’  of the 
European  Parliament.  Thus  unanimity-voting  in  the  Council  is  supplemented  by  the 
necessary  consent  of  the  European  Parliament.  Further,  under  Article  1-18  (2)  the 
Commission must  also  draw  Member States’  national  Parliaments  attention  to proposals 
based on Article 1-18. This does not go as far as providing that national legislatures can veto 
EU legislation in case of a proposed extension of Union competence. It merely appears as an 
attempt by the Convention to cast away any scepticism as regards potential abuse of Article 
1-18.  According  to  the  House  of Lords  Select  Committee  on  European  Union  “this  is, 
however only the slightest of nod in the direction of national parliaments, even though the 
draft Treaty acknowledges that national parliaments constitute an important link in giving 
effect to the principle of representative democracy.”2 3  Hence, Article 1-18 (2) could ideally 
be  transferred  to  the  text  of the  “Protocol  on  the  Role  of National  Parliaments  in  the 
European Union”2 4
In order to limit recourse to Article 1-18, the Convention also included new legal 
bases in Part HI of the draft Constitutional Treaty that explicitly empower the Union to take
21 Opinion of 15 November 1994, [1994] ECR 11/121-5267.
22 Opinion of 28 March 1996, [1996] ECR 3 1-1788
23  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  European  Union,  Forty-First  Report,  Chapter  2:  “Does  a 
Constitution  imply  a  European  State?”,  the  UK  Parliament,  (October 21,2003),  available  at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationerv-office.co.uk
24  See  “IGC  2003  -   Editorial  and  legal  comments  on  the  draft  Treaty  establishing  a  constitution  for 
Europe”, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Brussels, October 
6, 2003, [CIG 4/1/03] REV  1
195action  in  certain  sectors.  For instance,  under Article  III-492 5   a new  legal  basis has been 
created, allowing the Council to adopt laws defining the legal framework needed to limit the 
free movement of capital and freeze the assets of persons, groups or non-state entities, as a 
means of fighting organised crime, terrorism and trafficking of human beings. Other areas in 
Part III  include  inter alia:  combating  tax  fraud  and evasion;  intellectual property;  space; 
energy;  integrated  management  of external  borders;  criminal  procedure;  sport  and  civil 
protection.  The  introduction  of  new  legal  bases  in  the  draft  Constitution  hardens  the 
possibility of recourse to Article 1-18 but does not reduce the functionality of this broad 
competence. The Convention seems to have weighed up the risk of paralysing the Union’s 
activities by preventing it from responding to new demands and unforeseeable realities and 
has the general flexibility provision through Article 1-18 (1). Emphasis is thus placed upon 
the Union’s capacity to act, according to Weatherill, “in a dynamic manner as a problem- 
solver”26.
The stereotypic  ‘problem-solving’  capacity of the Union may however suggest an 
excessive  use  of this  general  competence.  The  lack  of protection  against  a  wide use  of 
Article 1-18 would contradict the Laeken concern  about the phenomenon of ‘competence 
creep’  that damages the relation between the Union and the Member States. It would also 
undermine  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht’s  Maastricht  decision2 7   that  the  Union’s 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz (or capacity to determine the limits of the powers conferred on it) 
contains the potential for review of Union acts by national courts when the Union’s powers
25 Now III-160 of the EU Constitutional Treaty
26  Weatherill,  S.  “Competence”  in  de Witte,  B.  (eds)  “Ten  Reflections  on  the  Constitutional  Treaty  for 
Europe”, EUI, Florence (2003) 45-66
27  Judgment of  12  October  1993  by  the  German Bundesverfassungsgericht,  in  Brunner v  The  European 
Union Treaty [1994] BVerfGE 89,155 / 1 CMLR 57.
196extend beyond the scope of the act by which Member States acceded to the Union. It seems 
that the question before the Convention was whether the current unanimity requirement to 
use Article 1-18 as a valid legislative basis was enough to uphold the principle of attributed 
competence.  Commenting  on  the  earlier  Draft,  Weatherill  stressed  that  the  new  system 
“confers  too  much  power  on  State  executives”  and  called  for  “a  special  system  of 
constitutional safeguards, which will constitute a more reliable method than that available 
via  the  orthodox  system  of institutional  involvement  in  the  Union’s  legislative  process 
backed by orthodox judicial control.”2 8
Next  to  the  requirement  of unanimity  Weatherill  placed  a  legislative  procedure 
involving Parliamentary  approval  -  which  is  stronger than  Article 1-18  (2)  -  as  an extra 
safeguard  against excessive resort to Article 1-18.  The  same argument was made by the 
House of Lords Select Committee: “In addition, any proposal to use the flexibility provision 
in Article 1-17 (now 1-18) to increase the competences of the European Union should not be 
supported by the Government without the prior approval of Parliament in each case.”2 9 Such 
a constitutional scrutiny could perhaps overcome the problem of mistrust among European 
citizens  towards  the  legislative  Community  Institutions  that  will  be  amplified  once  the 
flexibility  clause  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  covers  all  Union  policies  after  its 
ratification.  Then,  the  suspicion  of  the  Union’s  invasion  upon  a  larger  number  of 
competences  will  expand  given  that the ratification  of the EU Constitutional  Treaty will 
make ‘communautarisation’ inevitable to the second and third pillar.
28  Weatherill,  S.  “Competence”  in  de  Witte,  B.  (eds)  “Ten  Reflections  on  the  Constitutional  Treaty  for 
Europe”, EUI, Florence (2003) 45-66
29  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  European  Union,  Forty-First  Report,  Chapter  2:  “Does  a 
Constitution  imply  a  European  State?”,  Para  85,  the  UK  Parliament,  (October  21,2003),  available  at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk
1972.  Internal Market Harmonisation
Under Article HI-14 “the Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or 
ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
the Constitution.” Article HI-172 offers a new but rather unchanged version of the current 
Article 95 EC. In that respect the Convention confirmed rather than revolutionised the trend 
of internal market harmonisation measures.
Under  Article  III-172,  internal  market  laws  and  framework  laws  are  passed  by 
qualified majority (1) excluding taxation, movement of persons and employees rights (2). A 
high  level  of protection  is provided for health and safety, the environment and consumer 
protection (3). However Member States may keep national rules for the environment and 
working environment (4) and introduce national rules in case specific problems arise after 
harmonisation  (5).  Further,  the  Commission  decides  whether  a  measure  is  excluding, 
discriminatory, a hidden trade restriction or an obstruction to the functioning of the internal 
market and notifies the Member States (6). If a national derogation from harmonisation is 
approved, the Commission shall propose adaptation of the measure in question (7). Public 
health is not included in the so-called environmental guarantee (8) and the Commission or a 
Member State may bring the matter before the Court (9) if another Member State makes 
improper use of the powers provided in Article HI-172. Finally a safeguard clause authorises 
Member States to adopt provisional measures subject to Union control.
Article III-172 may still function as a Commission’s tool to force legislation upon 
Member  States  as  long  as  it  identifies  a link  between  the  object  of legislation  and  the 
internal  market.  For  instance,  Under  Article  III-172  (3)  health  and  safety  is  considered 
individually, compelling the Union to provide a “high level of protection, taking account in
198particular of any new development based on scientific facts.” Article HI-210 provides: “with 
a  view  to  achieving  the  objectives  of  Article  HI-209,  the  Union  shall  support  and 
complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields: (a) improvement in 
particular  of  the  working  environment  to  protect  workers’  health  and  safety...”  The 
identification  of  ‘working  conditions’  as  a  complementary  competence  leaves  all  other 
health and safety issues, which can be associated to the aims of the internal market, to be 
treated  as  Union  competence  under  Article  HI-172.  Thus,  if the  Commission  desires  to 
propose legislation  on  a  smoking ban  it can  force  it to the  Member  States by  qualified 
majority under Article IH-172.
As  regards  consumer  protection,  the  Union’s  limits  of  competence  to  enact 
legislation  for consumers remain unchanged.  However,  the EU Constitutional  Treaty has 
placed  consumer protection  under the list of shared competence.  There  “the Union  shall 
share  competence  with  the  Member  States  where  the  Constitution  confers  on  it  a 
competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 1-13 and 1-17.” Despite 
that, under Article III-235 (1) “the Union shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and 
economic  interests  of  consumers,  as  well  as  to  promoting  their  right  to  information, 
education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests”. Both the current 
EC  Treaty  and  the  draft  Constitution  provide for a  ‘high’  level  of consumer protection, 
while placed high up the list of priorities of the internal market, one would have thought that 
consumer protection  deserves  the highest level of protection.  An emergency may push  a 
consumer protection  measure  beyond the internal  market objectives  when  for instance  a 
Member  State  restrict  the  free  movement  of goods  on  grounds  of consumer  protection 
(health and security of national consumers).
199Conclusion
According  to  Article 1-12  (6),  “the  scope of and arrangements  for exercising the 
Union's competences shall be determined by the provisions relating to each area in Part III”. 
These legal bases  in Part HI define the scope of the policy field over which the Union’s 
competence takes effect.  This Chapter has attempted to portray how subject and objective 
related  competences  appear  in  the  relevant  provisions  of the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty 
providing a critical approach. The question is did the Convention achieve what it was set up 
to do? According to Craig30, the EU Constitutional Treaty as a reform process was driven by 
three main forces: ‘clarity’ to remedy the unclear division of competences in the EC Treaty; 
‘containment’  to reflect the demands of the German Lander  and  ‘consideration’  as to the 
areas that the Union should act in the future.
As  regards  clarity  in  relation  to  the  distribution  of  competences,  the  draft 
Constitution,  does  not fully correspond to the aim for simplification of the Community’s 
legal  order  marked  by  drawbacks  as  regards  the  choice  of the  Community’s  decision­
making procedures3 1   or the possible impact of a legislative provision upon the relationship 
between EC  and national competence32. The way competences  are categorised in the EU 
Constitutional Treaty beg the question as to whether they aim to provide the Union with a 
model of simpler / clearer delimitation of competences or simply with one that presents a 
mere statement of powers. Even as a mere statement of powers, the Constitutional Treaty’s 
competence categorisation lacks the crucial detail as to how these powers should be shared 
within  an  enlarged Union.  This  is made particularly manifest in the way  shared external
30 Craig, P.,  “What Constitution does Europe Need? The House that Giscard Built:  Constitutional Rooms 
with a View”, (2003) 26/03 European Federal Trust Online Paper, London
31  See Case C-155/91  Commission v Council (Waste Directive) [1993] ECR 1-939
32 See Case C 84/94 UK v Council (Working Time Directive) [1996] ECR 1-5755
200competence  and  mixed  agreements  have  been  allocated.  The  problem  there  lies  in  the 
difficulty of the task of codification of the Court’s vast and complicated decisions as well as 
their subsequent transformation into a simplified and transparent formula. One can hardly 
say that clarity is apparent in the Convention’s effort; at least to such a degree that candidate 
or new Member States will understand what they have committed themselves to.
Dougan3 3   lists  three  major  criteria  under  which  “a  category  approach  of  EU 
competences  can  be  judged  successfully.”  Thus  the  general  categories  of  Union 
competences  need  i)  to  be  comprehensive  yet  abstract  to  ensure  both  information  and 
flexibility in crossing different policy areas; ii) to provide reasons in case they deviate from 
the current Treaty regime and iii) to be clear to avoid undesired legal effects. Given that the 
EU  Constitutional  Treaty  was  formally  signed  by  the  twenty-five  EU  leaders  in  Rome 
(October,  29,  2004)  there  is  little  room  for  amendment  unless  in  the  next  round  of 
constitutional  talks,  scheduled  for  2006,  politicians  remedy  certain  unintended  legal 
consequences  arising  from  the text.  This  verifies  Amato’s  view  almost ten  years  ago  in 
relation to a Pan-European Constitution34. He stressed that if the goal of the Constitution is 
to “give national public opinions the sense of the foreseeable dimension of the powers they 
are delegating to the central authorities...the draft Constitution has to be heavily amended, 
primarily because of its ambiguity.” Thus, as Amato concludes, “if we want to pass from an 
incremental accumulation of treaties to a constitution, we need the courage to forge a new 
beginning, at least in terms of clarity.”
33 Dougan,  M,  “Assesing the  ‘Legal Legitimacy’  of the Draft Constitutional Treaty”,  Seminar on Internal 
Reform  and  the  Constitution  Building  Capacities,  (April  2003)  Centre  for  International  Relations, 
CONVEU-30, Warsaw.
34  Amato,  G.  “Distribution  of Powers”,  in  “A Constitution  for the European  Union?”,  Proceedings  of a 
Conference,  12-13  May  1994,  Organised by the Robert Schuman Centre, EUI  Working Paper 95/9, EUI, 
Florence
201As regards containment and consideration, the relevant competence provisions in the 
EU  Constitutional  Treaty  suggest  a  peculiar  mixture  of  the  supranational  and 
intergovernmental  elements.  This of course reflects the nature of the text as a product of 
political  compromise  and  diplomacy.  On  the  one  hand,  one  witnesses  a  tendency  of 
centralisation  in  relation  to  the  Union’s  exclusive  competences  (competition  distortions, 
CCP,  international  agreements)  and  on  the  other  a  strong  preservation  of 
intergovemmentalism  (CFSP).  Those  desiring  a  strong  maintenance  of  the 
intergovernmental  element within a constitutionalised Union  would support that although 
the initial proposal to extend the Union’s exclusive competence in order to contain the four 
Community freedoms  was  abandoned by the Praesidium in  its  final  Draft,  an  analogous 
outcome could emerge in the Constitutional Treaty from the management of the “Union’s 
external  relations,  through  an  expansion  of the  CCP  for  instance.  As  regards  objective 
related competence, the Convention did not propose any considerable reform of Article 95 
EC. The Court’s decision in the German Tobacco Case15appears to have very much set the 
boundaries under which the Community Institutions may rely on Article 95 EC as a valid 
legal basis and have restricted their legislative competence within the area of the internal 
market.  In  contrast,  the  Convention  approached with more interest the general  flexibility 
clause of Article 308 EC that under Article 1-18 may enjoy a wider scope of application but 
is  also burdened with  safeguards to avoid a threat to the principle of conferral of powers 
within the Union.
Clarity,  Containment  and  consideration  thus  emphasise  the  technical  side  of  a 
constitution  based  on  competence  distribution.  This  neglects  the  fact  that  a  constitution
35 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR-I-8419
202symbolises the legal manifestation of the social contract attached to the notion of the nation 
state. But yet again the EU Constitutional Treaty is not a state-like constitution but begun in 
the name  of simplification  and codification  and ending up as a tidying-up exercise.  The 
question is whether this  ‘tidying-up exercise’ needs some ‘tidying-up of its own’36. As the 
vice-president  of  the  Convention,  Giuliano  Amato,  had  commented  early  on  the 
Constitution  negotiations:  “we  wanted a girl,  we  gave birth to  a boy, but  we do have  a 
child.”3 7
36 Dougan,  M.,  “The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty:  A Tidying Up Exercise that Needs  Some 
‘Tidying-up’  Of Its Own”, (2003) The Federal Trust, UK
37  See  Article  in  EurActiv  entitled  “The  European  Convention  and  EU  Foreign  Policy”,  available  at 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-110177-16&tvDe=Analvsis
203CHAPTER 6 
COMPETENCE, SUBSIDIARITY & MONITORING DEVICES 
Introduction
As illustrated in previous chapters the balance of the vertical relation between the 
different  levels  of  governance  (i.e.  the  Community  vis-a-vis  the  Member  States  and 
peripheries)  depends  upon  the  issue  of  competence.  The  question  of  who  has  the 
competence to legislate and the rightness of choice of the legal basis once the Community 
has been assessed as competent to do so, has always created room for conflict. Subsidiarity 
comes as an additional feature that aims to preserve the balance of this relationship in the 
absence of a clear division of competences between the Community and the Member States. 
The  principle  of subsidiarity  (which  does  not  apply  in  areas  of exclusive  competences) 
operates  on  the  one  hand  as  a  constitutional  safeguard  to  national  autonomy  against 
excessive  Community  centralisation  and  on  the  other  as  a  vehicle  of  extending  EC 
legislative competences, provided that state action is insufficient in a given area1.
This chapter will focus on how the evolution; restraints and potential of the principle 
of subsidiarity influence the vertical delimitation of EU competences. It appears that whilst 
until  the Treaty  of Amsterdam  subsidiarity was running  an identity crisis with particular 
focus on definitional and procedural aspects, in the post Amsterdam period, it has undergone 
a  monitoring  crisis.  Both  crises  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  vertical  delimitation  of 
competences in the Community. To allow flexibility, the EU Constitutional Treaty has been 
called to remedy the monitoring gap of subsidiarity by modifying the Union’s legislative 
procedure.  It has partly  succeeded by allowing national parliaments to  scrutinise Council
1   See  Lenaerts,  K.  and  Stewart,  R.  “The Principle of Subsidiarity and  the Environment  in  the European 
Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism”, (1994) 17 Fordham International Journal 846, at 879
204legislation before its adoption through what has been called an ‘early warning system’. This, 
however, does not imply that national parliaments are entitled under the EU Constitutional 
Treaty to bring legal proceedings against Community legislation. Additionally, the Court’s 
history of ex post monitoring of the Community’s compliance with the principle does not 
suggest that it can do more than policing procedural subsidiarity.
A.  THE DEFINITIONAL CRISIS
1.  The Duty not to Interfere and the Duty to Supplement
The principle of subsidiarity, which was first mentioned in Article 25(4) of the 1987 
Single European Act in relation to environmental policy, was incorporated in the EC Treaty 
through  the  Treaty  of Maastricht  Article  3b  following  “the  debate  on  the  Community’s 
legitimacy between the Member States from the end of the 1980s onwards”2  The content of 
this provision was repeated in Article 5 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The aim behind it was 
to ensure that  action  is most accurate  where competence is  shared between the Member 
States and the Union. As the competence of implementation and application of legislation is 
vested upon the Member States, subject to limitations deriving from the Treaty and the EC 
Institutions,  the Community exercises that competence only in compliance to subsidiarity 
[Article 5  (2) EC]  and proportionality  [Article 5 (3) EC]. The set of norms posed by the 
principle  of  subsidiarity  delineates  the  spheres  where  the  Community  may  or  may  not 
engage  into  legislative  action.  The  choice  of  where  to  allocate  power  while  avoiding 
unrestrained behaviour and gaps is summarised in Article 5 (2) EC:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
shall  take  action,  in  accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,  only if
2 Estella A., “The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique”, Oxford University Press, (2002)
205and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Article 5 EC defines the use and not the meaning of subsidiarity. The principle aims 
to be a guiding light to condition the exercise of Community competence and not a signpost 
of the subject matter over which the Community has or has not competence to act. As seen 
in Chapter 3, the clarification of the term  ‘exclusive competence’  (i.e. subsidiarity applies 
within  the  Community’s  non-exclusive  /  shared  competence)  has  been  left  to  the 
jurisprudence of the Court. The same occurs with subsidiarity as a justiciable principle of 
Community law3   Yet, being the result of a political negotiation, there is ambiguity in the 
Treaty as to whether the Court’s jurisprudence applies in reviewing the legislative process or 
/ and in interpreting Community legislation. The Court from its side has been cautious in 
applying subsidiarity to its interpretations of Community law. This happens,  according to 
the  author,  not  out  of concern  of the  Court  about  the  degree  of  ‘justiciablity’  that  it is 
allowed but out of fear of extending Community competence. The purpose of this example 
is to highlight that a definitional crisis of subsidiarity has a direct impact upon the vertical 
division  of competences  as  this  occurs between  the  supranational  and intergovernmental 
levels of Community governance.
One could suggest that the definition of subsidiarity is possibly broad to allow scope 
for flexibility in the policies to be followed at Community level. The wording of Article 5 
(2) EC sets two main obligations for the Community: The duty not to interfere and the duty 
to  supplement.  Both  duties  do  not  ascertain  when  the  Community  has  competence  to 
intervene. Instead it is through Article 5 (1) EC that the Treaty determines textually when
3 See Case C-491/01  R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco [2002] ECR II- 
11453, particularly paragraphs:  177-185
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powers, which states that “the Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred 
upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein”. Suitably, Article 5 (2) EC 
establishes  that  decisions  and  responsibilities  should  lie  as  low  down  in  the  system  as 
possible. A competence can therefore be exercised on the lower (Member States) level of 
government as long as the objectives of an action can be achieved at that level. Accordingly, 
a competence can be exercised on the higher (Community) level  as long as the Member 
States  cannot  achieve  these  objectives.  Thus,  subsidiarity  carries  several  political 
consequences  bringing  Europe  towards  a  “decentralised  processes  of  decision 
making...within constitutional political structures.”4
By its very nature the principle of subsidiarity is highly political and difficult to put 
into operation. However, a strict political use of the principle of subsidiarity lacking a legal 
approach is not sufficient to make it effective. The practical function and observance of the 
principle of subsidiarity in a constitutionalised Union necessitates the existence of multiple 
legal / procedural checks to EC legislation. At present, subsidiarity as a procedural question 
has  been  left  to  the  Court.  As  it will be discussed below5,  the  Court only monitors  EC 
legislation ex post. Due to its hesitancy towards subsidiarity pleadings, the Court has never 
annulled  a measure  on  the  basis  of violation  of the principle.  Thus,  commentators  have 
stressed the importance of effective subsidiarity checks not only ex post but also ex ante, 
when EC legislation is prepared as a proposal by the Commission. In the recent debate about 
the EU Constitutional  Treaty, the procedural  and monitoring aspects of subsidiarity were 
interconnected. This reflects the realisation of the Convention on the Future of Europe that
4 Bohman, J., “The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy”, (1998), (6) Journal of Political Philosophy 
399-423
5 See Section B.2. “Monitoring by the Court, or lack of it”
207any legal application and monitoring of subsidiarity might be easier to concentrate upon its 
procedural  aspects  rather  than  trying  to  utilise  it  as  a  substantive  test.  Particularly,  the 
Protocol  of the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty,  regarding  the  application  of the principles  of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, assigns a unique role to the national parliaments in relation 
to the evaluation of the level to which the principle is complied with.
The clouds over the definition of subsidiarity and their legal-political implications on 
the  European  power  vacuum  have created  a schism  of opinions  as to  the  nature  of the 
principle itself. Schilling has characteristically alleged that “a split of opinions has occurred 
with  lawyers  coming  out  in  favour  of  treating  the  subsidiarity  principle  as  a  political 
principle and politicians coming out in favour of treating it as a legal norm.”6 In the case of 
the  Community,  subsidiarity  does  not  constitute  a  version  nouvelle  of  the  American 
principle  of decentralised  federalism  but  a block  to  federalism,  without representing  an 
expression  of  it.  Until  all  intergovernmental  arrangements  . have  been  questioned 
constitutional  lawyers  will  most  likely  continue  talking  about  a  quasi-federal  European 
polity. The point defended here is that subsidiarity is a part of a package of legal obligations 
that includes the principle of conferral [Article 5(1) EC] and the principle of proportionality 
[Article 5 (3) EC]. According to Estella7  “subsidiarity enters the scene only when it is clear 
that  the  Community  has  competence  to  act...In  other  words,  subsidiarity  is  a  principle 
regulating  the  exercise,  not  the  holding,  of  Community  competence.”  Toth8   adds  that 
subsidiarity  “cannot affect the competences granted by the Treaty, nor can it confer new 
competences on the Community.” In other words subsidiarity can neither be employed to
6 Schilling, T., “Subsidiarity as a Rule and as a Principle, or: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously”, (1995),  10/95 
Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, NYU.
7 Estella, A., ’’The Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique”, Oxford University Press, (1997), at pp 91
8 Toth, A.G. “Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?”, (1994) 19 (3) European Law Review 268-385
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sub-national  levels  of government  (the peripheries).  As  to  its  application,  not only does 
subsidiarity  subject  Community  action  to  take place  only  where  an  objective  cannot be 
achieved by Member  States  but it also contains  a negative obligation  on the part of the 
Member States to avoid acting if this condition is satisfied.
The Amsterdam Protocol No. 30 “on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and  proportionality”9   added  to  the  function  of  subsidiarity  as  a  limitation  clause  for 
ascertaining  the  equal  distribution  of powers  between  the  Community  and  the  Member 
States.  It  replaced  questions  of  political  choice  (at  what  point  and  why  should  the 
Community interfere) with issues of policy organisation (how to provide a guarantee that the 
Community does as little as possible). It succeeded in this by drawing the attention of the 
Institutions taking part in the legislative procedure to substantive aspects, including a list of 
guidelines  to  be  used  in  examining  whether  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  is  fulfilled 
(paragraphs 3 and 5) and procedural aspects, including a statement of reasons for legislative 
proposals (paragraph 4)1 0   In other words the  ‘Subsidiarity Protocol’  constitutional!sed the 
already  existing  guidelines  “focusing  less  on  the  idea  of  exclusivity  and  more  on  the 
possibilities for sharing competence across different levels of authority through the use of 
specific  types  of  legal  instrument,  and  emphasising  the  importance  of  reasoning  and 
justification of decision-making at least at EC level.”1 1  Last but not least it touched upon the 
definitional  problem  of  subsidiarity  by  pointing  in  Point  (3)  that:  “the  principle  of
9 See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre345.html
10  “...the  reasons  for  concluding  that a Community  objective can  be better achieved  by  the  Community 
must be substantiated  by qualitative or,  whenever possible,  quantitative  indicators.”  See the Commission 
Proposal  for  a  Directive  on  the  Conditions  of Entry  and  Residence  of  third-country  nationals  for  the 
Purposes of Studies, Vocational Training or Voluntary Service, COM (2002) 548 Final
1 1   De Burca,  G.,  “Reappraising  Subsidiarity's  Significance after Amsterdam”,  (1999),  7/99  Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper, NYU
209subsidiarity does not call into question the powers conferred on the European Community 
by the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court...” Instead it “provides a guide as to how those 
powers are to be exercised at Community level.”
According to Endo “nothing is absolutely sovereign in the world of subsidiarity. The 
principle does not view the Member States and the EU as sovereign entities. It is a Europe 
equipped with multiple levels of governance internally, and viewed as such by those outside 
the EU”12. A ‘Subsidiarian Europe’ is founded on the doctrine of limited / attributed powers 
of the Community (subsidiarity is a further development - one shape so to say - of this). 
According  to  Dashwood,  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  “are  principles  controlling  the 
exercise of Community powers; whereas the attribution principle goes to the question of the 
existence and extent of such powers.”1 3  As the EU only derives its powers and authority 
from the Treaty,  it does not possess a genuine own competence to enlarge unilaterally its 
powers. This is the crucial difference of the EU in comparison to any sovereign state. The 
Community  does  not  possess  what  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht  1 4   calls  Kompetenz- 
Kompetenz, meaning the competence to enlarge its own competences. Instead it is always 
dependent on  the  Member States  and the amount of powers  these are  willing to transfer 
upon  the  Community.  The  debate between the the German Constitutional  Court and the 
European Court of Justice  (the Court hereafter) has always been  a point of reference for 
academics as regards the balance of Community and national competence.
12  Endo,  K.,  “Subsidiarity  and  its  Enemies:  To  What  Extent  is  Sovereignty  Contested  in  the  Mixed 
Commonwealth of Europe?” (2001) EUI Working Paper 2001/24, EU1, Florence
13 Dashwood, A . “The Limits of European Community Powers”, (1996) 21  (2) European Law Review 113
14 The German Constitutional Court or BVerfG in short.
2102.  The Position of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG)
The Kompetenz-Kompetenz argumentation was used by the BVerfG in the line of the 
Solange  Saga1 5   and  later  in  Brunner1 6   in  order  to  support  the  point  that  although  EC 
supremacy is acknowledged in general, Community acts might be subjected to national legal 
review as soon as matters of national sovereignty, for instance - although not exclusively - 
fundamental  rights  protection,  are at  risk  of  being  infringed  by  Community  measures. 
Consequently,  some  Community  acts  might  be  ‘ultra  vires’  and  don’t exercise  binding 
power in  Germany,  because  the  Community has  exceeded its  competences.  If it  acts  to 
regulate to an effect that minimises the fundamental rights protection under the Basic Law, 
it  is  not  entitled  to  do  this  under  the  EC  Treaty  and  therefore  it  lacks  the  required 
competence. To act nonetheless, would mean to create a new competence ‘out of no-where’.
In accordance with Articles 23(1), 24(1) of the Basic Law, the National Parliament 
may  pass  an  act  that  accepts  a  loss  of governmental  power  in  favour of another body. 
Under the German Constitution this way of power-transfer is only allowed insofar as it does 
not challenge the fundamental rules and values set out in the Basic Law. Thus, the German 
Constitution only provides a delegation of power. The final juridical control rests within the 
Member  State  who  granted  the  power  to  the  Community  in  the  first  place.  However, 
Articles 23(1) and 24(1) Basic Law refer to 'Ubertragung von Hoheitsrechten’ (transfer of 
sovereign  power).  The  ambiguity  of the  term  ‘transfer’  (Ubertragung)  leaves  room  for 
interpretation. The BVerfG has only indirectly clarified ‘transfer’ in terms of its relationship 
to the Court.  For instance,  in  the aftermath  of Solange II,  the two Courts  agreed on the 
consequence of incompatibility of a Community rule with national law. The supremacy of
15 Solange I [1974] BVerfGE 37, 271 /2  CMLR 540; Solange II [1987] BVerfGE 73, 339 / 3 CMLR 225
16 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] BVerfGE 89,155 / CMLR 57
211Community law led to a priority application as far as the legal collision reached1 7  and not to 
the invalidity of the national rule. However, this was only true until October 1993, where the 
BVerfG ruled over constitutional complaints against the Treaty of Maastricht1 8.
The ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht was suspended by the German Federal 
President to await the judgment of the BverfG. The BVerfG emphasised the importance of 
the protection of fundamental rights and democratic principles under EC law. To ensure this 
aim,  it  assumed  that  the  degree  of transference  of power  should  be  limited  to  ensure 
effectiveness  of  the  protection  of  fundamental  constitutional  principles.  The  BVerfG 
contended that the transfer of power must not result in ‘emptying’ the values represented in 
the German Basic Law such as democracy (Article 38 basic Law enshrines the right to vote) 
and national sovereignty.1 9  This is because the legislative Institutions of the Community are 
not elected directly by the people of the Member States. Thus, according to the BverfG, an 
unrestricted transfer of power from the democratically elected National  Parliament to the 
Community and its Institutions could infringe the right of active influence of governing.20.
In  order to  secure  the protection  of the fundamental  constitutional  principles  the 
BVerfG has entered within a ‘co-operative relationship’ to the Court. This occurs when the 
BVerfG is reviewing the compatibility of Community law on the grounds of the German 
Constitution.  But  how  this  cooperation  between  the  two  courts  operates  in  practice?  In 
general, the Court guarantees through its case law the protection of fundamental rights in all 
Member States. However, if the Court fails to meet the standards set by the BVerfG then the 
latter can claim authority to make a final decision in single cases on the grounds of national
17 Case C-l 84/89 Nimz v City of Hamburg [1991] ECR1-297, 321.
18 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] BVerfGE 89,155 / CMLR 57
19 BVerfGE 89,  155 (172).
20  Zuleeg,  M.,  “The  European  Constitution  Under  Constitutional  Constraints:  The  German  Scenario”, 
(1997) 22 European Law Review 19, 27.
212constitutional law21. Thus the BVerfG saw itself in Brunner as last instance when it comes to 
evaluate  the  constitutionality  of  EC  law  under  the  Basic  Law.  Had  the  constitutional 
complaint in Brunner not been ultimately dismissed by the BVerfG, the exclusive authority 
and competence of the Court over the validity of EC law would have been questioned.
This conflict persisted in the so-called “EU-Banana-litigation”. The Court dismissed 
appeals  of  German  Banana  importers  and  Government  against  EC  Regulation  404/93, 
stating that fundamental rights had not been infringed. On the other hand, the BVerfG partly 
upheld  the  claims  and  instructed  the  Administrative  Court  of Appeal  to  grant  effective 
protection of Art.  14(1) Basic Law22. It was an order under the influence of the decision in 
Brunner.  Regulation  404/93  was  said  to  infringe  fundamental rights,  because  it  failed  a 
proportionality testing and violated the obligations under GATT that the Community was 
bound to under Art. 307 EC23. Again the last decision was up to the national courts, although 
not on a constitutional level. In the course of this rather dramatic development, the BVerfG 
delivered yet another judgement on the Banana-struggle in 200024. This ruling summarised 
the legal situation from its point of view and defined concrete limits to the revision of EC 
law. For the first time the BVerfG spoke of a misinterpretation of the Brunner decision by 
the plaintiffs attorneys, when they sought relief from the EC quota invoking fundamental 
rights [Art.  12(1),  14(1) Basic Law] before the BVerfG25. In the end it did not uphold the 
claims of banana-importers, because they had failed to provide substantial evidence that the
21  See BVerfG E 89,  155  (175;  178).
22 [1995] BVerfG, NJW, 950.
23 Reich, N., “Judge-Made ‘Europe k la Carte’: Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts between European and 
German Constitutional Law Provoked by the Banana Litigation, (1996) 7 European Journal of International 
Law  101,  109-110.
24 [2000] BVerfG, NJW, 3124-3126.
25 [2000] BVerfG, NJW, 3124 (3125).
213protection  of fundamental  rights  on  Community  level  had  deteriorated  under  the  Basic 
Law’s threshold26.
In  all  above-mentioned judgments  of the  BVerfG,  the protection  of fundamental 
rights has always been the centre point of reasoning. However, in Brunner the individual 
right of Art. 38(1) Basic Law was more or less only the starting point that led to a deeper 
reflection on the democratic basis of the Community27. The BVerfG came to the conclusion 
that the principle  of democracy that expresses the  sovereignty of the people implies the 
necessity of direct democratic legitimation of institutions exercising governmental power28. 
This  finding  applies,  according  to  the  BVerfG,  also  to  the  European  Union.  So  the 
Community must not exceed its competences only derived from transfer-acts of national, 
directly democratically legitimated, parliaments. In so far the Community does not have a 
so-called “Kompetenz-Kompetenz!'', it is not able to achieve autonomously more powers than 
granted by third parties29. This is one of the reasons, why a “Federal State of Europe” does 
not exist. A state is sovereign and thus may exceed its powers on its own30. The crucial point 
in  the  opinion  of the  BVerfG  is  that  Community  legal  acts  -   generally  independent  of 
national law and as ruled supreme to them -  are therefore believed to be able to break out of 
those limits. This situation will occur, when Community legislation unjustifiably infringes 
fundamental rights. As a consequence those acts will be ultra vires and are void.
26 [2000] BVerfG, NJW, 3124 (3125).
27 Herdegen, M., “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court:  Constitutional Restraints for an  ‘Ever 
Closer  Union”,  (1994)  31  Common  Market  Law  Review  235,  238;  Everling,  U.,  “The  Maastricht 
Judgement of the German Constitutional Court and its Significance for the Development of the European 
Union”, (1994) 14 Yearbook of European Law 1, 5.
28 BVerfGE 89,  155 (184).
29 Herdegen., M,  “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court:  Constitutional Restraints for an  ‘Ever 
Closer Union’”, (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review. 235, 242
30 See Everling, U., “The Maastricht Judgement of the German Constitutional Court and its Significance for 
the Development of the European Union”, (1994) 14 Yearbook of European Law 1, 6.
214This string of reasoning does not necessarily obstruct the concept of the EC legal 
system in the first place. EC law acknowledges the principle of subsidiarity and attributed 
powers as enshrined in Article 5 EC. The concept of EC law supremacy is in this case not 
denied, but simply not applicable. According to the BverfG, only such Community measure 
may  claim  supremacy  over  national  law,  which  was  legally  adopted  in  the  “sphere  of 
Community”31. The astonishing fact about the mling of the BVerfG still is, that it claims 
juridical  competence  in  this  field for itself,  ignoring  the  Court  and the procedure  under 
Article 234 EC32.  In doing so, the BVerfG had prepared a field of potential conflict with the 
Court,  as  the  more  recent  litigation  against EC  Regulation  404/933 3   before  the  national 
courts  has  shown.  A  parallel juridical  competence  of a national  court  over  Community 
legislation is likely to destroy the unity of EC law application sooner or later, resulting in 
uncertainty as to what the law is3 4  The common ground, the Community is built on, is firstly 
the legal community. Therefore a European integration is hardly imaginable without a legal 
unity, which as such can only be established through a unified jurisdiction.  It can be argued 
that the concept of the BVerfG in its last consequence could result in a split up of the EU. In 
fact, through its jurisdiction the German Constitutional Court showed that to withdraw from 
the Community  in more than  one way is theoretically possible35. Theoretically,  since the
31 De Witte, B., “Community Law and National Constitutional Values”, (1991) 2 Legal Issues of European 
Integration 1 (3).
32  Everling,  U.,  “Will  Europe  Slip  on  Bananas?  The  Bananas  Judgement  of  the  Court  of Justice  and 
National Courts”, (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 401, 434-435.
33 Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93, OJ L 47/1  as regards the arrangements for importing bananas into 
the Community was amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 216/2001.
34 See Schermers, H.G., “The Scales in Balance: National Constitutional Court v. Court of Justice”, (1990) 
27 Common Market Law Review 97, 103.
35 Zuleeg, T., “The European Constitution under Constitutional Constraints: The German Scenario”, (1997) 
22 European Law Review  19, 29.
215Member States remain the  ‘Masters of the Treaties’  i^Herren der Vertrage’)3 6 they should 
be  able  to  terminate  their membership  unilaterally37.  Furthermore,  as  Germany  is  still  a 
sovereign  state,  the  national  Parliament  could  easily  overcome  the  legitimation  of  the 
Community Institutions by cancelling the act of Accession to the Treaties.
The BVerfG has not needlessly used the expression “co-operation” to describe its 
relationship to the Court. That was presumably to avoid too hard a confrontation between 
the  two  Courts.  To  place  national  legislation,  even  though  a  constitutional  one,  over 
Community law would contradict the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy established 
by the Court and which so far is applied amongst the Member States. This could therefore 
be considered as a breach of Treaty on behalf of the German Federal Republic. Thus, the 
BVerfG cannot review every single Community rule in every single case it affects a German 
citizen  or  business,  which  enjoys  the  guarantee  of certain  fundamental  rights  under the 
German  Basic  Law  as  well  [Art.  19(3)].  On  the contrary,  a relationship  of co-operation 
exists  and  has  also  been  accepted  by  the  Court38.  The procedure  under Article  234  EC 
supports this relationship.  This leads one to conclude that the revision  of EC law by the 
BVerfG is  ultima ratio in order to preserve unchangeable constitutional  guarantees under 
Art. 79(3) Basic Law39. Art. 79(3) Basic Law guarantees fundamental principles and rights 
in the way that any alteration of the constitution in this respect is even out of the reach of
36  Wieland,  G.,  “Germany  in  the  European  Union  -  The  Maastricht  Decision  of  the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht”,  (1994) 5 European Journal of International Law 259, 263.
37 See Article 1-60 of the EU Constitutional Treaty on the voluntary withdrawal of a Member State from the 
Union.  According  to  it  “any  Member  State  may  decide  to  withdraw  from  the  European  Union  in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements.”
38 Case  127/73, Belgische Radio a.  o.  v SV SABAM [1974] ECR 51; Case C-234/89, Delimitis v Henninger 
Brdu AG [1991] ECR 1-935
39 [2000] BVerfG, NJW, 3124 (3125)
216Parliament;  meaning  practically  that there  is  no  legal  way  to  undermine  them.40  As  the 
parliament-transferred power turns  all  Community  acts  into  “acts  of public  power”(“A£f 
offentlicher Gewalt”) according to Art. 19(4), 93(1) 4b Basic Law and makes them equal to 
national legislation, the BVerfG has the general competence to review them41.
However, the jurisdiction of the BVerfG concerning this matter must not be over­
interpreted. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the complexity of the legal matter 
and the choice of words by the BVerfG might have led to a wrong understanding42. It is not 
an  established  fact  that  the  BVerfG  in  Brunner dissociated  itself  from  the  findings  in 
Solange II. The Court has only examined the consequences of ‘ultra vires' Community acts 
in  greater  detail.  One  could  even  argue  that  the  aim  of all judgments  delivered by  the 
BVerfG  was  to  stress  the  necessity  of  effective  fundamental  rights’  protection  on 
Community level. A point that might have been neglected a bit over the relatively quick and 
profound changes  that  stood on the EC political  agenda to push integration  even  further 
within  a  small  time-schedule  (for  example,  the  completion  of  the  Single  Market  and 
Monetary Union).  Yet, according to the present author, even when the fundamental rights 
issue seemed to have been resolved through judicial cooperation between the two courts, the 
question of who possesses the ultimate competence was not directly answered. This is still 
capable of creating tension in the vertical relation between the Community and the Member 
States.  Both  in  Solange II and Brunner the BVerfG claimed to possess this competence, 
although  it put  its  exercise  under the condition that the  standard of fundamental  human
40 Everling, U., “The Maastricht Judgement of the German Constitutional Court and its Significance for the 
Development of the European Union”, (1994) 14 Yearbook of European Law 1, 5.
41 BVerfG E 89,  155 (174-5); E 73, 339 (376-7; 386); E 37, 271 (280-2).
42 BVerfGE 89,  155 (172).
217rights’  protection in its essential requirements has  ‘sunk under the standard of Germany’s 
Basic Law’43.
As  a  consequence,  in  the  Banana  Cases  the  BverfG  held  that  constitutional 
complaints,  which cannot make credible that such a deterioration of protection before the 
Court has taken place, will and must not be admitted44. After all neither the supremacy of EC 
law nor the competence of the Court is doubted in principle45  Furthermore this point of 
view  also  corresponds  to  the  frame  set out by  Art.  23  (1)  1  Basic  Law  for Germany’s 
participation  in  the  Community.  The  German  Constitution  names  the  protection  of 
fundamental rights explicitly within this provision and also Art. 79(3) Basic Law demands 
the safeguarding of these most fundamental values. The BVerfG is legally bound to this. 
Hence, only the core of sovereignty of the people is said to be preserved46 . This is a right 
that by no means can be denied to a state4 7   Under British constitutional law, for instance, 
there is now doubt that the application of EC law in the country can be immediately stopped 
by an Act of Parliament48. It is interesting that the British reluctance as regards the extent of 
Community competence is related to the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty and not the 
adequacy of protection  of fundamental rights.  Italy has also a legal  “emergency-exit” for
43 BVerfG E 73, 339 (378-381); [2000] BVerfG, NJW, 3124 (3125); [1988] 25 CMLR 201 (203).
44Hoffmeister,  F.,  “Case  Law;  German  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Alcan  Decision  of  17  February 2000; 
Constitutional  Review  of EC  Regulation  on  Bananas,  Decision  of  7  June  2000”,  (2001)  38  Common 
Market Law Review 791, 793.
45 Weatherill, S., and Beaumont, P., “EU Law”, 3rd  edition., London ,Penguin (2000), 444; Steiner, J., and 
Woods, T., “Textbook on EC Law”, 7th  edition., Mayfield, Blackstone, (2000), 105.
46 BVerfG E 37, 271  (279/280); E 58, 1 (90); E 73, 339 (374)
47 Rodriguez  Iglesias,  G.,  “Mackenzie-Stuart  Lecture”,  10.  Feb.  1997,  (1998)  1  CambridgeYerabook  of 
European Legal Studies  1,13-14.
48 Craig P.  and de Burca, G., “EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials”, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press 
(1998), 253; Frowein, J., “Solange II (BVerfG E 73, 339). Constitutional Complaint Firma W.”, (1988) 25 
Common Market Law Review. 201, 204.
218extreme cases49.  As a result Art. 23(1) Basic Law can only be interpreted in the way that 
only a delegation of power is allowed.
One should point out that this healthy tension between the two courts would not be 
altered by the EU Constitutional Treaty. For instance, the House of Lords Select Committee 
on European Union has discussed the issue of competence in the light of Article 1-29 (1) of 
the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty.  The  provision  enables  the  Court  to  “ensure  that  in  the 
interpretation and application of the Constitution the law is observed”. Again with reference 
to  the  Brunner judgment  that  has  not  been  overruled  to  the  present  day,  Dr  Berrisch 
concluded:
“...I  understand  that  there  are  two  questions  to  distinguish  here.  One 
question  is,  if Germany has agreed to the Constitution the Treaty,  which 
becomes  the  new  EU  Constitution,  they  agree  implicitly  also  that  the 
European  Court  of  Justice  will  have  the  competence  to  decide  on  the 
competence of the Community, or the Union, whatever it will be called.
The other debate that can come up is whether by agreeing to that, Germany 
has  violated the German Constitution and gave more power to the Union 
than permissible under the Constitution That would be a question not to be 
decided by the European Court of Justice but to be decided by the German 
Constitutional Court. That is how I would view the question. For a number 
of reasons, I find it very unlikely that, if I look at the new Treaty here, the 
outcome would be that Germany has given more power to the Community 
than allowed under the German Constitution.”5 0
Indeed, the EU Constitutional Treaty does not cany the threat of legal uncertainty or 
disunity  of the  application  of Community law  in  Germany.  As  the threshold  set by  the
49 La Pergola,  A.  and  Del  Duca,  P.,  “Community Law,  International  Law  and  the Italian  Constitution”, 
(1985) 79 American Journal of International Law 598, 599; 610-611.
50 House of Lords,  Select Committee on European Union, Examination of Witnesses  (Questions  60-79), 
(22 October 2003). Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
219BVerfG only seeks to provide a core-protection of the rights set out in the Basic Law, the 
likeliness of an intervention tends to zero51. Also the citizens are clearly not encouraged to 
press constitutional complaints, as these would most certainly not be admitted52. As shown, 
the correct  application  of the criteria set out in  the BVerfG rulings  does not result in  a 
general exemption in favour of German citizens from the binding provisions of Community 
legislation,  so that the process of integration is never really at risk. The Court rather has 
outlined the inherit limits of Community power, something that has also been made clear in 
the EC Treaty (Article 5 EC) and the EU Constitutional Treaty (Article 1-11)1. After all, the 
Community’s obligation under the Treaty is to respect its Member States’ national identities, 
and the Member States must assist each other fulfil the Community’s objectives. Thus any 
current or future conflict between the Court and the national courts of the Member States is 
healthy and illustrates the degree that the Court relies on their cooperation.
3. Division of Competence or Division of Sovereignty?
The definitional crisis of subsidiarity may transform the principle from a tool against 
excessive  intervention  to  a  constraint  on European  integration  the  more  Member  States 
disagree  about  common  ends  and  shared  standards.  On  the  other  hand,  resorting  to 
individual rather than common action ensures that some issues of national importance would 
still remain attached to the state. Social rights, for instance are considered to be ‘government 
obligations’,  an  area  where  Member  States  still  to  a  large  extent  wish  to  retain  their 
competence by national regulation. For instance, the UK has a different conception of unfair
51  Hoffmeister,  F.,  “Case  Law;  German Bundesverfassungsgericht Alcan Decision  of  17  February  2000; 
Constitutional Review of EC Regulation on bananas”, Decision of 7 June 2000, (2001) 38 Common Market 
Law Review 791, 803.
52 See also Finanzgericht Hamburg 01/02/2001  -  Az. IV  178/95 -; “Banana Regulation does not infringe 
fundamental rights. No reference to BVerfG made.”
220dismissal  rights  that  does  not  reflect  the  wording  of  Article  30  of the  EU  Charter  of 
Fundamental  Rights53.  Given  the  short  British  experience  with  the  Human  Rights  Act 
(1998)54,  any  chance  of co-existence  with  a binding EU  Charter of Fundamental  Rights 
would be problematic. Legally established social rights at Community level, especially after 
a  possible  ratification  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty,  would  throw  the  question  of 
subsidiarity  at  the  Union’s  table.  Supposedly  the  drafters  of  the  Charter  foresaw  this 
argument.  This  is  apparent  in  Article  51(1)  and  (2)  of  the  Charter5 5   where  respect  to 
subsidiarity is paid explicitly. Equally this was reaffirmed in the Court’s case law56. Thus 
alongside  the  legalisation  of  the  Human  Rights  Charter  or  a  formal  constitutional 
framework,  a  uniform,  almost  federal  regime  resulting  to  a  blind  transference  of 
competences  to  a  supranational  level  is  doubted  in  face  of  the  subsidiarity  question 
employed to defeat those who hope to increase the federalist lesson of the Community57.
Subsidiarity in its orthodox meaning does not imply a diminution of the political 
value of European integration. The principle itself is a sufficient checking point and prevents 
the Community’s attempts to expand its competences to the Member States’  detriment by 
breaking into reserved national  areas. Therefore subsidiarity does not aim to prevent any 
efforts  of the  Union’s  constitutionalisation  process  but  its  application,  especially  in  the 
British American Tobacco Judgment, signals a return to orthodoxy where the Community
53  “Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Community 
law and national laws and practices.”
54 See Ewing, K., “The Human Rights Act and Labour Law” (1998) 27 International Law Journal 225
55 It is made explicit that  “the provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the 
Union  with  due  regard for the  principle  of subsidiarity  and to  the  Member  States  only  when  they  are 
implementing Union law... ”
56 Case C-292/97 Karlsson a.o.  [2000] ECR 1-2737
57  See  Emiliou,  N.,  “Subsidiarity:  an  Effective  Barrier  against  the  Enterprises  of Ambition”,  (1992)  17 
European Law Review 383
58  Case  C-491/01  R  v  Secretary  of State for Health ex parte  British American  Tobacco  [2002]  ECR II- 
11453
221under Article 95 EC “does not enjoy exclusive competence to regulate economic activity on the 
internal market, but only a certain competence for the purpose of improving the conditions for its 
establishment  and  functioning,  by  eliminating  barriers  to the  free  movement of goods  and the 
freedom to provide services or by removing distortions of competition.”5 9 After all, subsidiarity as a 
dynamic concept should be applied in the light of the objectives set out in the EC Treaty.
Given  the  impediments  that  render  a  final  or  absolute  division  of competences 
impractical,  a  wide  gap  of  ‘grey’  shared  authority  within  the  Union  has  rendered  the 
procedural  tactics  of precise  power distribution  problematical.  Probably this  is  the main 
reason  why the practical  implementation  of subsidiarity within  a positive text was  never 
discussed in detail during the political post-Nice debates. Instead, federalist proposals went 
as  far  as  suggesting  that  “to  strengthen  the  clarity  of  the  competence  order,  the  EU 
competences could be allocated to different competence categories, varying by the intensity 
of EU  activity  permitted in  the  different political fields.”6 0   According  to this model,  the 
Court  would  become  the  real  Constitutional  Court  of  the  Union  with  an  extended 
jurisdiction covering all the acts of the Union. Most of all, federalists insisted on a central 
control  consisting  of  a  parliamentarised  European  legislation  with  nucleus  sovereignty 
attached to the Federation.  Subsidiarity would constitute a basic ingredient in this model, 
albeit well hidden behind the Federation’s capacity going, according to Fischer,  as far as 
“what  is  absolutely  necessary  to  regulate  at  European  level”61.  This  theory  lacked 
contemplation as instead of closing a long-standing conflict of competence division it only 
succeed in touching upon one front only to open another, that of division of sovereignty.
59 Ibid, paragraph 179
60 The Federalist View of the Future of Europe, Initial UEF Contribution to the Convention, Adopted by 
the  Federal  Committee  Meeting  at  Palma  de  Mallorca,  21  April  2002.  Available  at 
http://en.federaleurope.org
61  See Lepsius, M.R., ‘‘The European Union as a Sovereignty Association of a Special Nature”, (2000) 7/00 
Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, NYU.
222B.  THE MONITORING CRISIS
Introduction
In recent years  the principle of subsidiarity has undergone an identity crisis. This 
crisis owes much to the insufficient legal monitoring of its application by the Court, which 
in any case can only intervene after the adoption of legislation62. The Court is more reluctant 
to annul Community legislation that constitutes part of the acquis communautaire and is 
applied by the Member States’ judiciaries. At the same time it is more willing to invalidate a 
legislative proposal that has no legal consequences at the time of its assessment. In this case, 
it  is  more  possible  for  the  Court to  examine  the  factual  evidence  over the  Community 
legislator’s proposal that the objective of the proposed legislative act cannot be achieved at 
national level. Second the marginal role of national parliaments in supranational legislation 
has  gone  against  the  wish  for  a  Union  closer  to  its  citizens.  “The  role  of  National 
Parliaments  in  the  European  architecture”63,  forming  the  last  point  of  the  post-Nice 
constitutional  agenda  is  based  on  two  assumptions.  First,  being not entirely involved  in 
Union legislation,  the European Parliament is unable to substitute for the role of national 
legislatives.  Second,  lacking  the  most  fundamental  attribute  of national  legislatures,  the 
representation  of a European  demos,  its democratic legitimacy appears weak without the 
backing of national parliaments64.
62 De Burca,  G.,  “Reappraising  Subsidiarity's  Significance  after  Amsterdam”,  (1999),  8/99  Jean Monnet 
Working Paper, NYU
63 The European Convention, Note from Praesidium to The Convention, “The Role of National Parliaments 
in the European Architecture”, 31 May 2002 (03.06), [CONV 68/02]
64  See  MacCormick,  N.  (1997a),  “Democracy,  Subsidiarity,  and  Citizenship  in  the  'European 
Commonwealth”, 16 Law and Philosophy 331-356.
2231.  Monitoring by the National Parliaments
(a)  Evolution before the EU Constitutional Treaty
The  Amsterdam  Subsidiarity  Protocol  may  have  increased  the  “determination  of 
relative  efficiency”6 5   (Article  5  EC)  as  a  method  to  agree  on  supranational  or 
intergovernmental  action.  Yet,  in the  absence of a detailed procedure and conditions for 
such an assessment, it is uncertain how efficiency could be weighed against political reasons 
or reasons of urgency that would render the application of the Protocol void. Moreover, as 
already seen in Chapter 5, certain competence provisions in the Treaty (Article 95 and 308 
EC) are complicated and too imprecise to allow for a clear and conventional judgement on 
their  scope  and  consequence.  Thus  a  demand  for  accurate  monitoring  of  subsidiarity 
gradually emerged at Community level. Chronologically, first the Nice Declaration 23 on 
“the Future of Europe”66 identified four specific  areas where future reform should focus. 
Competences and subsidiarity as well as the role of national parliaments were included next 
to fundamental  rights  and  the  simplification  of the Treaties.  Behind this idea for reform 
rested a collective realisation that a prerequisite for any attempt to reduce the discretionary 
powers of the Community as a decision-maker is a clarification of certain provisions at the 
level  of the  distribution  of competences.  Hence,  the  tidier the  system  of delimitation  of 
competences is, the less subsidiarity conflicts will emerge when competences are exercised.
Additionally,  the European Council meeting at Laeken on December  14-15, 2001 
investigated the chances of failure of the Community Institutions to act upon the legislative 
limits imposed by the concept of subsidiarity. The question was how subsidiarity could be
65 See F0llesdal, A.,  “Subsidiarity and Democratic Deliberation” in Eriksen, E.O. and Fossum, J.E., (eds), 
“Democracy and the European Union - Integration Through Deliberation”, Routledge, London (1999)
66 See also De Witte, B., “The Nice Declaration: time for a Constitutional Treaty of the European Union”, 
(2001) International Spectator 21-30, at 29
224applied within a transparent division of exclusive, shared and complementary competences. 
More accurately the concern of the EU Leaders was: “how to establish and monitor a more 
precise delimitation of competences between the EU and the Member States reflecting the 
principle of subsidiarity”. The further Declaration to the one annexed to the Treaty of Nice 
aimed to establish a political and judicial manual on the Union’s competences. Politically, 
the  EU  leaders  at  Laeken  supported  the  idea  that  more  institutions  and  /  or  national 
parliaments need to participate in the legislative process. It is clear, however, that there was 
no concrete plan of action.
Characteristically the  Laeken Declaration  states:  “A  second question,  which  also 
relates to democratic legitimacy, involves the role of national parliaments. Should they be 
represented in a new institution, alongside the Council and the European Parliament? Should 
they  have  a  role  in  areas  of European  action in  which  the European  Parliament has no 
competence? Should they focus on the division of competence between Union and Member 
States,  for  example  through  preliminary  checking  of  compliance  with  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity?” Judicially, there was an open proposal (later brought up by Working Group I 
of the  European  Convention67)  for  widening  the  list  of privileged  applicants  under  the 
existing Article 230 EC to include national parliaments. This would allow annulment actions 
to be brought (specifically on grounds of subsidiarity) by national legislatures to the Court 
of First Instance, now renamed ‘the High Court’ by the EU Constitutional Treaty. A detailed 
reporting  of  violations  of  subsidiarity  could  enhance  the  effective  application  of  the 
principle, especially in cases where the home parliament is at odds with its government’s 
vote  on  a  measure  in  the  Council.  This  proposal  however  did  not  succeed  for reasons
67  Mandate  and  composition  [CONV  71/02];  Final  report  of  Working  Group  I  on  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity  [CONV286/02]; Final Report debated at October 3-4, 2002, 9th Plenary Session - see Agenda 
at [CONV302/02]
225explained  below  in  the  context  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty’s  Protocol  on  the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
Yet another unsuccessful proposal in the Convention, revisiting the long-standing 
problem of sharing competences, suggested the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee 
on Subsidiarity acting as a form of constitutional council68. This body would be composed 
of  both  national  and  European  Parliament  representatives  and  would  be  exclusively 
occupied with the monitoring of the uniform application of the principle of subsidiarity and 
proportionality  in  the  Council  and Parliament legislation.  Such  a committee  would be  a 
reference  point  for  all  national  and European  organs  that  would receive  an  informative 
opinion about whether the Union was acting within the boundaries of its competence. The 
proposal for the creation of such a body only went as far as to bestow powers of reference. 
A decision of the Subsidiarity Committee against an act in question could have the power to 
compel the Council or Parliament to turn down a Commission proposal or state the reasons 
that would make such  an act invalid. In the latter case the whole issue would need to be 
revisited  by  the  Court,  as  the  best  possible  institution  to  scrutinize  whether  the  act  in 
question  respects  the  principle  of subsidiarity.  The  opponents  of such  a novel  approach 
identified  a potential jurisdictional  clash between the Committee  and the Court.  Being a 
party-led political body, the subsidiarity Committee could possibly act as a third legislative 
chamber, undermining the fact that the power to scrutinize the Constitution is reserved to the 
Court.
68 [CONV67/1/02]
226The  Final  Report  of  Group  IV  on  the  national  parliaments6 9   emphasised  the 
important role of the national legislatures and the European Parliament in the establishment 
of a  ‘mechanism for European debate’. The Convention recognised the important role of 
national parliaments as actors in the Union’s legislative process; instruments of control of 
their  national  governments  regarding  European  policies  and  most  significantly 
representatives  of the Member States’  citizens in the Union’s constitutionalisation70.  The 
basic  argument  was  that  both  the  European  and  national  Parliaments  shall  work  in 
cooperation, especially in matters like pollution that have a transnational impact. Given the 
scale and effects of pollution incidents that either take place in a Member State or occur 
outside it but have  a direct effect upon it or other Member States,  makes  any unilateral 
action  of  national  parliaments  impossible.  This  transnational  idea  of  governance  to 
complement  national jurisdictions  is  at  odds  with  the  Working  Group’s  suggestions  on 
national  control  over  the  Union  Institutions.  The  nationalisation  of European  decision­
making reflects  the  view  that Ministers in  the Council  act in  a hostile  way towards  the 
domestic  and local  interests of national executives.  Yet,  a shift from supranationalism to 
pure  intergovemmentalism  may  work  against  integration.  It  will  possibly  substitute  the 
Union’s creeping competence with a general freeze in the exercise of those competences, 
contradicting therefore what has been achieved by the Union.
(b)  Subsidiarity in the EU Constitutional Treaty and the Role of National Parliaments
When it comes to the EU Constitutional Treaty, the enforcement of subsidiarity is 
based on Article 1-11 (3) supported by the two protocols on the role of national parliaments
69 Final report of Working Group IV on the Role of National Parliaments [CONV353/02]
70 See Pemice, I., “The Role Of National Parliaments in the European Union”, in Melissas, D., and Pemice, 
I., (eds), “Perspectives of the Nice Treaty and the Intergovernmental Conference” in 2004 ‘Nomos’, Baden 
Baden, (2001)
227and on subsidiarity and proportionality,  annexed to the Constitutional text. Article I-11  of 
the EU Constitutional Treaty states the fundamental principles of the Union that govern the 
distribution of competences.  It starts with the principle of conferral in paragraphs (1) and 
(2)7 1  under which the Union exercises only those competences that are conferred upon it by 
Member States. Within these limits, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality apply. 
The following paragraph (3) on subsidiarity does not provide a definition of the principle but 
rather affirms the current Article 5 EC wording as to how subsidiarity should function in the 
Union:
Under the principle  of subsidiarity,  in  areas  which  do  not fall  within  its 
exclusive  competence,  the  Union  shall  act  only  if  and  insofar  as  the 
objectives  of the proposed  action  cannot be  sufficiently  achieved by  the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather,  by reason of the  scale or effects of the proposed  action, be better 
achieved at Union level.
This  provision  is  thus  designed  to  block  any  Union  attempts  at  centralised 
integration by way of shifting competences to the supranational level, apart from occasions 
where the explicit conditions for the exercise of Community competence are met.
The EU Constitutional Treaty introduces  a new subsidiarity control mechanism. 
Article 1-11 (3) refers to the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality  that  subjects  the  application  of  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality to a new monitoring (early warning) system. There national parliaments are 
entrusted  with  an  additional  task  next  to  influencing  and  scrutinising  their  national
71  1.  The  limits  of  Union  competences  are  governed  by  the  principle  of conferral.  The  use  of Union 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act within the limits of the competences conferred upon 
it by the Member States in the Constitution to attain the objectives set out in the Constitution. Competences 
not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States.
228executives.  They  become  actively  involved  in  European  legislation  through  inspecting 
directly the work of European  Institutions  applying to all  legislative proposals  under co­
decision and falling under the category of shared competence72.
The Institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid 
down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  National  Parliaments  shall  ensure  compliance  with  that 
principle in accordance with the procedure set out in the Protocol.
In  short, the Protocol  states that national parliaments are to be informed about all 
new Commission initiatives at the same time as the Union legislator. They are given a time 
limit of six  weeks to  send to  the Presidents  of the European Parliament,  the Council  of 
Ministers  and  the  Commission  a  reasoned  opinion  stating  why  they  consider  that  the 
proposal does not conform to the principle of subsidiarity. If one third of the votes consider 
that a proposal  does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,  the Commission must 
review its proposal. It can then decide whether to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal. 
The involvement of national parliaments appears a crucial step in the clarification and re­
distribution of competences at European level by ensuring, early in the legislative process, 
that the principle of subsidiarity is not violated by the Union’s casual attempts. Also in view 
of  the  fact  that  qualified  majority  voting  will  outmanoeuvre  the  national  veto  over 
consultation in the EU Constitutional Treaty, the immediate responsibility of governments 
towards their parliaments declines. The new mechanism of early warning could be used to 
counterbalance this development, since the parliamentary monitoring of subsidiarity allows 
for immediate pressure and scrutiny of the European legislative process.
72 This  also  includes  wide policy proposals  (e.g.  Green Papers,  White Papers,  the Commission’s  annual 
work programme)
229The  question  however  remains:  how  much  can  the  ‘early  warning  system’  do? 
Theoretically, the new system is proposed to allow a national parliament or a chamber of 
a parliament to contest a legislative proposal with regard to its compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity. Realistically, after the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty, it will be 
impossible to block  - on  subsidiarity grounds  - any form of undesired legislation passed 
under qualified majority in the Council. Quite the opposite, under the early warning system, 
only dubiously justified legislation would be challenged by national legislatures. This would 
be  rather  problematic  once  an  unwanted  measure  is  based  on  one  of  the  flexibility 
provisions. Weatherill7 3  proposes that “...in two cases the Commission must invite national 
parliaments  explicitly  to  consider  matters  from  the  perspective  of  competence  and 
subsidiarity. The two cases are proposals advanced under the long-stop provision, currently 
found in Article 308 EC, and proposed harmonisation measures. This addresses the risk that 
the provisions may be surreptitiously abused by national executives. Both Articles 95 and 
308 EC were, remember, mentioned with explicit suspicion in the Laeken Declaration, and 
here is a way to provide for extra procedural supervision.”7 4
Even as an informative exercise, the early warning system is likely to affect policy 
initiative and informal practices7 5  as well as influence the relations of national legislatives 
with the European Parliament. Even though national parliaments will not have the right to 
veto a legislative proposal, their political views and values -  shaped by domestic politics -
73  Weatherill,  S.,  “Using  National  Parliaments  to Improve  Scrutiny  of EC/EU  Action”,  Jurist,  Thinking 
Outside the Box Editorial  Series,  (2003) Paper 2/2003,  available at http://www.fd.uni.pt/ie/edit  pap2003- 
02.htm
74  It  should  be  added  that  there  is  no  exaggeration  in  Weatherill’s  words  considering  that  in  the  early 
Convention talks there was a radical call for amendment of Article 308 EC conditional on consultation with 
national parliaments (CONV 32/02, p.4).
75 E.g. Conciliation arrangements between the European Parliament and Council. See Maurer, A., “What is 
next  for  the  European  Parliament?”  (1999)  Federal  Trust  Series,  Future  of  European  Parliamentary 
Democracy 2
230would  influence  the  function  of the  Union  as  a  whole.  Additionally  it  is  interesting  to 
consider whether their views portrayed in their questions and warnings towards the Union 
Institutions  will  create  any  kind  of obligations  to  national  governments,  especially  with 
reference to judicial review on subsidiarity considerations. One should be aware that under 
the  early  warning  system,  subsidiarity  constitutes  a  mere  political judgment  and  not  a 
ground for judicial review. Under the EU Constitutional Treaty, neither national parliaments 
nor the Committee of the Regions, which are primarily concerned by subsidiarity violations, 
are entitled to bring a direct action against a Council measure. This is due to the majority 
opinion of certain members of the plenary debate at Working Group I that Member States 
would lose  their  unitary character once national  parliaments  were  given  a right to bring 
direct actions to the Court76.
Instead, those parliaments that have drafted a negative position have the possibility 
to take legal action against the Commission before the Court on the grounds of a procedural 
subsidiarity infringement.  Even  there,  the Court -  in  an  attempt to preserve the Union’s 
institutional  balance  -   will  rule  on  the  legality  of the  procedures  followed  and  not  on 
subsidiarity per se. This mirrors its past and current approach77. During those proceedings, 
national parliaments will be represented by their governments, acting on their behalf. Article 
8 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
provides:
“The  Court  of Justice  of the  European  Union  shall  have jurisdiction  in 
actions  on  grounds  of infringement  of the  principle  of subsidiarity by  a 
European legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down in 
Article III-365  of the Constitution by Member States, or notified by them
76 [CONV331/02], p9; [CONV 630/03], p7
77 See below under the headline “Monitoring By the Court, Or Lack of It”
231in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament 
or a chamber of it.”
The Protocol leaves some ambiguity as regards the manner under which subsidiarity 
complaints may be raised before the Court. These must be brought according to the Protocol 
by the Member States but can be on behalf of their national parliaments according to their 
legal order.  This of course raises two related questions: First, the extent of governments’ 
obligation  to  represent  their respective  parliaments  at  the  Court  against their  own  will. 
Second, the extent of parliamentary participation to ensure the proper representation of their 
interests  at the  Court.  Dougan  questions:  “are domestic rules  intended to  govern  purely 
procedural  issues  related  to  the  national  parliaments’  rights  under  Union  law  to  raise 
subsidiarity complaints; or does the Protocol leave Member States free to decide whether 
they are prepared  to notify subsidiarity issues on behalf of their domestic parliaments  at 
all?”7 8  Such an uncertainty may create controversy within the Member States’ constitutional 
orders as to how national parliaments should make their decisions and whether or not any 
government shall be obliged by the decision of its parliament to take legal action against EU 
legislation. Second, under the Protocol, the relationship between the chambers and the role 
of regional assemblies is no more left to national parliaments but according to the proposed 
system it is decentralised, meaning that both have been given a voice. Potential problems 
may  arise  when  for  instance  one  of  the  chambers  is  in  opposition  to  the  national 
government.
Thus, even though for the first time in the history of European integration national 
parliaments  and  sub-national  units  are  involved  in  the  European  legislative  process,  it 
appears  that  much  work  remains  to  get  the  internal  balances  right  in  order  to  preserve
78 Dougan,  M., The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty: A ’Tidying-Up Exercise’  that Needs Some 
Tidying-Up Of its Own”, (2003) 27/2003, Federal Trust Online Constitutional Essay, UK
232legitimacy and power under the EU Constitutional Treaty. The author supports the view that 
given  the limitation  within  the early warning system with regard to national parliaments 
referring  subsidiarity  violations  directly to  the  Court,  it  is  fruitless  to  alter  the  Union’s 
legislative  procedure  only  to  introduce  a procedural  alteration  in  the  implementation  of 
subsidiarity.  The  Protocol  encourages  a further level  of democratic  scrutiny  by  national 
parliaments and sub-national units. This would eventually balance the vertical delimitation 
of  competence,  as  it  would  involve  the  participation  of  more  national  actors  in  EU 
legislation.  Despite  that,  the  Protocol  does  not  contribute  to  the  original  aim  of  the 
Convention for simplification of decision-making within the Union. Instead it is more likely 
that the proposed reforms will encourage an invasion of domestic political conflicts into the 
Union  level  of  decision-making.  National  leaders  could  therefore  settle  on  a  more 
appropriate mechanism to ensure that national parliaments are able to efficiently scrutinise 
the proposals of their governments in the Council.
One should note that despite the fact that the proposals for the reform of subsidiarity 
were supposed to address the problematic environment of the Union’s competence system, 
they focused in the legitimacy deficit of the Union. A first thought on the participation of 
national parliaments in EU legislation begins with the expectation of finding a competence 
solution through enhancing the dialogue between the Union and Member States. Instead of 
that, one discovers that the proposals for monitoring the application of subsdiarity divert the 
debate on competences to that of institutional  legitimacy.  Raunio for instance writes that 
“the biggest problem  with  the  system is that through making national parliaments  direct 
participants  in  the  EU’s  legislative  process,  it  goes  against  the  very  principle  of 
parliamentary democracy...  (where)...the government is accountable to the legislature and
233can be voted out of office by it.”7 9  This thesis, however, supports the view that the biggest 
problem  with  the early warning system is that its contribution to the greater problem of 
competences is limited as subsidiarity will not increase legal certainty. The principle itself is 
left unchanged and tied to the European level. As such it will remain after the ratification of 
the EU Constitutional Treaty.
2.  Monitoring by the Court, or lack of it
Apart from the proposal that wants national parliaments to adopt a monitoring role 
over the principle of subsidiarity, one should not overlook the potential role of the Court in 
policing subsidiarity. This role perhaps could have been more effective, had the Court been 
able to monitor the legislative process within the Council at its outset and not in its outcome. 
While the former involves questions of material subsidiarity, the second includes issues of 
procedural subsidiarity. As the position stands, the Court can declare EC legislation invalid 
or unconstitutional under the EU Constitutional Treaty only after legislation has taken place. 
Even  there  it  appears  that  the  Court  has  not  been  willing  to  interfere  with  the  EC 
legislature’s discretion in questions of procedural subsidiarity therefore revealing the nature 
and limits of its control. The control of procedural subsidiarity has been a hard task for the 
Court  that  has  not  taken  advantage  of subsidiarity,  even  in  its  material  form,  to  check 
whether the EC legislature is going off track. Unless, therefore, the Court identifies a grave 
error  on  the  part  of the  EC  legislature  it will  not review  Community  legislation  on  the 
grounds of subsidiarity. Horizontally, this demonstrates its respect for the other Institutions 
of  the  Community  but  vertically  it  discourages  the  Member  States  from  bringing
79 Raunio,  T.,  “Towards  Tighter  Scrutiny? National  Legislatures  in  the EU  Constitution”,  (2004)  16/04 
The Federal Trust Online Papers, UK
234subsidiarity  cases  to  Court  knowing  that  the  Court  will  not  substitute  the  legislature’s 
discretion with its own.
According to Article 230 EC the Court has competence to review “the legality of 
acts adopted by the European Parliament and the Council,  of acts  of the Council,  of the 
Commission and of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the 
European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third parties.” Despite the 
pressure from the European Parliament, there is no special procedure for submitting issues 
of subsidiarity at the Court80. The Court may thus, under the claim of a Member State that 
has been  outvoted in  the Council,  annul EC  legislation when  there is  a violation  of the 
Treaty’s Article 5 EC in the legislative process. Alternative judicial avenues for a Member 
State are to make a preliminary reference to the Court under Article 234 EC or to resort to 
the  illegality  exception  of  Article  241  EC.  In  the  post-Maastricht  period,  subsidiarity 
theoretically functions as a new ground for the Court to declare EC legislation invalid. In 
practice, however, Member States seem somewhat reluctant to bring a case before the Court 
claiming that subsidiarity has been violated.
The Court, on the other hand, has been similarly unwilling to declare a Community 
measure invalid for contradicting the principle. That is why a small number of cases have 
appeared before the Court on these grounds and the Court has never ruled in favour of a 
Member  State.  Instead  it  has  adopted  a  cautious  or  prudent  approach.  There  are  two 
hypotheses for this approach: First, one can translate it as a means of self defence on the part 
of the Court to preserve its legitimacy, taking into account the low credibility of subsidiarity 
as a legal principle. Second, bearing in mind the anti-integrationist character of subsidiarity
80 For more practical points on how to bring the issue of subsidiarity before the Court see Toth, A.G., “Is 
Subsidiarity Justiciable” (1994) 19 (3) European Law Review 268-285
235as “a pause and rethink” device to European legislation, one could argue that the Court does 
not wish to jeopardise its pro-integrationist political agenda. Indeed, in its early case law on 
subsidiarity, the Court seemed quite reluctant to carry out something more than a procedural 
assessment of compliance with subsidiarity81. For instance, in the Working Time Directive 
Case8 2  it denied the British claim against the Council seeking annulment of the Directive on 
the basis that it was adopted under the wrong legislative basis of Article  118a instead of 
Article 100 or Article 235 EC. The British argument was that the Community action was not 
grounded on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. The Court however said that “... once the 
Council has found that it is necessary to improve the existing level of protection as regards 
the  health  and  safety  of  workers  and  to  harmonise  the  conditions  in  this  area  while 
maintaining the improvements made, achievement of that objective through the imposition 
of minimum requirements necessarily presupposes Community-wide action.” According to 
Wyatt  and  Dashwood8 3   “that  seems  hardly  sufficient,  given  that  the  relevant  Treaty 
provisions  clearly contemplate the possibility  of pursuing those  same  objectives  through 
actions at Member States level.”
Further in the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive  Caseu ,  a case concerning a 
German challenge to the adoption of Directive 94/19 harmonising national laws on deposit 
guarantee schemes, the Court decided likewise. It stated that “... it is apparent that, on any 
view, the Parliament and the Council did explain why they considered that their action was 
in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity and, accordingly, that they complied with the 
obligation to give reasons as required under Article  190 (now 253 EC) of the Treaty. An
81  De Burca, G.,  “The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor”, (1998) 
36 (2) Journal of Common Market Studies 217-235
82 Case C-84/94 UK v.  Council [1996] ECR1-5755
83 Wyatt, D., and Dashwood, A., “European Union Law”, 4th  ed., Sweet and Maxwell, (2000), p. 162
84 Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR 1-2405
236express  reference  to  subsidiarity  could  not  be  required.  On  those  grounds,  the  plea  of 
infringement of the obligation to state reasons is unfounded in fact and must therefore be
85 rejected.”  The  conclusion  one can  draw from these decisions is  that as  far as  material 
subsidiarity has not been violated; procedural subsidiarity (i.e. a statement in the Directive’s 
Preamble of the reasons that led the EC legislature to adopt the measure in question) is given 
a secondary importance.
In both, the Working Time Directive and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive 
cases,  the  Court  did not emphasise the need for the  subsidiarity principle to be referred 
expressly in Community legislation. This, however, does not imply that lack of reasoning as 
regards the principle cannot provide grounds for annulment under the broad scope of Article 
190 EC (now 253 EC)86. This direct link of subsidiarity with Article 190 EC (now 253 EC)
R7 was the basis of the German argument in Germany v Parliament and Council  . The fact 
that the German  argument was more articulated that the British one in  UK v.  Council, 
forced  the  Court  to  make  a  detailed  assessment  on  whether  the  Directive’s  Preamble 
justified  Community  action  from  the  side  of  subsidiarity.  Advocate  General  Leger’s89 
comments on the proper application of the principle also aimed to create a link between 
procedural subsidiarity and Article 190 EC (now 253 EC): “how useful.. .it could be, for the 
purpose of ensuring proper application of the principle of subsidiarity for the obligation to 
state reasons laid down in Article  190 of the Treaty to be enforced with particular rigour
85 Para 7 of the Judgment
86 “Regulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and 
as such acts adopted by the Council or the Commission, shall state the reasons on which they are based and 
shall refer to any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to the Treaty”.
87 Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR 1-2405
88 C-84/94 UK v.  Council [1996] ECR 1-5755
89  Advocate  General  Leger  in  Case  C-84/94;  Common  Market  Law  Reports  Vol.77  1996  pp.671-723 
(1996) 3 CMLR 671  “It does not seem to me that the relevant authorities have ignored the requirement to 
state reasons in view of the exclusive competence of the Community, the Council and the Parliament were 
not, in my opinion, required to justify the need to apply the principle of subsidiarity.”
237whenever the Community legislature takes action to lay down new rules.”90 The purpose 
behind  the  requirement  of  subsidiarity-specific  reasoning  is  to  enhance  democratic 
accountability  in  the  Community.  The  Advocate  General  suggested  that all  Community 
measures should therefore indicate “on what basis the authority concerned is acting.. .even if 
only to state, where this is the case, that the principle of subsidiarity does not come into 
play.” The aim of the application of the principle of subsidiarity in the interpretation of EC 
legislative  acts  seems  logical  given  that  the  Community  Institutions  take  into  account 
material  subsidiarity  when  framing  EC  legislation.  The  Court’s  reluctance  to  take  into 
account procedural subsidiarity demonstrates that subsidiarity and flexibility cannot restrain 
its judicial role to uphold Community’s competence to adopt a level of protection for the 
interest of the Member States’ public, which seems acceptable in the Community91. Thus, 
review  of the EC  legislature’s discretion needs  to be limited.  An  interpretation  of every 
directive in the light of subsidiarity could create a problem when the Community legislates 
“in an area not falling within its exclusive competence”92.
In more recent cases the Court seems more confident about determining substantive 
compliance of Community legislation with the principle of subsidiarity. This has coincided 
with the establishment of the Amsterdam Protocol on Subsidiarity. The Protocol has been 
particularly valuable as regards Article 253 EC that constitutes the most problematic aspect 
of  the  Court’s  jurisprudence  on  procedural  subsidiarity.  Paragraph  9  of  the  Protocol 
summarises the Commission’s responsibilities and obliges it to give reasons for all of its 
proposals  with  reference  to  the principle  of subsidiarity  and  to  clarify  any  financing  of
90 Ibid
91 See Shaw, J., and Wiener, A., “The Paradox of the European Polity”, (1999) 10/99 Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Papers, NYU.
92 Case C-188/95 Fantask A/S v. Industriministeriet (Erhvervsministeriet) [1997] ECR 1-6783
238action from the Community budget. This requirement of subsidiarity reasoning, very much 
like  the  general  reasoning  requirement  in  Article  253  EC,  as  invoked  in  Germany  v 
Parliament and Council is important to enhancing the legitimacy of Community legislative 
Institutions. It is intended to compel them to reflect about whether Community action on a 
certain  matter is  suitable and to oblige  them  to  speak coherently about the  way and the
reason  they have  arrived  at  a given  decision.  Looking  at the British American  Tobacco
93 case  , it appears that the Court is also worried about its legitimacy that depends upon the 
quality of its legal reasoning. This however does not imply a subsidiarity-friendly approach. 
In the given case it ruled that Directive 2001/37/EC, the objective of which was to eliminate 
barriers  raised  by  the  differences  between  national  laws,  was  not  invalid  by  reason  of 
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity. The Court looked closely at the objective of the 
Directive and asked whether the same result could be achieved by the Member States acting 
individually to eliminate barriers to trade in tobacco products. The Directive concerned the 
elimination of barriers to the free movement of goods and satisfied the proportionality test 
(i.e. that the action did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve the objective pursued). 
Thus the Court ruled that the internal market objective of the Directive called for action at 
Community level  in  accordance with  Article 95  EC  and no violation of subsidiarity was 
present.
Similarly in the Biotech Directive Case94 the Council and the Parliament considered 
the  inadequacy  of  action  at  national  level  in  the  field  of  the  legal  protection  of 
biotechnological inventions and recognised the necessity of harmonising certain principles 
through Directive 98/44 EC. The objective of the Directive, challenged by the Netherlands,
93 Case C-491/01 R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco  [2003]  1 CMLR 14
94 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR 1-7079
239was  to  ensure  the  smooth  operation  of the  internal  market  by  preventing  /  eliminating 
differences  between  the  domestic  legislation  of  Member  States  in  the  protection  of 
biotechnological inventions. This according to the Court “could not be achieved by action 
taken by the Member States alone.”95 The Court thus held that “given the scale and effects 
of  the  proposed  action,  the  objective  in  question  could  be  better  achieved  by  the 
Community.” Advocate General Jacob emphasised that “it is clear from the case-law of the 
Court that in  such  circumstances  it is  not necessary  for the  legislation  to make  express 
reference to the principle of subsidiarity.”96 This implies that subsidiarity is relevant insofar 
as  a  directive  is  under  consideration.  There,  according  to  the  Amsterdam  Protocol  on 
Subsidiarity  the  reasons  for  the  proposed  act  must  be  explained  by  the  Community’s 
legislative. It seems that the Court is therefore only concerned with the quality of its legal 
reasoning fearing  that  a pro-subsidiarity judgment might  go  against the  development  of 
Community competences and, most importantly, substitute the Council’s discretion for its 
own wishes.
Nonetheless,  as  with  attributed  powers,  it  is  more  likely  that  subsidiarity  will 
influence the interpretation of the scope / content of Community legislation rather than be a 
basis for its validity or invalidity. In AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy 97 a Finnish court referred 
questions to the Court concerning the qualification of leftover rock and sand from mining 
operations  as  being  waste  within  the  meaning  of  Article  1(a)  of  the  Waste  Directive 
75/442/EEC, or a by-product which would fall outside the scope of the Directive. The Court 
held that the area did fall within the Community’s exclusive competence and it took action
95 ibid at paragraph 32
96  Case  C-377/98,  Opinion  of Mr  Advocate  General  Jacobs  delivered  on  14  June  2001,  [2001]  ECR I- 
07079
97 Case C-l 14/01 AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy (Judgment of 11 September 2003) ECR 1-08725
240in accordance to  Article 5  EC  (i.e.  the principle of subsidiarity)  as  the objectives of the 
proposed  action  could  be  better  achieved  by  the  Community  than  the  Member  States. 
However it added that the Community legislature considered it appropriate, while adopting 
Directive 91/156, that until specific Community rules were adopted on the management of 
certain  categories  of  waste,  Member  States  could  ensure  that  management  outside  the 
framework of Directive 75/442 on the basis  of national  legislation  as  far as  the level  of 
protection of environment was at least equivalent to that aimed by the Directive. In this case 
the  subsidiarity  principle  has  been  transformed  into  something  more  than  an  objective 
criterion for determining when Community action on an issue can be justified and adopted 
by the Community’s legislative process.
The Court has on the one hand interpreted Community’s competences widely but 
has never annulled a Community legislative measure due to lack of competence. It has only 
gone as far as annulling Community measures on the basis of an incorrect legal basis, which 
does not imply that the Community lacked the competence to legislate in the first place. 
However, as the Community has no formal catalogue of competences everything depends 
on  individual  legal  bases  contained  within  the  Treaty  itself98.  In  the  German  Tobacco 
Case99 the Court looked at Article 5 EC pointing to the fact that Community’s powers are 
restricted to those conferred by the Treaty. It concluded that the EC legislature had gone 
beyond those limits by regulating tobacco advertising when in fact the case involved no real 
obstacle  to  free  movement  Therefore,  Community  competence has  limits  and the  Court 
upholds  those  limits,  creating  thereby  a  “stable  nucleus  of Community’s  competences”,
98 The importance of the correct legal basis for Community legislation was demonstrated in Case C-300/89 
Commission v Council (The Titanium Dioxide Case) [1991] ECR 1-2867. The Court held that Article  100a 
was the proper legal basis and annulled the directive adopted on the basis of Article 130s.
99 See Chapter 4, particularly the discussion on Case C- 376/98 Tobacco Advertising [2000] ECR 1-8419
241which in itself was important in the constitutionalisation of the TreatnylOO and the drafting 
of competences within the EU Constitutional Treaty.
Conclusion
The Court, through its Treaty interpretation, confirms that Community Institutions 
cannot  deal  with  all  aspects  from  law-making  to  implementation  and  enforcement  of 
Community measures. The division of competences between the Community vis-a-vis the 
Member States is (and remains in the EU Constitutional Treaty) vertical with multiple levels 
reflecting the diverse phases of the regulatory process.  In  such  a system the principle of 
subsidiarity  shall  function,  in  its material  form,  as  a political  guideline.  As  such  it will 
constitute for the Community’s legislature a binding commitment for not going beyond what 
is necessary.
In the EU Constitutional Treaty, national parliaments will ensure a more rewarding 
form  of  control  applicable  to  the  Union’s  competence-challenges  in  the  adoption  of  a 
particular measure. Through the early warning system, national parliaments would be able 
to consider a draft from the angle of subsidiarity from the starting point of the legislative 
process. Their role will therefore be vital to the general application of material subsidiarity 
and finally to the policing of the flexibility provision of Article 308 EC (Article 1-18 in the 
EU Constitutional Treaty). Yet certain commentators might feel that European leaders have 
over-estimated  what  the  early  warning  system  can  do  for  the  healthy  delimitation  of 
competences.  Once  a  national  parliament  has  raised  a  subsidiarity  ‘red  flag’,  the 
Commission  would  be  required  to justify  it.  Once  the  Commission  has  responded,  the 
proposal shall continue through the legislative process unless the Commission withdraws it.
100 See Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339
242National parliaments are not to become co-legislators under the new system. Instead their 
role would remain “essentially advisory”101.
On the other hand as Bausili102 suggests “subsidiarity judgements...go beyond legal 
base considerations,  in fact they do not refer to the existence of competence, but entail a 
substantial political judgement in the adequacy of any level to attain more efficiently and 
democratically whatever objectives pursued.” The Court needs to play a more active role by 
employing  procedural  subsidiarity  as  a  monitoring  device  for  more  transparency  in  the 
Union.  This  is  particularly  significant  for  three  reasons:  First,  because  even  after  the 
potential ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty, the ex post monitoring of the principle 
of subsidiarity  will  still remain  subject to judicial review by the Court.  Second, because 
most legislative proposals, scrutinised by the national parliaments after the ratification of the 
EU Constitutional Treaty, do not normally create competence problems. Third, because the 
wording  of  subsidiarity  in  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  [Article  I-11  (3)]  leaves  EU 
Institutions an ample margin of discretion.
101 Davies, G., “The Post-Laeken Division of Competences”, (2003) 28 (5) European Law Review 686-698
102  Bausili,  A.V.,  “Rethinking  the  Methods  of Dividing  and  Exercising  Powers  in  the  EU:  Reforming 
Subsidiarity and National Parliaments”, (2002), 9/02 Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, NYU
243CHAPTER 7
A DIFFERENT EXERCISE OF COMPETENCES:
THE CASE OF ENHANCED CO-OPERATION & CORE EUROPE 
Introduction
Enhanced  cooperation  was  introduced in  1997  by  the  Treaty of Amsterdam  that 
came into force in May 1999. It constitutes a flexible mechanism to accommodate diversity 
when certain Member States are unwilling or unable to participate in the Union’s policy 
developments. Following the amendments introduced by the Treaty of Nice (2000), a group 
of  no  less  than  eight  Member  States  may  use  the  Treaty  framework  to  develop  their 
cooperation  in  policy  areas  under  the  competence  of  the  European  Union.  Enhanced 
cooperation  was  addressed  during the Amsterdam negotiations  as  a practical  solution  to 
advance efficient decision-making in an almost twice enlarged Union with substantial socio­
economic diversity. Flexibility, as a method of policy making, has become a trend among 
the Member States of the Union since the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference1 . However, it 
is the number of participants / policy makers and the application within the different sectors 
of Union competence that might create tension between centralist and decentralist views.
The  option  of enhanced cooperation  appears  both  in  the  EC  Treaty  and the  EU 
Treaty2  and most recently in the Convention’s EU Constitutional Treaty that introduces a
1   Curtin, D.  “The shaping of a European constitution and the  1996 IGC:  ‘flexibility’  as a key paradigm?” 
(1995), 50(1) Aussenwirtschaft 237-256.
2 EC Treaty: Articles  11- Procedure for Establishing Enhanced Cooperation;  11a -  Susequent Participation 
of a  Member  State.  EU  Treaty:  Articles  27a -  27e Enhanced  Cooperation  in  the  Area  of the  Common 
Foreign and  Security Policy (CFSP); 40 -  Enhanced Cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA); 40a -  Procedure for Establishing Enhanced Cooperation (JHA); 40b -  Subsequent Participation of a 
Member State (JHA); 43 -  General Principles of Enhanced Cooperation; 43a -  Principle of last resort; 43b
243broader  European  Union.  Particularly  the  European  Convention  has  agreed  to  a  major 
extension of its scope to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), although its area of 
application  still  excludes  sectors  of exclusive EU competence.  This  chapter will  analyse 
enhanced cooperation with regard to the first supranational (EC) pillar and subsequently will 
consider the  reforms  of the  EU Constitutional  Treaty,  where  the pillar  structures  would 
cease to exist and the EC would no longer constitute a separate legal entity.  It will then 
examine  the  implications  of enhanced cooperation  upon  wider political  debates  about  a 
‘core  Europe’  and  its  impact  upon  the  vertical  relationship  of competence  between  the 
Union and the Member States. A number of questions stand:  Does enhanced cooperation 
signals a potential  attack upon the supranational structure of the Community by a core of 
Member States? Is enhanced cooperation synonymous with a ‘core Europe’, operating under 
the guise of European Union?
A.  EVOLUTION OF ENHANCED COOPERATION
From a competence perspective, enhanced cooperation could be characterised as the 
child of the crisis of the constitutional foundations of the Community. As Duff points out, 
“designed to prevent fragmentation of policy within the Union between disparate or even 
competing  groups  of Member States, it was necessary  to insist on  the use of the  single 
institutional  framework  of the Union.”3   From the beginning  of the European Economic 
Community in  1957 it was established that all Member States are equal partners having the 
same rights and obligations. This partnership was functional in a Community of six Member
-   Principle  of Openess;  44  -   Decision-making  Under  Enhanced  Cooperation;  44a -   Cost  of Enhanced 
Cooperation; 45 -  Consistency with EU Policies.
3 Duff,  A.,  “Do We Really Need Enhanced Cooperation”, Contribution 336 to the European Convention, 
May 22, 2003,[CONV 759/03],
244States. However, gradual enlargement of the Community multiplied the disparities between 
the old and new Member States to engage collectively in all EEC policy areas. Hence, an 
agreement whereby a new system would not impose the same obligations to all Member 
States became essential. The question is whether this realisation, especially at this point of 
integration, creates a challenge to the Community’s stereotypic picture where  wonderful 
harmony arises from joining together the seemingly unconnected. ”4 Any disturbance of this 
harmony would have an effect upon the unity of actors taking initiatives in the exercise of 
the Union’s competences.
Surely,  it  is  difficult  to prove  that  the  exercise  of enhanced  cooperation  would 
threaten  the  Union’s  harmony or unity for two reasons.  First,  enhanced cooperation  has 
never been used in practice. Second, cooperative models have operated in the past within the 
boundaries of the Union. The first attempt to introduce a relevant cooperative model was 
with the Exchange Rate Mechanism, established in 1979. This kind of accommodation was 
aimed to address the British unwillingness to join a new monetary system. Apart from this 
instant, the history of European integration is full of occasions where certain Member States 
unearth ways to proceed faster on a given policy area when their neighbours are reluctant or 
unprepared to  do  so.  Examples can be drawn from the Social  Chapter of the Maastricht 
Treaty5,  where  again the UK decided to opt out and the Schengen  Agreement  (1995) in 
relation to border controls, where the UK and Ireland agreed to maintain their own internal 
border checks6. The introduction of the common currency (Euro) in 1999 also constitutes a 
recent example of such an accommodation, although it represents a substantially different
4  Quote  by  Heraclitus  (540 BC  -  480 BC).  See  Scoon,  R.,  “Greek Philosophy  Before Plato”,  Princeton 
University Press (1928)
5 See Barnard C., “EC Employment Law”, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press (2000), Chapter 1
6 Wiener, A., “Forging Flexibility -  the British ‘No’ to Schengen”, (2000) 00/1 Arena Working Paper, Oslo
245case of flexibility. There, the UK - along with Denmark and Sweden - decided to opt out 
from the European Monetary Union (EMU). However, the EMU complies with significant 
Community  principles  and  its  substantive regulations  have been  agreed  by  all  Member 
States, both EMU members and non-members.
Following  from these developments,  there was  a growing  anticipation  within the 
Community that any initiative for a partnership arrangement should rather occur within the 
structures and Institutions of the Community rather than outside them. This means that any 
agreement  involving  a  certain  amount  of  Member  States  would  come  under  the 
Community’s parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. One should note that before the Treaty of 
Amsterdam  integration  of the Schengen acquis1,  internal  border controls  were primarily 
based on intergovernmental arrangements. Schengenland, as it is often referred8, was mainly 
established due to the difficulty that Member States met in reaching a collective agreement 
on internal border controls to monitor immigration and combat international and organised 
crime. As a result, France, Germany and the Benelux countries decided in  1985 to create 
between  them  a territory  without internal  borders.  A  protocol  annexed  to  the  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam  later  incorporated  the  achievements  of  the  Schengen  Agreement  into  the 
Community framework. This is the first institutionalised example of enhanced cooperation 
occurring between thirteen Member States and operating under the legal framework of the 
Union to attain the Treaty objective of free movement of persons.
Subsequent to the Amsterdam IGC (1997) and whilst ratification of the Treaty was 
proceeding, the Community focused on European enlargement and the third and last phase 
of EMU.  As  already  said, the  occurrence  of the  single currency  can  be  mentioned  as  a
7 Official Journal L 176 of 10.07.1999
8 Kostakopoulou, D., “Is there an Alternative to ‘Schengenland’?, (1998) 46 (5) Political Studies 886-902.
246persuasive  example  of the  efficient  application  of flexibility  mechanisms  (although  the 
EMU and its substantive rules were negotiated in advance by all Member States). Measuring 
the Union’s capacity to act in an enlarged Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) laid down 
the general rules and conditions for enhanced cooperation. It created the formal possibility 
of  a  certain  number  of  Member  States  establishing  enhanced  cooperation  between 
themselves on policy areas covered by the Treaties, using the institutions and procedures of 
the European Union. France and Germany were among the first to introduce cooperation 
renforcee (enhanced cooperation) into the political agenda of the IGC9. There, two kinds of 
questions emerged:  First as regards the types of EC policies that would be included and 
second  as  to  whether  a  Member  State  alone  could  exercise  control  or block  enhanced 
cooperation  through  a veto in the Council. In reply to the first question,  Member States 
decided that enhanced cooperation should be restricted only to areas covered by the Treaty. 
As to the  second question,  a Member State could rely on the procedural  and substantial 
safeguards of the Treaty to reduce any threat of enhanced cooperation to Community policy 
making.
The rules governing enhanced cooperation were revisited in the discussions that led 
to the Treaty of Nice  (2000),  which set out the rules for accommodating diversity in an 
enlarged Union.  The new provisions introduced at Nice were aimed at ensuring that any 
initiative  for  enhanced  cooperation  would  be  open  to  all  Member  States,  dismissing 
therefore any hypotheses about a two-tier Europe. It is visible that the Treaty drafters aimed 
to disassociate the occasional use of enhanced cooperation with that of a two-tier Europe. 
The difference between the two lies in the maintenance of the relevant policy objectives. In
9 Carvajal, J.M.A, “Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Some Critical Remarks”,  (1998) 
13  Harvard  Jean  Monnet  Working  Papers,  NYU;  Gaja,  G.,  “How  flexible  is  flexibility  under  the 
Amsterdam Treaty?”, (1998), 35 (4) Common Market Law Review 855-70.
247the former case (enhanced cooperation), these objectives would ultimately be reached by all 
Member States  at  some moment in time. In the latter case (two-tier Europe), there is no 
safeguard that all Member States are guaranteed full participation in the relevant decisions 
taken by the leading group of states. There is also the possibility, as we witness later, that the 
decision process of such a model, might occur outside the acquis communautaire, making it 
therefore impracticable for a state to join in due course. Hence, the Treaty of Nice indicated 
that any initiative for enhanced cooperation must involve at least eight Member States whilst 
being open to accept others to join at a later stage. The initiative for action by enhanced 
cooperation must respect the Treaties and the institutional architecture of the Union as well 
as promote the objectives and interests of the Union without being exclusive or divisive. 
Finally, such action cannot take place within the Union’s exclusive competence and, where 
it can be authorised, it must be established that its objectives cannot be attained within a 
reasonable period through the existing Treaty provisions.
The general conditions set down in Article 43-45 EU, apply to enhanced cooperation 
established in the areas covered by the EC Treaty. The EC Treaty provides in Articles  11 
and  11a EC respectively the precise procedures to this pillar for the establishment of and 
subsequent  participation  of  Member  States  in  enhanced  cooperation.  Member  States 
intending to establish enhanced cooperation within the EC Treaty framework shall address a 
request to the Commission, which may submit a proposal to the Council. The Council shall 
grant authorisation, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consultation  with  the European Parliament.  Moreover,  a Council member may  also 
request  that  the  issue  be  referred  to  the  European  Council  of  Heads  of  State  and 
Government. Then, the matter is referred back to the Council of Ministers, which may act
248by qualified majority since the right of veto granted to the Member States by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam has been abolished by the Treaty of Nice (2000). When enhanced cooperation 
relates to an area covered by the co-decision procedure under Article 251 EC, the assent of 
the  European  Parliament  shall  be  required.  Finally,  according  to  Article  11a  EC,  the 
Commission shall decide upon the request of a Member State its subsequent participation in 
enhanced  cooperation.  The Commission’s  contribution  within  the  framework  of the EC 
Treaty is more significant compared to the intergovernmental pillars of CFSP and JHA.
As  already mentioned,  since its  adoption by the Amsterdam Treaty (May  1999), 
there has not been a single instance where the enhanced cooperation mechanism has been 
put  into  use.  Shaw  contends  that  this  owes  to  the  restrictiveness  of the  provisions  of 
enhanced cooperation as drafted in the Treaty of Amsterdam: “one point of clear agreement 
can be found in the post-Amsterdam commentary: the conclusion that the provisions were 
so restrictively drafted that it was difficult to conceive of the circumstances in which they 
could be used.”1 0  For this reason, one can only hypothesise about the impact of the policies 
passed through  this kind of action. Even so,  shortly after its establishment,  in June  1999 
there  was  an  informal  proposal  to use  the enhanced  cooperation  provision  according to 
Article  11  EC  in  relation  to  the European  Company  Statute1 1.  The  proposal  involved  a 
directive  on  the  regulation  of workers’  participation  in  European  Companies.  The  draft 
directive was agreed by fourteen Member States with only Spain being reluctant to adopt it 
due to its non-compliance with the conditions of Article 43 EU and Article  11  EC. Spain 
argued that the adoption of the European Company Statute by enhanced cooperation would
10 Shaw, J., “Enhancing Cooperation After Nice: Will the Treaty do the Trick?” in Andenas, M. and Usher, 
J., (eds.), “The Treaty of Nice and the EU Constitution”, Oxford, Hart Publishing, (2002).
1 1   See  Areilza,  J.M.,  “The  Reform  of Enhanced  Cooperation  Rules:  Towards  Less  Flexibility?”  (2001) 
2001/01  Francisco  Lucas  Pires  Working  Papers  Series  on  European  Constitutionalism,  Faculdade  de 
Direito da Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
249negatively  affect  the  internal  market,  creating  therefore  a  barrier  to  the  fundamental 
economic freedom of establishment.
The Spanish argument was based in the fact that due to the internal market nature of 
the objective,  the proposed directive had to be passed by unanimity under the flexibility 
provision  of  Article  308  EC.  Had  the  proposed  directive  been  passed  by  enhanced 
cooperation, Spain would have remained outside the partnership. The fact that it had to be 
adopted by the unanimity requirement of Article 308 EC would protect its interests on trans- 
European  mergers  and  stop  the  Community  from  adopting  it.  The  Treaty  of Nice  has 
introduced a new safeguard / condition that very much echoes the Spanish claim in relation 
to  the  European  Company  Statute.  Enhanced  cooperation  must  therefore  contribute  to 
enhancing the process of integration within the Union and must not undermine the single 
market or the  Union’s  economic  and social  cohesion.  Furthermore,  it must not create  a 
barrier  to  or  discrimination  in  trade  between  the  Member  States  and  must  not  distort 
competition between them. What is more, Spain could have argued that the adoption of the 
European  Company  Statute  concerns  Community  competence  to  close  international 
agreements.  The Community has external competence in areas where the EC Treaty has 
made explicit reference to the competence of the Community to negotiate an international 
agreement in a given area. However it can also have external competence in cases where the 
Treaty  is  silent.  There  the  Community  is  externally  competent  as  far  as  it  has  been 
competent  to  act  internally1 2.  In  the  field  of  external  competence  the  most  significant 
exclusive competence is Common Commercial Policy (CCP) based on Article  113 EC. If
12 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263
250we examine the possibility that the adoption of the European Company Statute constitutes 
an exclusive Community competence, then enhanced cooperation does not operate.
Vetoing  the  launching  of the cooperation  that Article  11  (2) EC  grants  to every 
Member State is beneficial on an individual level but in the Union of twenty-five Member 
States it implies a freezing of the integration momentum. What is more, under the Article 
43a EU introduced by the Nice Treaty, enhanced cooperation may be undertaken only as a 
last resort, when the Council has affirmed that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be 
attained  within  a reasonable  period by  applying  the  relevant provisions  of the  Treaties. 
However, according to Article 43b enhanced cooperation shall be open to all Member States 
when it is established  at any given time insofar as  the Member State complies  with the 
policies  adopted.  Additionally,  Article  44  EU  specifies  that  acts  adopted  within  the 
framework of enhanced cooperation shall not form part of the Union acquis. Instead those 
acts shall be applied by the participating Member States and their implementation shall not 
be impeded by the other Member States. Both points emphasised in Article 43b and 44 EU 
have  been  reaffirmed  by  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  in  Article  1-44  (l)1 3 and  (4)1 4  
respectively. However, Article III-420 (1) states that with reference to enhanced cooperation 
outside the scope of the CFSP, the Commission must confirm whether the Member State
13 Member States which wish to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves within the framework 
of the Union's non-exclusive competences may make use of its institutions and exercise those competences 
by  applying  the  relevant provisions of the Constitution,  subject  to the limits  and  in  accordance  with the 
procedures laid down in this Article and in Articles III-416 to III-423.
Enhanced cooperation shall aim to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its 
integration process.  Such cooperation shall be open at any time to all Member States, in accordance with 
Article III-418.
14 Acts  adopted  in the framework of enhanced cooperation  shall  bind only participating  Member States. 
They shall not be regarded as part of the acquis which has to be accepted by candidate States for accession 
to the Union
251meets the conditions for participation or needs to adopt transitional measures1 5 . In case the 
Commission  refuses  twice the  subsequent participation  of a Member  State to  enhanced 
cooperation,  the  latter may appeal to the  Council  against that decision in accordance to 
Article III-420 (1).
1. Launching Enhanced Cooperation in the EU Constitutional Treaty
As  to  the  conditions  for  launching  enhanced  cooperation,  the  EU Constitutional 
Treaty introduces three important changes. First, according to Article 1-44 (2)1 6 , enhanced 
cooperation in the EU Constitutional Treaty involves the participation of a third of Member 
States.  This  would  raise  the  number  of  the  countries  required  to  launch  enhanced 
cooperation from eight (Treaty of Nice) to at least nine in the current Union of twenty-five. 
In a continuously enlarged Union, enhanced cooperation would be made difficult to initiate. 
Under  the  same  provision,  authorisation  to  proceed  with  enhanced  cooperation  will  be 
granted  by the  Council  acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the  consent of the 
European Parliament, on a proposal from the Commission. Second, the complex text of the 
Treaty of Nice has been improved so that there would be no need for a particular proposal 
for the Union as a whole to be voted by the Council. Instead the Council would focus on the 
general  objectives  of the proposed  policy  of enhanced  cooperation.  Third,  the  scope  of 
enhanced  cooperation would be extended in the area of CFSP, overcoming therefore the
15 Any Member State which wishes to participate in enhanced cooperation in progress in one of the areas 
referred  to  in  Article. III-419  (1)  shall  notify  its  intention  to  the  Council  and  the  Commission.  The 
Commission shall, within four months of the date of receipt of the notification, confirm the participation of 
the Member State concerned.  It shall note where necessary that the conditions of participation have been 
fulfilled  and  shall  adopt  any transitional  measures  necessary  with  regard to the  application  of the  acts 
already adopted within the framewbrk of enhanced cooperation.
16 The European decision authorising enhanced cooperation shall be adopted by the Council as a last resort, 
when  it  has  established  that the  objectives  of such  cooperation  cannot  be  attained  within  a  reasonable 
period by the Union as a whole, and provided that at least one third of the Member States participate in it. 
The Council shall act in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article III-419.
252current limitation of Article 27b EU. The CFSP would require the opinions of the Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Commission  whilst  the  European  Parliament’s  role  would 
remain informative.  The limited roles of the Commission and the Parliament would thus 
resemble current Article 27c EU. Non-participant Member States in enhanced cooperation 
will take part in Council meetings even though they will not be involved in the decision­
making process.
With  the  adoption  of the EU  Constitutional  Treaty,  enhanced  cooperation  would 
cover  a  larger  part  of the  Union’s  policy  areas.  Article  1-40  of  the  draft  Constitution 
envisages  a form  of enhanced cooperation  with  reference  to  the  Common  Security  and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). This again goes against Article 27b EU, which states that enhanced 
cooperation under Title V must not relate to matters having military or defence character. 
For  some  commentators,  this  would  automatically  have  a  substantial  impact  upon 
supranational competence. The extension of the scope of enhanced cooperation to all aspects 
of CFSP  could  create  disparity,  especially  in  Member  States  that  wish  to  maintain  the 
European Council unanimity restraint. For this reason certain Members of the Convention 
suggested  that  enhanced  cooperation  should  involve  as  many  Member  States  as  it  is 
possible.  For  instance,  a  contribution  for  amendment  of  Article  1-43  of  the  draft 
Constitutional  Treaty  (now  Article  1-44)  by  Mr.  Andriukaitis17;  Ms  Kalniete1 8   and  Mr 
Kohout1 9 ,  to name but a few Members of the Convention, proposed that authorisation to 
proceed  with  enhanced cooperation  should  at least require  the  agreement of half of the
17 Andriukaitis, V.P., “Suggestion for Amendment of Article 1-43”, See European Convention Web-Site at 
http://european-convention.eu.int/amendments.asp?content=32999&lang=EN
18  Kalniete,  S.,  “Suggestion  for  Amendment  of Article  1-43”,  See  European  Convention  Web-Site  (as 
above)
19 Kohout, J., “Suggestion for Amendment of Article 1-43”, See European Convention Web-Site (as above)
253Member States. This is to resemble the Nice - eight out of fifteen Member States - position 
that can be interpreted as half of majority of Member States. Ms Klaniete explains that “the 
threshold of the Member States initiating enhanced cooperation should be made higher to 
avoid fragmentation of the Union and unnecessary competence of different structures of the 
Member States with specific needs and objectives.” From the above contributions one may 
conclude that the participation of at least half of the Member States in EU policy making via 
enhanced cooperation  would potentially enhance partnership between the Member States 
and persuade their non-participant neighbours to join early a policy initiative.
According  to  the  author,  the  flexibility  provided by  the  new  rules  on  enhanced 
cooperation is not intended for and cannot substitute institutional reform as an immediate 
way of setting constraints on traditional Community action. In the short term, the new rules 
on enhanced cooperation may fulfil their immediate goal: that is to accommodate the present 
political demands for a constitutionalised -  quasi federal Union. Thus, enhanced cooperation 
is an efficient tool for the promotion of the deepening of European integration. However, 
one needs  to be cautious at the same time about the Union’s unity. The extent to which 
European integration can proceed by rules that are made by and apply to only eight out of 
the twenty-five Member States brings competence issues to the fore. Enhanced cooperation 
allows Member States to deviate from the rule of majority voting by resorting to a selective 
partnership arrangement. In the present situation, the existence of this alternative mechanism 
implies that national governments, who have lost a great deal of votes in the Council, have 
more bargaining power in their negotiations with the Commission and the non-participant 
Member States. Not only that, but even where unanimity applies in a policy area, enhanced 
cooperation  assists  a majority  of willing Member  States  to proceed  without the  need to
254satisfy the  strict unanimity requirements  of the Treaty.  From  that perspective,  it can be 
suggested  that  flexible  enhanced  cooperation  hides  certain  constitutional  dangers.  For 
instance, one could argue= that its abuse may undermine the principle of solidarity in the 
decision-making by qualified majority voting in the Council20.
Most important, for the scope of this thesis, enhanced cooperation may operate as a 
method of governance and ultimately as tool for the redistribution of competence inside the 
Union. For this reason it would be desirable if the Council and the Commission ensured and 
monitored the consistency of activities undertaken in the context of enhanced cooperation 
and the uniformity of such activities with the policies of the Union, and cooperated to that 
end. Furthermore, enhanced cooperation as a measure of last resort could be considered by 
the EU Institutions as a principle of EU law subject to judicial interpretation. Article 1-44 (2) 
of the draft Constitution omits this kind of assessment and renders the issue of ‘last resort 
settlement’ as a mere Council decision. This could possibly transform enhanced cooperation 
to a governance method rather than a last resort measure applicable when the function of 
other relevant provisions  of the EU Constitutional  Treaty falls  short.  Hence,  despite the 
importance  of  enhanced  cooperation  in  a  Union  of  twenty-five  Member  States,  the 
procedure should remain  a safety valve and not a general method of governance.  In this 
manner coherence and unity of EU action could be safeguarded.
The material limitation of collective supranational action may suggest the advance 
not of a multi-speed but of a two-tier Europe with a hard-core operating beyond the control 
of the majority of Member States. This, of course, is different to the EMU system, where all
20 De la Serre, F., and Wallace, H., “Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union: Placebo 
rather than panacea?” (1997) 2 Notre Europe Research and Policy Paper
255Member States agreed to the possibility of a two-tier Europe in this area21. A Europe led by 
a  pioneer  group  would  potentially  arrive  at  a  schism  between  Member  States,  always 
depending  upon  their level  of contribution  -  competence in relation to the inner core of 
integration. This is a rational concern, considering that decisions taken by that inner core 
would  in  due  course  have  to  be  acknowledged  by  those  Member  States  who  intend to 
participate in the given policy area. Such a reality would confirm that any aid in the building 
of an enlarged Community is rather disputed than facilitated by enhanced cooperation. The 
most cautious would even suggest that the implementation of enhanced cooperation and its 
position  in the  EU  Constitutional Treaty,  threatens  the unity of the EU as  a legal  order 
shaped  by  the  teleological  interpretations  of  the  Court.  The  policies  within  enhanced 
cooperation do not constitute a part of the acquis communautaire. Thus, they do not create 
legal obligations to the Union as a whole. The most critical commentators would witness the 
parallel  establishment  of legal  policies,  binding  only  to  those  Member  States  that  have 
initiated  them.  In  this  climate,  the  core-states  to  enhanced  cooperation  would  amplify 
Community policies creating therefore a selective supranational competence block, a ‘core 
Europe’.  There  according  to  Chirac  speaking  in  2000  about  the  French  Presidency's 
priorities22, the facilitation of the use of enhanced cooperation mechanism would assist in 
“the creation of a group of countries which would be the front-runners of those which want 
to take Europe forward...”
21 See Regulation 974/98  ‘on the introduction of the new currency’ (3 May 1998) A clause at the end of the 
regulation states that the norm applies in all Member States, except Protocols  11  and  12 and Article  109K 
EC (now Article  122 EC). This sets out the criteria for participating in the Euro-zone and the possibility of 
less than fifteen Member States taking part in this policy.
22 Chirac, J., “Annual Conference of French Ambassadors”, (August 28, 2000), Paris
256B.  FISCHER’S CORE EUROPE
In the present enlarged Union, where it is difficult to reach unanimously a common 
position in a given policy area, enhanced cooperation emerges as a tool of flexibility and 
integration between  a majority group of Member States desiring to establish cooperation 
between themselves. German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has more than once argued 
that enhanced cooperation is the logical consequence of European enlargement. According 
to the Minister, standing still in this area would mean stepping backwards23. Most recently, 
he proposed the development of enhanced cooperation and closer partnership in the fields of 
“security,  politics,  the  economy,  law,  culture  and civil  society”24.  However,  Fischer has 
always been criticised in relation to his classic Humboldt speech given by in 2000. Apart 
from being relatively recent and therefore reflecting current questions of EU enlargement 
and  constitutionalisation,  it  represents  for  commentators  the  opening  act  of  the 
unconventional constitutional debate in Europe. Its proximate timing to the conclusions of 
the Heads of State and Governments at Nice, in conjunction with its morale pointing to a 
long-term vision of Europe, have functioned as evidence that Fischer’s speech constituted a 
point  of  inspiration  to  the  formal  constitutional  debate  which  matured  initially  at 
Community, and later at Convention level.
In  his  Humboldt  speech,  the  Minister  talked  of  ‘reinforced  cooperation’  as  an 
essential first step for furthering European integration. Thus, closer or enhanced cooperation 
could be employed so that certain Member States of the Union could engage and progress in
23  Fischer,  J.,  “Vom  Staatenverbund  zur  Federation  -  Gedanken  iiber  die  Finalitat  der  europaischen 
Integration“(trans. “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration”), 
Berlin, Humboldt Universitaet,  (May 2000).  English  version  with commentary  in Joerges,  C.,  Meny,  Y., 
and Weiler, J.H.H. (eds) “What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity?”, EUI, Florence (2000)
24 Fischer J., “40th Munich Conference on Security Policy”, (February 7, 2004), Munich
257sectors  like  environmental  protection,  the  fight  against  organised  crime,  common 
immigration and asylum policies as well as the area of CFSP. Fischer used the EMU and 
Schengen as archetypes of ‘reinforced cooperation’. In order to cast away any suspicion that 
his model of cooperation reflected either the end of European integration as we know it or 
the beginning of a two-tier Europe he emerged with a new term: the ‘centre of gravity’. The 
‘Fischer’  federalist  archetype,  also  common  as  a  neo-federalist model25,  encourages  the 
establishment of such  a  ‘centre of gravity’ made by two or three sophisticated countries 
occupied with pushing the integration momentum forward26.
The  most  common  feature  shared  among  this  ‘new’  school  of federalism  is  its 
deviation  from any form of unilateral intergovernmental  approach or classic cooperativist 
Communitarian  method.  Thus,  even  though  at  first  glance  one  may  categorise  it  as 
supranationalist due to its bilateral approaches, Fischer’s vision represents a rather unique 
version of supranationalism. Its atypical nature owes a lot to the Nice political background 
under which  it  sprung  out,  which in  essence is not very different to  the current context 
regarding  the  ratification  of  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty.  Fischer’s  reference  to  the 
Schumann-Monnet rhetoric served to pardon his deviation from the old good methods of 
Communitarised  cooperativism.  Instead  he  proposed  that  the  imminence  of  European 
enlargement necessitates the completion of political integration in Europe via a deliberate -  
almost egoistical  -  political  act. The balance of sovereignty preserved in the cooperative 
regime between the Union organs and the Member States needs, according to Fischer, to be 
altered to give away precedence to the supranational entity - federation of Member States as
25  Scharpf,  F.,  “Joint-decision trap:  Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration”  (1988), 
Public Administration 239-268.
26 Konstadinides, T., “Now and Then: Fischer’s Core Europe in the Aftermath of the Collapse of December 
2003 Constitutional Talks”, (2004) 11 (1) Irish Journal of European Law
258opposed to the nation state. However, the formation of such a federation cannot emerge all 
of a sudden. It involves the establishment of a ‘centre of gravity' made out of a group of the 
most determined Member States who will push the integration momentum forward. If this 
‘centre ’ proves to be unrewarding within the EU framework, then it can always transform to 
an  ‘avant-garde ’ capable of surviving outside the EU altogether with its own institutions.2 7
Fischer  split  the  development  of  the  whole  course  of  cooperation  into  three 
distinctive stages. Firstly he demonstrated the necessity of the establishment of a  ‘core’. A 
small number of states  should,  according to Fischer,  operate in full cooperation within a 
range  of  areas  involving  environmental  protection,  common  immigration  and  asylum 
policies, the fight against organised crime, monetary union and other EU second (CFSP) and 
third  pillar  issues.  Second,  this  cooperation  would  presumably  grow  to  become  the 
renowned Gravitationskem (centre of gravity), an open-ended zone most possibly identified 
in  a  Franco-German  axis.  According  to  Fischer,  the  establishment  of  a  ‘centre’  would 
eventually turn out to be synonymous to the ‘core’  of the federation. The  ‘core’ of states, 
enhanced  by  a  European  Constitution,  would  set  the  federal  powers  and  foresee  their 
representation  as  a whole  through  the establishment of an institutional  framework either 
within or outside the EU Treaties. Those two groundwork stages would lead to the third and 
most important stage, where the  ‘core ’ would enjoy the fruits of its labour through the final 
establishment of the Europdischen Bundesstaat (European federation).
The problem of Minister Fischer’s federal model of integration is not so much its 
exclusivity  as  the  uncertainty  of its  commencement.  At the beginning  of his  speech,  he 
supported the idea that European enlargement makes EU political reform imminent, but then
27 Olsen, J.P., “How, Then, Does One Get There? An Institutionalist Response to Herr Fischer's Vision of a 
European Federation”, (2002), 00/22 Arena Working Paper, Oslo
259during its course, he declared that such a change should take place in ‘ten years’ time. One 
wonders what was his true intention here. Does the apparent inconsistency reflect the notion 
that European enlargement provides the dominant factor necessitating EU political reform? 
Is it more accurately a reflection of the Minister’s wish not so much that the political finality 
of European integration arises imminently, but rather that the establishment of a German 
federation  replica  within  or  outside  the  Union  is  realised?  Another  thing  that  Minister 
Fischer did not make explicit in his speech at Berlin was that his image of the  ‘core’ of 
states  as  members  of  the  federation  leaves  open  questions  regarding  the  status  of the 
periphery2 8  made by the outsider (existing small and new entrant) States that would not be 
competent to join the ‘open’ federation at once. It is difficult to think that the creation of a 
‘core Europe ’ albeit open in character will soften the hard-line stance taken by the French and 
Dutch public during the nervous constitutional referendums of May 29 and June 1, 2005 against the 
role of the Union and European integration29.
Moreover, although the Foreign Minister spoke grandly of a European Constitution, 
today  he  could  be  criticised  for  implying  the  establishment  of  a  mere  catalogue  of 
competences (Kompetenzkatalog) or quasi-constitution based upon a delineation of powers 
awarded  to  supra-national  authorities  and to national  and regional bodies.  This could be 
explained by Minister Fischer taking into account Germany’s interest at the time on a future 
division of competences between the EU, the Member States  and the Lander or regions. 
Even  so,  Minister Fischer  avoided the danger  of giving examples  of how  the proposed 
division of competences should occur within the federation. Neither was the effect of the
28  See  Zielonka,  J.,  “Enlargement  and  the  Finality  of European  Integration”  (2000)  7/00  Harvard  Jean 
Monnet Working Papers, NYU
29 See Foreign Policy  Centre,  Event Report:  “The French and Dutch Referendums:  Lessons for Britain”, 
The Foreign Press Association, London (June 9, 2005)
260Constitution upon subsidiarity illustrated in his speech, but merely hinted at in the legislative 
structure  of the  federation  consisting  of national  representatives,  possibly  an  additional 
subsidiarity body, next to the already existing Community institutional organs.
Minister Fischer’s speech was more elaborate about the institutional framework of 
the  federation  that  would  consequently  replace  the  present  institutional  triangle.  He 
proposed a two-chambered legislative, most likely consisting of the European Parliament 
operating  in  tandem  with  elected  national  Parliamentarians,  possibly  drawn  from  the 
Council  of Ministers.  This  proposal  almost  has  echoes  of intergovernmental  themes  of 
governance,  as  well  as  echoing the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty’s  Protocol  on  the Role  of 
National  Parliaments  in  the  EU  that  ideally  supports  the  monitoring  by  national 
representatives  of  the  Union’s  legislative  outcome.  At  this  juncture,  Minister  Fischer 
presented  supranational  and  intergovernmental  options  as  equivalent,  hinting  at  post­
federation preservation  of national  sovereignty.  As for the executive,  he insisted upon  a 
government for the federation whose role would most likely be played by the Commission, 
chaired by a directly elected President (although a politicised Commission does not reflect 
the  situation  in the draft Constitution,  where the Union’s executive role has almost been 
taken over by the increasingly competent European Council). This was reiterated in the joint 
declaration on dual EU Presidencies made by French President Jacques Chirac and German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder (January 14, 2003). The joint declaration constituted a Franco- 
German compromise, where each of the protagonists would work upon their core interests:
261France  on  its  role  as  a  global  power  and  Germany  on  its  purpose  as  the  promoter  of 
democratic legitimacy in Europe.3 0
C.  ENHANCED COOPERATION AND CORE EUROPE
Among  the  supporters  of  the  expansion  of  reinforced  cooperation  is  Giuliano 
Amato. He proposed in response to Fischer’s theses that “establishment of a central core of 
the European Union is undoubtedly necessary to prevent a reduction of the European Union 
to  a  mere  economic  area”31.  During  his  lecture  at  the  European  University  Institute  in 
Florence (2000)32,  he portrayed enhanced cooperation as one of the “channels that might 
lead us toward the political project of a return to Europe”. He proposed easier access to 
enhanced cooperation “between those countries ready to integrate in other new ways” but he 
was cautious about its use. He concluded by saying that enhanced cooperation “should act as 
a  magnet  for  further  integration  and  not  as  a  divisive  instrument  or  a  source  of 
hierarchisation in a two-speed Europe.” This is different to Fischer’s vision that goes beyond 
what  is  allowed  by  Article  43  EU.  Fischer  speaks  of  an  open  vanguard  that  would 
subsequently allow the rest of the Member States to catch up and join the ‘centre of gravity' 
as long as the latter has pushed the evolution dynamic far enough. This cannot be compared 
to the occasional EC Treaty Protocols that grant a partial exception to a Member State from 
a Union Policy (e.g. Protocol 25 about the UK and the EMU). In this case, the Protocol’s 
exception does not dismiss the security of common action.
30  “Franco-German  Declaration  on  dual  EU  Presidencies  -  A  seismic  shift  for  the  future  of Europe?” 
(15/01/2003), Paper by the European Policy Centre, Brussels.
31  See  Tohidipur,  T.,  “Expansion  of Closer  Cooperation  as  Contra-Indication  to  the  Idea  of European 
Integration:  A Critique of Joschka Fischer’s  Speech and Giuliano Amato’s Comment Thereon”  (2001) 2 
(14) German Law Journal
32  Amato,  G.,  “From  Nice  to  Europe”,  XXIInd  Jean  Monnet Lecture,  (November  20,  2000),  European 
University Institute, Florence
262Fischer’s  unique  version  of integration  necessitates  two  prior reforms.  First,  the 
improvement of the Union’s institutional  structures through  a complete reordering of the 
current institutional triangle. Second, the elevation of its democratic legitimacy through the 
establishment  of a  federal  constitution33.  In  the light of Europe’s  awkward choice  for a 
wholly inclusive but yet static supranational Union (as shaped by the classic Communitarian 
method) the flexible neo-federalist proposal appears to be an interesting alternative despite 
its  elitist  components.  Apart  from  Minister  Joshka  Fischer,  the  same  desire  was  also 
expressed in the Chirac - Schroder joint declaration on the future political leadership of the 
EU  on the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty.34 Seen as a catalyst for the influence of 
Germany upon France and a point of furthering the debate on the political finality of Europe 
(and not necessarily a motor of political integration), the Franco-German axis is symbolic of 
a strong proposal for a federalist centre of gravity35. In front of cold calculations of national 
interest, ultimately serving the relative preservation and influence of sovereign Member States in the 
Union during the negotiations and ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty, Fischer’s scenario 
could be furthered with the advent of ‘hard, core’ enhanced co-operation.36 As already mentioned, 
the effects of this principle, generated at Nice to take place among eight Member States, are to be 
decided by qualified majority. France and Germany, possibly with the backing of the UK, could
33 Lenaerts,  K.,  “Constitutionalism  and  the  Many  Faces  of Federalism”  (1990)  38  American  Journal  of 
Comparative Law 205-263.
34 The Elys6e Treaty was signed between the two countries on January 22, 1963 between General de Gaulle 
and Chancellor Adenauer. See The German Press and Information Office “Joint appeal by President Chirac 
of  France  and  Federal  Chancellor  Schroder  on  the  40th  anniversary  of  the  Elys6e  Treaty”,  Paris, 
(22.01.2003).
35 Grapin, J., “Franco-German Friendship:  An Indispensable Factor in European Stability”, Speech on the 
Occasion of the 40th Anniversary Celebration of the Elysde Treaty, German School, Washington (January 
22, 2003)
36  Philippart,  E.,  “A  New  Mechanism  for Enhanced  Cooperation  for  An  Enlarged  Union”,  (March  22, 
2003), Contribution to the Research and Policy Group ‘Notre Europe’, Paris.
263therefore activate that decision over the prospective economic policy for the Euro-countries; foreign 
policy and defence matters.
Yet,  the  weakness  of the  Franco-German  federalist  proposal  does  not  lie  in  the 
deviation from the intergovernmental, and the fairly motionless but inclusive supranational 
methods, but more in the fact that the proposal for a ‘centre of gravity’ or ‘ pioneer group’ is 
itself sufficient to encourage the maintenance of a semi-inclusive, virtually two-tier Europe. 
Despite  its  practicality,  such  a rationale would reduce  the  old  Communitarian  notion  of 
cooperation  to  a  privilege  enjoyed  only  by  those  acquainted  with  the  competence 
arrangements  of  the  vanguard.  These  conditions  may  further  create  a  split  between 
supranationalists, and bring to the fore a group of small states that abide with an inclusive 
supranational Union. In other words, an exclusive federalist model will most likely frustrate 
the idea that small Member States have shaped, as regards the meaning and progression of a 
European  supranational confederation. Moreover,  allowing a temporary breakaway of the 
most economically  advanced states from  their less  developed fellow  states is capable of 
turning European integration into a selective process. Federalists could obviously argue that 
political  finality can  be carried out more efficiently by  a flexible Franco-German  ‘core’ 
rather than a Union seriously occupied with the economic impairments of its newcomers. 
The neo-federalist stance can be translated as the embodiment of the belief that the end 
justifies the means even when, at least for a short term, the Franco-German axis will operate 
almost as  a counter-Union.  The question  is  still  whether Europe  desires that its political 
finality should occur at the expense or absence of the  ‘outer ring’  composed of medium, 
small and applicant states.
264The exclusivity of the proposal for a ‘core Europe \ albeit temporary, is sufficient to 
lift up the weaker and less demanding idea of Communitarian enhanced cooperation. Yet as 
the Communitarian approach has historically failed to lead to a settlement, since Member 
States tend to  identify more  with the concept of national  competence / sovereignty than 
European  integration,  the Franco-German  relationship can  emerge  as  a close  association 
based on the shared belief that there is something over and above the interests of the nation 
state37. But still, it is its elitist character that renders it not reflective of the European public 
conscience  as manifested in  the demos of the Member States38.  The establishment of an 
avant-garde that would drag speedily the rest of the Member and applicant States to the 
appealing Aristotelian telos of the EU may thus remain reduced to a last resort solution or 
more  possibly  to  an  additional  factor  of furthering  the  EU  debate  about  the  finality  of 
European  integration.  Besides,  according  to  Tohidipur  “closer  cooperation  was  once 
permitted, not as an equal instrument to joint activity, but as a ‘last resort’. The idea was not 
to create an avant garde of some states only wanting to satisfy their national interests within 
the European  Union  while leaving the rest  ‘outside’.  Common  development is still to be 
given the priority. Taking the Fischer proposal seriously means making a rule out of the 
exception.”  Besides  the course  and telos of integration  is  a matter of a political  choice: 
Constitutionalism beyond the state where every Member State lives under a different degree 
of progress  or one  where different levels  of government operate together in a system of 
multilevel constitutionalism.
37  Sch6r6,  J.,  “On  the  Dual  Structure  Proposed  by  the  Franco-German  Axis:  Institutional  Chalk  and 
Cheese?” (March 2003) TUFTS University, USA
38 The concept of demos has been extensively analysed by J.H.H. Weiler, See Weiler, “Does Europe Need a 
Constitution? Demos Telos and the German Maastricht Decision” (1995) 1  European Law Journal 219-258
265A Federal Union and a Passe ‘Core Europe’
The  Franco-German  Declaration3 9  to  the  Convention,  prior  to  the  latter’s 
presentation  of  the  full  draft  Constitutional  Treaty  is  symbolic  of  a  common  position 
reached  between  France  and  Germany  on  strengthening  the  European  Parliament  and 
Commission.  It  displays  an  attempt  to  marry  the  federalist  and  intergovernmental 
approaches as to the future institutional structure of the EU. This reveals that the process that 
was  originally  set  up  by  the  Convention  in  managing  the  typical  diversity  between  the 
intergovernmental  and  supranational  method  has  gradually  led  to  shifts  in  opinions  and 
ultimately to joint standpoints. France, which initially expressed a traditional reluctance over 
the powers handed over to the Commission, arrived at a settlement with Germany for the 
election of a President of the Commission by the Parliament. On the other hand Germany, 
which  from  Fischer’s  words  seemed  for  sometime  to  have  departed  from  the  idea  of 
bestowing powers on the Commission also reconsidered its thesis. The arrival of the debate 
on  ‘competences’  at the Convention’s table therefore assisted considerably in producing a 
consensus between Member States  as regards the leadership issue  in  a constitutionalised 
Europe that inter alia is required to cope with the institutional makeup of the EU and the 
balance of power amongst its Institutions.
In such a climate,  the fact that the European Council has become an integral and 
increasingly competent part of the Union, creating therefore more choices as to the future 
governance of the EU has generated several dilemmas.  Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s plan for 
establishing  a full-time  chairman  within  the European  Council  has  gone  in  the  opposite
39 “Joint declaration by Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, and Gerhard Schroder, Chancellor of the 
Federal Republic of Germany” (22.01.2003) Fortieth Anniversary of the Elysie Treaty, Paris,  available at 
http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/
266direction from the wishes of the Member States, particularly Britain, France and Spain, and 
to  a  lesser  degree  Germany  and  Italy,  for  a presidency  that  would  concentrate  the  EU 
dynamic in the hands of the national governments. This has generated fear in relation to the 
way powers would be distributed vertically within the constitutionalised Union. Taking this 
into consideration, the European Convention established eleven working groups to deal with 
the main issues concerning the future of the Union. The Groups prepared recommendations 
that were finally included in the Convention’s draft proposal for a future EU Constitutional 
Treaty presented to the EU leaders at the Thessaloniki European Council (June, 20 2003).
In  its  final  report to the Convention,  the Working Group V  on  “Complementary 
Competences”40 emphasised that “the reference to ‘an ever closer Union’ in TEU Article 1  
should  be  rephrased  or  clarified  to  avoid  giving  the  impression  that  further  transfer  of 
competence  to  the  Union  is  in  itself an  aim  and  objective  of the  Union”.  This is partly 
reflected in the Convention’ Praesidium decision to later remove the word ‘federal’ from its Draft 
possibly fearing that the term implied an indirect transference of national sovereign powers over to 
the  Union41.  Yet,  although  optimistic  at  first  glance,  the  replacement  of  ‘federal’  by  the 
‘Community Way’42 or  ‘Community basis’4 3  has a symbolic or cosmetic rather than an actual 
effect.  Hence  although the term  ‘federal’  was removed to make the Convention’s Constitutional
40  Chairman  of  Working  Group  V,  “Complementary  Competences”,  Final  Report,  4.11.2002,  [CONV 
375/1/02], Brussels. See more about the Convention and its Working Groups in Chapter 2.
41 The word ‘federal’  occurred in the first of the 16 articles. Article 1  (1) stated: “Reflecting the will of the 
peoples of and the states of Europe to build a common future, this constitution establishes a Union...within 
which the policies of the Member States shall be co-ordinated and which shall administer certain common 
competences  on  a  federal  basis.”  The  British  argument  was  simply  that  the  federal  wording  seemed  to 
favour the  emergence from the EU of a super-state with  the  authority to  over-rule  national  policies  and 
laws. Proposals for amendments were widespread within the Convention. See “Reactions to draft Articles 1 
to  16  of the Constitutional  Treaty -  Analysis”  (26.02.2003)  CONV 574/1/03 REV1;  “Reactions  to  draft 
Articles  1  to  16 of the Constitutional Treaty -  Summary sheets”  (21/02/2003) CONV 574/03,  “Summary 
report of the additional plenary session, March 26, 2003” (08.04.2003) CONV 674/03
42 [CONV 850/03]
43 As it stands in the latest version of the EU Constitutional Treaty [CIG 87/2/04].
267Treaty more appealing to Britons44 and other Euro-sceptics, still - although indirectly - it’s content 
may point towards a fairly centralised Union despite the absence of the ‘federal’ label. Article 1-1 of 
the draft Constitution sets the tone:
Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, 
this Constitution establishes the European Union, on which the Member States 
confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.
The Union  shall  coordinate the policies  by  which  the  Member States  aim to 
achieve  these  objectives,  and  shall  exercise  on  a  Community  basis  the 
competences they confer on it.
Here  the  word  ‘Community’  replaced  the  original  ‘federal’  to  assuage  British 
concerns. But a commitment to the goal of an ‘ever-closer union’ is still within the spirit of 
the EU Constitutional Treaty and will very much determine the way powers are allocated 
vertically between the EU and the Member States. So even if the term ‘federal state’ seems 
awkward due to the well-known lack of a participatory democratic  system in Europe, by 
reason of its nature the Union satisfies a number of other requirements for the creation of a 
state-like entity recognised by international law. It has a citizenship to complement that of 
nationality; a clearly defined external frontier accompanied by free movement of its citizens 
inside its borders and a common system of visa control on foreign nationals who cross them. 
Institutionally although different from the nation state, the Union still has an executive in the 
face of the Commission; a legislature shared by the Council of Ministers in conjunction with 
the European Parliament and an expanding judicial system with the Court of Justice acting
44 See Guardian Unlimited,  ‘Britain and the EU’, “Do we Want to be in or out: The British press divides 
along predictable lines”, (Wednesday May 28, 2003)
Available at: http://politics. guardian.co.uk/eu/comment/0.9236.965381.00.html
268as supreme court complemented by the lower Court of First Instance and other evolving 
judicial bodies.
But still, neither directly, through the election of a president, nor indirectly through 
the European Parliament has the citizen the impression that is involved in deciding upon a 
European system of governance proximate to his/her appreciation. In the German Maastricht 
Decision, otherwise known as Brunner45, the individual right of Art. 38(1) Basic Law was 
relatively the starting point that led to a deeper reflection on the democratic basis of the 
Eu46  The BVerfG came to the conclusion that the principle of democracy that expresses the 
sovereignty  of  the  people  implies  the  necessity  of  direct  democratic  legitimation  of 
institutions exercising governmental power47. This finding applies, according to the Court, 
also to the EU.  So  the Community must not exceed its competences  only derived from 
transfer-acts of national directly democratically legitimated parliaments.  In so far the EU 
does  not  have  a  so-called  Kompetenz-Kompetenz  (competence  to  enlarge  its  own 
competences)48; it is not able to achieve autonomously more powers than granted by third 
parties. This exactly is the reason, why a ‘Federal State of Europe’ does not exist. A federal 
state is sovereign and thus may exceed its powers on its own.4 9 This is not the case with the 
Community that draws its authority from the Member States that compose it.
45 [1994]  1 CMLR 57
46 Herdegen, M.,  “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints for an  ‘Ever 
Closer  Union’”,  (1994)  31  Common  Market  Law  Review  235,  at  238;  Everling,  U.,  “The  Maastricht 
Judgement of the German Constitutional Court and its Significance for the Development of the European 
Union”, (1994)  14 Yearbook of European Law 1, at 5.
47 BVerfG E 89, 155 (184).
48 Further discussed in the Chapter examining the balance of competences between the EC and the Member 
States.
49 Everling, U., “The Maastricht Judgement of the German Constitutional Court and its Significance for the 
Development of the European Union”, (1994) 14 Yearbook of European Law 1, 6.
269Thus,  despite  its  innovation,  Minister  Fischer’s  speech  is  neither  capable  of 
changing the way we see the European political finality nor distorting the “prevailing mood 
in European integration” that Cruz evokes.5 0  Certain matters are left open ended. As already 
mentioned, there is ambiguity in terms of the appropriate timing for the introduction of the 
required political  change that he proposes.  This reduces his proposals to an  inspirational 
point  of discussion,  rather  than  a  serious  model  on  which  to  base  EU  ground reforms. 
Perhaps the Minister intended it to be this way. At a speech given at London on January 
2001 on the occasion of the presentation of the German-British 2000 Award, having stated 
his beliefs in a milder -  less enthusiastic and more realistic tone -  Fischer attempted to go 
back and chase away the demons of his earlier speech at Berlin concluding:
“...let me repeat: my Humboldt University speech was not a call for a European 
superstate.  The EU is  an  entity  sui  generis.  The  European  nation  states  will 
continue  to  exist  within  the  Union.  But  only  if  we  succeed  in  building  an 
economically and politically integrated Europe with reformed institutions, with 
the  means  to  act,  a  Europe  that  its  citizens  can  understand  and  that  enjoys 
democratic  legitimacy  in  their eyes,  will  this European  project,  this  enlarged 
Europe of 27  or more Member States, have a real future.  And only then will 
Europe  be  able,  both  on  our continent and in the  world at  large,  to play the 
important  role  that  we  all  want  it  to  play  in  building  freedom,  peace  and 
prosperity in the 21 st century.”51
Once  again  the  Minister  avoided  stating  when  this  democratically  legitimate, 
economically and politically integrated Europe will emerge, although this time he seemed to 
suggest that any politico-institutional change should occur prior to enlargement as opposed
50 Cruz,  “Whither Europe and When:  Citizen Fischer and the European Federation” (2000) 7/00 Harvard 
Jean Monnet Working Papers.
51  Fischer, J.,  “Speech on the occasion of the presentation of the German-British 2000 Award - London” 
(24.01.2001).
270to  his  ‘ten  year’  timeframe  specified  back  at  the  Humboldt  speech.  One  can  feel  his 
anticipation that the Union should have made the most of this pre-enlargement phase by 
preparing its institutional framework for a larger Community and at the same time carrying 
out its constitutionalisation52. However exciting this may sound, for it implies an updating of 
the conditionality of the  accession criteria5 3   for the future  applicants to include all those 
adjustments that would make candidates fit to enter into a newly constitutionalised Union, 
the  present  context  of enlargement  and  constitutionalisation  contradicts  such  a  step.  As 
Fischer himself illustrated in reference to the EU Constitutional Treaty in January 2004 after 
meeting Poland’s Foreign Minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, “it will not get easier, the quicker 
it goes, the better for Europe.”5 4
Conclusion
In case the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty fails, the example of a core 
Europe as an alternative does not seem to resolve any of the imminent challenges faced by 
the Union: it neither improves the pre-accession strategy of European Enlargement, nor does 
it smooth the process of reviving talks and agreeing upon the EU Constitutional Treaty at a 
later stage.  It only confirms the existence of varying speeds of European integration. The 
likelihood is that there will be more than one ‘cores’ operating simultaneously. This matches 
Fischer’s most recent remark in an interview with Berliner Zeitung in February 28, 2004 that
52 Smith, J., “Enlarging the EU” (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review; Zielonka, 
J.  “How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol 39, No 3,(2001) pp. 507-536.
53 Konstadinides, T., “The Element of Conditionality in the Pre-Accession Strategy of the East and Central 
East European Enlargement”, (May 2004) Common Law Review, Common Law Society, Prague
54  Mahony,  H.  “Warsaw  and  Berlin  Continue  to  Disagree”  (15.01.2004)  EU  Observer 
(www.euobserver.com)
271the idea of a  ‘core Europe’ is  ‘passe’55. There, Fischer argues that an ‘avant-garde’ could 
exist  in  certain  areas  but  only  ‘within  the  framework  of  the  Constitution’.  Since  its 
presentation,  the  ‘Humboldt’  optimistic  vision  of  a  constitutional  and  institutional 
changeover  within  the  EU  constantly raises  questions  about  the  realism  of the  type  of 
integration that the Minister had in mind. Thus, it is not accidental that Fischer’s speech has 
continued to be used as a point of reference on the political future of Europe almost five 
years after it was first delivered
55 Available at http://www. germanv-info.org/relaunch/politics/eu/eu  archives.html
272CONCLUSION
The aim of the present thesis has been to capture the character, dynamic, and the 
shortcomings of the current system of competences within the EC Treaty and the reforms 
proposed by the EU Constitutional Treaty for a clearer delimitation of competences. This 
was  achieved  through  an  examination  of  the  nature  and  development  of  Community 
competences within the European legal order and the efforts made through the interesting 
debate between the European Court of Justice and the national courts about the scope of the 
Treaty (Tobacco Advertising Case1) and the so-called  ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ (or capacity 
to determine the limits of the powers conferred on the EC, as discussed in Brunner2). Both 
prove that the allocation of competences in the Community represents a unique example of 
distribution  of  competence  intended  for  a  multilevel  system  that  although  it  does  not 
resemble national constitutional democracies, is characterised by pluralism.
The  present  work  used  a  particular  conception  of  the  term  ‘Community 
competences’,  according  to  their  subject  or  objective.  Subject-related  competences  are 
linked  to  the  conduct  of  Community  policies  while  objective-related  competences  are 
associated  with the achievement of the Community’s internal  market goals.  Through the 
analysis of the two types of competence and their subcategories, this thesis has endeavoured 
to point out the importance of having a clearer categorisation without however threatening 
the  flexibility  of the  current  system.  The conclusion  to  be  drawn  is that  any  attempt to 
establish  a clear separation of powers between the Community and the Member States in 
relation to the various levels of competence needs to take into account the existence of the
1  Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council  (Tobacco Advertising Directive) [2000] ECR1-8419
2 Brunner (German Maastricht Decision) [1994]  1 CMLR 57, 6 89 BVerfGE 155,
273cooperative  system  of power-separation  that  exists  in  the  Community.  This  cooperative 
system exists both horizontally (within the Institutions themselves) and vertically (between 
the Community and the Member States). This makes problematic the drawing of clear-cut 
lines  of responsibility  along  with  a strict  allocation  of internal  competence between  the 
Community vis-a-vis the Member States.
This thesis proposes that in a system that is unable to absorb a formal catalogue of 
competences, it is only possible to identify several generic types of Community competence 
or general principles  governing the relationship with  domestic regulatory power.  This is 
exactly  what  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  did.  The  Convention  adopted  a  tidying  up 
exercise as regards the categorisation of the previously scattered Community competences 
within the EC Treaties. It did not create new competences out of the blue. Thus, according 
to the author, the most innovative adjustment introduced by the EU Constitutional Treaty 
merely  lie  in  the  classification  /  codification  of  the  Union’s  exclusive,  shared  and 
complementary competence and the sectors falling into each category, not previously found 
in the EC Treaties. Yet the author contends: Does the text of the EU Constitutional Treaty 
answer the challenging academic question of ‘creeping competence’? Does it even clarify 
the post-Brunner concerns  about the extent of the Union’s  competence?  This thesis has 
contended  that  despite  the  Community’s  creeping  attempts,  manifested  in  the  Tobacco 
Advertising  Case,  there  are  limits  to  Community  competence  and  the Court is  ready to 
uphold those limits. The use of Articles 95 and 308 EC in a way that does not undermine the 
fundamental  principles  of attributed powers  and subsidiarity,  enshrined in  Article  5  EC, 
constitutes the most effective barrier to the creeping expansion of Community competences.
However, The Court has restricted the conditions under which the EC Institutions might rely
274upon Article 95 EC, especially as a way of overcoming restrictions on EC competence in 
fields other than  the internal market.  However, Article 1-18  (1) of the EU Constitutional 
Treaty extends the flexibility clause of Article 308 EC to the former second and third pillars. 
Does this imply that Union’s competence will thus increase to all the policies within Part HI 
of the new Treaty, which includes the CFSP and police and criminal law?
The author argues that the introduction of new legal bases along with the unanimity 
requirement in the EU Constitutional Treaty strengthens the possibility of recourse to Article 
1-18 but does not reduce the functionality of this broad competence. Thus the Convention 
appears to have maintained the Union’s capacity to respond to new demands as a problem- 
solver. However, the lack of protection against a wide use of Article 1-18 would contradict 
the early Community concerns about the phenomenon of ‘competence creep’ that damages 
the relations  between  the  Union  and the Member  States.  Such  an  approach  would  also 
undermine the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Maastricht decision that the Union’s Kompetenz- 
Kompetenz  contains  the  potential  for review  of Union  acts by national  courts  when  the 
Union’s powers extend beyond the scope of the act by which Member States acceded to the 
Union.  Emphasis is therefore placed on the importance of an extra safeguard against the 
Union’s attempts at creeping competence. A legislative procedure involving Parliamentary 
approval, next to the existing requirement of unanimity against excessive resort to Article I-
18 could be desirable. Yet, in the absence of a clear division of competences between the 
Community and the Member States, the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5 EC, 
shall  be  the  prime  constitutional  safeguard  to  national  autonomy  against  excessive 
Community centralisation.  However one  should be cautious  about its  extended  use as  it 
could lead to a fragmentation of the integration momentum of the Union.
275The  thesis  argues  that  by  its  very  nature  the  principle  of subsidiarity  is  highly 
political and difficult to put into operation. However, it is claimed that a strict political use 
of the principle of subsidiarity lacking a legal approach is not sufficient to make it effective. 
The practical function and observance of the principle of subsidiarity in a constitutionalised 
Union necessitates the existence of multiple legal / procedural checks to EC legislation. At 
present, subsidiarity as a procedural question has been left to the Court. Yet, the Court only 
monitors EC legislation ex post.  Due to its hesitancy towards  subsidiarity pleadings, the 
Court has  never annulled a measure on  the basis of violation of the principle.  Thus,  the
author emphasises the importance of effective subsidiarity checks not only ex post but also 
ex ante, when EC legislation is prepared as a proposal by the Commission. In the current 
debate  about  the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty,  the  procedural  and  monitoring  aspects  of 
subsidiarity are interconnected. This reflects the realisation of the Convention on the Future 
of Europe  that  any  legal  application  and  monitoring  of  subsidiarity  might  be  easier  to 
concentrate upon its procedural aspects rather than trying to utilise it as a substantive test. 
Particularly, the Protocol of the EU Constitutional Treaty, regarding the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity, assigns a unique role to the national parliaments in relation to the 
evaluation of the level to which the principle is complied with (early warning system). This 
role  assigned  to  national  legislatures  is  vital  to  the  general  application  of  material 
subsidiarity and finally to the policing of the flexibility provision of Article 308 EC (Article 
1-18 in the EU Constitutional Treaty). However, the author contends that European leaders 
have over-estimated what the early warning system can do for the healthy delimitation of 
competences.  Once  a  national  parliament  has  raised  a  subsidiarity  ‘red  flag’,  the 
Commission  would  be  required  to justify  it.  Once  the  Commission  has  responded,  the
276proposal shall continue through the legislative process unless the Commission withdraws it. 
Hence, national parliaments are not to become co-legislators under the new system. Instead 
their role would remain “essentially advisory”.
The  vision  of  the  Union,  as  a  confederation  of  states,  for  a  functional  and 
participative  democracy through  a new path  of constitutional reform requires  an explicit 
authorisation to all  actors in civil  society to contribute to the development of EU policy. 
This is the horizontal dimension of subsidiarity: recognising that different competences in 
society are exercised not only by different levels of government (vertical subsidiarity) but 
also by different actors. The Laeken Declaration  stated that there is an increasing awareness 
from the side of the European citizen that although the system is muddled up, the Union’s 
interventionist  role  has  expanded  alarmingly.  This  is  visible  especially  in  terms  of the 
vertical distribution of competences in the Community. Apart from the confusing Articles 
94, 95 and 308 EC no other Treaty provisions clarify the principles governing the allocation 
of powers between the Union and its Member States. Hence, the need to weigh legitimacy 
against  efficiency,  amplified  by  auxiliary  concerns  such  as  subsidiarity  is  a  demanding 
process,  especially  given  the  impending  questions  in  terms  of  whether  the  present 
delimitation of competences (as regards the enforcement of subsidiarity and proportionality 
and the instruments available to the EU for exercising its competences) matches the Union’s 
tasks as those are identified in the Convention’s Constitution.
The question remains: How likely is the establishment of the Constitutional Treaty 
in  the  coming  months?  The  reality  behind  signing  and ratifying  the  Constitutional  text 
produced by the European Convention has been contradictory, both in essence and content,
3 Laeken Presidency Conclusions (15.12.2001) SN 273/01
277to the polity. Initially, the veto of Poland backed by Spain on the system of voting weights 
during  the  December  2003  European  Council  in  Brussels  created  problems  to  the 
negotiation  of the  draft  Constitutional  Treaty.4.  Despite  the  later  agreement  on  the  EU 
Constitutional Treaty,  signed by the twenty-five Member States on October 29, 2004, the 
recent outcome of the French and Dutch referendums put the future of the EU Constitutional 
Treaty in uncertainty. Although both incidents created fears as to the momentum of political 
integration in Europe, the French and Dutch ‘no’ is not equivalent to the early Spanish and 
Polish refusals regarding the agreement on the EU Constitutional Treaty. This is because the 
Spanish  and Polish  rejections  were  a political  choice  concerning  a proposed framework 
introduced by the then draft Constitutional Treaty (double majority voting system). On the 
other hand, the French and Dutch rejections came from the electorate and were directed 
against the EU Constitutional Treaty as a whole. Yet, one would raise parallels between the 
early  Polish  -  Spanish  unwillingness  to negotiate  the  Constitutional  Treaty  and  the  late 
French - Dutch choice to vote against it. One would comment that the rejection of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty represents the anticipation of European leaders and their electorate that 
European constitutionalisation would make stronger the Union’s powers  and competence 
over  the  Member  States,  undermining  therefore  the  nature  of the  nation  state  and  the 
national  democracies  that  underpin  them.  The  conclusion  that  can  be  made  from  that 
assumption is that as integration grows so does the game for balance of power between the 
States.
The  sticking points  continuing to hold up the proposed Constitutional  Treaty are 
frozen and reaffirm that the establishment of a ‘balanced Europe’ is more preferable to an
4 This was similar to the atmosphere surrounding the signing of the Treaty of Nice (Nice IGC, 2000), which 
was ratified as late as February 1, 2003.
278organisation with a substandard ‘federal’ appearance. At best, such a decision would assist 
in preserving a typical balance of competences between Member States vis-a-vis the Union. 
Otherwise, this thesis argues, we would have to talk about the inevitability of witnessing the 
formation of a two-speed Europe operating under a unique model of enhanced cooperation. 
Joshka Fischer described in  the aftermath  of Treaty of Nice his vision  of  ‘core Europe’ 
capable of surviving outside the EU altogether with its own institutions5. This is different to 
the cooperative model of enhanced cooperation that operates within the boundaries of the 
Union.  On  the  other  hand,  European  enlargement  will  negatively  contribute  towards 
diminishing the Court’s ability to decide comprehensibly. Schepel argues that it will even be 
“reduced to a deliberative assembly of 20 plus judges under increasing political pressure. 
Both on a practical level of organisation and composition and on a conceptual level -  in 
comes the ‘flexible multilevel constitution’ -  a lot of work awaits.”
In a future Union, which would still receive its competences from its Member States, 
the problem of competences would still relate to the fact that the boundaries, which were 
meant to restrict the areas in which the Union could operate have been pushed beyond their 
limit.  Does  or will  the EU Constitutional Treaty change this?  Under the current rules of 
ratification,  it appears  that even if the Constitutional text is re-negotiated,  if at least one 
Member State fails again to ratify it, the EU Constitutional Treaty will still not enter into 
force. The legal position is that the existing Treaties would still continue to apply, since the 
provisions  of the  EU  Constitutional  Treaty  determine  their  repeal.  Alternatively,  a  new 
negotiation  would  possibly  occur  for  certain  sceptical  Member  States  on  a  mutually 
acceptable solution with certain opt-outs from several provisions of the EU Constitutional
5  Olsen,  “How,  Then,  Does  One Get  There?  An  Institutionalist Response to Herr Fischer's  Vision  of a 
European Federation”, (2002), 00/22 Arena Working PaperTreaty. Otherwise, it is more likely that the current Treaty position will remain. But even 
then, we would still speak of a distribution of competences that constitutes the result of a 
pragmatic political compromise rather than an authentic effort to allocate competences on a 
rational basis between the main actors of European Constitutionalism.
Given the current efforts of the EU to constitutionalise the supranational polity, two 
different  conclusions  can  be  sketched  out.  A  pessimistic  assumption  that  European 
constitutionalisation gestures toward the gradual end of concepts attached to sovereignty and 
territoriality and by extension to the idea behind the nation state where the great majority of 
citizens  are conscious  of a common identity.  On  the other hand  an optimistic  and more 
realistic conclusion  may  imply that the inclusion  of unwritten  values  within  a European 
Constitution aims to stipulate the balance between the vertical and horizontal levels, the EU 
decision-makers and the nation states along with their peripheries. The second conclusion 
dismisses  any  doomsday  about  the  future  of  Europe,  especially  as  the  constitutional 
defences and checks inherent in the EC Treaty are included in the EU Constitutional Treaty 
ensuring that the EU will not go beyond its mandate of competences as these have been 
attributed by the Constitutional text.
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